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1I N D E X

2COMPETITION POLICY AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY

3OCTOBER 25, 2005

4

5PANEL/SPEAKER:

6  OPENING REMARKS

7      CHAIRMAN MAJORAS

8      MR. BARNETT

9  OVERVIEW OF THE REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION

10      MS. OHLHAUSEN

11  ISSUES AFFECTING COMPETITION AMONG

12  SELLERS' BROKERS

13      DR. COOPER

14      MR. FARMER

15      MR. KUNZ

16      MR. SAMBROTTO

17      DR. THORBURN

18REMARKS

19      COMMISSIONER LEIBOWITZ

20ISSUES AFFECTING COMPETITION AMONG

21BUYERS' BROKERS

22      MS. QUINN

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1      MR. PERRIELLO

2      MR. HENDERSON

3      MS. WHATLEY

4      MR. EARLY

5      MR. LEWIS

6      MR. DelBIANCO

7EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN THE

8REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY

9      DR. SALINGER

10      DR. YUN

11      DR. HSIEH

12CLOSING REMARKS

13      MS. CREIGHTON

14      MR. KRAMER

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1DISCLAIMER

2

3The views expressed in this conference are the

4views of the participants alone and are not

5necessarily the views of the Justice Department,

6the Federal Trade Commission or any

7Commissioner. Likewise, the selection of any

8panelist or moderator does not necessarily

9reflect the view of the Justice Department, the

10Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner

11regarding the views or qualifications of any

12panelist of moderator.

13

14

15

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1COMPETITION POLICY

2AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY

3

4

5

6A PUBLIC WORKSHOP HOSTED BY THE

7FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

8AND THE

9DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

10

11

12TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2005

139:00 A.M.

14

15

16FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

17601 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, N.W.

18WASHINGTON, D.C.

19

20

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22

23

24

25

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1P R O C E E D I N G S

2- - - - -

3MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much for coming

4on such a wet, windy day. I'm pleased to welcome you to

5the FTC and DOJ's Conference on Competition Policy in

6the Real Estate Industry. I'm Maureen Ohlhausen. I'm

7the Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the

8Federal Trade Commission. Before we get started this

9morning, I wanted to go over a few details.

10First, the matter of security. You're required

11at all times by the Federal Protective Service to wear

12your visitors' badges or these name tags. If for any

13reason you leave the building, my script says to catch a

14breath of fresh air because you're the really hearty

15type to want to be out in the rain today to do that, but

16in case you want to or when you leave for lunch, you

17will need to go back through security when you come in.

18And I'll give you more specifics about the process

19before we leave for lunch.

20In case of an emergency, there are two exits

21that you should know about. One is the front door where

22you came in, and there's another one behind you, there's

23a corridor there next to where the coffee table is. If

24for any reason there's an emergency and we need to stay

25inside, the security personnel will advise us on what to

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1 do.

2If you need to use the restrooms, they're very

3close by. They are on the other side of the lobby.

4Simply go through the lobby and follow the signs. And

5you can always ask any of the staff members or security

6for assistance.

7As for cell phones, our audio/visual staff asked

8me to remind you that our microphones are very

9sensitive, so please turn them off, and if you are out

10in the hallway, actually sometimes the conversations can

11be picked up as well. So, for your own privacy, if you

12are going to make a cell phone call, you may want to go

13out to the main lobby out there.

14During the panels, there will be time for

15questions from the audience. What we are going to do is

16have people write them on cards. They should be in your

17packet. If you need additional question cards or pens,

18our kind staff of paralegals will be walking around with

19additional cards and pens, and if you have a question to

20hand in, you know, hold it up, and they will bring it up

21to the moderator. That way, time is tight, and we're

22able to get through a lot more questions that way.

23Also, if there are any additional comments you

24need to make, the record for the workshop will be open

25another month, until November 25th, and we definitely

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1welcome comments from anyone and everyone. You should

2file your comments with the Federal Trade Commission and

3with the Department of Justice on our web sites. The

4FTC web site is www.ftc.gov, and the DOJ web site is

5www.usdoj.gov/apr/index.html.

6Finally, I would like to emphasize that the

7views expressed in this conference are the views of the

8participants alone and are not necessarily the views of

9the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade

10Commission or any Commissioner. Likewise, the selection

11of any panelist or moderator does not necessarily

12reflect the views of the Justice Department, the Federal

13Trade Commission or any Commissioner regarding the views

14or qualifications of any moderator or panelist.

15So, if everyone has turned off their cell phones

16and pagers, to begin our proceedings today, I'm honored

17to present the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,

18Deborah Platt Majoras.

19(Applause.)

20CHAIRMAN MAJORAS: Thank you so much, Maureen.

21Good morning, everyone, and welcome to our workshop.

22The real estate industry is critical to our

23citizens. For many, the purchase of a home represents

24tangible fulfillment of the American Dream, the reward

25for hard work and dedication, sometimes spanning

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1decades. It may also be the most significant personal

2investment that some make in their lifetimes.

3Competition in the real estate industry, therefore, is

4not merely of interest to those involved in the real

5estate industry or to enforcers, but rather to anyone

6who has ever bought or sold or is thinking about buying

7or selling a house.

8As housing prices across the country have

9continued to rise at significant rates, the stakes have

10been raised for home sellers and buyers, as well as for

11those professionals working for sellers and buyers in

12this market environment.

13The vast majority of residential real estate

14sales involve real estate brokers who may assist at

15different times both home buyers and home sellers.

16Traditionally, real estate brokers and their affiliated

17agents have performed virtually all services relating to

18the sale of a home, including listing the home in the

19Multiple Listing Service or MLS, marketing the home,

20negotiating with the potential buyers, and helping to

21coordinate the closing of the transaction.

22Several related developments are presenting

23challenges to the traditional brokerage model. First,

24in response to perceived consumer demand, some real

25estate professionals are offering to provide services

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1more on an a la carte basis rather than as an entire

2package of services. In a so-called fee-for-service or

3limited service brokerage model, a home seller might

4choose, for example, to pay a broker only for the

5service of listing the home in the local MLS and placing

6advertisements and then choose to handle negotiations or

7paperwork for him or herself.

8Second, real estate professionals are

9increasingly incorporating the internet into their

10business models in a variety of ways, as many other

11industries are as well. In general, these models use

12the internet to allow someone else to perform a task

13perhaps traditionally performed by the broker or agent.

14Some brokers, for example, offer potential buyers the

15option of viewing full, detailed listing information

16online, allowing them perhaps to delay contacting a real

17estate professional until they are ready to buy. Other

18firms use web sites to gather lead information on

19customers who seek real estate services and sell those

20leads to real estate professionals, usually for a fee,

21based on the commission that the professional earns in

22the transaction. Still other business models exist that

23use the internet to match home buyers and sellers.

24Actions by individual firms of real estate

25professionals, by groups of professionals acting through

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1MLSs, by industry trade associations and by state

2regulatory or legislative bodies have all spawned recent

3controversies or even lawsuits. Some of the issues

4concern how existing industry members and institutions

5have responded to real estate professionals that offer

6these new business models. Several states have

7considered or passed laws or regulations that would

8effectively curtail fee-for-service brokerage. Further,

9some states have either passed new laws or regulations

10or interpreted existing laws or regulations to prevent

11brokers from passing a portion of their commissions

12along to consumers.

13As you may know, the FTC has a strong and

14growing advocacy program. We not only bring cases to

15challenge anti-competitive conduct or unfair

16competition, we also advocate for competition in the

17marketplace. The FTC, often in conjunction with our

18colleagues at the Department of Justice Antitrust

19Division, provides comments to legislators and other

20policy makers on proposed legislation or actions that

21may impact competition either adversely or sometimes

22even favorably. It is important that competition have a

23voice apart from individual interests, because

24government-imposed barriers to or restrictions on

25competition may have at least as adverse an effect on

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1consumers as private restrictions, if not an even

2greater effect.

3Proponents of government-imposed restrictions

4often tout the consumer benefits of their restrictions,

5perhaps without focus on the potential harms that such

6restrictions may impose on consumers. At the FTC, we

7need to look at both. In our advocacy comments, we try

8to identify the potential harms and suggest ways in

9which decision-makers might accomplish their goals while

10still minimizing restrictions on competition.

11Recently, as you know, the FTC and the DOJ

12together have advocated in a number of states against

13the passage of laws and regulations that would impose

14minimum service requirements on real estate brokers. In

15general terms, under the proposed legislation, real

16estate professionals who agree to list homeowners'

17property for sale would be required to provide a

18state-mandated minimum service package, effectively

19impeding consumers' ability to purchase a more limited

20and perhaps less expensive set of real estate services.

21We have argued that the proposed legislation would

22likely harm competition in two ways.

23First, consumers who want to hire a broker to

24list their property in the MLS will have to purchase

25additional services that they may not want or need,

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1which may cost them more. And second, without

2competition from fee-for-service brokers, the prices for

3traditional full-service options will likely be higher.

4What we want for consumers is choice.

5Admittedly, our efforts thus far in state

6legislatures have not been terribly successful, as

7several have imposed statutory minimum service

8requirements on brokers that likely will limit the range

9of services available to consumers. Nonetheless, we

10have continued to advocate against such measures and, in

11fact, have submitted an advocacy letter urging the

12 Michigan Legislature not to impose a minimum service

13requirement on brokers in that state.

14Critical to being a champion for competition is

15careful study and analysis of the marketplace, as well

16as then educating the public on its workings. The

17Commission regularly holds public workshops on issues of

18importance to consumers in an effort to further educate

19ourselves and others. Given the substantial changes

20occurring in the real estate brokerage marketplace,

21given consumers' strong interest in a competitive real

22estate brokerage industry, and given that industry

23participants have told us that they think that our

24advocacy in this industry thus far has been misplaced,

25the FTC and DOJ are hosting today's workshop, to provide

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1a public forum to discuss current issues affecting the

2competitiveness of real estate brokerage.

3This workshop will afford us the opportunity to

4hear from all sides on the many issues facing the

5industry, hopefully to increase everyone's understanding

6and identify ways to preserve competition while

7protecting consumers.

8In our first panel this morning, we will lay the

9groundwork for discussion of these issues by providing

10an overview of the real estate transaction from both the

11buyer's and seller's sides, defining key terms and

12identifying the various relationships and business

13models that currently exist in this industry. One of

14the areas of focus will be how industry participants are

15using the internet as an efficiency-enhancing tool.

16The second morning panel will address issues

17affecting competition among sellers' brokers, including

18minimum service requirements, state licensing and other

19requirements affecting for-sale-by-owner web sites,

20local MLS rules, and other private actions that may

21impact brokers with non-traditional models.

22In the first afternoon panel following the lunch

23break, we will turn to issues affecting competition

24among buyers' brokers, including state anti-rebate

25legislation, policies that limit the online display of

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1real estate listings, and the effect of minimum service

2requirements on buyers' brokers. With each of the

3issues to be discussed today, we will explore how the

4restrictions or actions impact consumers, either by

5producing benefits or imposing higher costs on them.

6In the final panel, we will address empirical

7evidence on competition in this industry. The panelists

8will examine the data available to test the various

9hypotheses and look at recommended areas for future

10empirical analysis. They will discuss what the data

11show about competition in this industry, for example,

12whether commission rates have been perennially fixed at

136 percent or have fluctuated over time in response to

14market conditions.

15In conclusion, I would like to thank our many

16distinguished panelists for coming from all over the

17country to share their insights and experiences. We are

18very pleased to have a wide variety of viewpoints

19represented at this workshop. Based on pre-registration

20information, we have in attendance today representatives

21from several real estate trade associations, including

22the National Association of Realtors. In addition, our

23attendees represent several different types of

24brokerages, including traditional, discount and

25fee-for-service. I am encouraged by the large number

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1who are willing to participate in this workshop, which I

2think demonstrates the importance of these issues.

3I would also like to thank the staffs of the

4Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission for

5their work in putting this program together. With that,

6I am now pleased to turn the panel over to my good

7friend and colleague, the Acting Assistant Attorney

8General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Tom

9Barnett.

10Thank you.

11(Applause.)

12MR. BARNETT: Thank you, Debbie, and good

13morning. I, too, want to welcome you to our workshop.

14I'm delighted to be here.

15These workshops I think are an excellent example

16of the good and healthy working relationship that the

17Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division have

18these days, and in particular these workshops I think

19are extraordinarily helpful to us in educating ourselves

20about the industries that we are monitoring and policing

21and educating the public about many of the issues.

22Indeed, as I was driving here this morning

23sitting in traffic, much delayed by the rain, I was

24thinking about what I was going to say today, and the

25concept that came to mind, shockingly, was sunshine.

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1I'd like to have more sunshine today, and I'm glad that

2you all are here to help us today to shed some light on

3issues of great importance.

4These workshops, while very valuable, do require

5a lot of work, and I want to thank up front the staffs

6of the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade

7Commission for all of the work that they have put into

8organizing the workshop today and to thank you all in

9advance for your help in carrying it forward. Because

10they require a lot of work, we can't do them for every

11industry for every issue, but I think the real estate

12industry is clearly an industry that warrants much

13scrutiny.

14As Debbie indicated, owning a home is the

15American Dream. In recent years, I think selling your

16home has become the American Dream given the rapid

17increase in prices, and in connection with that, it's

18reported that in 2004, American consumers paid over $60

19billion in commissions for basically real estate

20brokerage services. That's an increase of $20 billion

21or almost 50 percent from the commissions paid the year

22before.

23One question we might ask is, why are brokers

24making so much money? Inquiring minds want to know.

25And certainly the FTC and the Antitrust Division want to

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1know. There could be a number of reasons for that.

2There is great change in the industry going on. As

3 Debbie pointed out, the introduction or expansion of the

4internet, our ability to collect and disseminate

5information, have caused new business models to begin to

6emerge.

7I guess what I thought I would like to do is

8just briefly talk about a couple of the areas which one

9could possibly think about or factors that one could

10point to as explaining that increase in the amount of

11money that American consumers paid for real estate

12brokerage services.

13One is that the number of transactions could

14well have gone up. I have no doubt that that's at least

15part of the explanation. It could be that the value of

16homes have gone up substantially and that brokers are

17paid on a percentage basis, but that raises to my mind a

18question, have the costs of providing these services

19gone up that much as well?

20In general, in a competitive market, it's not

21the value of the services that leads to the price. The

22economists tell us it's the cost of those services, and

23many of the technological innovations that we see

24suggest that the costs, if anything, are going down.

25Our ability to collect and disseminate information at a

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1low cost is far superior to what it was even five or ten

2years ago, and as a result, that leads to a suggestion

3of whether or not there are other factors that may be at

4work here.

5I emphasize I am raising these as questions. I

6have -- and based on some of the public statements that

7we have made and actions that we have taken, we

8obviously have some views -- on some specific issues,

9but our purpose here today is to raise questions and to

10listen.

11One area in particular that Debbie has already

12alluded to is, when there is change, you would expect

13many in the industry to react to that change. They can

14react by bringing out new products, services, trying to

15compete harder, or they may react by going to their

16state real estate commission, their state legislature,

17trying to obtain measures that will protect them from

18the forces of those changes. It's not a new phenomenon.

19I strongly suspect that the manufacturers of horses and

20 buggies were not big fans of Henry Clay Ford, and

21similarly, it's probably true that the makers of the IBM

22Selectric were not big fans of the Wang word processing

23system, but from the consumer perspective, these types

24of changes can be good.

25Now, again, I want to emphasize here that I'm

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1not suggesting that every time somebody goes to a real

2estate commission or legislature that that's not good.

3There are many laws, many regulations that are passed

4that can be helpful to consumers. We certainly suspect

5that there are some efforts that have been undertaken

6recently that are not so helpful for consumers, and

7Debbie alluded to a couple of those.

8One of those -- and it's been going on for a

9number of years -- has to do with the definition of the

10practice of law. There are a number of states that

11allow laypersons, non-lawyers, to provide certain

12closing services relating to these transactions, and in

13the states where that's allowed, people have done

14studies, and they've found out that there doesn't appear

15to be any greater incidence of consumer complaints of

16consumer harm. The cost of those services provided by

17laypersons is lower, and indeed, the cost of those same

18services provided by attorneys is lower because they

19face competition from the non-lawyers. That's an

20example of when we believe something is good and

21successful regulation or, shall we say, limited

22regulation that advances the interests of consumer

23welfare.

24There have been a number of states who have

25looked at expanding the definition of "practice of law"

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1to prevent laypersons from providing those real estate

2closing services. We have been asked in a number of

3instances to provide our perspective, and we have done

4so, and we have had a number of what we view as

5successes in terms of encouraging people to keep the

6definition relatively narrow.

7More recently, Debbie again alluded to the what

8I call minimum service legislation or regulations. On

9the one hand, these can be presented as a consumer

10protection measure designed to ensure that when I retain

11a real estate broker, I am going to get the services

12that I expect. There's another perspective out there

13that suggests that it's no different than passing a

14regulation that says, "When I walk into McDonald's and

15order a hamburger, I'm told that I also have to buy some

16french fries, because the state has decided that it

17might be deceptive or misleading or bad if I only got

18the hamburger, paid for it and didn't realize I wasn't

19going to get the french fries." I may not want french

20fries, and from that perspective, being able to choose

21from amongst a menu of services to buy only the things

22that you want to buy we generally view as a good and

23positive thing.

24What do we do about these situations? Our role

25is threefold. First is to educate ourselves, and that's

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1what we're here to do today. Second is to use the

2benefit of our experience and the information that we

3collect to educate others who have to make a decision,

4and when, for example, a state legislature is

5considering a proposed minimum service law, we have been

6asked to and we try to respond to those requests to give

7the benefit of our knowledge and information, and I'm

8slightly more optimistic than Debbie on this one. I

9think we have had some successes.

10In a fairly public example, the State of

11Oklahoma amended the legislation after looking at what

12we and others had to say about it, to narrow the

13restrictions, to provide and preserve more consumer

14choice. There have been several other states where they

15have reached out, asked us for input, and in response to

16some of that input, they made changes. That, from our

17perspective, is positive.

18Our message to these lawmakers is before you

19restrict consumer choice, before you require a purchase

20of certain services, make sure there's a need to do so,

21and if you decide that there's a need to do so, we

22recommend doing it as narrowly and on limited a basis as

23possible. Ultimately, with respect to the legislatures,

24we understand and respect that it is their choice. Our

25role is to help them make the most informed choices

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1possible.

2There are times, however, where we run across a

3state-related restriction that we think allows us to

4have a more active role. An example of that would be

5the case that the Antitrust Division brought against the

6Kentucky Real Estate Commission earlier this year. It

7related to a rebate prohibition that prohibited brokers

8from giving a rebate on their commission to their

9clients. From what we could tell, there was no

10pro-competitive justification for this rule. There was

11certainly an obvious restriction on competition. When

12we looked into it, we looked at some of the statements

13from the brokers themselves who said -- in their words,

14not mine -- that "this regulation was preventing the

15outbreak of a bidding war. It was preventing consumers

16from demanding things that would reduce broker profits,"

17and from our perspective, that made the regulation a bad

18thing, anti-consumer, and we challenged it. I'm pleased

19to say that we have a proposed settlement pending with

20the Court right now and that brokers in the State of

21Kentucky are already beginning to offer rebates and

22other inducements, which we view as a positive thing.

23Stepping back a little bit, I note that, again,

24coming back to what I said, what we are trying to do is

25shed light on the facts, the issues or what is going on,

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1so legislatures can make informed choices, real estate

2commissions can make informed choices, and if necessary,

3judges can make informed choices.

4Finally, I will mention just briefly that one

5other possible source of the rise in real estate

6commissions and potentially profits is, of course,

7private agreements beyond the scope of what I've just

8been talking about, and I'll have no further comment on

9that for now.

10So, again, thank you very much for

11participating. We do think that this is an

12extraordinarily important issue, appreciate the effort

13that the staff have put into this. We look forward to

14hearing from you, to evaluating the results and seeing

15what we can all do to improve the welfare of consumers

16in this important industry.

17Thank you.

18(Applause.)

19MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Tom and

20Debbie, for your remarks.

21At this point, we are going to start the first

22panel. So, if you will just give us a moment's

23indulgence, I ask Cathy Whatley and Robert Hahn to come

24up, and we will get started.

25(Pause in the proceedings.)

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1MS. OHLHAUSEN: Well, this is the overview

2panel, and the purpose of this panel is to, as Chairman

3Majoras mentioned, give an overview of the transaction

4and go through some of the relationships between buyers

5and sellers and brokers and the MLS and different things

6like that and also identify some of the areas that may

7be raising competitive issues and competitive concerns.

8To help educate us all and inform us, we have

9Cathy Whatley, the 2003 President of the National

10Association of Realtors. Cathy is a realtor from

11Jacksonville, Florida, and I should mention that the NAR

12is the largest professional association with over a

13million members. She's been a realtor since 1969 and is

14the broker/owner of Buck & Buck, a family firm

15established by her grandfather in 1907.

16Cathy has also been very active at the state

17level, and she was the President of the Florida

18Association of Realtors in 1996 and received the Realtor

19of the Year Award in 1998. She currently serves as one

20of the nine commissioners on the Florida Commission on

21Ethics and also is a member of the State's Impact Fee

22Task Force. She lives in Jacksonville with her husband,

23and she has five children and seven grandchildren.

24On my left, your right, is Robert Hahn.

25It's all right if we call you Bob? Okay.

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1He is the Co-Founder and Executive Director of

2the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint

3Center, which focuses on regulation and antitrust.

4Previously, Bob worked for the Council of Economic

5Advisers. He has also served on the faculties of

6Harvard University and Carnegie Mellon University, and

7he frequently contributes to leading scholarly journals

8and general-interest periodicals, including the American

9Economic Review, Yale Law Journal, Science, and the New

10York Times.

11He is the author of "Reviving Regulatory Reform:

12A Global Perspective," which is put out by

13AEI-Brookings, and several other books. He is also

14Co-Founder of the Community Prep School, an inner-city

15middle school in Providence, Rhode Island that provides

16opportunities for disadvantaged youth to achieve their

17full potential.

18I would like to just thank you both for coming

19today.

20This is just going to be basically -- we are not

21going to do formal presentations. It's just a

22discussion, so I'll be playing the Oprah character this

23morning, I guess, posing some questions and just going

24through some of these topics and getting the viewpoints

25of these both very well-informed and experienced people.

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1First of all, I guess, the first question is,

2 who are the relevant players in the real estate

3brokerage industry and what roles do they play?

4Maybe, Cathy, you can -- feel free to both jump

5in, but maybe we will start with Cathy on that one.

6MS. WHATLEY: Sure.

7There are a number of relevant players in the

8real estate transaction. You certainly start with the

9 buyer, the seller. You have the real estate

10professional, and then you have a lot of additional

11relevant players, such as the mortgage lender, the

12insurance agent, the home inspector, the termite or WDO,

13as we call it, wood-destroying organism inspector, the

14surveyor, the appraiser, the closing attorney, the title

15company, the escrow agent. There are a number of

16relevant parts to the transaction that are essential to

17get from the buyer and seller actually having a

18discussion about the purchase and sale of that home to

19actually getting the keys to the home when they get to

20closing.

21I think just to start the discussion, I'd like

22to maybe paint a picture, and I think of it as somewhat

23analogous to a play. You might be at a theater. If

24you're in the audience, everything seems to go very

25smoothly because everyone has a role. They know their

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1part. They know their part in the script. In the event

2that something were not to go well and someone either

3enters at the wrong time, forgets their lines, it

4becomes very disruptive to the process. The ultimate

5end goal for both the buyer and the seller is to have a

6successful closing. So, all parts of the transaction

7are extremely relevant to make sure that it is a very

8seamless and successful transaction for the buyer and

9seller.

10MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, maybe you could follow up

11on that and just say, what role does the real estate

12agent play in -- like a number of the things you

13mentioned involved the legal requirements for

14transferring the property in a particular state and

15certain financial requirements.

16MS. WHATLEY: Well, in my role as a real estate

17professional, depending upon whether I'm assisting the

18buyer or the seller, I have different roles in that

19transaction, but ultimately a real estate professional,

20and if there are more than one in the transaction, will

21work together to make sure that all parts of that

22transaction are facilitated appropriately, not only in

23terms of actually showing the property, marketing the

24property, working through the transaction itself,

25meeting the home inspector, helping the seller and/or

Page 28

1the buyer understand what the results of that inspection

2were, overseeing repairs, making sure that things that

3are necessarily time-sensitive get responded to in a

4time-sensitive manner.

5I think that the transaction itself, if you talk

6about what has technology done to the transaction, it's

7not just the internet that has driven things.

8Technology has shortened the entire process time for the

9buyer and seller to be able to transact this sale, and

10so when you talk about the internet, the internet is

11just one part of technology that has driven a shortened

12time frame, which really makes it more critical than

13ever to have someone who understands the script, to be

14able to make every stage of that process work, to come

15to a successful closing.

16DR. HAHN: Can I just comment?

17 MS. OHLHAUSEN: Yes, sure, Bob.

18DR. HAHN: I agree with most of what Cathy says,

19but what strikes me -- my mom was a real estate agent

20and my dad was a real estate broker but dealing with

21commercial, and my mom dealt with residential.

22UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We can't hear you.

23DR. HAHN: I can swallow the mic if you like.

24I was saying that my mom was a real estate agent

25in the residential market, and my dad dealt with

Page 29

1commercial and real estate management, but what's

2striking, even though Cathy is talking about changes in

3technology, is when I look at the kind of transaction

4that my mom engaged in, if I'm allowed to say it, 30

5years ago or 40 years ago since she's not here, it's

6virtually the same as the transaction that most of you

7engage in today when you buy or sell a house.

8I don't see a whole lot of new technology

9entering into this transaction or the kinds of gains

10that we've seen in other industries and the internet

11resulting, at least in the residential market, in

12benefits for consumers. So, in that sense, while I

13think we're beginning to see some new models emerge, I

14think public policy -- and I think Mr. Barnett alluded

15to this in his remarks -- public policy could have an

16impact on the pace at which they emerge and the likely

17benefits that could accrue to consumers.

18MS. OHLHAUSEN: So, Bob, just to make sure that

19I understand what you're saying, you're saying there is

20technology out there, and there is a role for it, but

21it's not being adopted as quickly into the process as

22one might expect?

23DR. HAHN: Certainly based on other industries.

24If you were to look at airlines, for example, you would

25probably go and bring up your favorite web site -- I am

Page 30

1not going to give an advertisement for one of them --

2and go get an airline ticket. You don't have that kind

3of menu of choices, at least the way I and my

4colleagues, Bob Litan and Jesse Gurman, who wrote a

5paper on this recently for the real estate industry.

6MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that brings me to my

7next question, which is the menu of services, because I

8also wanted to talk a little bit about the MLS and the

9part of the transaction, the service that the real

10estate agent provides in listing a seller's property in

11the MLS or showing MLS data to a buyer.

12Maybe, Cathy, you could expand on that a little

13 bit.

14MS. WHATLEY: Sure. The Multiple Listing

15Service -- let me start with the understanding that the

16MLS is a broker-to-broker information exchange that

17provides the opportunity for cooperation and

18compensation. It establishes rules by which we all

19understand are discussion points. It tells me if I put

20the property in as a listing agent, I'm then allowing

21those who are cooperating in the marketplace, in my

22marketplace, to have access to that information, and it

23tells them at what fee that I am willing to cooperate

24with them. So, that's all disclosed up front, and

25that's a very important part, because if you talk about

Page 31

1what brings an efficient marketplace, the ability to

2have aggregated information for me, as a practitioner,

3to be able to go and have information that other brokers

4in my marketplace are willing to share with me, to allow

5me to have the information that I can assist my customer

6and client with.

7It also spells out what the cooperation is that

8that listing agent is willing to pay me if I'm going to

9show the property, and that is highly competitive. I

10can tell you that that is extremely competitive in the

11marketplace. A lot of things are driven by supply and

12demand, and we have been through a period of increasing

13demand for real estate and limited supply. So, if there

14is anything that really can motivate competition, it is

15limited supply and strong demand and vice versa. So,

16you know, it is important.

17The MLS is strategically one of the most

18valuable things to me, and that's done because the

19brokers in my marketplace are all willing to cooperate

20and provide that information in a competitive

21environment but still working in the best interests of

22their customers or clients.

23MS. OHLHAUSEN: Let me just follow up, Cathy --

24DR. HAHN: Can I --

25MS. OHLHAUSEN: Okay, Bob, and then --

Page 32

1DR. HAHN: This is absolutely crucial and an

2area where weary economists like myself might differ

3from the average person on the street, but I want to

4talk about the MLS for a minute and try to quote what

5Cathy just said.

6The MLS provides for cooperation among

7competitors, I think that's what she said, and I think I

8 would also agree -- before I explain where I might

9disagree with Cathy -- that sometimes cooperation among

10competitors can be a really good thing, but by the same

11token, what we as economists know is when we allow

12competitors to cooperate, we want to look very closely

13at the rules that they might have about who can

14cooperate with each other and the conditions under which

15they can cooperate with each other.

16The MLS is essentially a club, and its members

17decide who gets to be in this club, who gets to share

18the listings, and the conditions under which they get to

19share the listings. From an economist's perspective,

20the more different types of folks who might get to share

21those listings, the more likely it is that the consumers

22are likely to be presented with a wide array of choices.

23So, I think this is a point that will come up later

24today, but it's important to note that when Cathy talks

25about competition, yes, it's absolutely true that my mom

Page 33

1would compete vigorously for listings, just as people do

2today, but that's very different from competition about

3who gets in the club, because the club decides the rules

4on who gets to be a member.

5So, for example, in the extreme, if a club

6decided only two people could be members and 17 people

7had a legitimate reason or a legitimate business model,

8albeit slightly different from those in the club, you

9might not think that that's an arrangement that the

10Department of Justice or the FTC would necessarily think

11was a good thing or was necessarily a good thing for

12consumers. So, I think that in a way we might be

13talking past each other, but economists see the problem

14a little bit differently.

15MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that feeds into what

16my question was going to be for you, Cathy, is who runs

17the MLSs and the kinds of rules that they promulgate?

18What do you see as sort of the most important rules that

19an MLS may promulgate for its members?

20 MS. WHATLEY: Well, most of the MLSs do have

21boards. They are made up of realtor members. That

22varies from MLS to MLS, because the MLS is unique to

23each individual market. The National Association of

24Realtors does not have, you know, guidelines that

25everyone must establish, they are unique to the

Page 34

1marketplace, but they are highly competitive as well.

2I want to state, too, that understand that the

3Multiple Listing Service has been validated by the

4courts. So, don't miss the point that it is an

5allowable opportunity to have this information provided

6to us as a benefit of our membership in the realtor

7organization, and the fact is that it is

8broker-to-broker cooperation. It's not trying to limit

9the club. It's trying to make sure that there are

10cooperation and compensation guidelines which everyone

11knows, because that's in the best interests of the

12consumer.

13Actually, again, the fact that you've got a

14distinguishable database of aggregated information helps

15the consumer because it allows us and now the consumer

16in those marketplaces where it's highly visible, such as

17REALTOR.com, to be able to see information and to have

18that efficient marketplace roll smoothly.

19DR. HAHN: I want to respond to that, if I

20might.

21Cathy said the MLS has been validated by the

22club, but it's also --

23MS. WHATLEY: By the courts.

24DR. HAHN: Or by the courts, excuse me, but it's

25also true that at one point commissions were totally

Page 35

1non-negotiable, which economists would call price fixing

2of a sort, and the courts struck that down. So, it's

3not as if this club has engaged only in activity that I

4would view as pro-consumer or pro-competitive. I would

5say that there have been major benefits from the setting

6up of a platform however many years ago that was called

7the MLS, but I also think it's time to take a serious

8look at what the institution can and cannot do and

9whether that's good for consumers, which is what I care

10about.

11MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, sticking with the MLS,

12I understand that not all listings go in in the same

13form, and I was hoping, Cathy, you could explain to us

14the differences between an exclusive right to sell, an

15exclusive agency, and something that's sometimes called

16an open listing contract.

17MS. WHATLEY: Sure. An exclusive right to sell

18agreement is one where the seller lists their property

19with a real estate firm, and there is a fee, either a

20percentage or a flat fee, that is agreed to, and that

21fee is paid regardless of who finds the purchaser for

22the property. So, even if the seller has someone to

23approach him in the store and they say, you know, "I've

24got my house up for sale." The seller then says,

25"Contact my real estate professional." The lead may

Page 36

1have come from the seller, and that comes to me, but

2there is still an agreed-upon commission structure.

3Most oftentimes, it is cooperation between real estate

4companies, an exclusive right to sell.

5An exclusive agency agreement, if that same

6seller lists with me, if any other real estate

7professional brings the buyer to the transaction, there

8is still a fee paid; however, if the seller has someone

9that they may have a pre-arrangement with, that they've

10said, you know, four people have contacted me and said

11I'm really interested, if you ever sell your house,

12please let me know, and they were exclusions and/or the

13seller retained the right to sell to someone that they

14found individually, that would be an exclusive agency

15relationship.

16The third is an open listing, and an open

17listing is where the seller could tell each one of us as

18licensees, "If you bring me a customer, I will pay you a

19fee," but there is nothing exclusive about it. It is

20independent, each one operating in that own environment.

21And I just can't leave the last comment without

22saying to Bob, I think we all serve consumers. The real

23estate professional's major responsibility is to work

24for their customer and client. We are in the business

25to serve the consumer. So, in that regard, we are both

Page 37

1on the same level.

2DR. HAHN: I don't dispute that. The airline

3industry, when essentially fares had to be filed with

4the Civil Aeronautics Board, also could make a strong

5argument that they served consumers in the sense that

6when people purchased a ticket, we knew that it was at

7least worth the value of that ticket to take the ride

8from San Francisco to New York.

9The question from an economic perspective is is

10this industrial structure that we call the residential

11real estate market the best way to serve consumers? I'm

12not suggesting that any individual agent would not work

13to promote the interests of necessarily the buyer or the

14seller, because that's what they're supposed to do.

15MS. WHATLEY: But a real estate transaction is

16unique in that there are multiple consumers who have to

17be served. When you're talking about the airlines, when

18you're talking about other industries such as that, you

19have one consumer who is able to interact with the

20business environment. It's different in the real estate

21transaction where you have two consumers who both need

22to be served, and the public interest, you know, that is

23a very strong component, which I think makes it distinct

24and different from some of the other areas that may be

25discussed.

Page 38

1MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, Cathy --

2DR. HAHN: There are a number of markets in

3which you have buyers and sellers and platforms,

4including your cousin, commercial real estate. So, I

5don't see that there's anything particularly unique

6about it. But you're right that you need to cater to

7buyers and sellers to get people to yes.

8MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, this might be a good

9point, Cathy, to go into the issue of the relationship

10between the agent who brings the buyer in and the duties

11that that agent may owe to the buyer and to the seller

12and the interaction between the listing agent and the

13agent who brings in the buyer.

14MS. WHATLEY: Understand that the state -- and

15it was mentioned earlier -- that the licensing is

16regulated at the state level. So, you have 50 states

17who have 50 state legislatures who enact laws and 50

18state real estate commissions who implement those laws.

19It varies in terms of what the real estate

20professional's duties and responsibilities are based

21upon what the state may have determined are those duties

22and responsibilities.

23By and large, most states work in an agency

24environment, meaning that there's common law areas,

25common law of agency, which talks about fiduciary duties

Page 39

1of obedience, loyalty, confidentiality, disclosure.

2There are some states who have established a little bit

3different type of fiduciary responsibilities and the

4real estate professional may be working in a transaction

5or a facilitator capacity, and so there are different

6defined fiduciary duties in those circumstances.

7There are times when a real estate professional

8may be working with a buyer who is actually their

9customer as opposed to their client. So, there are

10various levels at which the responsibility of the real

11estate professional may be in terms of fiduciary duties

12to their buyer, customer or client.

13MS. OHLHAUSEN: And in that also, could you

14explain how the splitting of the commission works

15between the listing and the cooperating brokers?

16Typically. I understand it varies.

17MS. WHATLEY: Sure. When I go out and I list a

18property, at the time that I list that and put it into

19the Multiple Listing Service, I make a definitive

20determination of what my real estate company will pay to

21a cooperating real estate firm and that broker. That is

22disclosed in the Multiple Listing Service where anyone

23who is going to show that property knows what I'm

24willing to pay.

25If they have any question about that payment,

Page 40

1they have to address that with me and either renegotiate

2it up front if they're unhappy with it, because once

3they've shown the property, then I have presumed that

4they have understood that is my compensation and that's

5what they will receive if they bring a customer and a

6buyer and we ultimately negotiate the contract.

7Everyone is considered a cooperating broker.

8You may have a cooperating broker who is a buyer's

9agent, who is working exclusively for the buyer, has

10exclusive fiduciary duties to that buyer. You may have

11a cooperating broker who is a subagent, actually is

12working on behalf of the seller. You may have a

13cooperating broker who is a transaction broker who has

14limited fiduciary duties, but their role is to make sure

15that the transaction works smoothly.

16But the compensation part is actually

17established, and that's why it's so important that it is

18known up front, because it would be extremely disruptive

19in the marketplace if I didn't know that, if I couldn't

20go into the MLS and it tell me what it was that the

21other broker was willing to pay me in the event I had a

22customer who was willing to buy that.

23DR. HAHN: Let's explore that for a minute.

24First of all, I just want to make a comment about these

25split arrangements. Sometimes they have been required

Page 41

1by the MLS bylaws, these traditional split arrangements,

2and from an economics point of view, that isn't

3necessarily a good thing.

4But when you tune in to -- if you're thinking

5about taking a flight, say, from Washington, D.C. to

6Providence or Boston, you don't necessarily have your

7fees or your splits set up front. You go look at the

8computer screen, and you say, "Today it's going to cost

9me $100 on Airline X and 50 bucks on Airline Y," and you

10decide whether the time's convenient or not and you

11choose.

12So, it's not necessarily clear to me that having

13the consumer know everything with certainty up front as

14a particular fixed price is a good thing. I mean, we

15may want to see more competition over price and

16certainly the menu of services that's offered. So, I

17think that's an open question, and that's why economists

18like the idea of different business models out there so

19we can see which ones actually will win in the

20marketplace.

21MS. WHATLEY: As a practitioner, though, if I

22did not have that information and I am working in an

23exclusive buyer agency relationship and I don't know

24that and my customer has a commitment to a certain level

25of compensation to me, in the event that that is not

Page 42

1achieved and I can't tell my customer that up front, I

2haven't served my consumer customer. So, it's very

3important that the entire process is known.

4For instance -- and it is highly competitive --

5in my marketplace, I can look on my MLS, and it will

6vary from listing to listing as to whatever the

7cooperating compensation is to me. Some it might be X

8percent, some it might be $1, because it can be a flat

9fee, and it can be as low as $1.

10Now, if it is a $1 cooperating compensation and

11I have a buyer broker agreement and the buyer is

12committed that I am going to receive at least a minimum

13compensation of X and I can't tell my buyer that before

14we even start in to go look at this property, I don't

15think I'm serving my buyer well. So, I think that the

16fact that the information is disclosed is very

17competitive, and the marketplace itself has driven very

18competitive pricing in terms of, you know, what the

19cooperating commission is.

20DR. HAHN: I'd like to take a poll here, see a

21show of hands of those people who own houses and have

22actually sold them, how many people sold them and had to

23pay a commission of 5 and a half to 6 percent?

24That doesn't suggest that there's necessarily

25collusion, but it does raise a flag that you want to be

Page 43

1thinking about, that this price-setting arrangement may

2not necessarily be the best way of serving consumers

3generally.

4MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that also brings up

5another question I think that Tom Barnett had brought up

6in the Kentucky case, on the buyer side, the rebates

7that occasionally are paid to the buyers, and I just

8wanted to get your impression, Cathy, of whether that's

9common. Does that raise issues that you think can

10affect the effectiveness of the MLS, or do you see any

11issues or concerns with that?

12MS. WHATLEY: Well, I'm not sure how it would

13play in your question as to the MLS. You know, are

14there opportunities for people to be able to work with

15their buyers and sellers? Yes, there are. In Florida,

16am I allowed to compensate the buyer or seller back for

17my commission? Yes, I am, and that may come in some

18type of negotiated arrangement. In.

19The event that we get into discussions with the

20seller, if I'm working with the buyer, if we get into

21discussions with the seller and I find that what it's

22going to take to actually put this transaction together

23is eliminating a part of my fee or something, I mean,

24there are ways that compensation is rebated. Sometimes

25it's direct. I'm limited to directing it only to the

Page 44

1buyer, to the parties in the transaction, in my state,

2but state by state makes those determinations.

3That's why you have state legislatures, and

4that's why you have regulatory bodies who implement the

5state legislation. They adopt what they believe is best

6for the consumers who have elected them.

7DR. HAHN: I don't get involved too much in

8state legislation, but from what I read in the papers

9and the academic literature, it's not unusual for the

10National Association of Realtors to come out on the side

11that price competition, which is essentially allowing

12rebates, is not a good thing and also supporting what

13Mr. Barnett alluded to, minimum quality standards

14related to real estate transactions, which is a flag

15also for economists, keeping certain competitors out who

16may only want to offer one part of the menu and not the

17total menu.

18So, I'm delighted to hear that Cathy is

19suggesting that this price competition is out there

20among realtors, and I would just urge the NAR and other

21groups at the state level to vote against legislation

22that puts restrictions on price competition.

23MS. WHATLEY: Well, I don't think minimum

24standards actually place restrictions on competition.

25In fact, I think minimum standards -- and I'm not

Page 45

1speaking for the National Association of Realtors,

2because NAR is very neutral on this position -- but as a

3practitioner, what I believe is important is that both

4parties are able to actually get to the closing, and you

5cannot make unilateral decisions oftentimes as one party

6that don't ultimately have an impact on the other party

7in the transaction.

8If the consumer is making the selective decision

9that they're going to try to work through this process

10on their own, there's no issue to that as long as they

11understand all of the things that are responsible in

12that entire transaction, where they understand the level

13of service that is necessary, that they are having to

14bring to the transaction. There are financial

15consequences to buyers and sellers when the transaction

16does not close.

17Buyers have paid for appraisals. They've paid

18for credit reports. Often their lenders have charged

19them up-front processing or application fees. They are

20time-restricted to be able to close the transaction.

21They have lock-ins on their loans, and if they do not

22close within 30 days, their interest rate is at risk,

23and those costs are at risk for them. In addition, the

24buyer is out there. They've actually given notice to

25their apartment or wherever it is they're living. So,

Page 46

1there are real time constraints in which the process has

2to work.

3And you're talking from one side of the seller's

4capability to be able to do all of it on his or her own,

5and that's fine as long as they understand. Oftentimes,

6though, the negotiation part requires somebody to help

7them understand exactly what it is that they're

8obligating themselves to, and in some contracts, the

9seller is obligated for those financial consequences if

10they are not able to bring the closing to the

11transaction.

12So, you know, if the seller is not told, "If you

13don't get to closing by 30 days, then you can't do

14this," then you have got all these buyer costs, and

15although the buyer said they were going to pay them in

16the contract, they are yours to pay now, Mr. Seller.

17It's just the understanding of the entire

18process, and the minimum level is either just making the

19seller aware that there are things that they need to

20know or minimal steps to be able to assure that both

21parties in that transaction can actually get to the

22point where the seller is handing the buyer the keys to

23the house.

24DR. HAHN: I agree with that. I also think

25that's one area where the different kinds of internet

Page 47

1models can play an incredibly important role simply

2 because all you have to do is have one web site, and you

3know, if you're trying to build a new business model,

4and you can decide whether you want to target sellers

5and educate them and maybe get some fee for that or do

6the opposite for buyers. So, I agree with you that the

7transaction is complicated, but I also think there are

8other ways of skinning the cat and other models that

9should be allowed to emerge.

10MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, actually, I wanted to

11follow up. In our competition advocacy filings, we've

12certainly brought out the issue that consumers, to the

13extent they're not understanding an issue, what they're

14giving up, you know, the unbundled services that maybe a

15disclaimer or waiver or something might work, but also,

16the other issue that we've heard is concerns from agents

17that they might be put in an undisclosed dual agency

18situation, and maybe if you could expand a little bit on

19that, what that entails.

20MS. WHATLEY: I would say if either party in the

21transaction has questions, what tends to happen is that

22they will ask whoever is there in front of them. So, if

23I'm representing the buyer and the obligation for me,

24based upon the relationship that the listing agent has

25with the seller, is that I'm to fax the contract to the

Page 48

1seller, I'm to present the contract to the seller, and

2that's not customary in my marketplace. In my

3marketplace, the listing agent presents all offers.

4That's not necessarily the case across the country, but

5that's what it is in my marketplace.

6I have a fiduciary duty to my buyer, but the

7seller who is sitting there is going to very naturally

8ask me questions about the contract. I mean, that's

9just typical. As they ask me those questions, I'm put

10in the position of either trying to say to the seller,

11"You know, I really can't answer that for you," which

12tends to not put my buyer in the best position, because

13the seller's automatically thinking I'm not trying to

14help them out. So, there are situations where it's a

15darned if you do and darned if you don't.

16If you try to answer those questions, you may be

17putting yourself in a position that you are not allowed

18to do based upon your fiduciary buyer duties with your

19client, and you are darned if you don't because the

20seller takes offense and they don't want to sell to your

21buyer.

22DR. HAHN: I think it's a difficult area. As

23Cathy points out, there can be conflicts of interest,

24and even if you sell your house and you have an agent,

25there are issues about how much effort that agent will

Page 49

1put into selling your house. Steve Levitt, the

2author -- I guess the now famous author of Freakonomics,

3did this amazing little study where he looked at sellers

4selling their own houses versus sellers selling other

5people's houses and the prices that were fetched for

6comparable houses, and needless to say, when the agent

7sold her own house, the price fetched was considerably

8higher. They put a little bit more effort in, because

9at the margin, it was worth it to them, they were

10getting the pull pay-off, versus if they got an extra

11$20,000 for a seller, they are going to get, say, 1 and

12a half percent of that. So, there are incentive issues

13all over the place in the real estate market.

14It's a complicated market. I'm not saying

15there's anything wrong with putting more effort into

16selling your own house if you're an agent than if you're

17selling somebody else's house, but we need to look at

18those, and that's all the more reason -- I realize I'm

19becoming a broken record on this -- but that's all the

20more reason to have different competitive models out

21there and different kinds of services being offered to

22the consumer.

23MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, I wanted to give you the

24opportunity if you wanted to say anything on that.

25MS. WHATLEY: Sure. You know, sellers make

Page 50

1decisions for a lot of different reasons. They may

2elect to take a negotiated price because, in fact, if

3they figured that they had to pay another mortgage

4payment or two, it would be the same dollars to them.

5Maybe based upon the time sensitivity of the market,

6when you're in a hot seller's market -- in fact, our

7market is still an extremely strong seller's market.

8There isn't any seller who is going to take a property

9contingent upon the sale of their home.

10So, the time sensitivity of being able to get a

11contract, know that they can then go out into the

12marketplace and buy a home and not be at the price point

13of what it is today versus what it might be six months

14from now, it's all relative. Those are all things that

15the buyers and sellers take into consideration as

16they're considering offers.

17I won't speak to whether or not, you know, an

18agent may or may not make additional money. There may

19be an investment property versus something where the

20home seller is needing to get out. So, there are

21different stages of things, but I think it's very

22important to know that when I'm meeting with sellers

23every day, they make their selling decisions based upon

24a number of factors that influence what their housing

25decisions are going to be.

Page 51

1Homestead Exemption, you know, are they going to

2be able to get in and be able to qualify for Homestead

3Exemption for that next year? In Florida, we have a 3

4percent cap on properties. So, it's very important that

5once you can get to that stage, then the property taxes

6are not going to increase by more than 3 percent. So,

7establishing that value as early on as possible is very

8important for people in my marketplace.

9So, there are a lot of things that weigh into

10the fact of why sellers make decisions based upon what

11they think is a reasonable price at which they're

12willing to sell.

13DR. HAHN: I agree.

14MS. OHLHAUSEN: Bob, you had mentioned how many

15people had sold homes and paid the 6 or 7 percent

16commission. Based on some of the research that you've

17reviewed, does it suggest that there is some sort of

18optional rate out there, commission rate?

19DR. HAHN: There may be, but I have no idea what

20it is, and I don't think anybody else does either. I

21think the more interesting question that came up a

22little earlier is are these rates going down and what do

23we know about them? That's why I kind of did this

24little poll. The sad truth is that we know very little

25about them.

Page 52

1When I issued or we issued an initial draft of

2our paper, we had hoped that we were going to get

3detailed microdata, not Mrs. Smith's, you know, we don't

4get to know who that is, but we wanted to see whether

5most folks were still paying 5, 6, whatever it is, and

6how that had changed over time.

7Steve Murray, who very graciously agreed to

8share with us some of his aggregate data along with the

9Wall Street Journal and everyone else, I mean, he has

10this generalized data, but I don't think it tells us

11very much about the structure of this market. So, one

12of the things that I would hope the FTC or Justice

13Department or Congress would do would be to figure out a

14way to get better data, but that's what economists like

15anyway, so we can publish papers.

16MS. OHLHAUSEN: That's what I've heard from our

17economists all the time, better data.

18Well, turning away from price competition, the

19recent GAO study suggested that brokers are competing

20more on non-price variables such as quality and

21reputation and level of service, and Cathy, I was

22wondering, do you think this is happening and sort of

23how does that play out in the market?

24MS. WHATLEY: Well, I can say I would disagree

25with the GAO in that there is price competition. I'm