Appendix 7 DOC Documents in Response to the July 25, 1998 NEOCC Inmate Escapes
Appendix 7
DOC Documents in Response to the July 25, 1998 NEOCC Inmate Escapes
Doc After-Action Report (August 4, 1998)
DOC Correspondence to CCA (August 10, 1998 and September 24, 1998)
Government of the District of Columbia
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Suite N-102
1923 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
August 4, 1998
MEMORANDUM
TO : Margaret A. Moore
Director
FROM : Calvin R. Edwards
Executive Deputy Director
SUBJECT : After Action Report
RE : Inmate Escapes - Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
The attached After Action Report is based on my findings and recommendations regarding the July 25, 1998 inmate escapes from the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center.
Attachment
CRE/rdj
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
The following were found to be contributing factors to the escape of the six inmates:
(1) Perimeter security is less than adequate
The prison perimeter consist of double twelve foot fences with razor wire configured at the top of both the inner and outer fences with three additional rolls of wire located on the ground adjacent to the outer fence. Additional security consist of closed circuit television cameras and motion sensors which surrounds the perimeter inside of the fences. This detection system provides visual images and sensors motion prior to accessing the inner fence. This perimeter security configuration is designed to preclude any access and breaching of the double fences. Also, two-armed patrol vehicles continuously circle the institution perimeter for additional observation and security.
(2) Heavy reliance on perimeter detection system.
The staff at the institution seems to rely on the effectiveness of the detection system and therefore have not placed more emphases on enhancing the razor wire configuration between the fences and increasing staff supervision and observation of inmates.
(3) Less than adequate supervision of the recreation yard.
The staffing patterns for inmate recreation revealed that five staff had the responsibility for supervising more than two hundred inmates in both the gym and a relatively secluded recreation yard. The staff are instructed to roam the yard as a means of supervision and observation. No stationary observation post exist for the recreation yard.
(4) Too many inmates recreating together in the main recreation yard.
As previously indicated, the recreation yard is relatively secluded from view by others throughout the institution. The yard is also somewhat smaller in comparison to main yards of many other prisons. Therefore, large numbers of inmates utilizing the yard poses serious security risk. The current situation allows for grouping of inmates in a concentrated area to form a "human wall" to obstruct staff from viewing portions of the fence line. Also, the yard offers minimum organized recreational opportunities for inmates.
(5) Staff negligence and lack of policy compliance.
The staff assigned to the recreation yard and control center appeared to have neglected to follow policy and adhere to the orders relating to their assigned duties. Their actions seemed to contribute to the successful escape of the six inmates because of the lack of supervision in the recreation yard, lack of accurately counting inmates into the institution from the recreation yard, and resetting the motion detector alarm without on site confirmation of staff that no security breach existed.
FINDING
I. Perimeter security less than adequate.
The inner and outer fences have only three (3) rolls of wire at the upper section. Outer fence has only three (3) rolls on the ground, (2 ground 1 stacked)
This is not adequate for an effective barrier to preclude escapes.
RECOMMENDATION
(1) Recommend more razor ribbon type wire to be added between the fences and configured in a way that would prevent intrusion between the fences. The wire should be structured to touch both inter and outer fences
FINDING
II. Heavy reliance on the perimeter detection system.
Several indications suggest that inmates in the recreation yard often test the response of staff to the detection system by throwing rocks through the motion sensor zone. Many rocks were observed on the concrete footer at the base of the inner fence. Staff also indicate that inmates in the recreation yard would often kick balls through the motion sensor zone and allowed to retrieve them. There is no physical out of bounds barrier. The frequency of alarms has probably caused staff to believe that zone intrusion in the recreation yard is routine and caused only by recreation activity. These assumptions could lead staff to become complacent and contribute to serious security breaches.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Recommend installing a control fence in the main recreation yard to preclude inmates and objects from entering "out of bounds" areas.
(2) Establish a stationary post to observe recreation from outside of the perimeter. (Stationary vehicle post or elevated observation post)
(3) Install perimeter detection indicator panels in patrol vehicles for additional capacity for immediate alert and response to zone intrusion.
(4) Install video recorders in the control center to link to the perimeter detection system. Establish automatic video recording of the zone intrusion area.
FINDING
III. Less than adequate supervision of the recreation yard.
Normally more than two hundred (200) inmates recreate together in these two areas. Five (5) staff are divided to supervise the gym and the recreation yard. There are too many inmates on the yard at one time for adequate staff supervision and observation.
RECOMMENDATION
(1) Ensure that a supervisory staff member oversees the recreation on the main yard and observe the counting in and out procedures of inmates going to and from the recreation yard.
(2) Ensure that recreation staff move throughout the yard to better observe inmate activity.
(3) Increase staff supervision in main yard.
FINDING
IV. Too many inmates recreating together in main yard.
RECOMMENDATION
(1) Reduce the number of inmates recreating together in the yard for better control and supervision.
(2) Add more recreation activities in the yard to keep inmates constructively occupied. There is currently only one (1) baseball field and one (1) soccer area.
FINDING
V. Staff negligence and lack of policy compliance.
These are some indications that staff are not following institution policies. The newness of many staff in this correctional environment adds to the potential for mistakes.
RECOMMENDATION
(1) Heighten visibility and availability of supervisory staff to provide direction and oversight of lower line staff activities.
(2) Establish and implement a perpetual audit system to ensure security procedures and policies are constantly adhered to.
(3) Examine the hiring practices to insure a reasonable mix of more tenured correctional staff with newly hired staff who lack correctional experience.
(4) Better insure timely compliance with the D.C. Department of Corrections contract monitor's citations.
CONCLUSION
The findings outlined in this report were contributing factors that lead to the escape of the six (6) inmates from the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center on July 25, 1998. The implementation of the recommendations contained in this report should eliminate the likelihood of inmates successfully breaching the security of the perimeter and escaping from the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center. It is believed that the Warden and staff of this correctional center have the sincere desire to effect these necessary initiatives to insure a more secure correctional environment.
Government of the District of Columbia
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Suite N-102
1923 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
August 10, 1998
BY FAX 615-263-03010 August 10, 1998
Doctor R. Crants
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President
Corrections Corporation of America
10 Burton Hills Boulevard
Nashville, Tennessee 37215
Dear Mr. Crants:
Attached for your review is the final Department of Correction's After Action Report which details factors contributing to the escape of six (6) inmates from the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center on July 25, 1998.
The findings and recommendations contained in this final report are not appreciably different from the preliminary findings that I submitted to you under date of August 3, 1998. Please review the report and direct Jimmie Turner, Warden, Northeast Ohio Correctional Center to develop in writing a plan of action to implement the security enhancements as recommended. I would appreciate a written plan of action by no later than August 20, 1998.
I appreciate your personal attention to this matter and trust that you will contact me directly if you have any questions or concerns.
Sincerely,
/s/
Margaret A. Moore
cc:
Dr. Camille Barnett, Chief Management Officer, District of Columbia
Dr. Calvin Edwards, Executive Deputy Director, Department of Corrections
John Thomas, Deputy Director/Operations, Department of Corrections
Joseph Johnson, Board of Directors, CCA
Melody Turner, Senior Divisional Director
Jimmie Turner, Warden, Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
Willie Golar, Contract Monitor, Department of Corrections
Government of the District of Columbia
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Suite N-203
1923 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Mr. Doctor R. Crants
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
And President
Corrections Corporation of America
10 Burton Hills Boulevard
Nashville, Tennessee 37215
Dear Mr. Crants:
This is a follow-up to the letters dated August 3 and 10, 1998 regarding the escape of six (6) inmates from the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center (NOCC).
These letters transmitted a preliminary and final after action report. The August 10, 1998 letter also requested a written plan of action by no later than Thursday, August 20, 1998. To date, a report has not been received. Accordingly, I am requesting that Corrections Corporation of America Provide the D.C. Department of Corrections with all activity that has occurred to enhance security and ensure the personal safety of staff and inmates since July 25, 1998.
Your cooperation in the matter is appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact me on (202) 673-7316
Sincerely,
/s/
Calvin R. Edwards
Interim Director
CRE/neh