|
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
| 1 | DISCLAIMER
|
| 2 |
|
| 3 | The views expressed in this conference are the
|
| 4 | views of the participants alone and are not
|
| 5 | necessarily the views of the Justice Department,
|
| 6 | the Federal Trade Commission or any
|
| 7 | Commissioner. Likewise, the selection of any
|
| 8 | panelist or moderator does not necessarily
|
| 9 | reflect the view of the Justice Department, the
|
| 10 | Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner
|
| 11 | regarding the views or qualifications of any
|
| 12 | panelist of moderator.
|
| 13 |
|
| 14 |
|
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
|
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
|
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
|
| 21 |
|
| 22 | |
Page 4
| 1 | COMPETITION POLICY
|
| 2 | AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
|
| 3 |
|
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
|
| 6 | A PUBLIC WORKSHOP HOSTED BY THE
|
| 7 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
|
| 8 | AND THE
|
| 9 | DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
|
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
|
| 12 | TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2005
|
| 13 | 9:00 A.M.
|
| 14 |
|
| 15 |
|
| 16 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
|
| 17 | 601 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, N.W.
|
| 18 | WASHINGTON, D.C.
|
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
|
| 21 |
|
| 22 |
|
| 23 |
|
| 24 |
|
| 25 | |
Page 5
| 1 | P R O C E E D I N G S
|
| 2 | - - - - -
|
| 3 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much for coming
|
| 4 | on such a wet, windy day. I'm pleased to welcome you to
|
| 5 | the FTC and DOJ's Conference on Competition Policy in
|
| 6 | the Real Estate Industry. I'm Maureen Ohlhausen. I'm
|
| 7 | the Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the
|
| 8 | Federal Trade Commission. Before we get started this
|
| 9 | morning, I wanted to go over a few details.
|
| 10 | First, the matter of security. You're required
|
| 11 | at all times by the Federal Protective Service to wear
|
| 12 | your visitors' badges or these name tags. If for any
|
| 13 | reason you leave the building, my script says to catch a
|
| 14 | breath of fresh air because you're the really hearty
|
| 15 | type to want to be out in the rain today to do that, but
|
| 16 | in case you want to or when you leave for lunch, you
|
| 17 | will need to go back through security when you come in.
|
| 18 | And I'll give you more specifics about the process
|
| 19 | before we leave for lunch.
|
| 20 | In case of an emergency, there are two exits
|
| 21 | that you should know about. One is the front door where
|
| 22 | you came in, and there's another one behind you, there's
|
| 23 | a corridor there next to where the coffee table is. If
|
| 24 | for any reason there's an emergency and we need to stay
|
| 25 | inside, the security personnel will advise us on what to |
Page 6
| 1 | do.
|
| 2 | If you need to use the restrooms, they're very
|
| 3 | close by. They are on the other side of the lobby.
|
| 4 | Simply go through the lobby and follow the signs. And
|
| 5 | you can always ask any of the staff members or security
|
| 6 | for assistance.
|
| 7 | As for cell phones, our audio/visual staff asked
|
| 8 | me to remind you that our microphones are very
|
| 9 | sensitive, so please turn them off, and if you are out
|
| 10 | in the hallway, actually sometimes the conversations can
|
| 11 | be picked up as well. So, for your own privacy, if you
|
| 12 | are going to make a cell phone call, you may want to go
|
| 13 | out to the main lobby out there.
|
| 14 | During the panels, there will be time for
|
| 15 | questions from the audience. What we are going to do is
|
| 16 | have people write them on cards. They should be in your
|
| 17 | packet. If you need additional question cards or pens,
|
| 18 | our kind staff of paralegals will be walking around with
|
| 19 | additional cards and pens, and if you have a question to
|
| 20 | hand in, you know, hold it up, and they will bring it up
|
| 21 | to the moderator. That way, time is tight, and we're
|
| 22 | able to get through a lot more questions that way.
|
| 23 | Also, if there are any additional comments you
|
| 24 | need to make, the record for the workshop will be open
|
| 25 | another month, until November 25th, and we definitely |
Page 7
| 1 | welcome comments from anyone and everyone. You should
|
| 2 | file your comments with the Federal Trade Commission and
|
| 3 | with the Department of Justice on our web sites. The
|
| 4 | FTC web site is www.ftc.gov, and the DOJ web site is
|
| 5 | www.usdoj.gov/apr/index.html.
|
| 6 | Finally, I would like to emphasize that the
|
| 7 | views expressed in this conference are the views of the
|
| 8 | participants alone and are not necessarily the views of
|
| 9 | the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
|
| 10 | Commission or any Commissioner. Likewise, the selection
|
| 11 | of any panelist or moderator does not necessarily
|
| 12 | reflect the views of the Justice Department, the Federal
|
| 13 | Trade Commission or any Commissioner regarding the views
|
| 14 | or qualifications of any moderator or panelist.
|
| 15 | So, if everyone has turned off their cell phones
|
| 16 | and pagers, to begin our proceedings today, I'm honored
|
| 17 | to present the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
|
| 18 | Deborah Platt Majoras.
|
| 19 | (Applause.)
|
| 20 | CHAIRMAN MAJORAS: Thank you so much, Maureen.
|
| 21 | Good morning, everyone, and welcome to our workshop.
|
| 22 | The real estate industry is critical to our
|
| 23 | citizens. For many, the purchase of a home represents
|
| 24 | tangible fulfillment of the American Dream, the reward
|
| 25 | for hard work and dedication, sometimes spanning |
Page 8
| 1 | decades. It may also be the most significant personal
|
| 2 | investment that some make in their lifetimes.
|
| 3 | Competition in the real estate industry, therefore, is
|
| 4 | not merely of interest to those involved in the real
|
| 5 | estate industry or to enforcers, but rather to anyone
|
| 6 | who has ever bought or sold or is thinking about buying
|
| 7 | or selling a house.
|
| 8 | As housing prices across the country have
|
| 9 | continued to rise at significant rates, the stakes have
|
| 10 | been raised for home sellers and buyers, as well as for
|
| 11 | those professionals working for sellers and buyers in
|
| 12 | this market environment.
|
| 13 | The vast majority of residential real estate
|
| 14 | sales involve real estate brokers who may assist at
|
| 15 | different times both home buyers and home sellers.
|
| 16 | Traditionally, real estate brokers and their affiliated
|
| 17 | agents have performed virtually all services relating to
|
| 18 | the sale of a home, including listing the home in the
|
| 19 | Multiple Listing Service or MLS, marketing the home,
|
| 20 | negotiating with the potential buyers, and helping to
|
| 21 | coordinate the closing of the transaction.
|
| 22 | Several related developments are presenting
|
| 23 | challenges to the traditional brokerage model. First,
|
| 24 | in response to perceived consumer demand, some real
|
| 25 | estate professionals are offering to provide services |
Page 9
| 1 | more on an a la carte basis rather than as an entire
|
| 2 | package of services. In a so-called fee-for-service or
|
| 3 | limited service brokerage model, a home seller might
|
| 4 | choose, for example, to pay a broker only for the
|
| 5 | service of listing the home in the local MLS and placing
|
| 6 | advertisements and then choose to handle negotiations or
|
| 7 | paperwork for him or herself.
|
| 8 | Second, real estate professionals are
|
| 9 | increasingly incorporating the internet into their
|
| 10 | business models in a variety of ways, as many other
|
| 11 | industries are as well. In general, these models use
|
| 12 | the internet to allow someone else to perform a task
|
| 13 | perhaps traditionally performed by the broker or agent.
|
| 14 | Some brokers, for example, offer potential buyers the
|
| 15 | option of viewing full, detailed listing information
|
| 16 | online, allowing them perhaps to delay contacting a real
|
| 17 | estate professional until they are ready to buy. Other
|
| 18 | firms use web sites to gather lead information on
|
| 19 | customers who seek real estate services and sell those
|
| 20 | leads to real estate professionals, usually for a fee,
|
| 21 | based on the commission that the professional earns in
|
| 22 | the transaction. Still other business models exist that
|
| 23 | use the internet to match home buyers and sellers.
|
| 24 | Actions by individual firms of real estate
|
| 25 | professionals, by groups of professionals acting through |
Page 10
| 1 | MLSs, by industry trade associations and by state
|
| 2 | regulatory or legislative bodies have all spawned recent
|
| 3 | controversies or even lawsuits. Some of the issues
|
| 4 | concern how existing industry members and institutions
|
| 5 | have responded to real estate professionals that offer
|
| 6 | these new business models. Several states have
|
| 7 | considered or passed laws or regulations that would
|
| 8 | effectively curtail fee-for-service brokerage. Further,
|
| 9 | some states have either passed new laws or regulations
|
| 10 | or interpreted existing laws or regulations to prevent
|
| 11 | brokers from passing a portion of their commissions
|
| 12 | along to consumers.
|
| 13 | As you may know, the FTC has a strong and
|
| 14 | growing advocacy program. We not only bring cases to
|
| 15 | challenge anti-competitive conduct or unfair
|
| 16 | competition, we also advocate for competition in the
|
| 17 | marketplace. The FTC, often in conjunction with our
|
| 18 | colleagues at the Department of Justice Antitrust
|
| 19 | Division, provides comments to legislators and other
|
| 20 | policy makers on proposed legislation or actions that
|
| 21 | may impact competition either adversely or sometimes
|
| 22 | even favorably. It is important that competition have a
|
| 23 | voice apart from individual interests, because
|
| 24 | government-imposed barriers to or restrictions on
|
| 25 | competition may have at least as adverse an effect on |
Page 11
| 1 | consumers as private restrictions, if not an even
|
| 2 | greater effect.
|
| 3 | Proponents of government-imposed restrictions
|
| 4 | often tout the consumer benefits of their restrictions,
|
| 5 | perhaps without focus on the potential harms that such
|
| 6 | restrictions may impose on consumers. At the FTC, we
|
| 7 | need to look at both. In our advocacy comments, we try
|
| 8 | to identify the potential harms and suggest ways in
|
| 9 | which decision-makers might accomplish their goals while
|
| 10 | still minimizing restrictions on competition.
|
| 11 | Recently, as you know, the FTC and the DOJ
|
| 12 | together have advocated in a number of states against
|
| 13 | the passage of laws and regulations that would impose
|
| 14 | minimum service requirements on real estate brokers. In
|
| 15 | general terms, under the proposed legislation, real
|
| 16 | estate professionals who agree to list homeowners'
|
| 17 | property for sale would be required to provide a
|
| 18 | state-mandated minimum service package, effectively
|
| 19 | impeding consumers' ability to purchase a more limited
|
| 20 | and perhaps less expensive set of real estate services.
|
| 21 | We have argued that the proposed legislation would
|
| 22 | likely harm competition in two ways.
|
| 23 | First, consumers who want to hire a broker to
|
| 24 | list their property in the MLS will have to purchase
|
| 25 | additional services that they may not want or need, |
Page 12
| 1 | which may cost them more. And second, without
|
| 2 | competition from fee-for-service brokers, the prices for
|
| 3 | traditional full-service options will likely be higher.
|
| 4 | What we want for consumers is choice.
|
| 5 | Admittedly, our efforts thus far in state
|
| 6 | legislatures have not been terribly successful, as
|
| 7 | several have imposed statutory minimum service
|
| 8 | requirements on brokers that likely will limit the range
|
| 9 | of services available to consumers. Nonetheless, we
|
| 10 | have continued to advocate against such measures and, in
|
| 11 | fact, have submitted an advocacy letter urging the
|
| 12 | Michigan Legislature not to impose a minimum service
|
| 13 | requirement on brokers in that state.
|
| 14 | Critical to being a champion for competition is
|
| 15 | careful study and analysis of the marketplace, as well
|
| 16 | as then educating the public on its workings. The
|
| 17 | Commission regularly holds public workshops on issues of
|
| 18 | importance to consumers in an effort to further educate
|
| 19 | ourselves and others. Given the substantial changes
|
| 20 | occurring in the real estate brokerage marketplace,
|
| 21 | given consumers' strong interest in a competitive real
|
| 22 | estate brokerage industry, and given that industry
|
| 23 | participants have told us that they think that our
|
| 24 | advocacy in this industry thus far has been misplaced,
|
| 25 | the FTC and DOJ are hosting today's workshop, to provide |
Page 13
| 1 | a public forum to discuss current issues affecting the
|
| 2 | competitiveness of real estate brokerage.
|
| 3 | This workshop will afford us the opportunity to
|
| 4 | hear from all sides on the many issues facing the
|
| 5 | industry, hopefully to increase everyone's understanding
|
| 6 | and identify ways to preserve competition while
|
| 7 | protecting consumers.
|
| 8 | In our first panel this morning, we will lay the
|
| 9 | groundwork for discussion of these issues by providing
|
| 10 | an overview of the real estate transaction from both the
|
| 11 | buyer's and seller's sides, defining key terms and
|
| 12 | identifying the various relationships and business
|
| 13 | models that currently exist in this industry. One of
|
| 14 | the areas of focus will be how industry participants are
|
| 15 | using the internet as an efficiency-enhancing tool.
|
| 16 | The second morning panel will address issues
|
| 17 | affecting competition among sellers' brokers, including
|
| 18 | minimum service requirements, state licensing and other
|
| 19 | requirements affecting for-sale-by-owner web sites,
|
| 20 | local MLS rules, and other private actions that may
|
| 21 | impact brokers with non-traditional models.
|
| 22 | In the first afternoon panel following the lunch
|
| 23 | break, we will turn to issues affecting competition
|
| 24 | among buyers' brokers, including state anti-rebate
|
| 25 | legislation, policies that limit the online display of |
Page 14
| 1 | real estate listings, and the effect of minimum service
|
| 2 | requirements on buyers' brokers. With each of the
|
| 3 | issues to be discussed today, we will explore how the
|
| 4 | restrictions or actions impact consumers, either by
|
| 5 | producing benefits or imposing higher costs on them.
|
| 6 | In the final panel, we will address empirical
|
| 7 | evidence on competition in this industry. The panelists
|
| 8 | will examine the data available to test the various
|
| 9 | hypotheses and look at recommended areas for future
|
| 10 | empirical analysis. They will discuss what the data
|
| 11 | show about competition in this industry, for example,
|
| 12 | whether commission rates have been perennially fixed at
|
| 13 | 6 percent or have fluctuated over time in response to
|
| 14 | market conditions.
|
| 15 | In conclusion, I would like to thank our many
|
| 16 | distinguished panelists for coming from all over the
|
| 17 | country to share their insights and experiences. We are
|
| 18 | very pleased to have a wide variety of viewpoints
|
| 19 | represented at this workshop. Based on pre-registration
|
| 20 | information, we have in attendance today representatives
|
| 21 | from several real estate trade associations, including
|
| 22 | the National Association of Realtors. In addition, our
|
| 23 | attendees represent several different types of
|
| 24 | brokerages, including traditional, discount and
|
| 25 | fee-for-service. I am encouraged by the large number |
Page 15
| 1 | who are willing to participate in this workshop, which I
|
| 2 | think demonstrates the importance of these issues.
|
| 3 | I would also like to thank the staffs of the
|
| 4 | Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission for
|
| 5 | their work in putting this program together. With that,
|
| 6 | I am now pleased to turn the panel over to my good
|
| 7 | friend and colleague, the Acting Assistant Attorney
|
| 8 | General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Tom
|
| 9 | Barnett.
|
| 10 | Thank you.
|
| 11 | (Applause.)
|
| 12 | MR. BARNETT: Thank you, Debbie, and good
|
| 13 | morning. I, too, want to welcome you to our workshop.
|
| 14 | I'm delighted to be here.
|
| 15 | These workshops I think are an excellent example
|
| 16 | of the good and healthy working relationship that the
|
| 17 | Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division have
|
| 18 | these days, and in particular these workshops I think
|
| 19 | are extraordinarily helpful to us in educating ourselves
|
| 20 | about the industries that we are monitoring and policing
|
| 21 | and educating the public about many of the issues.
|
| 22 | Indeed, as I was driving here this morning
|
| 23 | sitting in traffic, much delayed by the rain, I was
|
| 24 | thinking about what I was going to say today, and the
|
| 25 | concept that came to mind, shockingly, was sunshine. |
Page 16
| 1 | I'd like to have more sunshine today, and I'm glad that
|
| 2 | you all are here to help us today to shed some light on
|
| 3 | issues of great importance.
|
| 4 | These workshops, while very valuable, do require
|
| 5 | a lot of work, and I want to thank up front the staffs
|
| 6 | of the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
|
| 7 | Commission for all of the work that they have put into
|
| 8 | organizing the workshop today and to thank you all in
|
| 9 | advance for your help in carrying it forward. Because
|
| 10 | they require a lot of work, we can't do them for every
|
| 11 | industry for every issue, but I think the real estate
|
| 12 | industry is clearly an industry that warrants much
|
| 13 | scrutiny.
|
| 14 | As Debbie indicated, owning a home is the
|
| 15 | American Dream. In recent years, I think selling your
|
| 16 | home has become the American Dream given the rapid
|
| 17 | increase in prices, and in connection with that, it's
|
| 18 | reported that in 2004, American consumers paid over $60
|
| 19 | billion in commissions for basically real estate
|
| 20 | brokerage services. That's an increase of $20 billion
|
| 21 | or almost 50 percent from the commissions paid the year
|
| 22 | before.
|
| 23 | One question we might ask is, why are brokers
|
| 24 | making so much money? Inquiring minds want to know.
|
| 25 | And certainly the FTC and the Antitrust Division want to |
Page 17
| 1 | know. There could be a number of reasons for that.
|
| 2 | There is great change in the industry going on. As
|
| 3 | Debbie pointed out, the introduction or expansion of the
|
| 4 | internet, our ability to collect and disseminate
|
| 5 | information, have caused new business models to begin to
|
| 6 | emerge.
|
| 7 | I guess what I thought I would like to do is
|
| 8 | just briefly talk about a couple of the areas which one
|
| 9 | could possibly think about or factors that one could
|
| 10 | point to as explaining that increase in the amount of
|
| 11 | money that American consumers paid for real estate
|
| 12 | brokerage services.
|
| 13 | One is that the number of transactions could
|
| 14 | well have gone up. I have no doubt that that's at least
|
| 15 | part of the explanation. It could be that the value of
|
| 16 | homes have gone up substantially and that brokers are
|
| 17 | paid on a percentage basis, but that raises to my mind a
|
| 18 | question, have the costs of providing these services
|
| 19 | gone up that much as well?
|
| 20 | In general, in a competitive market, it's not
|
| 21 | the value of the services that leads to the price. The
|
| 22 | economists tell us it's the cost of those services, and
|
| 23 | many of the technological innovations that we see
|
| 24 | suggest that the costs, if anything, are going down.
|
| 25 | Our ability to collect and disseminate information at a |
Page 18
| 1 | low cost is far superior to what it was even five or ten
|
| 2 | years ago, and as a result, that leads to a suggestion
|
| 3 | of whether or not there are other factors that may be at
|
| 4 | work here.
|
| 5 | I emphasize I am raising these as questions. I
|
| 6 | have -- and based on some of the public statements that
|
| 7 | we have made and actions that we have taken, we
|
| 8 | obviously have some views -- on some specific issues,
|
| 9 | but our purpose here today is to raise questions and to
|
| 10 | listen.
|
| 11 | One area in particular that Debbie has already
|
| 12 | alluded to is, when there is change, you would expect
|
| 13 | many in the industry to react to that change. They can
|
| 14 | react by bringing out new products, services, trying to
|
| 15 | compete harder, or they may react by going to their
|
| 16 | state real estate commission, their state legislature,
|
| 17 | trying to obtain measures that will protect them from
|
| 18 | the forces of those changes. It's not a new phenomenon.
|
| 19 | I strongly suspect that the manufacturers of horses and
|
| 20 | buggies were not big fans of Henry Clay Ford, and
|
| 21 | similarly, it's probably true that the makers of the IBM
|
| 22 | Selectric were not big fans of the Wang word processing
|
| 23 | system, but from the consumer perspective, these types
|
| 24 | of changes can be good.
|
| 25 | Now, again, I want to emphasize here that I'm |
Page 19
| 1 | not suggesting that every time somebody goes to a real
|
| 2 | estate commission or legislature that that's not good.
|
| 3 | There are many laws, many regulations that are passed
|
| 4 | that can be helpful to consumers. We certainly suspect
|
| 5 | that there are some efforts that have been undertaken
|
| 6 | recently that are not so helpful for consumers, and
|
| 7 | Debbie alluded to a couple of those.
|
| 8 | One of those -- and it's been going on for a
|
| 9 | number of years -- has to do with the definition of the
|
| 10 | practice of law. There are a number of states that
|
| 11 | allow laypersons, non-lawyers, to provide certain
|
| 12 | closing services relating to these transactions, and in
|
| 13 | the states where that's allowed, people have done
|
| 14 | studies, and they've found out that there doesn't appear
|
| 15 | to be any greater incidence of consumer complaints of
|
| 16 | consumer harm. The cost of those services provided by
|
| 17 | laypersons is lower, and indeed, the cost of those same
|
| 18 | services provided by attorneys is lower because they
|
| 19 | face competition from the non-lawyers. That's an
|
| 20 | example of when we believe something is good and
|
| 21 | successful regulation or, shall we say, limited
|
| 22 | regulation that advances the interests of consumer
|
| 23 | welfare.
|
| 24 | There have been a number of states who have
|
| 25 | looked at expanding the definition of "practice of law" |
Page 20
| 1 | to prevent laypersons from providing those real estate
|
| 2 | closing services. We have been asked in a number of
|
| 3 | instances to provide our perspective, and we have done
|
| 4 | so, and we have had a number of what we view as
|
| 5 | successes in terms of encouraging people to keep the
|
| 6 | definition relatively narrow.
|
| 7 | More recently, Debbie again alluded to the what
|
| 8 | I call minimum service legislation or regulations. On
|
| 9 | the one hand, these can be presented as a consumer
|
| 10 | protection measure designed to ensure that when I retain
|
| 11 | a real estate broker, I am going to get the services
|
| 12 | that I expect. There's another perspective out there
|
| 13 | that suggests that it's no different than passing a
|
| 14 | regulation that says, "When I walk into McDonald's and
|
| 15 | order a hamburger, I'm told that I also have to buy some
|
| 16 | french fries, because the state has decided that it
|
| 17 | might be deceptive or misleading or bad if I only got
|
| 18 | the hamburger, paid for it and didn't realize I wasn't
|
| 19 | going to get the french fries." I may not want french
|
| 20 | fries, and from that perspective, being able to choose
|
| 21 | from amongst a menu of services to buy only the things
|
| 22 | that you want to buy we generally view as a good and
|
| 23 | positive thing.
|
| 24 | What do we do about these situations? Our role
|
| 25 | is threefold. First is to educate ourselves, and that's |
Page 21
| 1 | what we're here to do today. Second is to use the
|
| 2 | benefit of our experience and the information that we
|
| 3 | collect to educate others who have to make a decision,
|
| 4 | and when, for example, a state legislature is
|
| 5 | considering a proposed minimum service law, we have been
|
| 6 | asked to and we try to respond to those requests to give
|
| 7 | the benefit of our knowledge and information, and I'm
|
| 8 | slightly more optimistic than Debbie on this one. I
|
| 9 | think we have had some successes.
|
| 10 | In a fairly public example, the State of
|
| 11 | Oklahoma amended the legislation after looking at what
|
| 12 | we and others had to say about it, to narrow the
|
| 13 | restrictions, to provide and preserve more consumer
|
| 14 | choice. There have been several other states where they
|
| 15 | have reached out, asked us for input, and in response to
|
| 16 | some of that input, they made changes. That, from our
|
| 17 | perspective, is positive.
|
| 18 | Our message to these lawmakers is before you
|
| 19 | restrict consumer choice, before you require a purchase
|
| 20 | of certain services, make sure there's a need to do so,
|
| 21 | and if you decide that there's a need to do so, we
|
| 22 | recommend doing it as narrowly and on limited a basis as
|
| 23 | possible. Ultimately, with respect to the legislatures,
|
| 24 | we understand and respect that it is their choice. Our
|
| 25 | role is to help them make the most informed choices |
Page 22
| 1 | possible.
|
| 2 | There are times, however, where we run across a
|
| 3 | state-related restriction that we think allows us to
|
| 4 | have a more active role. An example of that would be
|
| 5 | the case that the Antitrust Division brought against the
|
| 6 | Kentucky Real Estate Commission earlier this year. It
|
| 7 | related to a rebate prohibition that prohibited brokers
|
| 8 | from giving a rebate on their commission to their
|
| 9 | clients. From what we could tell, there was no
|
| 10 | pro-competitive justification for this rule. There was
|
| 11 | certainly an obvious restriction on competition. When
|
| 12 | we looked into it, we looked at some of the statements
|
| 13 | from the brokers themselves who said -- in their words,
|
| 14 | not mine -- that "this regulation was preventing the
|
| 15 | outbreak of a bidding war. It was preventing consumers
|
| 16 | from demanding things that would reduce broker profits,"
|
| 17 | and from our perspective, that made the regulation a bad
|
| 18 | thing, anti-consumer, and we challenged it. I'm pleased
|
| 19 | to say that we have a proposed settlement pending with
|
| 20 | the Court right now and that brokers in the State of
|
| 21 | Kentucky are already beginning to offer rebates and
|
| 22 | other inducements, which we view as a positive thing.
|
| 23 | Stepping back a little bit, I note that, again,
|
| 24 | coming back to what I said, what we are trying to do is
|
| 25 | shed light on the facts, the issues or what is going on, |
Page 23
| 1 | so legislatures can make informed choices, real estate
|
| 2 | commissions can make informed choices, and if necessary,
|
| 3 | judges can make informed choices.
|
| 4 | Finally, I will mention just briefly that one
|
| 5 | other possible source of the rise in real estate
|
| 6 | commissions and potentially profits is, of course,
|
| 7 | private agreements beyond the scope of what I've just
|
| 8 | been talking about, and I'll have no further comment on
|
| 9 | that for now.
|
| 10 | So, again, thank you very much for
|
| 11 | participating. We do think that this is an
|
| 12 | extraordinarily important issue, appreciate the effort
|
| 13 | that the staff have put into this. We look forward to
|
| 14 | hearing from you, to evaluating the results and seeing
|
| 15 | what we can all do to improve the welfare of consumers
|
| 16 | in this important industry.
|
| 17 | Thank you.
|
| 18 | (Applause.)
|
| 19 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Tom and
|
| 20 | Debbie, for your remarks.
|
| 21 | At this point, we are going to start the first
|
| 22 | panel. So, if you will just give us a moment's
|
| 23 | indulgence, I ask Cathy Whatley and Robert Hahn to come
|
| 24 | up, and we will get started.
|
| 25 | (Pause in the proceedings.) |
Page 24
| 1 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Well, this is the overview
|
| 2 | panel, and the purpose of this panel is to, as Chairman
|
| 3 | Majoras mentioned, give an overview of the transaction
|
| 4 | and go through some of the relationships between buyers
|
| 5 | and sellers and brokers and the MLS and different things
|
| 6 | like that and also identify some of the areas that may
|
| 7 | be raising competitive issues and competitive concerns.
|
| 8 | To help educate us all and inform us, we have
|
| 9 | Cathy Whatley, the 2003 President of the National
|
| 10 | Association of Realtors. Cathy is a realtor from
|
| 11 | Jacksonville, Florida, and I should mention that the NAR
|
| 12 | is the largest professional association with over a
|
| 13 | million members. She's been a realtor since 1969 and is
|
| 14 | the broker/owner of Buck & Buck, a family firm
|
| 15 | established by her grandfather in 1907.
|
| 16 | Cathy has also been very active at the state
|
| 17 | level, and she was the President of the Florida
|
| 18 | Association of Realtors in 1996 and received the Realtor
|
| 19 | of the Year Award in 1998. She currently serves as one
|
| 20 | of the nine commissioners on the Florida Commission on
|
| 21 | Ethics and also is a member of the State's Impact Fee
|
| 22 | Task Force. She lives in Jacksonville with her husband,
|
| 23 | and she has five children and seven grandchildren.
|
| 24 | On my left, your right, is Robert Hahn.
|
| 25 | It's all right if we call you Bob? Okay. |
Page 25
| 1 | He is the Co-Founder and Executive Director of
|
| 2 | the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint
|
| 3 | Center, which focuses on regulation and antitrust.
|
| 4 | Previously, Bob worked for the Council of Economic
|
| 5 | Advisers. He has also served on the faculties of
|
| 6 | Harvard University and Carnegie Mellon University, and
|
| 7 | he frequently contributes to leading scholarly journals
|
| 8 | and general-interest periodicals, including the American
|
| 9 | Economic Review, Yale Law Journal, Science, and the New
|
| 10 | York Times.
|
| 11 | He is the author of "Reviving Regulatory Reform:
|
| 12 | A Global Perspective," which is put out by
|
| 13 | AEI-Brookings, and several other books. He is also
|
| 14 | Co-Founder of the Community Prep School, an inner-city
|
| 15 | middle school in Providence, Rhode Island that provides
|
| 16 | opportunities for disadvantaged youth to achieve their
|
| 17 | full potential.
|
| 18 | I would like to just thank you both for coming
|
| 19 | today.
|
| 20 | This is just going to be basically -- we are not
|
| 21 | going to do formal presentations. It's just a
|
| 22 | discussion, so I'll be playing the Oprah character this
|
| 23 | morning, I guess, posing some questions and just going
|
| 24 | through some of these topics and getting the viewpoints
|
| 25 | of these both very well-informed and experienced people. |
Page 26
| 1 | First of all, I guess, the first question is,
|
| 2 | who are the relevant players in the real estate
|
| 3 | brokerage industry and what roles do they play?
|
| 4 | Maybe, Cathy, you can -- feel free to both jump
|
| 5 | in, but maybe we will start with Cathy on that one.
|
| 6 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure.
|
| 7 | There are a number of relevant players in the
|
| 8 | real estate transaction. You certainly start with the
|
| 9 | buyer, the seller. You have the real estate
|
| 10 | professional, and then you have a lot of additional
|
| 11 | relevant players, such as the mortgage lender, the
|
| 12 | insurance agent, the home inspector, the termite or WDO,
|
| 13 | as we call it, wood-destroying organism inspector, the
|
| 14 | surveyor, the appraiser, the closing attorney, the title
|
| 15 | company, the escrow agent. There are a number of
|
| 16 | relevant parts to the transaction that are essential to
|
| 17 | get from the buyer and seller actually having a
|
| 18 | discussion about the purchase and sale of that home to
|
| 19 | actually getting the keys to the home when they get to
|
| 20 | closing.
|
| 21 | I think just to start the discussion, I'd like
|
| 22 | to maybe paint a picture, and I think of it as somewhat
|
| 23 | analogous to a play. You might be at a theater. If
|
| 24 | you're in the audience, everything seems to go very
|
| 25 | smoothly because everyone has a role. They know their |
Page 27
| 1 | part. They know their part in the script. In the event
|
| 2 | that something were not to go well and someone either
|
| 3 | enters at the wrong time, forgets their lines, it
|
| 4 | becomes very disruptive to the process. The ultimate
|
| 5 | end goal for both the buyer and the seller is to have a
|
| 6 | successful closing. So, all parts of the transaction
|
| 7 | are extremely relevant to make sure that it is a very
|
| 8 | seamless and successful transaction for the buyer and
|
| 9 | seller.
|
| 10 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, maybe you could follow up
|
| 11 | on that and just say, what role does the real estate
|
| 12 | agent play in -- like a number of the things you
|
| 13 | mentioned involved the legal requirements for
|
| 14 | transferring the property in a particular state and
|
| 15 | certain financial requirements.
|
| 16 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, in my role as a real estate
|
| 17 | professional, depending upon whether I'm assisting the
|
| 18 | buyer or the seller, I have different roles in that
|
| 19 | transaction, but ultimately a real estate professional,
|
| 20 | and if there are more than one in the transaction, will
|
| 21 | work together to make sure that all parts of that
|
| 22 | transaction are facilitated appropriately, not only in
|
| 23 | terms of actually showing the property, marketing the
|
| 24 | property, working through the transaction itself,
|
| 25 | meeting the home inspector, helping the seller and/or |
Page 28
| 1 | the buyer understand what the results of that inspection
|
| 2 | were, overseeing repairs, making sure that things that
|
| 3 | are necessarily time-sensitive get responded to in a
|
| 4 | time-sensitive manner.
|
| 5 | I think that the transaction itself, if you talk
|
| 6 | about what has technology done to the transaction, it's
|
| 7 | not just the internet that has driven things.
|
| 8 | Technology has shortened the entire process time for the
|
| 9 | buyer and seller to be able to transact this sale, and
|
| 10 | so when you talk about the internet, the internet is
|
| 11 | just one part of technology that has driven a shortened
|
| 12 | time frame, which really makes it more critical than
|
| 13 | ever to have someone who understands the script, to be
|
| 14 | able to make every stage of that process work, to come
|
| 15 | to a successful closing.
|
| 16 | DR. HAHN: Can I just comment?
|
| 17 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Yes, sure, Bob.
|
| 18 | DR. HAHN: I agree with most of what Cathy says,
|
| 19 | but what strikes me -- my mom was a real estate agent
|
| 20 | and my dad was a real estate broker but dealing with
|
| 21 | commercial, and my mom dealt with residential.
|
| 22 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We can't hear you.
|
| 23 | DR. HAHN: I can swallow the mic if you like.
|
| 24 | I was saying that my mom was a real estate agent
|
| 25 | in the residential market, and my dad dealt with |
Page 29
| 1 | commercial and real estate management, but what's
|
| 2 | striking, even though Cathy is talking about changes in
|
| 3 | technology, is when I look at the kind of transaction
|
| 4 | that my mom engaged in, if I'm allowed to say it, 30
|
| 5 | years ago or 40 years ago since she's not here, it's
|
| 6 | virtually the same as the transaction that most of you
|
| 7 | engage in today when you buy or sell a house.
|
| 8 | I don't see a whole lot of new technology
|
| 9 | entering into this transaction or the kinds of gains
|
| 10 | that we've seen in other industries and the internet
|
| 11 | resulting, at least in the residential market, in
|
| 12 | benefits for consumers. So, in that sense, while I
|
| 13 | think we're beginning to see some new models emerge, I
|
| 14 | think public policy -- and I think Mr. Barnett alluded
|
| 15 | to this in his remarks -- public policy could have an
|
| 16 | impact on the pace at which they emerge and the likely
|
| 17 | benefits that could accrue to consumers.
|
| 18 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: So, Bob, just to make sure that
|
| 19 | I understand what you're saying, you're saying there is
|
| 20 | technology out there, and there is a role for it, but
|
| 21 | it's not being adopted as quickly into the process as
|
| 22 | one might expect?
|
| 23 | DR. HAHN: Certainly based on other industries.
|
| 24 | If you were to look at airlines, for example, you would
|
| 25 | probably go and bring up your favorite web site -- I am |
Page 30
| 1 | not going to give an advertisement for one of them --
|
| 2 | and go get an airline ticket. You don't have that kind
|
| 3 | of menu of choices, at least the way I and my
|
| 4 | colleagues, Bob Litan and Jesse Gurman, who wrote a
|
| 5 | paper on this recently for the real estate industry.
|
| 6 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that brings me to my
|
| 7 | next question, which is the menu of services, because I
|
| 8 | also wanted to talk a little bit about the MLS and the
|
| 9 | part of the transaction, the service that the real
|
| 10 | estate agent provides in listing a seller's property in
|
| 11 | the MLS or showing MLS data to a buyer.
|
| 12 | Maybe, Cathy, you could expand on that a little
|
| 13 | bit.
|
| 14 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. The Multiple Listing
|
| 15 | Service -- let me start with the understanding that the
|
| 16 | MLS is a broker-to-broker information exchange that
|
| 17 | provides the opportunity for cooperation and
|
| 18 | compensation. It establishes rules by which we all
|
| 19 | understand are discussion points. It tells me if I put
|
| 20 | the property in as a listing agent, I'm then allowing
|
| 21 | those who are cooperating in the marketplace, in my
|
| 22 | marketplace, to have access to that information, and it
|
| 23 | tells them at what fee that I am willing to cooperate
|
| 24 | with them. So, that's all disclosed up front, and
|
| 25 | that's a very important part, because if you talk about |
Page 31
| 1 | what brings an efficient marketplace, the ability to
|
| 2 | have aggregated information for me, as a practitioner,
|
| 3 | to be able to go and have information that other brokers
|
| 4 | in my marketplace are willing to share with me, to allow
|
| 5 | me to have the information that I can assist my customer
|
| 6 | and client with.
|
| 7 | It also spells out what the cooperation is that
|
| 8 | that listing agent is willing to pay me if I'm going to
|
| 9 | show the property, and that is highly competitive. I
|
| 10 | can tell you that that is extremely competitive in the
|
| 11 | marketplace. A lot of things are driven by supply and
|
| 12 | demand, and we have been through a period of increasing
|
| 13 | demand for real estate and limited supply. So, if there
|
| 14 | is anything that really can motivate competition, it is
|
| 15 | limited supply and strong demand and vice versa. So,
|
| 16 | you know, it is important.
|
| 17 | The MLS is strategically one of the most
|
| 18 | valuable things to me, and that's done because the
|
| 19 | brokers in my marketplace are all willing to cooperate
|
| 20 | and provide that information in a competitive
|
| 21 | environment but still working in the best interests of
|
| 22 | their customers or clients.
|
| 23 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Let me just follow up, Cathy --
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: Can I --
|
| 25 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Okay, Bob, and then -- |
Page 32
| 1 | DR. HAHN: This is absolutely crucial and an
|
| 2 | area where weary economists like myself might differ
|
| 3 | from the average person on the street, but I want to
|
| 4 | talk about the MLS for a minute and try to quote what
|
| 5 | Cathy just said.
|
| 6 | The MLS provides for cooperation among
|
| 7 | competitors, I think that's what she said, and I think I
|
| 8 | would also agree -- before I explain where I might
|
| 9 | disagree with Cathy -- that sometimes cooperation among
|
| 10 | competitors can be a really good thing, but by the same
|
| 11 | token, what we as economists know is when we allow
|
| 12 | competitors to cooperate, we want to look very closely
|
| 13 | at the rules that they might have about who can
|
| 14 | cooperate with each other and the conditions under which
|
| 15 | they can cooperate with each other.
|
| 16 | The MLS is essentially a club, and its members
|
| 17 | decide who gets to be in this club, who gets to share
|
| 18 | the listings, and the conditions under which they get to
|
| 19 | share the listings. From an economist's perspective,
|
| 20 | the more different types of folks who might get to share
|
| 21 | those listings, the more likely it is that the consumers
|
| 22 | are likely to be presented with a wide array of choices.
|
| 23 | So, I think this is a point that will come up later
|
| 24 | today, but it's important to note that when Cathy talks
|
| 25 | about competition, yes, it's absolutely true that my mom |
Page 33
| 1 | would compete vigorously for listings, just as people do
|
| 2 | today, but that's very different from competition about
|
| 3 | who gets in the club, because the club decides the rules
|
| 4 | on who gets to be a member.
|
| 5 | So, for example, in the extreme, if a club
|
| 6 | decided only two people could be members and 17 people
|
| 7 | had a legitimate reason or a legitimate business model,
|
| 8 | albeit slightly different from those in the club, you
|
| 9 | might not think that that's an arrangement that the
|
| 10 | Department of Justice or the FTC would necessarily think
|
| 11 | was a good thing or was necessarily a good thing for
|
| 12 | consumers. So, I think that in a way we might be
|
| 13 | talking past each other, but economists see the problem
|
| 14 | a little bit differently.
|
| 15 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that feeds into what
|
| 16 | my question was going to be for you, Cathy, is who runs
|
| 17 | the MLSs and the kinds of rules that they promulgate?
|
| 18 | What do you see as sort of the most important rules that
|
| 19 | an MLS may promulgate for its members?
|
| 20 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, most of the MLSs do have
|
| 21 | boards. They are made up of realtor members. That
|
| 22 | varies from MLS to MLS, because the MLS is unique to
|
| 23 | each individual market. The National Association of
|
| 24 | Realtors does not have, you know, guidelines that
|
| 25 | everyone must establish, they are unique to the |
Page 34
| 1 | marketplace, but they are highly competitive as well.
|
| 2 | I want to state, too, that understand that the
|
| 3 | Multiple Listing Service has been validated by the
|
| 4 | courts. So, don't miss the point that it is an
|
| 5 | allowable opportunity to have this information provided
|
| 6 | to us as a benefit of our membership in the realtor
|
| 7 | organization, and the fact is that it is
|
| 8 | broker-to-broker cooperation. It's not trying to limit
|
| 9 | the club. It's trying to make sure that there are
|
| 10 | cooperation and compensation guidelines which everyone
|
| 11 | knows, because that's in the best interests of the
|
| 12 | consumer.
|
| 13 | Actually, again, the fact that you've got a
|
| 14 | distinguishable database of aggregated information helps
|
| 15 | the consumer because it allows us and now the consumer
|
| 16 | in those marketplaces where it's highly visible, such as
|
| 17 | REALTOR.com, to be able to see information and to have
|
| 18 | that efficient marketplace roll smoothly.
|
| 19 | DR. HAHN: I want to respond to that, if I
|
| 20 | might.
|
| 21 | Cathy said the MLS has been validated by the
|
| 22 | club, but it's also --
|
| 23 | MS. WHATLEY: By the courts.
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: Or by the courts, excuse me, but it's
|
| 25 | also true that at one point commissions were totally |
Page 35
| 1 | non-negotiable, which economists would call price fixing
|
| 2 | of a sort, and the courts struck that down. So, it's
|
| 3 | not as if this club has engaged only in activity that I
|
| 4 | would view as pro-consumer or pro-competitive. I would
|
| 5 | say that there have been major benefits from the setting
|
| 6 | up of a platform however many years ago that was called
|
| 7 | the MLS, but I also think it's time to take a serious
|
| 8 | look at what the institution can and cannot do and
|
| 9 | whether that's good for consumers, which is what I care
|
| 10 | about.
|
| 11 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, sticking with the MLS,
|
| 12 | I understand that not all listings go in in the same
|
| 13 | form, and I was hoping, Cathy, you could explain to us
|
| 14 | the differences between an exclusive right to sell, an
|
| 15 | exclusive agency, and something that's sometimes called
|
| 16 | an open listing contract.
|
| 17 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. An exclusive right to sell
|
| 18 | agreement is one where the seller lists their property
|
| 19 | with a real estate firm, and there is a fee, either a
|
| 20 | percentage or a flat fee, that is agreed to, and that
|
| 21 | fee is paid regardless of who finds the purchaser for
|
| 22 | the property. So, even if the seller has someone to
|
| 23 | approach him in the store and they say, you know, "I've
|
| 24 | got my house up for sale." The seller then says,
|
| 25 | "Contact my real estate professional." The lead may |
Page 36
| 1 | have come from the seller, and that comes to me, but
|
| 2 | there is still an agreed-upon commission structure.
|
| 3 | Most oftentimes, it is cooperation between real estate
|
| 4 | companies, an exclusive right to sell.
|
| 5 | An exclusive agency agreement, if that same
|
| 6 | seller lists with me, if any other real estate
|
| 7 | professional brings the buyer to the transaction, there
|
| 8 | is still a fee paid; however, if the seller has someone
|
| 9 | that they may have a pre-arrangement with, that they've
|
| 10 | said, you know, four people have contacted me and said
|
| 11 | I'm really interested, if you ever sell your house,
|
| 12 | please let me know, and they were exclusions and/or the
|
| 13 | seller retained the right to sell to someone that they
|
| 14 | found individually, that would be an exclusive agency
|
| 15 | relationship.
|
| 16 | The third is an open listing, and an open
|
| 17 | listing is where the seller could tell each one of us as
|
| 18 | licensees, "If you bring me a customer, I will pay you a
|
| 19 | fee," but there is nothing exclusive about it. It is
|
| 20 | independent, each one operating in that own environment.
|
| 21 | And I just can't leave the last comment without
|
| 22 | saying to Bob, I think we all serve consumers. The real
|
| 23 | estate professional's major responsibility is to work
|
| 24 | for their customer and client. We are in the business
|
| 25 | to serve the consumer. So, in that regard, we are both |
Page 37
| 1 | on the same level.
|
| 2 | DR. HAHN: I don't dispute that. The airline
|
| 3 | industry, when essentially fares had to be filed with
|
| 4 | the Civil Aeronautics Board, also could make a strong
|
| 5 | argument that they served consumers in the sense that
|
| 6 | when people purchased a ticket, we knew that it was at
|
| 7 | least worth the value of that ticket to take the ride
|
| 8 | from San Francisco to New York.
|
| 9 | The question from an economic perspective is is
|
| 10 | this industrial structure that we call the residential
|
| 11 | real estate market the best way to serve consumers? I'm
|
| 12 | not suggesting that any individual agent would not work
|
| 13 | to promote the interests of necessarily the buyer or the
|
| 14 | seller, because that's what they're supposed to do.
|
| 15 | MS. WHATLEY: But a real estate transaction is
|
| 16 | unique in that there are multiple consumers who have to
|
| 17 | be served. When you're talking about the airlines, when
|
| 18 | you're talking about other industries such as that, you
|
| 19 | have one consumer who is able to interact with the
|
| 20 | business environment. It's different in the real estate
|
| 21 | transaction where you have two consumers who both need
|
| 22 | to be served, and the public interest, you know, that is
|
| 23 | a very strong component, which I think makes it distinct
|
| 24 | and different from some of the other areas that may be
|
| 25 | discussed. |
Page 38
| 1 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, Cathy --
|
| 2 | DR. HAHN: There are a number of markets in
|
| 3 | which you have buyers and sellers and platforms,
|
| 4 | including your cousin, commercial real estate. So, I
|
| 5 | don't see that there's anything particularly unique
|
| 6 | about it. But you're right that you need to cater to
|
| 7 | buyers and sellers to get people to yes.
|
| 8 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, this might be a good
|
| 9 | point, Cathy, to go into the issue of the relationship
|
| 10 | between the agent who brings the buyer in and the duties
|
| 11 | that that agent may owe to the buyer and to the seller
|
| 12 | and the interaction between the listing agent and the
|
| 13 | agent who brings in the buyer.
|
| 14 | MS. WHATLEY: Understand that the state -- and
|
| 15 | it was mentioned earlier -- that the licensing is
|
| 16 | regulated at the state level. So, you have 50 states
|
| 17 | who have 50 state legislatures who enact laws and 50
|
| 18 | state real estate commissions who implement those laws.
|
| 19 | It varies in terms of what the real estate
|
| 20 | professional's duties and responsibilities are based
|
| 21 | upon what the state may have determined are those duties
|
| 22 | and responsibilities.
|
| 23 | By and large, most states work in an agency
|
| 24 | environment, meaning that there's common law areas,
|
| 25 | common law of agency, which talks about fiduciary duties |
Page 39
| 1 | of obedience, loyalty, confidentiality, disclosure.
|
| 2 | There are some states who have established a little bit
|
| 3 | different type of fiduciary responsibilities and the
|
| 4 | real estate professional may be working in a transaction
|
| 5 | or a facilitator capacity, and so there are different
|
| 6 | defined fiduciary duties in those circumstances.
|
| 7 | There are times when a real estate professional
|
| 8 | may be working with a buyer who is actually their
|
| 9 | customer as opposed to their client. So, there are
|
| 10 | various levels at which the responsibility of the real
|
| 11 | estate professional may be in terms of fiduciary duties
|
| 12 | to their buyer, customer or client.
|
| 13 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: And in that also, could you
|
| 14 | explain how the splitting of the commission works
|
| 15 | between the listing and the cooperating brokers?
|
| 16 | Typically. I understand it varies.
|
| 17 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. When I go out and I list a
|
| 18 | property, at the time that I list that and put it into
|
| 19 | the Multiple Listing Service, I make a definitive
|
| 20 | determination of what my real estate company will pay to
|
| 21 | a cooperating real estate firm and that broker. That is
|
| 22 | disclosed in the Multiple Listing Service where anyone
|
| 23 | who is going to show that property knows what I'm
|
| 24 | willing to pay.
|
| 25 | If they have any question about that payment, |
Page 40
| 1 | they have to address that with me and either renegotiate
|
| 2 | it up front if they're unhappy with it, because once
|
| 3 | they've shown the property, then I have presumed that
|
| 4 | they have understood that is my compensation and that's
|
| 5 | what they will receive if they bring a customer and a
|
| 6 | buyer and we ultimately negotiate the contract.
|
| 7 | Everyone is considered a cooperating broker.
|
| 8 | You may have a cooperating broker who is a buyer's
|
| 9 | agent, who is working exclusively for the buyer, has
|
| 10 | exclusive fiduciary duties to that buyer. You may have
|
| 11 | a cooperating broker who is a subagent, actually is
|
| 12 | working on behalf of the seller. You may have a
|
| 13 | cooperating broker who is a transaction broker who has
|
| 14 | limited fiduciary duties, but their role is to make sure
|
| 15 | that the transaction works smoothly.
|
| 16 | But the compensation part is actually
|
| 17 | established, and that's why it's so important that it is
|
| 18 | known up front, because it would be extremely disruptive
|
| 19 | in the marketplace if I didn't know that, if I couldn't
|
| 20 | go into the MLS and it tell me what it was that the
|
| 21 | other broker was willing to pay me in the event I had a
|
| 22 | customer who was willing to buy that.
|
| 23 | DR. HAHN: Let's explore that for a minute.
|
| 24 | First of all, I just want to make a comment about these
|
| 25 | split arrangements. Sometimes they have been required |
Page 41
| 1 | by the MLS bylaws, these traditional split arrangements,
|
| 2 | and from an economics point of view, that isn't
|
| 3 | necessarily a good thing.
|
| 4 | But when you tune in to -- if you're thinking
|
| 5 | about taking a flight, say, from Washington, D.C. to
|
| 6 | Providence or Boston, you don't necessarily have your
|
| 7 | fees or your splits set up front. You go look at the
|
| 8 | computer screen, and you say, "Today it's going to cost
|
| 9 | me $100 on Airline X and 50 bucks on Airline Y," and you
|
| 10 | decide whether the time's convenient or not and you
|
| 11 | choose.
|
| 12 | So, it's not necessarily clear to me that having
|
| 13 | the consumer know everything with certainty up front as
|
| 14 | a particular fixed price is a good thing. I mean, we
|
| 15 | may want to see more competition over price and
|
| 16 | certainly the menu of services that's offered. So, I
|
| 17 | think that's an open question, and that's why economists
|
| 18 | like the idea of different business models out there so
|
| 19 | we can see which ones actually will win in the
|
| 20 | marketplace.
|
| 21 | MS. WHATLEY: As a practitioner, though, if I
|
| 22 | did not have that information and I am working in an
|
| 23 | exclusive buyer agency relationship and I don't know
|
| 24 | that and my customer has a commitment to a certain level
|
| 25 | of compensation to me, in the event that that is not |
Page 42
| 1 | achieved and I can't tell my customer that up front, I
|
| 2 | haven't served my consumer customer. So, it's very
|
| 3 | important that the entire process is known.
|
| 4 | For instance -- and it is highly competitive --
|
| 5 | in my marketplace, I can look on my MLS, and it will
|
| 6 | vary from listing to listing as to whatever the
|
| 7 | cooperating compensation is to me. Some it might be X
|
| 8 | percent, some it might be $1, because it can be a flat
|
| 9 | fee, and it can be as low as $1.
|
| 10 | Now, if it is a $1 cooperating compensation and
|
| 11 | I have a buyer broker agreement and the buyer is
|
| 12 | committed that I am going to receive at least a minimum
|
| 13 | compensation of X and I can't tell my buyer that before
|
| 14 | we even start in to go look at this property, I don't
|
| 15 | think I'm serving my buyer well. So, I think that the
|
| 16 | fact that the information is disclosed is very
|
| 17 | competitive, and the marketplace itself has driven very
|
| 18 | competitive pricing in terms of, you know, what the
|
| 19 | cooperating commission is.
|
| 20 | DR. HAHN: I'd like to take a poll here, see a
|
| 21 | show of hands of those people who own houses and have
|
| 22 | actually sold them, how many people sold them and had to
|
| 23 | pay a commission of 5 and a half to 6 percent?
|
| 24 | That doesn't suggest that there's necessarily
|
| 25 | collusion, but it does raise a flag that you want to be |
Page 43
| 1 | thinking about, that this price-setting arrangement may
|
| 2 | not necessarily be the best way of serving consumers
|
| 3 | generally.
|
| 4 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that also brings up
|
| 5 | another question I think that Tom Barnett had brought up
|
| 6 | in the Kentucky case, on the buyer side, the rebates
|
| 7 | that occasionally are paid to the buyers, and I just
|
| 8 | wanted to get your impression, Cathy, of whether that's
|
| 9 | common. Does that raise issues that you think can
|
| 10 | affect the effectiveness of the MLS, or do you see any
|
| 11 | issues or concerns with that?
|
| 12 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, I'm not sure how it would
|
| 13 | play in your question as to the MLS. You know, are
|
| 14 | there opportunities for people to be able to work with
|
| 15 | their buyers and sellers? Yes, there are. In Florida,
|
| 16 | am I allowed to compensate the buyer or seller back for
|
| 17 | my commission? Yes, I am, and that may come in some
|
| 18 | type of negotiated arrangement. In.
|
| 19 | The event that we get into discussions with the
|
| 20 | seller, if I'm working with the buyer, if we get into
|
| 21 | discussions with the seller and I find that what it's
|
| 22 | going to take to actually put this transaction together
|
| 23 | is eliminating a part of my fee or something, I mean,
|
| 24 | there are ways that compensation is rebated. Sometimes
|
| 25 | it's direct. I'm limited to directing it only to the |
Page 44
| 1 | buyer, to the parties in the transaction, in my state,
|
| 2 | but state by state makes those determinations.
|
| 3 | That's why you have state legislatures, and
|
| 4 | that's why you have regulatory bodies who implement the
|
| 5 | state legislation. They adopt what they believe is best
|
| 6 | for the consumers who have elected them.
|
| 7 | DR. HAHN: I don't get involved too much in
|
| 8 | state legislation, but from what I read in the papers
|
| 9 | and the academic literature, it's not unusual for the
|
| 10 | National Association of Realtors to come out on the side
|
| 11 | that price competition, which is essentially allowing
|
| 12 | rebates, is not a good thing and also supporting what
|
| 13 | Mr. Barnett alluded to, minimum quality standards
|
| 14 | related to real estate transactions, which is a flag
|
| 15 | also for economists, keeping certain competitors out who
|
| 16 | may only want to offer one part of the menu and not the
|
| 17 | total menu.
|
| 18 | So, I'm delighted to hear that Cathy is
|
| 19 | suggesting that this price competition is out there
|
| 20 | among realtors, and I would just urge the NAR and other
|
| 21 | groups at the state level to vote against legislation
|
| 22 | that puts restrictions on price competition.
|
| 23 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, I don't think minimum
|
| 24 | standards actually place restrictions on competition.
|
| 25 | In fact, I think minimum standards -- and I'm not |
Page 45
| 1 | speaking for the National Association of Realtors,
|
| 2 | because NAR is very neutral on this position -- but as a
|
| 3 | practitioner, what I believe is important is that both
|
| 4 | parties are able to actually get to the closing, and you
|
| 5 | cannot make unilateral decisions oftentimes as one party
|
| 6 | that don't ultimately have an impact on the other party
|
| 7 | in the transaction.
|
| 8 | If the consumer is making the selective decision
|
| 9 | that they're going to try to work through this process
|
| 10 | on their own, there's no issue to that as long as they
|
| 11 | understand all of the things that are responsible in
|
| 12 | that entire transaction, where they understand the level
|
| 13 | of service that is necessary, that they are having to
|
| 14 | bring to the transaction. There are financial
|
| 15 | consequences to buyers and sellers when the transaction
|
| 16 | does not close.
|
| 17 | Buyers have paid for appraisals. They've paid
|
| 18 | for credit reports. Often their lenders have charged
|
| 19 | them up-front processing or application fees. They are
|
| 20 | time-restricted to be able to close the transaction.
|
| 21 | They have lock-ins on their loans, and if they do not
|
| 22 | close within 30 days, their interest rate is at risk,
|
| 23 | and those costs are at risk for them. In addition, the
|
| 24 | buyer is out there. They've actually given notice to
|
| 25 | their apartment or wherever it is they're living. So, |
Page 46
| 1 | there are real time constraints in which the process has
|
| 2 | to work.
|
| 3 | And you're talking from one side of the seller's
|
| 4 | capability to be able to do all of it on his or her own,
|
| 5 | and that's fine as long as they understand. Oftentimes,
|
| 6 | though, the negotiation part requires somebody to help
|
| 7 | them understand exactly what it is that they're
|
| 8 | obligating themselves to, and in some contracts, the
|
| 9 | seller is obligated for those financial consequences if
|
| 10 | they are not able to bring the closing to the
|
| 11 | transaction.
|
| 12 | So, you know, if the seller is not told, "If you
|
| 13 | don't get to closing by 30 days, then you can't do
|
| 14 | this," then you have got all these buyer costs, and
|
| 15 | although the buyer said they were going to pay them in
|
| 16 | the contract, they are yours to pay now, Mr. Seller.
|
| 17 | It's just the understanding of the entire
|
| 18 | process, and the minimum level is either just making the
|
| 19 | seller aware that there are things that they need to
|
| 20 | know or minimal steps to be able to assure that both
|
| 21 | parties in that transaction can actually get to the
|
| 22 | point where the seller is handing the buyer the keys to
|
| 23 | the house.
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: I agree with that. I also think
|
| 25 | that's one area where the different kinds of internet |
Page 47
| 1 | models can play an incredibly important role simply
|
| 2 | because all you have to do is have one web site, and you
|
| 3 | know, if you're trying to build a new business model,
|
| 4 | and you can decide whether you want to target sellers
|
| 5 | and educate them and maybe get some fee for that or do
|
| 6 | the opposite for buyers. So, I agree with you that the
|
| 7 | transaction is complicated, but I also think there are
|
| 8 | other ways of skinning the cat and other models that
|
| 9 | should be allowed to emerge.
|
| 10 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, actually, I wanted to
|
| 11 | follow up. In our competition advocacy filings, we've
|
| 12 | certainly brought out the issue that consumers, to the
|
| 13 | extent they're not understanding an issue, what they're
|
| 14 | giving up, you know, the unbundled services that maybe a
|
| 15 | disclaimer or waiver or something might work, but also,
|
| 16 | the other issue that we've heard is concerns from agents
|
| 17 | that they might be put in an undisclosed dual agency
|
| 18 | situation, and maybe if you could expand a little bit on
|
| 19 | that, what that entails.
|
| 20 | MS. WHATLEY: I would say if either party in the
|
| 21 | transaction has questions, what tends to happen is that
|
| 22 | they will ask whoever is there in front of them. So, if
|
| 23 | I'm representing the buyer and the obligation for me,
|
| 24 | based upon the relationship that the listing agent has
|
| 25 | with the seller, is that I'm to fax the contract to the |
Page 48
| 1 | seller, I'm to present the contract to the seller, and
|
| 2 | that's not customary in my marketplace. In my
|
| 3 | marketplace, the listing agent presents all offers.
|
| 4 | That's not necessarily the case across the country, but
|
| 5 | that's what it is in my marketplace.
|
| 6 | I have a fiduciary duty to my buyer, but the
|
| 7 | seller who is sitting there is going to very naturally
|
| 8 | ask me questions about the contract. I mean, that's
|
| 9 | just typical. As they ask me those questions, I'm put
|
| 10 | in the position of either trying to say to the seller,
|
| 11 | "You know, I really can't answer that for you," which
|
| 12 | tends to not put my buyer in the best position, because
|
| 13 | the seller's automatically thinking I'm not trying to
|
| 14 | help them out. So, there are situations where it's a
|
| 15 | darned if you do and darned if you don't.
|
| 16 | If you try to answer those questions, you may be
|
| 17 | putting yourself in a position that you are not allowed
|
| 18 | to do based upon your fiduciary buyer duties with your
|
| 19 | client, and you are darned if you don't because the
|
| 20 | seller takes offense and they don't want to sell to your
|
| 21 | buyer.
|
| 22 | DR. HAHN: I think it's a difficult area. As
|
| 23 | Cathy points out, there can be conflicts of interest,
|
| 24 | and even if you sell your house and you have an agent,
|
| 25 | there are issues about how much effort that agent will |
Page 49
| 1 | put into selling your house. Steve Levitt, the
|
| 2 | author -- I guess the now famous author of Freakonomics,
|
| 3 | did this amazing little study where he looked at sellers
|
| 4 | selling their own houses versus sellers selling other
|
| 5 | people's houses and the prices that were fetched for
|
| 6 | comparable houses, and needless to say, when the agent
|
| 7 | sold her own house, the price fetched was considerably
|
| 8 | higher. They put a little bit more effort in, because
|
| 9 | at the margin, it was worth it to them, they were
|
| 10 | getting the pull pay-off, versus if they got an extra
|
| 11 | $20,000 for a seller, they are going to get, say, 1 and
|
| 12 | a half percent of that. So, there are incentive issues
|
| 13 | all over the place in the real estate market.
|
| 14 | It's a complicated market. I'm not saying
|
| 15 | there's anything wrong with putting more effort into
|
| 16 | selling your own house if you're an agent than if you're
|
| 17 | selling somebody else's house, but we need to look at
|
| 18 | those, and that's all the more reason -- I realize I'm
|
| 19 | becoming a broken record on this -- but that's all the
|
| 20 | more reason to have different competitive models out
|
| 21 | there and different kinds of services being offered to
|
| 22 | the consumer.
|
| 23 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, I wanted to give you the
|
| 24 | opportunity if you wanted to say anything on that.
|
| 25 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. You know, sellers make |
Page 50
| 1 | decisions for a lot of different reasons. They may
|
| 2 | elect to take a negotiated price because, in fact, if
|
| 3 | they figured that they had to pay another mortgage
|
| 4 | payment or two, it would be the same dollars to them.
|
| 5 | Maybe based upon the time sensitivity of the market,
|
| 6 | when you're in a hot seller's market -- in fact, our
|
| 7 | market is still an extremely strong seller's market.
|
| 8 | There isn't any seller who is going to take a property
|
| 9 | contingent upon the sale of their home.
|
| 10 | So, the time sensitivity of being able to get a
|
| 11 | contract, know that they can then go out into the
|
| 12 | marketplace and buy a home and not be at the price point
|
| 13 | of what it is today versus what it might be six months
|
| 14 | from now, it's all relative. Those are all things that
|
| 15 | the buyers and sellers take into consideration as
|
| 16 | they're considering offers.
|
| 17 | I won't speak to whether or not, you know, an
|
| 18 | agent may or may not make additional money. There may
|
| 19 | be an investment property versus something where the
|
| 20 | home seller is needing to get out. So, there are
|
| 21 | different stages of things, but I think it's very
|
| 22 | important to know that when I'm meeting with sellers
|
| 23 | every day, they make their selling decisions based upon
|
| 24 | a number of factors that influence what their housing
|
| 25 | decisions are going to be. |
Page 51
| 1 | Homestead Exemption, you know, are they going to
|
| 2 | be able to get in and be able to qualify for Homestead
|
| 3 | Exemption for that next year? In Florida, we have a 3
|
| 4 | percent cap on properties. So, it's very important that
|
| 5 | once you can get to that stage, then the property taxes
|
| 6 | are not going to increase by more than 3 percent. So,
|
| 7 | establishing that value as early on as possible is very
|
| 8 | important for people in my marketplace.
|
| 9 | So, there are a lot of things that weigh into
|
| 10 | the fact of why sellers make decisions based upon what
|
| 11 | they think is a reasonable price at which they're
|
| 12 | willing to sell.
|
| 13 | DR. HAHN: I agree.
|
| 14 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Bob, you had mentioned how many
|
| 15 | people had sold homes and paid the 6 or 7 percent
|
| 16 | commission. Based on some of the research that you've
|
| 17 | reviewed, does it suggest that there is some sort of
|
| 18 | optional rate out there, commission rate?
|
| 19 | DR. HAHN: There may be, but I have no idea what
|
| 20 | it is, and I don't think anybody else does either. I
|
| 21 | think the more interesting question that came up a
|
| 22 | little earlier is are these rates going down and what do
|
| 23 | we know about them? That's why I kind of did this
|
| 24 | little poll. The sad truth is that we know very little
|
| 25 | about them. |
Page 52
| 1 | When I issued or we issued an initial draft of
|
| 2 | our paper, we had hoped that we were going to get
|
| 3 | detailed microdata, not Mrs. Smith's, you know, we don't
|
| 4 | get to know who that is, but we wanted to see whether
|
| 5 | most folks were still paying 5, 6, whatever it is, and
|
| 6 | how that had changed over time.
|
| 7 | Steve Murray, who very graciously agreed to
|
| 8 | share with us some of his aggregate data along with the
|
| 9 | Wall Street Journal and everyone else, I mean, he has
|
| 10 | this generalized data, but I don't think it tells us
|
| 11 | very much about the structure of this market. So, one
|
| 12 | of the things that I would hope the FTC or Justice
|
| 13 | Department or Congress would do would be to figure out a
|
| 14 | way to get better data, but that's what economists like
|
| 15 | anyway, so we can publish papers.
|
| 16 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: That's what I've heard from our
|
| 17 | economists all the time, better data.
|
| 18 | Well, turning away from price competition, the
|
| 19 | recent GAO study suggested that brokers are competing
|
| 20 | more on non-price variables such as quality and
|
| 21 | reputation and level of service, and Cathy, I was
|
| 22 | wondering, do you think this is happening and sort of
|
| 23 | how does that play out in the market?
|
| 24 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, I can say I would disagree
|
| 25 | with the GAO in that there is price competition. I'm |
|