Section Two   STRATEGIC GOAL TWO:
Enforce Federal Criminal Laws


As a result of the provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the law enforcement functions of the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms transferred to Department of Justice's (DOJ). The mission of the renamed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) is to deter and investigate violations of law relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives and arson; areas that could be monitored under Strategic Goal Two. Although ATF is not yet reflected in the Department's Strategic Plan, a separate section (Appendix A) addresses the ATF FY 2003 and FY 2004 performance plan and related resources (budget and personnel).

At the heart of DOJ's mission is our responsibility to enforce the Nation's federal laws through the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses. The array of areas for which we are responsible are diverse and challenging, including: terrorism, drug related crime, violent crimes, firearms offenses, white-collar crime, child exploitation, cybercrime, and public corruption.

Adding to this challenge is the complexity of the American criminal justice system. The law enforcement responsibility in the United States is shared and addressed cooperatively among DOJ organizations, and other federal, tribal, state, and local agencies. Several DOJ component organizations share primary responsibility for enforcing the Nation's criminal laws. In addition, the increased globalization of crime requires the Department to strengthen cooperation with international law enforcement organizations.

In addition, the Antitrust (ATR), Civil (CIV), Civil Rights (CRT), Environment and Natural Resources (ENRD) and Tax (TAX) Divisions perform critical and specialized functions in prosecuting violators of the Nation's antitrust, consumer, civil rights, environmental, wildlife, and tax laws. The priority performance goals of these divisions are split between Strategic Goals Two and Four, as appropriate.

Lastly, while we continue to focus on violent crime, white-collar crime, and illegal drugs, we must confront the sophistication of criminals that will challenge our ability to prevent and solve crimes, and bring criminals to justice. We will work aggressively to combat gun crimes. We will also face the complexities of fighting cybercrime and international crimes. We will confront these issues recognizing that the Department is a crime-fighting partner with other federal, state, tribal, and local agencies working strategically to define our roles and coordinate our efforts to ensure that our scarce resources provide maximum impact in our crime-fighting efforts.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.1: VIOLENT CRIME
Reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent crime, especially as it stems from illegal use of guns or from organized criminal enterprises.

DOJ's principal law enforcement investigative agencies will counter violent crime by emphasizing targeted enforcement strategies. The ultimate goal of the Department's organized crime program is to dismantle the most significant organized crime enterprises through investigation and prosecution. Our principal enforcement efforts are currently directed against: (1) the 22 active La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and native Italian organized crime families operating in the United States; (2) the 21 most significant Russian/Eastern European/Eurasian criminal enterprises (more commonly referred to as the Russian Organized Crime) operating in the United States and elsewhere; and (3) approximately 25 Asian organized crime groups operating in the United States, including Chinese Triads, criminally influenced Tongs and various gangs. The transnational activities of these groups will also be addressed to the extent that such activities impact the United States. A related goal is to undercut the strong financial underpinnings of these large criminal enterprises by placing renewed emphasis on efforts to prevent the laundering of their illegal proceeds and to forfeit their assets, thereby seeking to permanently cripple their operations.

Continued commitment of resources for international liaison and enforcement efforts will help counter the foreign-based aspect of emerging threats such as Russian, Eastern European, Asian, Italian, and other organized crime groups. The increasing international nexus of this new breed of criminal organization means that the corruption of key officials in major industries, and the operation of large-scale money laundering schemes, through bank stock exchanges and commodities markets, can flourish without regard to national boundaries.

Another growing threat is posed by emerging organized crime enterprises, or so-called "non-traditional" crime organizations, that have rapidly expanding membership, are flourishing in the drug underworld, and often employ violent means to establish themselves. The FBI and the DEA have adopted new technologies to improve analytical support for investigations and have strengthened their intelligence base about these non-traditional groups and their leadership in order to prevent them from gaining a stronger foothold.

Efforts to curtail gang-related violence and the illegal use of firearms are other major features of this plan. In response to a surge in juvenile and gang-related violent crime between 1985 and 1995, the FBI developed its National Gang Strategy. As part of this gang strategy, federal law enforcement agents continue to form multi-agency task forces that include state and local police officers. Collectively, these teams are able to achieve results, which no agency could do on its own.

Similarly, the DEA will deploy its Mobile Enforcement Teams (MET) to help meet emerging drug crises in particular localities and in collaboration with the National Crime Prevention Council and the Bureau of Justice Assistance. DEA will continue to provide anti-drug training to community leaders following their MET deployment where appropriate. The training is a grass-roots effort to help communities plan, organize, implement and evaluate a prevention program. In addition, the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) will update its National Street Gang Survey Report, a key reference for enforcement agencies. At the district and headquarters levels, the EOUSA and CRM play a leadership role in developing and refining the DOJ's violent crime reduction strategies and increasing cooperation between state, local, and federal enforcement authorities.

Project Safe Neighborhoods is a comprehensive national strategy that has created local partnerships to effectively enforce existing gun laws. The strategy promotes cooperation to determine where gun criminals can be most effectively prosecuted and punished. Project Safe Neighborhoods gives each federal district the flexibility it needs to focus on individual challenges that a specific community faces.

Another on-going initiative will address the rising incidence of crimes against children, including abduction cases, sexual exploitation offenses, and the production of child pornography. DOJ' s multi-agency, multi-disciplinary teams address problems, including the growing use of the Internet and commercial on-line subscription services, to pursue related crimes.

Coordinating the Department's law enforcement activities ensure that the objectives of the Department's investigative agencies are fully coordinated and complementary, that intelligence is shared, and that administrative practices are consistent. The Department will develop and implement, under the guidance of each U.S. Attorney, a District Enforcement Strategy that targets both national and local priorities and identifies how all parts of the system can interact more effectively to meet the needs of justice. In addition, the Department will identify and coordinate cases in which a multi-district prosecution effort is needed.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.2: DRUGS
Reduce the threat, trafficking, and related violence of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations

America faces many challenges due to the trafficking of illegal drugs. Illegal drug trafficking and use weakens our society; violent drug trafficking groups erode the quality of life in our communities; and drug trafficking provides some terrorist groups a steady source of income to finance their operations. The ultimate goal of law enforcement efforts in this area is to reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the U.S.

This Performance Plan supports the President's Anti-Drug Abuse Policy and is consistent with the general guidance of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the Department's Drug Control Strategic Plan. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program is the vehicle for implementing the Attorney's General's drug strategy to reduce the drug supply available within the United States. These plans articulate that our primary investigative and prosecutorial objective is to curtail the availability of illegal drugs through the disruption and dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations, as well as forfeiting illegal proceeds and their economic foundations at the national and international levels.

DOJ will strengthen its efforts to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations by continuing to increase the analytical capacity of each investigative agency and the Special Operations Division (SOD). The Department, working with ONDCP and the Intelligence Community, will continue to actively support the work of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Intelligence Center (FinCen).

The Department will strengthen its programs to target drug smuggling organizations that traffic across the Southern borders, and from Europe and Asia. Since September 11, 2001, the Department has strengthened its programs focus on targeting drug organizations using the Northern border as their transit zone for drugs and drug proceeds. All of these programs are intended to link federal, state and local investigations domestically and to facilitate multilateral enforcement efforts abroad.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.3: ESPIONAGE
Combat espionage against the United States by strengthening counterintelligence capabilities

To combat foreign intelligence operations against U.S. interests, DOJ, through the FBI, will emphasize effective intelligence gathering and analytical capability to evaluate foreign intelligence threats. The FBI's counterintelligence program conducts, manages, and supports investigations which collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence in order to identify and neutralize the intelligence activities of foreign powers and their agents that adversely affect U.S. national security or have a substantial economic impact on the nation.

The 1990's saw great changes in the global intelligence environment, patterned after the changes in the geopolitical environment. There has been an increase in the number of intelligence actors, both at the state and individual levels. To achieve their goals, foreign countries are engaged in long-term efforts designed to gain critical intelligence relating to sensitive U.S. information. Our adversaries will continuously strive to impede investigative operations, obtain sensitive information, initiate and implement reprisal actions against DOJ personnel or facilities, and take illegal advantage of any opportunity presented to them.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.4: WHITE COLLAR CRIME
Combat white collar and economic crime, especially cybercrime

DOJ's plan for reducing white collar crime is based on the premise that a strong deterrent capability is required to prevent criminals from defrauding and thus weakening the Nation's industries and institutions. In monetary terms, the annual loss to American citizens and businesses is conservatively estimated in the billions of dollars.

The criminal threat originates from several sources and may have a variety of purposes and targets including: the financial markets; the health care field; public officials open to corruption; communications facilities; critical infrastructure; computers storing sensitive proprietary, financial and personal data; valuable intellectual properties; international commerce; and telemarketing, insurance, commodities, retirement system, and other businesses susceptible to fraud.

The Department will devote considerable resources to countering white collar crime matters involving corporate fraud. The President has designated the Deputy Attorney General to lead the inter-agency Corporate Fraud Task Force in order to ensure that this top priority receives the full attention of a vested federal law enforcement community. The Department will also work against health care fraud; financial institution fraud, telemarketing, Internet, and other mass-marketing fraud; public corruption and government fraud; high technology crime; computer crime and the theft of intellectual property; and international price fixing cartels.

The Department also addresses environmental and wildlife crime issues focusing on the endangerment of the environment and public health, fraud in the environmental testing industry, smuggling and poaching of protected species, exploitation and abuse of marine resources through illegal commercial fishing, and related criminal activity.

Violations of the Internal Revenue Code drain the federal fisc and undermine public trust in the voluntary tax system. The Tax Division utilizes criminal prosecutions to ensure that the Nation's internal revenue laws are fairly and uniformly applied and the public complies with the Nation's tax laws. In this way our accomplishments contribute significantly and directly to efforts of the Administration and Congress to protect the federal fisc from intentional false tax returns and evasion schemes. For all stages of case investigation, review, litigation and appeals the Tax Division's attorneys are guided by the principles of fair and uniform treatment for all categories of taxpayers.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.5: CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN AND THE EXPLOITABLE
Combat crimes against children and other vulnerable victims of violence and exploitation

The Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division works closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Labor, the Criminal Division, the U.S. Attorneys Offices, and Non-Government Organizations to identify victims, many of who are women and children of illegal trafficking. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, enacted into law in 2000, expanded the scope of federal enforcement authority over slavery offenses.

PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
  Was the Target Achieved FY 2002 Performance
Strategic Objective Performance Measure/Indicator Yes No N/A Target Actual Performance Improvement From FY 2001
2.1 Dismantled Asian Criminal Enterprises   x   9 7 Reallocation of resources to CT mission
2.1 Dismantled Eurasian Criminal Enterprises   x   8 0 Reallocation of resources to CT mission
2.1 # Dismantled of the 30 Targeted Gangs Identified as Most Dangerous x     3 6  
2.1 DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Persons with Criminal Records Prevented from Purchasing Firearms     x N/A 65,525  
2.1 NEW MEASURE: Reduction in Targeted Local Fun-related Crime     x New for 2002 N/A  
2.1 DISCONTINUED MEASURE: New Treaties with Other Countries - Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties x     4 5  
2.1 DISCONTINUED MEASURE: New Treaties with Other Countries - Extradition Treaties   x   4 2  
2.1 NEW MEASURE: Fugitives Surrendered - To the U.S.     x New for 2002 269  
2.1 NEW MEASURE: Fugitives Surrendered - From the U.S.       New for 2002 102  
2.2 DOJ's Reduction in Supply of Drugs Available for Consumption Within the U.S. x     Baseline Baseline Est.  
2.2 Dismantled / Disrupted Priority Drug Trafficking Organizations (PDTO's) Operating Within the U.S. - PDTOs Targeted x     588 764  
2.2 Dismantled / Disrupted Priority Drug Trafficking Organizations (PDTO's) Operating Within the U.S. - PDTOs Disrupted / Dismantled x     35 190  
2.2 NEW MEASURE: Dismantled Priority Drug Trafficking Organizations (U.S. and Foreign) - CPOT Linked     x New for 2002 16  
2.2 NEW MEASURE: Dismantled Priority Drug Trafficking Organizations (U.S. and Foreign) - Non CPOT     x New for 2002 92  
2.2 Dismantled Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO's) - DTOs Identified x     250 253 DTOs linked to NPTs took priority over non-linked organizations
2.2 Dismantled Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO's) - DTOs Dismantled linked to NPT's (and CPOT organizations) x     13 14
2.2 Dismantled Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO's) - Other DTOs Dismantled   x   160 105
2.3 Foreign Counterintelligence Convictions     x N/A 1  
2.4 Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment Targeted for Fraud (millions) - Diabetic Footwear x     $69.5 $42.2  
2.4 Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment Targeted for Fraud (millions) - Enternal Nutrition x     $456.5 $323.8  
2.4 Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment Targeted for Fraud (millions) - Manual Wheelchairs x     $205.5 $151.9  
2.4 Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment Targeted for Fraud (millions) - Motorized Wheelchairs x     $415.6 $412.9  
2.4 Convictions / Pre-Trial Diversions in White Collar Crime     x N/A 5,799  
2.4 Recoveries, Restitutions & Fines - White Collar Crimes (billions) - Recoveries/Restitutions     x N/A $9.80  
2.4 Recoveries, Restitutions & Fines - White Collar Crimes (billions) - Fines     x N/A $0.50  
2.4 Convictions / Pre-Trial Diversions in Public Corruption     x N/A 631  
2.4 Recoveries, Restitutions & fines - Public Corruption (billions) - Recoveries/Restitutions     x N/A $28  
2.4 Recoveries, Restitutions & fines - Public Corruption (billions) - Fines     x N/A $25  
2.4 High Technology Crime (Fraud) Ciminal Case Success Rate x     80% 100%  
2.4 Success Rate for Antitrust Ciminal Cases x     90% 91%  
2.4 Savings to U.S. Consumers (millions)     x N/A $45  
2.4 % of Criminal Environmental and Wildlife Cases Successfully Litigated x     80% 88%  
2.4 $ Awarded in Criminal Envrionmental and Wildlife Cases (millions)     x N/A $26  
2.4 DISCONTINUED MEASURE: # of Request for Litigation Honored, Tax Division   x   300 269/205 Reporting methodology revised
2.5 Convictions / Pre-Trial Diversions for Crimes Against Children Via Computer Usage     x N/A 646  
2.5 Number of Missing Children Located     x N/A 106  
2.5 Victims Protected from Involuntary Servitude and Human Trafficking x     43 54  

 

RESOURCES
Section Appropriation FY 2002 FTE FY 2002 Actual $
(millions)
FY 2003 FTE FY 2003 Request $
(millions)
FY 2004 FTE FY 2004 Request $
(millions)
2.1 Criminal Division 174 19 190 20 185 21
2.1 FBI 8,259 1,155 10,089 1,518 10,624 1,624
2.1 Interpol 66 8 64 9 64 11
2.1 U.S. Attorneys 1661 219 1720 228 1751 238
Subtotal 2.1 10,160 $1,401 12,063 $1,775 12,624 $1,894
2.2 Asset Forfeiture Fund (Current Authority) -- 18 -- 23 -- 23
2.2 Criminal Division 200 32 242 33 344 34
2.2 DEA 7,949 1,518 8,708 1,546 8,965 1,559
2.2 Diversion Control Fee 644 86 722 114 789 119
2.2 FBI 2,569 380 2,743 352 2,759 367
2.2 Interagency Crime/Drug [2,915] 340 [2,952] 362 [3,907] 542
2.2 National Drug Intell. Center 217 42 322 34 322 34
2.2 U.S. Attorneys 2,725 359 2,869 380 2,916 395
Subtotal 2.2 14,304 $2,675 15,606 $2,844 15,995 3,073
2.3 Criminal Division 42 9 66 11 72 14
2.3 General Administration 16 3 18 3 17 3
Subtotal 2.3 58 $12 84 $14 89 $17
2.4 Antitrust Division 270 40 298 48 298 50
2.4 Criminal Division 253 42 273 45 275 47
2.4 Environment & Natural Resources Division 65 7 69 8 73 9
2.4 FBI-Health Care Fraud 522 101 844 114 834 114
2.4 FBI 4,189 550 5,020 758 5,113 803
2.4 Tax Division 156 21 147 20 145 20
2.4 U.S. Attorneys 2,644 348 2,798 370 2,844 384
Subtotal 2.4 8,099 $1,109 9,449 $1,363 9,582 $1,427
2.5 Civil Rights Division 14 2 21 3 21 2
2.5 Criminal Division 24 4 30 5 30 5
2.5 FBI 580 86 736 120 744 122
Subtotal 2.5 618 $92 787 $128 795 $129
TOTAL SG 2 33,239 $5,289 37,989 $6,124 39,085 $6,540

RESOURCE COMPARISON: Strategic Goal to Total DOJ $ and FTE

Resource Comparisond   Resource Comparisond

Required Skills: The Department requires skilled agents, attorneys, analysts, and linguists. Linguists are critical to supporting criminal and national security investigations and intelligence success. This goal requires the skills and abilities of experienced attorneys and law enforcement professionals, DEA relies on experienced prosecutors, agents, investigators, intelligence analysts, and linguists are critical to supporting Major Drug Trafficking Organization investigations. In addition, DEA must have skilled Special Agents, Diversion Investigators, and forensic chemists. The majority of positions require analysis and writing skills.

Successful accomplishment of this goal requires highly skilled agents, analysts and engineers with sophisticated knowledge of computer technology and computer systems, as well as an array of highly complex software and hardware systems. The Antitrust Division requires experienced attorneys, economists, paralegals and support staff. Attorneys experienced in complex, international investigations are particularly valued. The Tax Division requires experienced trial and appellate attorneys and support staff. That Division also requires some specialized experience to include substantive tax issues and tax procedures; search warrants of computer stored financial data; sentencing guidelines in financial crimes; obtaining foreign evidence and information and knowledge about international agreements to achieve international tax compliance, such as tax treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition treaties. The Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD) requires attorneys, particularly litigators experienced in criminal and appellate environmental law, in addition to experienced legal support staff.

Information Technology Utilized: FBI programs in this area are supported by: the Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA), a centralized database which tracks statistical case accomplishment from inception to closure; the Automated Case Support System (ACS), a database which captures all information pertaining to the administration of cases; a separate case management system maintained by the Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI); IIIA, a centralized database that tracks foreign activity; data collected through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); NICS, a national name check system that compares the identity of firearm purchasers against several databases to determine eligibility for firearm purchase; and internal databases that support the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). ENRD relies upon its version of the DOJ Justice Consolidated Office Network (JCON) and its Case Management System. DEA relies on FIREBIRD, the primary office automation infrastructure that supports the full spectrum of DEA's global operations; and MERLIN, an advanced intelligence system designed to support the classified processing needs of Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists operating worldwide.

In addition, DEA has developed the Priority Target Activity and Resource Reporting System (PTARRS), a subordinate automated system specifically to link the resources applied and the results achieved against priority targeted organizations. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) maintains a management information database system that captures information on investigations and prosecutions.

The Antitrust Division relies upon its Matter Tracking System and companion user interfaces; office systems, including networks and infrastructure; litigation support tools and applications, including those for courtroom presentations; and data storage capacity related to all of these technologies. The Tax Division relies upon the Justice Consolidated Office Network system and recently implemented TaxDoc Case Management System. ENRD relies upon the Justice Consolidated Office Network system and its Case Management System.

PROGRAM EVALUATIONS

There are no program evaluations planned for FY 2003.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.1: VIOLENT CRIME
Reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent crime, especially as it stems from illegal use of guns or from organized criminal enterprises

2.1A Dismantle Targeted Organized Crime Groups

Background/Program Objectives:
The FBI, working closely with DOJ prosecutors, will continue its intensive efforts against the threats of active La Cosa Nostra (LCN), native Italian, and emerging Asian and Eurasian criminal enterprises. The Organized Crime Section, through the use of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute, targets the entire entity responsible for the crime problem, the organization. This is accomplished by charging the organization's members as a group with a wide range of crimes committed by its members in violation of local, state, and federal laws.

Organized Criminal Enterprises are structured to ensure that their leadership is far removed from the criminal activity, making it difficult to link overt crimes to the leaders of the organization. Moreover, even if key individuals are removed, the strength of these organizations often allows the enterprise to be sustained. This situation requires the FBI to develop strategies targeted primarily at dismantling the organization, as opposed to merely removing key individuals.

Dismantled Asian Criminal Enterprises [FBI]
Dismantled Asian Criminal Enterprises [FBI]d

Dismantled Eurasian Criminal Enterprises [FBI]
Dismantled Eurasian Criminal Enterprises [FBI]d

Data Collection and Storage: The data source for the dismantlements is the FBI's Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA). The database tracks accomplishments from inception to closure.

Data Validation and Verification: Before data are entered into the system, they are reviewed and approved by an FBI field manager. The data are subsequently verified through the FBI's inspection process. Inspections occur on a 2 to 3 year cycle. Using statistical sampling methods, data are tracked to source documents contained in FBI files.

Data Limitations: None known at this time.

Performance:
Performance Measure: Dismantled Asian Criminal Enterprises (ACE) [FBI] (NOTE: Prior year actuals have been updated to reflect the most current and accurate data available.)
  FY 2002 Target: 9
  FY 2002 Actual: 7
  Discussion: The goal of the FBI's ACE subprogram is to reduce the rapid growth and increasingly adverse impact of domestic and international ACEs on the United States, as well as to prevent ACEs from becoming established and entrenched criminal institutions in the United States.
  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: The events of September 11,2001, had a significant impact on ACE subprogram performance. Field offices with the largest ACE subprogram, such as New York and Washington Field Office, have diverted their resources to focus on the prevention of terrorism. Based on performance in FY 2002, we have revised our FY 2003 target downward. The revised FY 2003 target is dismantling 5 ACEs.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: 5
  Public Benefit: The ACE problem clearly poses a threat to the public safety. Traditional ACEs, such as the Chinese Triads and Japanese Boryokudan, have hundreds of thousands of members worldwide and financial resources equal to some small countries. ACEs continue to pursue profitable criminal activity, including financial crimes, public corruption, alien smuggling and narcotics trafficking. A different but equally alarming threat exists from emerging non-traditional ACEs, such as the violent gangs active in ethnic Asian immigrant communities (i.e., Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, Thai, etc.). In March 2002, FBI agents and detectives from the New York Police Department arrested 5 subjects of a violent ACE in connection with their cross-country armed robbery crime spree. The arrest of these subjects interdicted a planned robbery in the Florida area, which was to occur in the following week. All of the subjects involved in this criminal enterprise originated from the Fujian Province, People's Republic of China. In July 2002, FBI agents made 30 arrests in eight states, culminating a five-year investigation that began when owners of a massage parlor in Blount County, TN tried to bribe public officials, including a judge. The ensuing investigation revealed hundreds of Korean massage parlors in 14 cities throughout the United States engaged in money laundering, prostitution, alien smuggling, and associated criminal activities.
 
Performance Measure: Dismantled Eurasian Criminal Enterprises (ECE) [FBI]
  FY 2002 Target: 8
  FY 2002 Actual: 0
 

Discussion: ECE groups in the United States are engaged in traditional racketeering activity such as extortion, murder, prostitution, and drugs. They are also deeply involved in large scale white collar crimes, such as gasoline excise tax scams, fraudulent insurance claims, stock fraud, and bank fraud.

The mission of the Eurasian Organized Crime Unit is to implement the FBI's Organized Crime (OC) Program Plan to coordinate and support FBI field offices and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to reduce the threat posed by Russian/Eastern European Criminal Enterprises. The fundamental goal of the unit is to assist the field in identifying, disrupting, and dismantling major Russian/Eastern European Criminal Enterprises.

The reallocation of field investigative resources following the events of September 11, 2001, had a significant impact on ECE program performance. Field offices with the largest Eurasian Organized Crime programs, such as New York, Newark, and Miami, were required to shift their focus to the investigative efforts following the terrorist attacks.

  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: Based on performance in FY 2002, we have revised our FY 2003 target downward. The revised FY 2003 target is 6 dismantled ECEs.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: 6
  Public Benefit: ECE groups are becoming increasingly more sophisticated in their domestic U.S. and worldwide criminal operations. This has become especially apparent in medical insurance fraud, international money laundering, and bank fraud activity. The conclusion of a New York Field Office investigation yielded multiple arrests for criminal violations involving health care fraud through the submission of no-fault claims and developed evidence linking the highest-ranking Russian Organized Crime figure to traditional LCN figures. An international investigation has identified Russian Organized Crime leaders who are involved in prostitution, extortion, bank fraud, and insurance fraud with connections to 33 countries and six cities in the U.S.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
The FBI will provide oversight of ACE investigations to ensure that the Enterprise Theory of Investigation and sophisticated investigative techniques are utilized to order to disrupt and dismantle targeted ACEs. Specifically, the FBI will provide appropriate training to field agents working Asian Organized Crime (AOC) cases, monitor and assess investigative progress through regular communications and case meetings among all AOC field staff, initiate undercover operations where necessary, and participate in multi-agency information sharing sessions. In addition, the FBI will apply the Enterprise Theory of Investigation, an integrated investigative approach that utilizes the entire range of sophisticated investigative techniques to dismantle ECEs.

Crosscutting Activities:
The FBI, U.S. Attorneys and the Criminal Division continue to work together in dismantling traditional organized crime groups and to ensure that a new generation of criminal enterprises does not emerge utilizing more advanced technology and new crime schemes. Law enforcement personnel from DOJ and other federal agencies including: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States Customs Service (USCS), combine their expertise and resources with state and local investigators to meet these objectives.

2.1B Reduce the Number of Targeted Gangs

Background/Program Objectives:
The mission of the FBI's Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Program is to reduce the incidence and impact of crimes of violence and of crimes against property that affect individuals, organizations, and communities. The Program's mission involves the proactive identification, disruption, and dismantlement of criminal enterprises, as well as the swift, efficient, and measured response to serious violent criminal acts, which call upon core FBI jurisdiction, responsibilities, and competencies.

Research shows that victimization costs $105 billion annually in property and productivity losses and for medical expenses. This amounts to an annual "crime tax" of roughly $425 for each United States citizen. From the business owner who must pay "protection" money to neighborhood gangs; to families who live like hostages within their own homes, afraid to venture out; to the residents of Indian Country, the harmful impact of violent crime on victims and on society collectively is both psychologically and physically debilitating.

The FBI strives to reduce the level of violent crime by dismantling gangs identified as being the most dangerous. The FBI maintains a "Top 30" list of these gangs each year, selected based upon the extent to which each gang's activity is multi-jurisdictional, violent, has a deleterious effect on the community, and is affiliated with a group identified in the FBI's National Gang Strategy. The FBI's objective is to dismantle 15 gangs that appear on this list over a 5-year period (an average of 3 per year).

# Dismantled of the 30 Targeted Gangs Identified as Most Dangerous [FBI]
# Dismantled of the 30 Targeted Gangs Identified as Most Dangerous 
[FBI]d

Data Collection and Storage: FBI's Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA) tracks statistical accomplishments from inception to closure.

Data Validation and Verification: Before data are entered into the system, they are reviewed and approved by an FBI field manager. They are subsequently verified through FBI's inspection process. Inspections occur on a 2-3 year cycle. Using statistical sampling methods, data in ISRAA is tracked back to source documents contained in FBI files.

Data Limitations: None known at this time.

Performance:
Performance Measure: # Dismantled of the 30 Gangs Targeted by the FBI as the Most Dangerous [FBI] (NOTE: Prior year actuals have been updated to reflect the most current and accurate data available.)
  FY 2002 Target: 3
  FY 2002 Actual: 6
  Discussion: The FBI exceeded the target. Highlights for FY 2002 are included below.
  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: Based on performance in FY 2002, we plan to achieve our original FY 2003 target of 3 dismantlements.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: 3
  Public Benefit: Despite the general decline in violent criminal activity, gangs are still a threat to the nation. The gangs that are emerging are composed of older, more experienced, hardened criminals that engage in a myriad of violent activities as well as thefts of cargo, motor vehicles, and high tech goods. Examples from FY 2002: On September 6, 2001, 29 subjects from the Santana Block Crips (SBC) gang were indicted on charges of drug trafficking, conspiracy, money laundering, and bank fraud. On September 7, 2001, 26 subjects were arrested on these federal charges in a coordinated sweep. Two subjects have passed away since their incarceration and three are being pursued as fugitives. On October 8, 2002, 12 defendants from the SBC pled guilty to charges of drug trafficking, conspiracy, money laundering, and bank fraud in the Central District of California, in Los Angeles, CA. This included a guilty plea of the main target, Frederick Staves. This represents the complete dismantling of the SBC and its existence as a criminal organization. Additionally, the Bridgeport Safe Streets Task Force (BSSTF) investigated the criminal organization headed by Frankie Estrada, aka "Terminator," which was linked to money laundering, weapon violations, armed robberies, and murders in connection with the operation and protection of a continuing criminal enterprise. Twenty?six subjects were indicted and arrested on drug distribution charges. A superseding indictment in June 2001, added additional subjects, money laundering counts, and a forfeiture count seeking $10 million in proceeds from Estradas' heroin sales. The BSSTF seized $750,000 in real estate, cash, cars, and jewelry for forfeiture. Twenty?three subjects were convicted, two were acquitted and one subject is awaiting trial. On March 18, 2002, the New Haven Division, BSSTF, dismantled the organization.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
In FY 2004, DOJ will target and respond to particular local crime problems involving violence and gang activity, including drug-related crimes. To achieve this objective, DOJ will strive to reduce the level of violent crime by taking violent criminals and gangs off our streets through cooperative enforcement efforts with state and local law enforcement programs such as the FBI's Safe Streets Task Forces and DEA's Mobile Enforcement Teams (MET). DOJ will accomplish this objective dismantling 15 of the most dangerous gangs over a 5-year period. Cases will be selected based upon the multi-jurisdictional nature, violent activity, affiliation with a group identified in the National Gang Strategy, and/or degree of deleterious effect on the community. These cases are identified at the beginning of each fiscal year and always consist of the 30 most dangerous gangs fitting the criteria above. As cases and investigations are closed, new gangs meeting the established criteria are rotated in to maintain a base of 30.

Crosscutting Activities:
The FBI, USNCB, DEA, USMS, U.S. Attorneys and the Criminal Division work with state and local law enforcement agencies to reduce the level of violent crime associated with these targeted gangs.

2.1C Implement Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Background/Program Objectives:
The Department of Justice implements gun violence reduction strategies through its Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative. Project Safe Neighborhoods is a comprehensive national strategy that creates multi-agency partnerships to effectively enforce existing gun laws and reduce the incidence of gun violence across the country. The strategy provides more options to prosecutors, allowing them to utilize local, state, and federal laws to ensure that criminals who commit gun crimes face tough sentences. It is also designed to deter gun crime by publicizing these enforcement efforts in the community. Project Safe Neighborhoods gives each federal district the flexibility it needs to focus on individual challenges that its community faces. Currently each district is in the process of gathering and utilizing relevant crime data to develop a strategic plan to target the illegal use, possession, and trafficking of firearms. Each district is tasked with developing meaningful measurements of the impact of its strategy and will report on both the plan and its impact every 6 months.

In addition to the Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative, the Department is tasked with implementing certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act. This act requires Federal Firearm Licensees (FFL) to request background checks on individuals attempting to purchase a firearm, and required the establishment of a National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) that any FFL may contact by telephone, or other electronic means, for information to be supplied immediately on whether the receipt of a firearm by a prospective transferee would violate federal or state law. Although NICS provides a definitive response (i.e., "proceed" or "deny") to 85 percent of inquiries by FFLs within 4 minutes, the Act allows NICS 3 business days to make its determination. If NICS does not contact the FFL before the expiration of the third business day with a definitive response to proceed or deny, the FFL may transfer the firearm without waiting for a response from NICS. If NICS receives information after the 3 day period has expired that would indicate a prohibited person has acquired a firearm from an FFL, NICS immediately refers this information to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for investigation and possible retrieval of the firearm. All NICS denials (i.e., NICS determinations that receipt of a firearm by the potential transferee would violate state or federal law) are referred to ATF for investigation and, where appropriate, are referred to the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for prosecution.

DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Persons with Criminal Records Prevented from Purchasing Firearms [FBI]
DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Persons with Criminal Records Prevented 
from Purchasing Firearms [FBI]d

NEW MEASURE: Reduction in Targeted Gun-related Crime

FY 2004: Establish Baseline

Data Collection and Storage: The NICS Operations Calls Center retains records on the calls made from FFLs directly to the FBI. Data are taken directly from the NICS.

Data Validation and Verification: Analysts advise management of daily volume for NICS checks to ensure validity of system generated data.

Data Limitations: Results of BJS surveys, supported under the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP), indicate that the number of criminal history records which are complete and instantly available through the national system has risen steadily since the late 1980's. However, a significant number of criminal history records are incomplete. Efforts are needed to assist state and local agencies and courts to update and report final dispositions in a more timely manner.

Performance:
Performance Measure: DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Persons with Criminal Records Prevented From Purchasing Firearms [FBI] (NOTE: This measure has been discontinued because the total number of persons denied by NICS per year is a factor of the total number of NICS checks performed per year. Accordingly, the measure does not adequately represent the Department's performance. Also, the prior year performance plan incorrectly reflected a target for FY 2002. This measure is not targeted and the figure previously reported was merely an estimate based on historical data.)
  FY 2002 Target: In accordance with Department guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.
  FY 2002 Actual: 65,525
  Discussion: The number of NICS checks performed per year is driven by market demand for firearms. In addition, denial determinations are dependent upon the accessibility of prohibiting records. Consequently, the Department of Justice does not establish a target for denial determinations either by percentage of total background checks or an actual projected number per year.
  Public Benefit: NICS is an important tool that allows DOJ to prevent firearms from falling into the wrong hands. NICS' goal is to "Reduce criminal activity by providing data on individuals who are prohibited from purchasing a firearm to FFLs in a timely manner." Potential firearms purchasers who have a criminal history or other background rendering them ineligible are blocked at the point of sale. Since its inception in November 1998 through September 2002, NICS has completed 16,344,895 FBI and call center inquiries and blocked 260,272 gun sales to ineligible persons.
 
Performance Measure: NEW MEASURE: Reduction in Targeted Local Gun-related Crime
  Discussion: Efforts are underway to capture the progress of the Department in targeting gun-related criminal activities in specific areas. See the strategies section below.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: Establish baseline.
  Public Benefit: The Department's efforts to design strategies tailored to the challenges of a specific locality, combined with a coordinated multi-agency approach, should yield maximum effectiveness in enforcing existing gun laws thereby reducing the incidence of gun violence across the country. In addition, by publicizing these enforcement efforts in the community, it is anticipated that these strategies will deter gun crime. The ultimate impact will be safer communities and a higher quality of life.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
Project Safe Neighborhoods is a comprehensive and strategic approach to reduce gun violence across the country. A centerpiece of this initiative is to create multi-agency partnerships in every district that will effectively enforce existing gun laws, target violent offenders, and deter gun crime by publicizing these enforcement efforts in the community. In every district, the PSN partners have been given resources to assist them in evaluating the nature of the local gun violence problem and to develop meaningful measurements of the impact of the strategies developed. This accountability component is designed to keep the district-based partnership abreast of changes occurring in the community, to assist them in evaluating their efforts in light of those changes, and to provide them with an opportunity to retool their gun plans to address emerging issues. Many of the PSN strategies developed to date have focused on those communities, towns, and cities that have been most affected by gun violence. Thus, in order to measure our performance at the national level, we will report on the change in gun violence in these targeted areas, rather than entire states or districts.

Crosscutting Activities:
Project Safe Neighborhoods brings together the law enforcement community at the local, state, and federal level. Our United States Attorneys' Offices and our federal investigative agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are coordinating their efforts with local police, sheriffs, and prosecutors. Non-law enforcement agencies as well as community and faith-based organizations are playing active roles in these gun violence reduction partnerships. At the national level, the PSN initiative is coordinated by a team represented by numerous Department components, with input from a number of national organizations.

2.1D Increase Cooperation with Foreign Law Enforcement

Background/Program Objectives:
International law enforcement cooperation is critical to addressing the dramatic growth in the scope of transnational crime such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, fraud, and cybercrime and the immediate threat it poses to the U.S. and the global community. The Department is increasing its emphasis on cooperation with foreign law enforcement and criminal justice officials to make it easier to obtain and provide information and evidence needed to pursue cases against transnational criminals. Working jointly with foreign counterparts is a realistic way to achieve the goals of dismantling international criminal organizations, locating fugitives, and establishing mutually recognized processes for ensuring criminals are brought to justice primarily through the extradition process coordinated and supervised by Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs (OIA).

OIA is the Central Authority for the United States under 40 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) in force and a number of multilateral conventions. As such, OIA makes and receives all MLAT requests and is responsible for the drafting by federal, state, or local prosecutors of requests for bank records or other evidence abroad. OIA insures that the requests are presented to the proper foreign Central Authority, and presses for the execution of the request in a timely manner. OIA also coordinates the execution in the U.S. of requests from foreign countries under the MLATs.

DISCONTINUED MEASURE: New Treaties with Other Countries [CRM]
DISCONTINUED MEASURE: New Treaties with Other Countries [CRM]d

NEW MEASURE: Fugitives Surrendered To and From the U.S. [CRM]
NEW MEASURE: Fugitives Surrendered To and From the U.S. [CRM]d

Data Collection and Storage: CRM employs both, electronic case management tracking systems and manual systems to report workload statistics.

Data Validation and Verification: Statistics are reviewed three times a year for accuracy by CRM's Section - Office Management.

Data Limitations: To ensure more complete and accurate data, this process will be automated with the completion of CRM's case tracking system.

Performance:
Performance Measure: DISCONTINUED MEASURE: Number of New Treaties with Other Countries Entering Into Force [CRM] (NOTE: This measure is being discontinued as it not outcome oriented.)
  FY 2002 Target: (9) - 5 Extradition treaties; 4 MLATs
  FY 2002 Actual: (7) - 2 Extradition treaties; 5 MLATs
  Discussion: We did not meet our target number of new treaties entering into force. Treaties entering into force are dependent on legislative action by the U.S. and the foreign country.
  Public Benefit: New extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties expand the complement of tools available to U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials engaged in the fight against transnational crime. Such treaties provide the means to bring fugitives to justice and supply evidence necessary to support criminal investigations and prosecutions. These treaties forge strong law enforcement relationships between the U.S. and other countries, and they convey an obligation to assist in international extradition and formal evidence gathering efforts. Equally important is the ongoing effort to implement our existing treaties, with a view to making them as effective as possible.
 
Performance Measure: NEW MEASURE: Number of Fugitives Surrendered To and From the U.S. during the FY [CRM]
  FY 2002 Actual: 269 fugitives surrendered to the U.S.; 102 fugitives surrendered from the U.S.
  Discussion: The Office of International Affairs works closely with U.S. federal, state, and local prosecutors, as well as with international law enforcement counterparts, to facilitate the surrender of fugitives wanted both in the U.S. and abroad for prosecution or service of sentence.
  FY 2003 Performance Target: Based on performance thus far in FY 2002, we plan to achieve FY 2003 targets of 250 fugitives surrendered to the U.S. and 100 fugitives surrendered from the U.S.
  FY 2004 Performance Plan: 250 fugitives surrendered to the U.S.; 100 fugitives surrendered from the U.S.
  Public Benefit: Facilitating the effective prosecution of fugitives, particularly those charged with the most serious crimes, including murder, narcotics trafficking, offenses related to terrorism, and large-scale financial fraud is a critical element in the fight against transnational crime.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
As our network of international law enforcement treaties has grown in recent years, we have begun to focus our efforts on implementing our existing treaties, with a view to making them as effective as possible, rather than on negotiating many new instruments. The legal processes leading up to a fugitive's surrender include extradition and waiver of extradition (the U.S. has extradition treaty relationships with approximately 120 countries), deportation, expulsion and voluntary return.

Crosscutting Activities:
DOJ works closely with the State Department in negotiating law enforcement related treaties and agreements and pursuing the extradition process. DOJ also deals with Treasury in international money laundering matters and with the Office of National Drug Control Policy in the development of strategies for domestic and transnational drug trafficking.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.2: DRUGS
Reduce the threat, trafficking, and related violence of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking organizations

2.2A Reduction in the Supply and Use of Drugs within in the U.S.

Background/Program Objectives:
The Department of Justice focuses its drug law enforcement efforts on reducing the availability of drugs by targeting the largest drug supply and money laundering networks for dismantlement of their entire infrastructure, from international supply and national transportation cells, to regional and local distribution organizations. The OCDETF program has been designated by the Attorney General as the centerpiece of his drug strategy. The program coordinates multi-agency and multi-region investigations, targeting the most serious drug trafficking threats. The OCDETF program functions through the efforts of the U.S. Attorneys; elements of the Department's Criminal Division; the investigative, intelligence, and support staffs of DEA, FBI, INS, and USMS; the investigative support of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Internal Revenue Service; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; as well as state and local law enforcement agencies. The goal of each OCDETF investigation is to determine connections to related investigations nationwide in order to identify and dismantle the entire structure of the drug trafficking organization (DTO). A major emphasis of OCDETF investigations is to disrupt financial dealings and dismantle the financial infrastructure that supports the DTO. As the Attorney General noted during a national conference in December 2001, "Sophisticated drug trafficking organizations mirror the Fortune 500. They have similar business structures, distribution systems, and profitability - laundering an estimated $300 - $500 billion a year. Just as the Department seeks to dismantle terrorist operations by cutting off their access to money, so too must we combat the sophisticated financial infrastructure of drug trafficking operations."

DOJ's Reduction in Supply of Drugs Available for Consumption Within the U.S. [DEA]
Drug FY 2002 Baseline
(Pure Metric Tons)
FY 2001 Seizures
(Metric Tons)
FY 2002 Seizures
(Metric Tons)
Cocaine 260-270 35 25
Heroin 13-18 .6 .7
Metham-phetamine 110-140 2.0 1.8
Marijuana 10,000-25,000 646 562

DOJ's Reduction in the Supply of Drugs Available for Consumption Within the U.S. [DEA, OCDETF]
FY 2002 = Baseline
DOJ's Reduction in the Supply of Drugs Available for Consumption 
Within the U.S. [DEA, OCDETF]d

Data Definition: Pure metric tons reflects the volume of drugs entering or produced in the U.S. prior to distribution and possible dilution.

Data Collection and Storage: FY 2001 estimates were developed using intelligence data from several sources including but not limited to, the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention; ONDCP; the National Drug Intelligence Center; and the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System. FY 2002 seizure statistics were drawn from FDSS. In addition, a baseline estimate for the amount of illicit drugs consumed in the U.S. was developed by ONDCP based on data from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration; National Institute of Justice's Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program; and the National Institute for Drug Abuse Monitoring the Future Survey.

Data Validation and Verification: An executive-level interagency Steering Committee oversaw this effort and individual interagency working groups were formed to develop availability estimates for each drug type, to include cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. The working groups met periodically to determine the most appropriate estimation model to be used for each of the drugs and to ensure that all applicable availability data was assessed for inclusion in the estimates. These drug specific working groups then presented their findings to the executive-level Steering Committee for approval.

Data Limitations: The development of credible drug availability estimates was a first?time effort and, thus, there is uncertainty in some of the estimates. The estimates for cocaine are based on several years of research so these figures are more precise. However, due to the wide variance in prices and use behavior of heroin users, the lack of information regarding methamphetamine diversion, and the fact that there are no reliable figures regarding domestic marijuana production, the estimates for these drugs are presented in fairly wide ranges.

Performance:
Performance Measure: DOJ's Reduction in the Supply of Drugs Available for Consumption Within the U.S. (Formerly Reduction in the Supply of Drugs Entering the U.S.) [DEA] (NOTE: This measure reflects drug enforcement efforts focused on the highest level violators regardless of the drug involved, therefore the target is an overall target and not drug specific.)
  FY 2002 Target: Establish Baseline
  FY 2002 Actual: Baseline Established, with seizure data for FY 2002
 

Discussion: During FY 2002, DOJ, in conjunction with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and an interagency group led by DEA, baseline estimates were developed for the annual amount of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana available for consumption in the U.S. during 2001. These totals include drugs transported into the U.S., as well as drugs produced domestically. These drug availability estimates will be updated annually.

While drug seizure data is readily available, it does not capture the total impact of disrupted or dismantled DTOs. In an effort to evaluate the Department's impact on the availability of drugs entering the U.S. during FY 2003, DEA is developing a methodology to determine the immediate and long term impact on drug trafficking and the drug supply as a result of successfully disrupting and/or dismantling a drug trafficking criminal enterprises. The development of this methodology will be complex due to the data limitations and numerous variables similar to those encountered in the development of the national drug supply estimates. Upon development of these estimates, the methodology will be expanded to determine the impact on drug supply as a result of the law enforcement efforts of the Departments of Transportation and Treasury.

  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: Based on FY 2002 performance, we plan to meet our original FY 2003 goal of a 5% reduction in the supply of drugs.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: 5% reduction
  Public Benefit: As entire drug trafficking networks, from sources of supply through the transporters/distributors, are disrupted or dismantled, the availability of drugs within the U.S. will be reduced. In addition, as more drug trafficking organizations are dismantled, the crime associated with those infrastructures should also be reduced.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
OCDETF has developed and implemented several changes to enhance the program's ability to achieve its goals. These developments include the establishment of a consolidated list of priority drug and money laundering targets, new and revised program guidelines, and new field guidance for agents and prosecutors to enhance effectiveness of OCDETF investigations.

Based on the new guidance, the OCDETF regions are accountable for ensuring that OCDETF resources are used toward the development of coordinated, multi?regional investigations and not for lower priority drug targets that could be investigated by a single federal agency or solely by state and local law enforcement. Thus, street level drug cases, without developed connections to higher-level organizations, are to be addressed by other law enforcement resources. To meet this challenge, each of the nine OCDETF Regions have developed a strategic plan that identifies the major drug trafficking and related money laundering networks operating within its region.

In addition, the Attorney General's drug strategy places increased emphasis on conducting financial investigations as an integral part of each OCDETF investigation. Accordingly, all OCDETF investigations must now include a financial investigation that extends beyond merely the seizure of cars or other personal property of the main defendants. Although initiation of the financial investigation is not a prerequisite to OCDETF approval, the supervising AUSA's will be required to certify that financial investigative steps have commenced within 6 months after OCDETF approval.

While OCDETF cases encompass the drug efforts of the FBI and much of DEA, they do not represent the majority of cases worked by law enforcement at various levels throughout the U.S., nor do they represent the sum total of the DOJ effort. Therefore, it is important to highlight the fact that there are many entities operating simultaneously at various levels, each with their specific area of focus and strategic approach, which contribute to a collective impact on the illicit drug supply within the U.S.

Crosscutting Activities:
Interagency cooperation is key to successful drug enforcement. Given the sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional nature of drug trafficking operations, controlled largely by criminal organizations in Colombia, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, the Department has developed a number of programs through which agencies can coordinate the counter-narcotics investigations with international, federal, state and local counterparts. Among these are the following:

2.2B Disrupt and Dismantle Major Drug Trafficking Criminal Enterprises

Background/Program Objectives:
In the past, the drug crime efforts of the DEA and FBI were reported separately, due in part to the size, complexity and significance of the drug trafficking organizations involved. While there were legitimate reasons for separate reporting, it created confusion and lacked Departmental focus. Consequently, in FY 2001, the Attorney General directed the Department to develop a single national list of major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. In response, DEA, the FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service, with input from the intelligence community and other OCDETF member agencies, identified 53 international command and control organizations representing the most significant drug organizations threatening the U.S. These targets, titled the Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list, represent the first time federal agencies have worked together to develop a single target list. This list reflects the most significant international narcotic supply and related money laundering organizations, poly?drug traffickers, clandestine drug manufacturers and producers, and major drug transporters supplying the U.S. The list, as well as linked organizations, will be updated periodically to remain current.

The efforts to disrupt and dismantle the CPOT organizations will be primarily accomplished via multi-agency and multi-regional investigations directed by DEA and the FBI. These investigations focus on the development of intelligence-driven multi-region investigations to identify and target national, international, and regional drug trafficking organizations that play significant roles in the production, transportation, distribution, or financial or other support of large scale drug trafficking. DEA and the FBI's ultimate objective is to dismantle these organizations so that reestablishment of the same criminal organization is impossible.

It is important to note that although DEA and FBI have both identified CPOT-linked organizations for dismantlerment, their accomplishments are not mutually exclusive. Given the size, complexity, and the numerous linkages associated with these organizations, it is probable that both the FBI and DEA have contributed to the dismantlement of a CPOT-linked organization.

DEA, through the utilization of its Priority Drug Targeting Organization (PDTO) Program, identifies and targets the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating at the International, National/Regional and Local levels. This is keeping with DEA's mission to combat drug trafficking at all levels. DEA's PDTO program is more expansive than CPOT, since it also includes local and regional drug organizations significantly impacting the drug supply in its 21 nationwide field divisions. PDTO investigations utilize intelligence derived from on-going PDTO and related investigations to identify major drug trafficking organizations to include the organization's distribution network, structure and members in order to target the highest level of the organization. The objective of each PDTO investigation is to dismantle/disrupt the identified organization, arrest the organization's leaders, distributors, importers, and facilitators, and seize and forfeit all assets associated with the organization. DEA management has directed that all PDTO investigations be coordinated with appropriate DEA Field Divisions, to include the Special Operations Division (SOD), DEA's Country Offices, and other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

The FBI also focuses on the domestic cells of international drug trafficking criminal enterprises that have the most adverse impact on U.S. national interests. These criminal enterprises have previously been included on the FBI's National Priority Target List (NPTL), which the FBI will discontinue when it begins to track its targets through the CPOT list. The FBI's contribution to the CPOT will be based upon crime surveys and threat assessments conducted by its field offices. Field offices will be required to expand the scope of their drug investigations and attempt to link them to the criminal enterprises on the CPOT list.

NEW MEASURE: Dismantled Priority Dug Trafficking Organizations (U.S. and Foreign) [DEA]
NEW MEASURE: Dismantled Priority Dug Trafficking Organizations 
(U.S. and Foreign) [DEA]d

    Target Disrupt Dismantle Total
FY02 CPOT-Link 141 5 16 21
  NonCPOT 674 81 92 173
  Total 815 86 108 194
FY03 CPOT-Link 155 4 12 16
  NonCPOT 741 36 38 74
  Total 896 40 50 90
FY04 CPOT-Link 171 4 13 17
  NonCPOT 815 40 41 81
  Total 986 44 54 98

Data Definition: Disruption occurs when the normal and effective operation of a specific enterprise of the targeted criminal organizations is impacted as a result of an affirmative law enforcement action. Indicators of disruption include changes in organizational leadership, trafficking patterns, drug production methods, and violence within and between organizations. Dismantlement occurs when an identified organization is eviscerated and no longer capable of operating as a coordinated criminal enterprise. The organizations must be impacted to the extent that it is incapable of reforming.

Data Collection and Storage: Each Special Agent in Charge (SAC) nominates priority targets (based on intelligence information). Headquarters staff ensure targets are tracked and nominations are supported by data and information stored in the Priority Target Activity and Resource Reporting System (PTARRS).

Data Validation and Verification: Targets are validated by the Chief, Operations Division at DEA. Headquarters staff ensure the disruptions and dismantlements are supported.

Data Limitations: DEA is currently improving reporting systems that capture investigative work hours and cost data. DEA also recently initiated a Managerial Cost Accounting Study that will eventually allow the agency to capture actual full costs of investigating, disrupting, and dismantling PDTOs.

Performance:

Performance Measure: Disrupted/Dismantled Priority Drug Trafficking Organizations (PDTOs) Operating with the U.S. (Formerly Disrupted/ Dismantled PDTOs) [DEA] (NOTE: Prior Year actual data has been revised. This data was originally drawn from a new system still in the process of being validated. A thorough review revealed that there had been some inadvertent duplication that has now been eliminated.)

Disrupted/Dismantled Priority Drug Trafficking Organizations (PDTOs)Operating within the U.S. [DEA]
PDTOs Targeted FY01 Actual FY02 Proj FY02 Act
International 221 240 331
National/Regional 228 234 298
Local 117 114 135
TOTAL 566 588 764
PDTOs Disrupted/ Dismantled  
International 43 14 70
National/ Regional 38 14 65
Local 19 7 55
TOTAL 100 35 190
  FY 2002 Target: 588 PDTOs targeted; 35 PDTOs disrupted/dismantled
  FY 2002 Actual: 764 PDTOs targeted; 190 PDTOs disrupted/dismantled
 

Discussion: DEA exceeded both revised targets. The target for PDTOs disrupted or dismantled equated to 6% of targeted PDTOs. The actual accomplishment in this area was 19.9% of targeted PDTOs. In addition, during FY 2002, DEA completed efforts to automate reporting of the PDTO program and is now working to automate the CPOT linkages.

DEA's accomplishments in the latter half of FY 2001 and FY2002 reflect a new program that initially included many PDTOs near completion for dismantlement. In the future, PDTO disruptions and dismantlements will level off.

  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: Based on FY 2002 performance, we revised the FY 2003 goal upward. The Revised Final FY 2003 goal is 90 drug trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: 98 drug trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled
  Public Benefit: DEA's PDTOs comprise the most significant investigations in each domestic field division. As these organizations are identified, disrupted, and dismantled, the investigative intelligence developed will be utilized to identify and target all organizational elements on the drug trafficking continuum. As entire drug trafficking networks, from sources of supply through the transporters/distributors, are disrupted or dismantled, the availability of drugs within the U.S. will be reduced.

 

Dismantled Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) [FBI]
Dismantled Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) [FBI]d

Data Definition: The FBI considers a DTO dismantled when, at a minimum, three objectives have been met: 1) the organization's leaders have been completely incapacitated; 2) the organization's financial base has been thoroughly destroyed; and 3) the organization's drug supply connection/network has been irreparably disrupted. A disruption has occurred when the usual operation of an identified organization is significantly impacted so that it is temporarily unable to conduct criminal operations for a significant period of time.

Data Collection and Storage: The data source is the FBI's ISRAA database that tracks accomplishments from inception to closure.

Data Validation and Verification: Before data are entered into the system, they are reviewed and approved by an FBI field manager. The data are subsequently verified through the FBI's inspection process. Inspections occur on a 2 to 3 year cycle. Using statistical sampling methods, data are tracked back to source documents contained in FBI files.

Data Limitations: None known at this time.

Performance Measure: Dismantled Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)[FBI]

  FY 2002 Target: Identify 250 DTOs; Dismantle 13 DTOs linked to NPTs (and CPOT organizations); Dismantle 160 Other DTOs
  FY 2002 Actual: Identified 253 NPT DTOs; Dismantled 14 DTOs linked to NPTs (and CPOT organizations); Dismantled 105 Other DTOs.
 

Discussion: Two targets were exceeded despite a FY 2002 reallocation of 400 agents from the FBI's counterdrug efforts to counterterrorism. The target for dismantling Other DTOs was not met because dismantling DTOs linked to NPTs took priority over dismantling non-linked organizations. FY 2002 accomplishments included Mexican, Colombian, and Caribbean-based organizations.

  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: Based on performance thus far in FY 2002, we plan to achieve our original FY 2003 targets: Identify 250 DTOs, Dismantle 13 CPOT-Linked DTOs, and Dismantle 160 Non-CPOT DTOs.
  FY 2004 Performance Target: Identify 176 DTOs; Dismantle 9 CPOT-Linked DTOs; Dismantle 114 Other DTOs.
  Public Benefit: In order to make the most progress with the resources available, the FBI concentrates counter-narcotics resources against DTOs with the most extensive drug networks in the U.S. As entire drug trafficking networks, from sources of supply through the transporters/ distributors, are disrupted or dismantled, the availability of drugs within the U.S. will be reduced.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
DEA has developed a strategy for targeting, disrupting and/or dismantling the most significant PDTOs and linked DTOs that present the greatest threat to the U.S. In order to disrupt or dismantle PDTOs, all organizational elements must be identified and targeted, including producers and/or suppliers, transporters, distributors, and facilitators. Due to the increasing decentralization of drug trafficking, not all organizational elements are usually contained within a single PDTO. A decentralized organizational structure affords a great deal of flexibility and protection. For example, the facilitator generally has little or no contact with the rest of the organization, so if the money laundering capability is disrupted, those arrested usually have little information about the remainder of the organization.

In order to ensure that resources are aligned against the significant drug trafficking threats to the U.S., DEA recently completed a Domestic Threat Assessment. Based on this assessment, DEA identified four primary illegal drug threat zones in the U.S.: Overland Arrival Zone, Maritime Arrival Zone, Methamphetamine Zone, and Heroin Zone.

PDTO producer/suppliers and transporters also rely on three other types of independent PDTOs and/or DTOs to further their criminal activities. Distributors provide a portion of the illicit drugs to local organized distributors for retail sale in a specific community, and the remainder distributed in other areas throughout the U.S. Non-Financial Facilitators provide services, including protection (corrupt government officials often ensure the safe passage of drug loads) and storage facilities to conceal the illicit drugs/proceeds. Financial Facilitators provide money-laundering services, arranging for bulk shipments of cash from distributors to transporters and sources of supply, and/or provide front money to PDTOs for the purchase and transportation of drugs.

The FBI's drug program is being restructured for several reasons. Recent events, primarily the September 11, 2001 attacks, required the FBI to examine current and future investigative priorities and develop organizational changes to accomplish its new objectives. The FBI, with the approval of Congress, has shifted 567 agents (in FY 2002 and 2003) from drug investigations to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, security, and training functions. This reduction will ultimately affect the number of DTOs identified, disrupted, and dismantled by the FBI.

Crosscutting Activities:
Please see Crosscutting Activities under 2.2A.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.3: ESPIONAGE
Combat espionage against the United States by strengthening counterintelligence capabilities

2.3A Identify, Prevent, and Defeat Foreign Intelligence Operations

Background/Program Objectives:
Foreign intelligence operations directed against the United States reflect the complexity and fluidity of the new world order. While the national goals of traditional rivals have changed, their capabilities and willingness to target traditional objectives, such as national defense information, plans and personnel, have not. At the same time, many of these rivals have increased their activities in other sectors affecting our national interests, such as in economic competitiveness. They join a formidable array of other foreign powers jockeying for economic or political preeminence, the success of whom is dependent upon effective intelligence operations directed against the United States.

Foreign intelligence threats can never be eliminated given that their origin and impetus lie primarily with sovereign states. They are planned, authorized, and financed by government entities beyond our boundaries and beyond the reach of our laws. Measures of success in these areas will gauge the FBI's capacity to detect potential hostile activities by foreign powers against the United States. In addition, the FBI will analyze its record at preventing and defeating these hostile activities in comparison to the best available estimates of the magnitude of foreign intelligence operations.

Foreign Counterintelligence Convictions [FBI]
Foreign Counterintelligence Convictions [FBI]d

Data Collection and Storage: The data source is the FBI's ISRAA database. The database tracks statistical accomplishments from inception to closure.

Data Validation and Verification: Before data are entered into the system, they are reviewed and approved by an FBI field manager. They are subsequently verified through FBI's inspection process. Inspections occur on a two to three year cycle. Using statistical sampling methods, data in ISRAA are tracked back to source documents contained in FBI files.

Data Limitations: None known at this time.

Performance:

Performance Measure: Defeat Intelligence Operations - Foreign Counterintelligence Convictions [FBI]

  FY 2002 Target: In accordance with Department guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.
  FY 2002 Actual: 1
 

Discussion: The number of convictions indicates only a portion of the success DOJ has had in preventing individuals or groups from conducting hostile intelligence activities, because law enforcement methods are only one of several methods used to protect against hostile intelligence activities. Other methods, however, are often classified. Convictions may also serve as a deterrent to other individuals who may be susceptible to participating in foreign intelligence operations. The number of convictions is subject to wide fluctuation based on the nature of the program itself. Such fluctuations do not necessarily indicate a change in the success or effectiveness of the program, as it employs various other methods to prevent and combat hostile intelligence activities.

  FY 2003 Performance Target: N/A
  FY 2004 Performance Target: N/A
  Public Benefit: Foreign entities frequently attempt to collect sensitive economic intelligence to enhance their military capabilities, as well as their economic stability and competitiveness. Advanced critical or restricted U.S. technologies, defense-related industries, and critical business trade secret information remain the primary targets of the foreign economic espionage activities. Through the identification and neutralization of such activities, the FBI has deterred foreign efforts to wrongfully obtain critical U.S. Government and private sector data, information and technologies that are critical to maintaining U.S. national security and economic prosperity.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
The FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Program has recently completed a thorough and wide-ranging internal review of its operations and, as a result, has developed a comprehensive new Counterintelligence strategy. In the coming months, the FCI program will be developing program plans to carry out this strategy. The strategy is predicated on the need for a centralized national direction that facilitates a focus on common priorities and specific objectives in all areas of the country. It also recognizes the need for collaboration with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This new strategy will enable the program to more effectively combat the intelligence threats facing the United States.

Crosscutting Activities:
DOJ continues to work with the intelligence community and with selected foreign governments to develop the internal and external relationships necessary to support investigations and prevention of intelligence threats and to generate information upon which analysis can be made. Coordination will facilitate long-range analysis of emerging threats.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE & ANNUAL GOAL 2.4: WHITE COLLAR CRIME
Combat white collar and economic crime, especially cybercrime

2.4A Reduce Fraudulent Practices in the Health Care Industry

Background/Program Objectives:
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), spending for health care totaled nearly $1.3 trillion in 2000, and accounted for 13.2 % of the nation's gross domestic product. Public spending for health care services through the Medicare, Medicaid, and all other government funded health care programs accounted for 45 % of total health care spending in 2000. Medicare spending grew 5.6 % in 2000, following a brief period of slower growth in 1999 (1.5 %) and 1998 (1.0 %). CMS has attributed most of the increased spending to changes in provider payments, particularly those enacted in the Balanced-Budget Refinement Act of 1999 and the Benefit Improvement Protection Act of 2000. Due largely to demographic trends, CMS projects that national health expenditures will more than double to $2.8 trillion by 2011, growing at a mean annual rate of 7.3 % during the forecast period 2001 to 2011. Due to this expected growth in health care spending, CMS further projects that national health expenditures will constitute approximately 17.0 % of GDP by 2011, a substantial increase from 13.2 % in 2000.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that as much as 10 % of annual health care costs may be attributable to fraud. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of Inspector General's most recent audit of improper payments in the Medicare fee-for-service program shows that the claims payment error rate was 6.3 % ($12.1 billion) in 2001, which is down from 14% ($23.2 billion) when the first audit was conducted in 1996. Fraudulent claims submitted to health care insurers and medically unnecessary services performed simply to generate billings are prevalent in every geographical area in the country. Pending cases demonstrate that fraud exists on a national scale, through either corporate schemes to defraud or systemic abuse by certain provider types. Home health care agencies, medical transport companies, suppliers of durable medical equipment, and clinical laboratories are particularly susceptible to fraud. Enhanced use of technology to analyze health care billing data will allow law enforcement and health care program agencies to become more proactive in detecting fraud and abuse, identifying systemic weaknesses and closing loopholes in the system before criminals take further advantage of them.

Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment Targeted for Fraud (mil) [FBI]
Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment Targeted for 
Fraud (mil) [FBI]d

Data Definition: Enteral Nutrition is defined as the provision of nutritional requirements through a tube into the stomach or small intestine.

Data Collection and Storage: Data are collected from databases maintained by regional carriers and stored by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Durable medical equipment information is collected from the Part B Extract Summary System (BESS).

Data Validation and Verification: Validation and verification of the data are performed by regional carriers and by CMS.

Data Limitations: Claims data from CMS are proved on a calendar year basis. BESS data are adjusted and reflect 95 % reporting of claims for 1999, 2000, and 2001, and 56 %reporting of claims for FY 2002. The figures are adjusted based upon the estimate of claims received for the reporting period. Changes in Medicare payment system due to legislative or regulatory action are taken into account so that comparisons of data from previous years are reliable.

Performance:

Performance Measure: Medicare Billings for Durable Medical Equipment (DME) Targeted for Fraud through FBI Investigations (in millions) [FBI] (NOTE: Prior year actuals have been updated to display the most accurate and current data available.)

  CY 2002 Projection (Based on previous estimates for CY 2001): Diabetic Footwear - $69.5; Enteral Nutrition - $456.5; Manual Wheelchairs - $205.5; Motorized Wheelchairs - $415.6
  CY 2002 Actual (Full year projections based upon available data): Diabetic Footwear - $42.2; Enteral Nutrition - $323.8; Manual Wheelchairs - $151.9; Motorized Wheelchairs - $412.9
 

Discussion: Although data collection takes place on a calendar year basis, and thus CY 2002 data are incomplete, so far the data indicate that the expected reduction in Medicare billings will occur. Updated information on CY 2001 Medicare data from CMS showed that previous estimates were reasonably close to more accurate data that are now available. Some of the updated revisions take into account certain DME codes that Medicare no longer services, and thus could not be tracked any further.

  FY 2003 Performance Plan Evaluation: Based on performance thus far in CY 2002, we expect to meet our original performance targets for FY 2003: Diabetic Footwear - $42.2; Enteral Nutrition - $323.8; Manual Wheelchairs - $151.9; Motorized Wheelchairs - $393.8
  FY 2004 Performance Target: Targets have been stabilized where estimated billings have already surpassed projections of cost reductions: Diabetic Footwear - $42.2; Enteral Nutrition - $323.8; Manual Wheelchairs - $151.9; Motorized Wheelchairs - $385.5
 

Public Benefit: The FBI's Health Care Fraud initiative protects the nation's health care system in multiple ways. First, it directly impacts the current operating budget of the Medicare system by preventing criminals from bilking taxpayers for hundreds of millions of dollars. Second, well-publicized and high-impact cases act as a deterrent for future crimes by those sectors of the health care industry that previously felt their activities would go unnoticed. For example:

  • On October 3, 2001, TAP Pharmaceuticals (TAP) had entered into the second largest Health Care Fraud settlement agreement in the United States. Investigation revealed that TAP engaged in the paying of kickbacks to urologists. The kickbacks appeared to have been paid in numerous forms, including unrestricted grants and free samples, office equipment, software, and tickets to sporting and cultural events. Four urologists were convicted in connection with this case for the selling of sample products of Lupron. TAP was sentenced to a $290 million criminal fine and accepted a $585 million civil settlement. In addition, TAP was required to pay interest of approximately $10 million as agreed to in the settlement.

  • Dr. Niels H. Lauersen and Magda Binion were convicted of 16 counts of health care fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy in their ten year scheme of defrauding private insurance companies for $2.5 million. After a six week trial, a Southern District of New York jury found renowned gynecologist, Lauersen, guilty of fraudulently billing insurance companies for covered gynecology procedures when, in fact, he was performing uncovered fertility surgeries, such as in-vitro fertilization.

Strategies to Achieve the FY 2003/FY 2004 Goal:
DOJ will continue to successfully investigate, prosecute and obtain judgments, forfeitures and settlements against providers that defraud health care programs. DOJ will also continue to sponsor training programs for prosecutors, investigators, and program integrity personnel and will collaborate with other federal and state agencies to combat health care fraud. The key performance measure illustrates projected reductions in discrete CMS Medicare expenditures based on recent enforcement initiatives. The relationship between law enforcement efforts targeting health care fraud and the resulting effect on identifiable areas of Medicare billings is implied by reductions in projected health care costs for Medicare expenditures related to services targeted for fraud enforcement. The Department will focus resources on early indicators of potential fraud that are anticipated to lead to high-impact investigations of nationwide health care schemes. Industries and markets that have been identified as potential targets for investigation will be monitored for reductions in economic loss and frequency of fraud.

Crosscutting Activities:
DOJ has increased participation on interagency task forces and working groups formed to address health care fraud and abuse issues. In addition to federal law enforcement and health care program agency representatives from the Departments of Justice, HHS, Defense, Labor, Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management, such task forces may also include state and/or local law enforcement representatives from the National District Attorneys Association, the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units, and the National Association of Attorneys General. To illustrate, the National Health Care and Managed Care Fraud Working Group was formed in the early 1990s and meets on a quarterly basis. Similarly, numerous United States Attorneys' Offices across the nation chair interagency health care fraud task forces that meet routinely on a local or state basis. DOJ and HHS formed an interagency Nursing Home Fraud and Abuse steering committee, comprised of CMS, HHS-OIG and the FBI, that has met monthly since the agencies launched a nursing home fraud and abuse initiative in October 1998. Since 2000, DOJ and CMS have jointly sponsored one national conference and two regional meetings to enhance the use of technology and high-tech analytic tools to combat health care fraud.

2.4B Combat Fraud

Background/Program Objectives:
Private industry in the U.S. controls trillions of dollars in assets, an inviting target for criminal schemes ranging from technological attacks on a corporation's intellectual property to more traditional attempts to defraud. The challenge facing the FBI in this area is to create and maintain a strong deterrent capability that will prevent criminal organizations from defrauding, and thereby weakening, U.S. industries. To prevent significant levels of fraud, the FBI must be able to identify emerging trends and industry vulnerabilities and enlist the cooperation of the private sector.

The overwhelming number of frauds committed each year far exceeds the FBI's capacity to investigate and prosecute each individually. Accordingly, the FBI will concentrate on the most significant crime problems, leverage limited resources through cooperative efforts with affected industries and other law enforcement agencies, and implement a preventive strategy that will rely heavily on improved intelligence.

The current focus in the area of fraud revolves around the President's Corporate Fraud Task Force, created by Executive Order, under the direction of the Deputy Attorney General to oversee and coordinate the Department's and the Federal Government's efforts to investigate, prosecute, and punish corporate fraud. The Corporate Fraud Task Force has thus far coordinated hundreds of investigations of accounting misstatements, fraudulent enrichment, and obstruction of justice at companies large and small. These efforts have yielded significant indictments and pleas in matters involving WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, Homestore.Com, Peregrine Systems, El Paso Corporation, ImClone, Newcom, Commercial Financial Services, and other companies.

Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions in White Collar Crime [FBI]
Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions in White Collar Crime [FBI]d

Recoveries, Restitutions & Fines ($Billions) [FBI]
Recoveries, Restitutions & Fines ($Billions) [FBI]d

Data Collection and Storage: The data source is the FBI's ISRAA database. The database tracks statistical accomplishments from inception to closure.

Data Validation and Verification: Before data are entered into the system, they ar