0001 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2 ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, : Civil Action 96-1285 3 et al. : Plaintiffs : 4 : Washington, D.C. V. : Monday, April 28, 2008 5 : DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Secretary : 6 of the Interior, et al. : : 10:00 a.m. 7 Defendants : 8 TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES ROBERTSON 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 APPEARANCES: 11 For the Plaintiffs: DENNIS GINGOLD, ESQUIRE LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS GINGOLD 12 607 14th Street, NW Ninth Floor 13 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 824-1448 14 ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, ESQUIRE 15 WILLIAM E. DORRIS, ESQUIRE KILPATRICK STOCKTON, L.L.P. 16 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 17 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4530 (404) 815-6450 18 KEITH HARPER, ESQUIRE 19 JUSTIN GUILDER, ESQUIRE KILPATRICK STOCKTON, L.L.P. 20 607 14th Street, N.W. Suite 900 21 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 585-0053 22 DAVID C. SMITH, ESQUIRE 23 DANIEL R. TAYLOR, JR., ESQUIRE KILPATRICK STOCKTON, L.L.P. 24 1001 West Fourth Street Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101 25 (336) 607-7392 0002 1 For the Defendants: ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ESQUIRE JOHN WARSHAWSKY, ESQUIRE 2 MICHAEL QUINN, ESQUIRE JOHN J. SIEMIETKOWSKI, ESQUIRE 3 U.S. Department of Justice 1100 L Street, N.W. 4 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 307-0010 5 JOHN STEMPLEWICZ, ESQUIRE 6 Senior Trial Attorney 7 U.S. Department of Justice 8 Commercial Litigation Branch 9 Civil Division 10 Ben Franklin Station 11 P.O. Box 975 12 Washington, D.C. 20044 13 (202) 307-1104 14 15 16 Court Reporter: REBECCA STONESTREET 17 Official Court Reporter 18 Room 6511, U.S. Courthouse 19 333 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 20 Washington, D.C. 20001 21 (202) 354-3249 22 23 24 Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript produced 25 by computer-aided transcription. 0003 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 COURTROOM DEPUTY: This is Civil Action Number 96-1285, 3 Cobell, et al. versus Gover, et al. 4 THE COURT: Counsel, as you stand to speak, state your 5 names for the court reporter. I won't enter appearances for 6 everybody at the beginning of this procedure. Some of you are 7 well-known to me, most of you are well-known to me. 8 We are here by prearrangement to talk about what might 9 be accomplished at another trial in this case, which I have set 10 for June 9th. And I have received something like 250 pages of 11 briefing from the parties, exclusive of appendices, attachments, 12 additions, reference materials, and so forth, which I and my 13 clerks have done our best to internalize. 14 And I understand that there are -- there is on the part 15 of the government enormous continued resistance to the very 16 idea, A, of having another trial, and B, of any remedy in this 17 case that has a dollar sign in front of it. And I understand on 18 the part of the plaintiffs that there are considerably more 19 zeros after the dollar sign than the government thinks is 20 possible, or frankly than I think is possible. 21 And the tent flap having been lifted by my order in 22 January, the plaintiffs are now asking me to -- I think they're 23 asking me to sweep into the remedy in this phase of the case all 24 kinds of things that I had thought were reserved to the 25 so-called management part of the case, which we haven't even 0004 1 begun to hear or contemplate. 2 To my way of thinking -- well, here's where I am today: 3 I have accepted provisionally -- I mean, I don't doubt the 4 ability, nor deny the right, of the parties to give me 300 more 5 pages of briefs on this question. But I accept provisionally 6 the major premise of the plaintiffs' case that what cannot be 7 accounted for must be replaced. 8 But I have also accepted the government's modalities of 9 accounting, which I don't mean to get a cheap laugh out of this, 10 but it's sort of close-enough-for-government-work theory of 11 accounting that the government and the Court of Appeals, by the 12 way, have decreed. 13 But as I found in January, that accounting doesn't 14 account for everything. In my January ruling I was critical of 15 what I considered the lackluster attention of both sides to the 16 question of how much cannot be accounted for. I thought from 17 the evidence at the last proceeding that the number was in the 18 vicinity of 3.6 billion, or 3 billion dollars; now the 19 plaintiffs have ratcheted that up to four and a half billion 20 dollars, I think principally by adding the Osage headrights 21 money, an arguable but I think questionable proposition. 22 With respect to both sides, I really don't want to hear 23 argument today about sovereign immunity, about jurisdiction, 24 about supremacy clause, about lots of the frankly ancillary 25 arguments that were in the briefs of both sides. 0005 1 What I am interested in, I think, are four basic 2 questions. The first is a question that I raised the last time 3 we were together that I don't think I have yet grasped the 4 answer to, and that is what I call the class certification 5 problem. Another way of putting that is to ask, if relief is 6 granted under a 23(b)(2) theory or a 23(b)(1) theory, what 7 further relief is precluded for class members who are bound by 8 that judgment? What is the claim-preclusive effect of a ruling, 9 and what is Eddie Jacobs and others like Eddie Jacobs going to 10 do? 11 The second major question which is raised in the 12 defendants' brief and really not responded to by the plaintiffs 13 is if there is an award with a dollar sign in front of it -- I 14 refuse to call it either damages or restitution or disgorgement. 15 Let's just call it an award with a dollar sign in front of it. 16 If there's an award with a dollar sign in front of it, who does 17 the money go to? How is it distributed? 18 There is sort of the suggestion in the plaintiffs' 19 brief that it would be just distributed pro rata, which makes 20 very little sense to me. But the complications of figuring out 21 who would get what share of what amount of money are quite 22 serious problems, it seems to me. 23 The third question relates to the time value of money, 24 which is either prejudgment interest or not. And if it is, I 25 have no jurisdiction; if it's not, it's something else. The 0006 1 plaintiffs have unearthed a very interesting decision by 2 Judge Boggs sitting in the 9th Circuit, concluding that the time 3 value of money improperly forfeited or seized in forfeiture is 4 not interest -- I mean -- yeah, is not prejudgment interest. 5 And I haven't come down on one side or another of that 6 issue, but before I even begin to come down on that issue, I 7 need to think about and counsel need to advise me about some of 8 the complexities that Judge Boggs noted in his opinion. Exactly 9 how is it calculated? Exactly how is the money booked? Where 10 was it booked? As one of my law clerks has pointed out to me, 11 during many of the years in question in this case, the United 12 States didn't have any debt, so what's the debt-servicing idea 13 here for years in which the United States was not borrowing 14 money? And, of course, the methodology of just allocating some 15 of any reward per year is certainly simple, but I might add the 16 word "istic" after the word simple. 17 So the time value of money problem is a serious problem 18 and one that I would think needs to be addressed in considerable 19 detail. 20 And finally, of course, what numbers follow the dollar 21 sign? What is the amount of the award? I used numbers of three 22 million and 3.6 million -- billion, excuse me. Three billion 23 and 3.6 billion in the January findings, but was frankly quite 24 critical of those numbers. And the government, of course, is 25 critical of those numbers. The plaintiff is happy with those 0007 1 numbers, or at least accepts those numbers, and wants to move on 2 from there by adding the time value of money to them. 3 But I do not consider that those numbers are -- I don't 4 think we're finished with that question, let's put it that way. 5 I don't think we're finished with that question at all. 6 Now, I have lots of other questions on my mind this 7 morning, but those are the major ones, class certification, how 8 is the money distributed, what about the time value of money, 9 and what is the amount of the award. And I would like to hear 10 from counsel on any of those four subjects, and if you have to 11 slip over into some other subject, okay, but frankly, I think 12 that's about all we have time to talk about in any serious 13 detail this morning. 14 Who goes first? Mr. Smith? 15 MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. David Smith 16 representing the plaintiffs. 17 You know, I'll focus on the first two issues that you 18 noted. Number one, the class certification problem if relief is 19 granted; what about the preclusive effect for any other actions 20 that may be brought, such as Mr. Jacobs. And number two, to 21 whom does the money go to. 22 Your Honor, addressing that first issue, a lot depends 23 on what the damage claim might be. There are certain damage 24 claims that certainly this Court, in various opinions, has 25 determined is not covered by this action. If the damage action 0008 1 is a failure to collect, I believe you said that's not within 2 the scope of this particular proceeding at this time. Certainly 3 that claim could have been brought in the claims court. If 4 there are certain mismanagement issues, those claims would not 5 be precluded. 6 The fact of the matter is that any individual 7 beneficiary could at any point have brought a damage action in 8 the court of claims if they felt it was possible. To our 9 knowledge, that has not happened during the course of this 10 litigation. The defendants certainly would be more aware of 11 that than we would because they would be the ones being sued. 12 So to our knowledge, certainly Mr. Jacobs hasn't filed 13 such an action, and we're not aware at this point of anybody 14 else who has. 15 The practical matter is, Your Honor, that given the 16 failure of accounting, that would be an impossible task. If 17 you're sitting here with money that's been placed into a 18 commingled account, nobody knows what the beginning account 19 balances are, there's -- without that accounting, nobody can go 20 and determine what their individual loss may be. 21 So as a practical matter, that remedy is not even 22 available for any plaintiff. Nobody can go over into the court 23 of claims and say, you know, based on this accounting, I've lost 24 this amount of money. So that possibility is really not a 25 reality, in our opinion. Could at some point someone try to do 0009 1 it, to go into the court of claims? Obviously that's a 2 possibility that a judge in that jurisdiction would have to 3 consider. 4 Your Honor, if this Court applied all the assumptions, 5 all the presumptions that a court of equity can in dealing with 6 a trust, giving every benefit of the doubt to the plaintiffs in 7 applying those trust principles, making the government go 8 through its proof of showing every disbursement, certainly I 9 could see the possibility that it would be precluded, any other 10 damage claim would be precluded. But as I understand from the 11 Court's ruling, that in fact is not what this Court is going to 12 do at this point. 13 Your Honor, the cases are not in agreement as to 14 whether a claim like this, dealing with equitable disgorgement, 15 what effect it may have on a damage claim, even if it was 16 possible. There are some cases that say you have to make an 17 election of remedies, there are some cases that say you give a 18 credit for anything you obtain in equity. Some cases you can 19 say you can do both. The cases certainly are not on agreement 20 on that point. 21 But it's our position that it really makes no 22 difference because it's not even possible. There's no 23 beneficiary of which we are aware who has had the advantage of 24 accounting to determine what individual losses may be. We don't 25 believe Mr. Jacobs or anybody else can do that. If the 0010 1 government had done that accounting, certainly that would be a 2 possibility. But it's not here. 3 So I don't think that's a concern, that any individual 4 plaintiff will actually attempt to do that under these 5 circumstances. 6 Your Honor, looking at the -- 7 THE COURT: Your argument triggers a subsidiary 8 question. If any plaintiff had accounting that is adequate 9 accounting back to the beginning, that plaintiff might have a 10 claim, you say. How are we to deal with judgement and per 11 capita accounts in this award? I'm using the word "award" as if 12 I had made one or as if I had promised to make one. I am not. 13 I'm using that word as shorthand. 14 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, presuming that there is an 15 award, the government raised the issue of judgement and per 16 capita accounts, and said certainly in this area we could show 17 an accounting and some damage claim could be made. 18 Your Honor, they had an opportunity to prove that at 19 the last trial, and as far as we could tell, they were 20 unsuccessful in showing that they could even produce an 21 accounting with respect to the very simple judgment or per 22 capita accounts. There were numerous issues that were 23 unanswered. There was no effort in those cases to, for example, 24 show the money was disbursed to the right people. Their 25 accountants looked at it but never looked at tribal rolls to 0011 1 make sure if money was properly disbursed. 2 Even in those cases where -- there may be some remote 3 cases out there where an account was opened just for a 4 particular judgment, and then disbursed, but in most cases these 5 were put into accounts and commingled with every other account 6 holder out there. And you have the same issues; you don't know 7 what the beginning account balances are. 8 There were huge issues dealing with judgement and per 9 capita accounts regarding interest, the interest to be 10 calculated, and those issues have never been resolved, despite 11 this trial. 12 So certainly the government had the opportunity to come 13 in and bring an action -- or had the opportunity to come in and 14 prove to the Court that with respect to this small class of 15 cases, we can do an accounting. As far as I can tell from the 16 evidence that was presented in this Court's ruling, they were 17 not able to do that. 18 And so I would put those class of -- 19 THE COURT: So you think they're precluded from doing 20 that in the hearing that we've got coming up in June? 21 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I think that would be 22 ultimately your decision. They certainly had the opportunity to 23 do it and did not do it. I think that was the purpose of that 24 trial, was to show what the government could and could not do, 25 and they were unsuccessful in doing that. 0012 1 You know, it's potential that a judgment or per capita 2 creditor could bring a damages action for money mismanagement 3 problems dealing with the management of those accounts, but 4 again, that's another issue that I don't believe is encompassed 5 within the scope of this particular proceeding. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, looking at the second issue you 8 mentioned regarding distribution, the government tends to sort 9 of conflate issues of calculation of a remedy and disbursement 10 of money together, talking about this fluid recovery concept. 11 And as I understand fluid recovery, and I think every court 12 tends to interpret it a little bit differently, but that's not 13 what we have here. 14 Looking at the 2nd Circuit cases, you're dealing with a 15 situation where you have so many plaintiffs, and you don't 16 really know what the damage is so you make estimates of what the 17 damage might be, and you go ahead and have a presumption of what 18 the class would be and what the remedy would be, and then you 19 have the folks come in later and make claims and you have a 20 bunch of money left over. 21 Certainly that's not what we contemplate in this case. 22 Your Honor, should this Court enter an award of restitution and 23 disgorgement, we enter, obviously, another stage. I'm not sure 24 the defendants have standing at that point to contest the 25 disbursement or the manner under which it's disbursed, but it 0013 1 obviously is a key question for this Court. 2 We anticipate that it would be important for 3 appointment of a Special Master at that point to determine how 4 the money should be disbursed, to try to identify all the 5 beneficiaries, using the government's records and other sources, 6 and to get notice to all beneficiaries. And I think the Special 7 Master could make a best effort on determining how the money 8 should be disbursed. 9 Your Honor, based on what we've seen, and I know Your 10 Honor has reservations about this at this point, but it most 11 likely should be done on a per capita basis. We realize that 12 there are different beneficiaries in different parts of the 13 country whose resources are different, but as a practical 14 matter, all their money has been commingled in one account. And 15 given the failure of the accounting, we believe it's an 16 impossible task to determine how that money should be allocated 17 based on individual resources. 18 I think this Court has a great deal of discretion under 19 various Supreme Court cases to determine what the fair and 20 equitable manner of disbursing that money is. And certainly 21 there are cases that have allocated that, a fund of that sort, 22 on a per capita basis, where the actual loss to individual 23 account holders is difficult to determine. 24 There's a case out of this district, Segar vs. Smith - 25 it was a discrimination case, a promotion case - but in that 0014 1 case you had a certain amount of money based on the failure to 2 promote, you had a lot of prospective employees, you don't know 3 which one would have gotten the job. It was impossible to break 4 that down by individual plaintiffs. 5 In that case, it was a 1982 case, the Court said 6 because of that difficult task of assigning different dollar 7 amounts to individual class members, we're going to do it on a 8 per capita basis. The Court felt that that was appropriate. 9 THE COURT: Segar is the most unfortunate precedent you 10 could possibly give me. 11 MR. SMITH: I apologize for that. 12 THE COURT: Because I know the Segar case. 13 MR. SMITH: I know you do. 14 THE COURT: I brought the Segar case in 1982, and it 15 took 26 years to get it resolved. 16 MR. SMITH: I recall that. We're getting close, 17 Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: That's the only unfortunate part of it. 19 26 years, that gives new meaning to the Bleak House idea. 20 So go on. I'm familiar with Segar. 21 MR. SMITH: Starting to make us look pretty good. I 22 appreciate that. 23 You know, there's other cases around the country. But 24 particularly when you're dealing here for relief, you're not 25 looking at individual losses, you're looking at the benefit 0015 1 conferred on the government. And so your calculation isn't 2 based on the individual losses, you're not looking at how much 3 each person would have lost, even if that was possible. 4 Instead, under those circumstances, where allocation is 5 difficult, a fair and equitable manner may very well be to put 6 it on a per capita basis. 7 THE COURT: Mr. Smith, come on. You've got, what, 8 300,000 individual Indian money accounts? 9 MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. 10 THE COURT: Some of them are accounts to which payments 11 of a dollar and a quarter are made every few months, they're 12 fractionated down almost to the vanishing point. Right? 13 MR. SMITH: That's correct. 14 THE COURT: Some of them are very substantial accounts 15 that have been much less fractionated and are much more intact. 16 Right? 17 MR. SMITH: That's correct. 18 THE COURT: Some of them have to do with oil leasing 19 and some of them have to do with timber, some of them have to do 20 with cattle grazing and with markedly different receipts in each 21 of those accounts, and you would take an award of X billion 22 dollars and whack it up pro rata, per capita, so everybody gets 23 the same amount of money? 24 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, first -- 25 THE COURT: You don't think I'm going to get some 0016 1 opt-outs if I do that? 2 MR. SMITH: You may very well get some requests for 3 opt-out. You certainly could. But each individual beneficiary 4 has a history going back 100 years of money that has been 5 accumulated or that they should have been entitled to from 6 various sources over that 100 years. It hasn't always been a 7 single fractionated share. They have predecessors in interest 8 who had various shares that should have been distributed to them 9 over the past century. 10 So while it may be $1.25 today, accumulated over what 11 they should have been entitled to over years is obviously much 12 more. 13 Certainly a Special Master can look and try to come up 14 with some calculation for that, but I think that would be 15 difficult. And looking at principles of -- at equitable 16 principles per capita may be the best, fairest way in fact to do 17 that. 18 THE COURT: Well, the problem you put to me, the class 19 action problem you put to me, which is that no individual 20 plaintiff can really possibly bring an action, that's your 21 assertion here -- 22 MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. 23 THE COURT: -- and therefore they're sort of stuck with 24 the class action remedy, raises in my mind the question of 25 whether there are due process rights of individuals who are 0017 1 subjected to class treatment of their claims. 2 And a decision to divide the money up per capita is a 3 kind of -- from the standpoint of somebody who thinks and can 4 make a colorable showing that he's entitled to a larger share of 5 that, seems to me to deprive him of the right to at least make 6 some argument to somebody that he should get a higher share of 7 that money. Or she. 8 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, that brings up obviously the 9 circuit's decision in Eubanks and the implications of that. 10 Your Honor, the key in Eubanks was whether there were clear 11 disparities in the nature or the magnitude of the relief sought 12 by individual class members. 13 In Eubanks the Court classified the relief as 14 equitable. But it was back pay, and so every potential class 15 member had a potentially different amount of back pay. It was 16 classified as equitable; it really was more of a compensatory 17 type damage remedy. 18 Here, Your Honor, certainly there are no disparities in 19 the nature of the relief that is requested. The nature of the 20 relief is uniform with respect to all class members. And again, 21 unlike in Eubanks, we're not focusing on the loss to individual 22 members, we're focusing on the benefit conferred on the 23 government. We're not relegated to try to determine what each 24 individual account holder would have lost. Under Eubanks, if 25 any individual member can come in and show he is sufficiently 0018 1 unique or distinct from other members of the class, I believe 2 under Eubanks this Court can consider an opt-out. 3 But I don't think we go there, where here the relief is 4 solely equitable, solely based on the defendants' own misconduct 5 and not on individual losses. I don't think we have those due 6 process concerns there. 7 THE COURT: I seem to remember being told, maybe on day 8 one of my involvement with this case, that plaintiffs had a much 9 more sophisticated model in mind for distributing the results of 10 this, a model that had something to do with timber sales and 11 geography and grazing and oil, and which tribes and which 12 individual members of which tribes might be expected to have 13 larger shares. What happened to that? 14 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, you heard a part of that model 15 from Mr. Fasold. And certainly not the entire model. And I 16 know you expressed some dissatisfaction with his presentation of 17 that model. 18 That model is still out there. You can look at 19 resources throughout history and determine certain amounts that 20 were allocated on certain amounts. 21 But I tell you, the best person to address that 22 particularly is probably Mr. Gingold, as he's just informed me. 23 That's something he has worked on for the past 12 years. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll pass on Mr. Gingold now 25 because I'm sure he's going to be up on some other subject. 0019 1 Maybe we can talk about it when it's his turn. 2 MR. SMITH: Okay. 3 THE COURT: Anything more to tell me about class 4 certification or manner of distribution? 5 MR. SMITH: Not those particular issues, no, 6 Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Mr. Smith, before you go, I asked the 8 question when I was talking about the class about claim 9 preclusion, and I'm not sure if you answered that. I'm not sure 10 I caught it when it was going by. What is precluded by an 11 award, of the award that you contemplate? 12 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, it's our position that as we 13 understand this trial going forward, that nothing has precluded 14 an individual beneficiary from pursuing a damage claim, and 15 nothing will preclude an individual beneficiary from presenting 16 a damage claim to the court of claims if they feel it's 17 possible. We don't think it is, based on the failure of the 18 accounting. But I don't think anything would preclude any of 19 the class members from attempting to assert a damage claim. 20 THE COURT: And a damage claim would comprehend what, 21 mismanagement, failure to collect, selling land too cheap? 22 MR. SMITH: Failure to collect, those things that at 23 least at this point this Court has determined is not within the 24 scope of this. But I think any damage claim, if they feel they 25 can show losses to their account, they have always had the 0020 1 opportunity to present that damage claim to the court of claims. 2 I don't think at this point anything precludes that. 3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Let me 4 hear from the government on those two first points. 5 MR. QUINN: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael Quinn 6 for the United States defendants. 7 THE COURT: Good morning, sir. 8 MR. QUINN: I will attempt to address Your Honor's 9 questions and Mr. Smith's arguments with respect to the two 10 issues you mentioned first this morning regarding 11 claim-preclusive effects and distribution. Mr. Stemplewicz may 12 have something to add on the distribution issue, but I can 13 address it somewhat from the class action perspective, 14 Your Honor. 15 I think your questions touch on a key concern that the 16 United States has with plaintiffs' proposal here for a trial in 17 June. First off, plaintiffs make no case that any damages could 18 be awarded under the first provision in which this case was 19 originally certified under 23(b)(1)(a). They argue that it 20 should go forward under 23(b)(2). However, in order to accept 21 plaintiffs' position and proceed on that basis, you essentially 22 would have to ignore three controlling decisions of the 23 DC Circuit, none of which plaintiffs even address in their 24 briefing. 25 The first is Thomas v. Albright, which holds, and in 0021 1 that case vacated and remanded a class certification decision in 2 a settlement circumstance because it failed to consider the 3 Eubanks v. Billington factors and analysis for whether a case 4 can be appropriately certified under 23(b)(2). 5 In the case of Thomas, as in the certification decision 6 here, the original certification order was issued prior to the 7 DC Circuit's decision in Eubanks. So this Court has never 8 considered this case with respect to the Eubanks v. Billington 9 factors and analysis. 10 Thomas holds that it's an abuse to discretion to go 11 forward with 23(b)(2) cases, particularly when you're going to 12 discuss or address opt-outs or notice to the class, without 13 going back and re-examining the propriety of certification under 14 23(b)(2). Thomas v. Albright is 139 F.3d at 525, and that's 15 addressed in our briefing. 16 The second case that plaintiffs fail to address in 17 their briefing, and which the Court would have to ignore in 18 order to proceed under 23(b)(2), is In Re: Veneman. That's at 19 309 F.3d 789. In that case the Court was concerned -- I believe 20 the Court has already referred to it this morning, and I would 21 like to just briefly quote from a particularly appropriate 22 section of that case at 795 and 796. 23 The Court mentions that there are two concerns 24 surrounding Rule 23 class actions; first, how class 25 certification affects the due process rights of absent class 0022 1 members to have their own day in court, and second, whether the 2 parties are bound by the judgment. Your Honor, those are 3 precisely the issues you were attempting to get at this morning. 4 But the Court in Veneman goes on to say: "As to the 5 first point - that is, how it affects the due process rights - 6 the Supreme Court established in Phillips Petroleum vs. Shutts 7 that, one, before a court can bind absent class members," and 8 quoting from Shutts, "concerning claims wholly or predominantly 9 for money damages," unquote, "due process requires that they 10 receive adequate notice and an opportunity to opt out of the 11 action." 12 The Court went on to say: "The defendant in such an 13 action has a right" - that is, the government here would have a 14 right - "standing, in effect, to demand that adequate notice be 15 given to the class members so as to avoid a situation where the 16 defendant would be bound by a loss, yet class members would not 17 be bound by its win." And that's the risk and one of the 18 concerns that we have in going forward under 23(b)(2). 19 To go on in Veneman, the Court also said: "To 20 complicate matters further, the Supreme Court has expressly left 21 open the question of whether a judgment in a no opt-out class 22 action," such as we have here, "like the one that the District 23 Court certified in Veneman, can ever preclude absent class 24 members from bringing their own individual lawsuits for monetary 25 damages," citing Ticor Title Company vs. Brown, 0023 1 511 U.S. 117. 2 The Court then mentioned second: "The constitutional 3 concern in Shutts and the Supreme Court's case Ticor may also 4 implicate concerns underlying Rule 23, and these constitutional 5 questions are not avoided simply because the party elects," as 6 they claim here, "to pursue it as an equitable remedy." 7 I think if you go and look at the Eubanks decision, 8 Your Honor, you see that in Eubanks the Court clearly said that 9 it doesn't matter whether you've styled this as a claim for 10 money damages or as one for injunctive relief. Eubanks involved 11 a question of the propriety of awarding back pay as incident to 12 a Title VII type of claim. 13 The Court said in Eubanks that, "Back pay, that it's 14 considered as a form of equitable relief, does not undercut the 15 fact that variations in individual class members' monetary 16 claims may lead to divergence of interests that make unitary 17 representation of a class problematic." That's Eubanks, 110 18 F.3d at 95. 19 Your Honor, that's the situation we are presented with 20 here, is we have an equitable theory that's been advanced by the 21 plaintiffs that is not an award to the whole. It is not a claim 22 of a whole. It's like you take a rubber -- you have one of 23 these rubber band balls, they bounce and it looks like one big 24 ball, but when you start looking at it, there are different 25 strands. Some are long, some are short, some are thin, others 0024 1 fatter. They all come apart. They're individualized, different 2 colors. 3 And I think that's what Your Honor was concerned 4 about -- 5 THE COURT: Wonderful extended metaphor. 6 MR. QUINN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I tried to come up 7 with something that could be concrete about the significance of 8 the abstract problem that exists here. 9 It is true, we know right off the bat, that as a whole, 10 plaintiffs have serious problems with the theory that they're 11 proposing. For one, Your Honor in your January 30 decision came 12 to the conclusion that certain members of the class, at least 13 putatively, are not proper plaintiffs in this class action; that 14 is, people who died before the act took effect in 1994. 15 THE COURT: That's a problem. 16 MR. QUINN: There's no approach here to carve out or 17 identify monies that belong to those people that are not part of 18 this case. Why should -- 19 THE COURT: Mark that down on your June 9th calendar. 20 MR. QUINN: Well, Your Honor, second, the class 21 definition excludes people who have brought claims prior to the 22 class being certified here. And there have been some claims, 23 cases brought by individual Indians that might exempt, take them 24 out from class consideration. 25 THE COURT: How many cases are there? 0025 1 MR. QUINN: Offhand I can't say, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Half a dozen? 3 MR. QUINN: That's probably a fair assessment. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. QUINN: The other is we know also, and I think it 6 was touched on here this morning, that those who have had 7 accountings under per capita or settlement judgment accounts, 8 those types of accounts, several thousand claimants, several 9 thousand accounts, the Department of Interior is at 95 percent 10 complete with those accountings. 11 Those accountings we believe do not run into some of 12 the problems in terms of the administration, performance of the 13 accounting. Most of those do not involve probated estates, they 14 don't have that question about going back in time and looking at 15 prior predecessor interest. They don't have those things. 16 They're limited in time. There's no explanation offered by 17 plaintiffs, and I heard none this morning, why those class 18 members should participate in any award here. Their money is 19 not at stake, based on their theory. 20 In a sense, and we've presented this in our briefing, 21 Your Honor, the plaintiffs have essentially put forward what is 22 referred to in the 2nd Circuit as an argument for a fluid 23 recovery. The recent case of the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 24 in McLaughlin vs. American Tobacco touches on the problems that 25 are inherent with that approach. 0026 1 In the McLaughlin case, cigarette smokers as a class 2 tried to sue the tobacco company over light cigarettes. They 3 couldn't prove -- they had problems of proof trying to show 4 individual injury. I think that's what Mr. Smith is trying to 5 argue here this morning, that some of these people wouldn't be 6 able to show individual harm with the particulars of their 7 account because they wouldn't have enough information. 8 That was the essentially the problem the plaintiffs 9 were trying to get around in the McLaughlin case. They proposed 10 a different approach. It was essentially a disgorgement; in an 11 economic analysis, the price difference, the profits, the excess 12 profits that the American Tobacco Company earned by hiding the 13 fact that the light cigarettes were not as safe as people were 14 led to believe, so that you would have a price differential 15 between the price actually paid and the price that would have 16 been commanded in the market had people known the truth. 17 The Court of Appeals rejected that approach as a class 18 action claim, and I think it's worth considering the reasons 19 that they did so. And I'm quoting here from what is on the 20 Westlaw version page start 11 of that opinion: "We reject 21 plaintiffs' proposed distribution of any recovery they might 22 receive because it offends both the Rules Enabling Act and the 23 due process clause. The distribution method at issue would 24 involve an initial estimate of the percentage of class members 25 who were defrauded and therefore have valid claims. The total 0027 1 amount of damages suffered would then be calculated based on 2 this estimate, and presumably on an estimate of an average loss 3 for each plaintiff. Essentially a per capita type of award." 4 "But such an aggregate determination is likely to 5 result in an astronomical damages figure that does not 6 accurately reflect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by 7 defendants, and that bears little or no relationship to the 8 amount of economic harm actually caused by the defendants. This 9 kind of disconnect offends the Rules Enabling Act, which 10 provides that federal rules of procedure such as Rule 23 cannot 11 be used to bridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. 12 The Court further explained that, quote, "Roughly 13 estimating the gross damages to the class as a whole, and only 14 subsequently allowing for the processing of individual claims, 15 would inevitably alter defendants' substantive right to pay 16 damages reflective of their actual liability." 17 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Quinn, the problem with that, 18 with the McLaughlin decision, is that apparently, as I 19 understand what you've read to me, the Court used a few data 20 points about injury and then figured out what the damage was. 21 But here we're starting with a big number and deciding how to 22 distribute it. 23 I mean, I hear you, but suppose, for example -- I'm 24 just thinking out loud a little bit here, but suppose -- let's 25 take an award of X, just take an award of X dollars, and it 0028 1 represents, after we sort out whether dead people are entitled 2 to it, after we sort out whether per capita and judgment 3 accounts are entitled to a piece of it, whether we decide 4 whether Osage headrights, it represents individual Indian money 5 account receipts that have never been properly accounted for. 6 Okay? Let's call it that. 7 MR. QUINN: For sake of argument, I'll assume that, 8 Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: For sake of argument. And then let's say 10 there are 300,000 Native Americans who are entitled to a piece 11 of that. Somebody is appointed to sort this out; remains to be 12 seen. I mean, the United States is the trustee, and I suppose 13 the United States would want to say, well, we would like to be 14 the trustee for that. Plaintiffs would say, no, no, it's got to 15 be somebody else. But let's sort that out later. Somebody is 16 going to sort this out. 17 Notice is given to the entire class that this is the 18 award. The class is told that there are going to be two phases 19 in distributing this award; the first phase will consider 20 individual claims brought by individuals who want to make a 21 claim, a specific claim. Those individual claims would be heard 22 and decided, monies disbursed, and then what's left over will be 23 distributed -- the class will be told, what's left over will be 24 distributed per capita. And the class will also be told, if you 25 don't like any of this, you can opt out and try to do it 0029 1 yourself. 2 Now, what are the constitutional, practical McLaughlin 3 or other problems you see in approaching it that way? 4 MR. QUINN: Well, for one, Your Honor, I think it 5 violates the Veneman decision of the DC Circuit, which the 6 primary concern there, they were faced with a petition 7 interlocutory from a certification decision, where the Court had 8 been faced with a question of whether we have a hybrid 9 certification of a class; that is, under 23(b)(2) go forward on 10 the substantive injunctive relief, and reserve for later whether 11 we have a damages issue that's going to need to be resolved and 12 be addressed, perhaps to qualify for class treatment under 13 23(b)(3). But we'll leave that to another day. 14 That petition went up to the Court of Appeals. The 15 Court of Appeals expressed great reservations about that, 16 ultimately remanded the case without deciding it, because it was 17 concerned that the issues that they were most concerned about 18 hadn't been really briefed by the parties. And that goes to 19 this issue about the notice to the class and the decision, when 20 the decision is made. 21 Rule 23 urges the Court to make a class certification 22 decision at the earliest practical time. And there are serious 23 constitutional questions to keep a case open with half of a 24 case -- with a case going to trial on an issue without having 25 already made the determination about who is in the class and 0030 1 who's out, and giving that notice in advance of the trial. 2 I don't see how you could go forward, if you were going 3 to allow opt-outs and give notice to class, with a trial in 4 June, just as a matter of practicality. Because all that would 5 have to transpire in advance of the trial, or you put the 6 outcome of the trial at risk later in terms of those who want to 7 opt out or argue that they should have been given notice prior 8 to the trial. 9 In terms of the distribution and those who have claims, 10 I think plaintiffs have a burden of establishing, as part of 11 their claim for unjust enrichment, that the money that they're 12 claiming for is inured to the benefit, taken from those class 13 members. And that may be ultimately a question of proof at a 14 trial. But in terms of -- you can't just throw a number up 15 there and say, well, it belongs to everybody in the class, when 16 it doesn't. 17 This case started out as a 23(b)(2) case or a 18 23(b)(1)(a) case where it made sense to proceed under those 19 provisions as a class, because regardless of the fact that 20 everybody had different accounts -- and we're talking about 21 hundreds of thousands of separate accounts, not a pooled fund, 22 not a single fund in which everybody shares a similar interest. 23 We have land in Montana, leases for range, timber leases, oil 24 leases, commercial leases in California, all those have inherent 25 different questions. 0031 1 Plaintiffs' land claim that is really kind of way, way, 2 way beyond the pale that they've tried to bring in, they've 3 tried to argue that that's all part of the common relief here, 4 but we know, just sitting here today, that none of the four 5 representative class plaintiffs has a legal interest in all 6 those parcels of land. 7 But the point is, it made sense originally to proceed 8 under 23(b)(2) and (b)(1)(a) because we were talking about a 9 singular duty to account that was same across all these 10 different interests. What's happened now is we've changed the 11 entire case. We turned it around to a case involving numerous 12 tens of thousands of different interests seeking claims against 13 the government for money allegedly improperly withheld. 14 Those are all -- if money was withheld, there's no 15 proof that it was withheld in common from everybody across the 16 class. If there was money withheld from an oil well royalty in 17 Texas, that doesn't give someone who is a land holder in Montana 18 a claim for unjust enrichment. You have to tie it -- even in 19 the trust cases that allow tracing into commingled funds, the 20 burden is still on the plaintiff to show entitlement to the 21 money that's been commingled. They just say, because it's 22 commingled, we get a pass on having to prove it. That's not the 23 law, Your Honor. 24 So I would say that ultimately, as they've framed the 25 relief remedy, they cannot be awarded as a class mechanism. You 0032 1 could have four individual, five individual plaintiffs make 2 claims of unjust enrichment as individuals, but it couldn't be 3 conducted as a class remedy, even if you got to 23(b)(3) and 4 tried to do this as a hybrid. 5 But if you were to proceed at all, I think you would 6 have to give the notice and the right of opt-out in advance of 7 the trial to the class to give them -- and they would have to 8 know, what's the theory of the recovery, what's the distribution 9 going to be, before they go blindly allowing the case to go into 10 the merits of the remedy. 11 THE COURT: Well, seems to me the notice that you're 12 talking about might be a better informed, more informative 13 notice after evidence is taken on the -- further evidence is 14 taken on the amount of any award, and the contemplated method 15 for its distribution. 16 MR. QUINN: Well, I mean, certainly as a plaintiff I 17 would like to know I could hold back my bet and keep it in my 18 pocket and decide what the outcome is until the cards are laid 19 up on the table, and then decide whether I want to participate 20 or not. I mean, I don't think that's the appropriate approach 21 to take in terms of what the informed approach in terms of an 22 opt-out is. 23 THE COURT: Okay. At any rate, your answer to my 24 question is, read Veneman? 25 MR. QUINN: That's one, Your Honor. I would also urge 0033 1 you -- 2 THE COURT: I will do that. I've read it once, I'll 3 read it again. 4 MR. QUINN: I would also suggest one other. When 5 plaintiffs came back in their reply brief and had affirmatively 6 said, we're not going to even talk about distribution now, and 7 tried to distinguish McLaughlin as a distribution case when 8 they're talking about fluid recovery, looking for some guidance 9 on distribution, I came across this other case I think is 10 instructive by Judge Pollack out of the Southern District of New 11 York. It's Schaffner vs. Chemical Bank, 339 F.Supp 329, 1972. 12 In that case, a beneficiary of a trust managed by 13 Chemical Bank tried to bring a class action on behalf of her 14 trust for certain overcharge practices by Chemical Bank as 15 trustee. And the class she sought to have certified was a class 16 that involved her trust as well as several thousand trusts also 17 managed by Chemical Bank. 18 Judge Pollack refused to certify the class as such, and 19 said: "While strictly not the same, the attempt of the 20 plaintiff to include in her class not only beneficiaries of her 21 own trust but beneficiaries of separate and distinct trusts is 22 akin to attempts by shareholders of one corporation to sue on 23 behalf of shareholders of all other like corporations. Several 24 attempts have been made to join as a class shareholders of 25 different mutual funds on federal claims bearing a similarity to 0034 1 those here asserted. These attempts have been turned back 2 uniformly. Thus far, courts have limited the equitable remedies 3 of the individual plaintiff only to actions involving the 4 economic union with which he has been associated," citing a 5 series of cases. That's -- I'm trying to find the exact page 6 where that quote appears, Your Honor. That's at 337, 38 of that 7 decision. So I would urge Your Honor to take a look at that as 8 well. 9 This is a remedy that involves individual rights. The 10 income streams are individual, the timing of when money may have 11 been withheld from any particular person is individual, the 12 amounts are individual, the issues are individual, and we would 13 submit it's not amenable to a class action treatment under any 14 provision. 15 Under 23(b)(3), for Your Honor to consider the 16 amenability of that, plaintiffs have an obligation to bring 17 forth a motion and bring forth proof that they're entitled to 18 treatment under 23(b)(3). They haven't asked that. 19 THE COURT: No, they have not. 20 MR. QUINN: So you're kind of stuck with 23(b)(2). And 21 23(b)(2), if you go back -- and I'm sure Your Honor has already 22 looked at Eubanks several times. But when you look at that 23 decision, the limitation of 23(b)(2) in terms of granting 24 opt-out and notice to class is designed for specific situations 25 where you have a particular plaintiff party who is in the class 0035 1 as a special circumstance and needs to be excused from the 2 class. 3 That's not meant to be an exemption that allows you to 4 take what is normally a 23(b)(3) type of class action for 5 damages. And that's really what we're here about. Plaintiffs 6 talk about this as injunctive relief, equitable relief, but that 7 is essentially a fiction. If this Court's jurisdiction weren't 8 limited to awarding equitable relief, we would be talking 9 essentially about a damages claim. That's really essentially, 10 at bottom, what they're seeking. 11 And I would ask Your Honor to look at one other case, 12 finally, that's in our brief, a case from last year decided by 13 the DC Circuit, Richards vs. Delta Airlines, 453 F.3d 525, 14 DC Circuit 2007. And we've discussed that in our brief, but I 15 wanted to highlight the point there. 16 The Court said, quote, "Plaintiff cannot transform a 17 claim for damages into an equitable action by asking for an 18 injunction that orders the payment of money." In that case they 19 brought a claim for a declaratory judgment action against the 20 airline, asking for an order requiring them to pay for lost 21 baggage. 22 And essentially that's what we have here in our case, 23 is plaintiffs can know that they can't bring a damages claim, 24 they know that the damages elements of their complaint were 25 stricken from this case with their blessing back in 1998, and so 0036 1 they're stuck choosing this Court, choosing these claims, 2 they're stuck with the one remedy that this Court has recognized 3 all along that they're limited to, and that is the accounting. 4 To get beyond talking about monetary remedy in this 5 context, I think it runs into the problems that the DC Circuit 6 found in Richards v. Delta Airlines as well. 7 THE COURT: Well, just let me comment on that last line 8 of argument about Richards vs. Delta Airlines. It is certainly 9 true that the plaintiffs have been hard pressed throughout this 10 case to describe what they wanted without using the term 11 "money." And they have been -- as you pointed out in your 12 brief, they expressly disavowed seeking an order for the payment 13 of money early on in this case. 14 And watching the plaintiffs try to navigate around that 15 rock, that big rock, is a subject of some -- strike that. I was 16 about to say amusement, but strike that. It's interesting to 17 watch the plaintiffs try to deal with that problem, which is a 18 serious problem for them. 19 But one thing -- and I have to tell you that I am not 20 at this point sure that an actual dollar award can be made, or, 21 if made, would be sustained on appeal. But I'm certainly going 22 to figure out what the dollar award should be, and there's no 23 question that I have declaratory judgment jurisdiction, and so 24 one result of this procedure may be a declaratory judgment that 25 the defendant is unable to account for X dollars that have been 0037 1 received in IIM accounts, and under the law of equity should pay 2 it. 3 Whether the government ever responds to declaratory 4 judgment actions unaccompanied by injunctions is an interesting 5 question, and one that I've always -- you know, the government's 6 response to that may be, how many divisions has the Pope. I 7 don't know. 8 And then there's another piece of the order that might 9 say, pay it, if I decide that I have, and then the whole thing 10 goes to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals decides 11 whether only the payment -- whether the payment order is 12 sustained or whether the declaratory judgment is sustained. 13 But I assure you that one way or another, the result of 14 this process is going to be a dollar figure. Because I have 15 believed from the time I took this case on that what this case 16 needs more than anything else is a dollar figure, so that 17 somebody up in the other branch of government can focus on this 18 and decide what to do about it. 19 So I hear you on the jurisdictional question, and I 20 agree that it is a dicey and complicated one, and I agree that 21 the plaintiffs have had a very difficult time with it throughout 22 this case, but my stewardship of this case is going to end with 23 something preceded by a dollar sign. 24 MR. QUINN: And I appreciate that, Your Honor. I 25 understand what you're saying here. However, the number that 0038 1 they're claiming, that we get up to somewhere in the 2 neighborhood of $58 billion, I think even by your own standard 3 in the Garcia case, is not incidental. I don't think it 4 qualifies by any test as incidental under 23(b)(2). 5 So there's more than just a jurisdictional problem, 6 there is a procedural problem that Your Honor faces, because 7 plaintiffs have basically limited your consideration here of the 8 class treatment of remedy. Your Honor could come up to a 9 number, I would say, in terms of the actual plaintiffs who are 10 named in the case, but as far as a class remedy, Your Honor has 11 to be comfortable, in effect, that 23(b)(2) allows this kind of 12 a relief. 13 And I think your own prior decisions where you've 14 considered this before, $20 billion I think at stake in Garcia, 15 you said it predominated over the injunctive relief in any sense 16 of the word. 17 And what we have here is monetary relief that is not 18 seeking to be incidental. It's not back pay as part of an 19 injunctive relief order and restatement or something of that 20 order, which is the traditional Title VII racial discrimination 21 kind of claim that's supposed to be addressed under 23(b)(2). 22 This doesn't come close to that configuration. 23 What we have here is a remedy that seeks to supplant 24 the injunctive relief that was supposed to be ordered. So in 25 effect, I don't know how you get past -- 0039 1 THE COURT: My own decision in Garcia? 2 MR. QUINN: Well, or the rule limiting 23(b)(2) to 3 predominant issue. Particularly with the question you started 4 out with, Your Honor, about the finality concerns and preclusive 5 effect, particularly in view of plaintiffs' remarks in their 6 reply brief. Reply at 78, note 88, plaintiffs say, "Class 7 members would not be precluded for seeking damages claims in 8 U.S. Court of Claims once these proceedings are concluded." The 9 United States has no assurance, you put a number up there, what 10 that would terminate in terms of finality down the road after a 11 judgment were rendered. And even if the United States 12 ultimately paid a sum of money, where that would leave us in 13 terms of continuing exposure. 14 A reply at page 97 offers another problem to 15 plaintiffs' allegations here for a remedy. At 97 of the reply 16 brief, plaintiffs say, quote, "The relief that plaintiffs 17 request," and they cite their own brief, original brief at 19 18 and 20, "is all equitable in nature, and alternative available 19 remedies in light of the inability to account, and is 20 independent of any monetary recovery adjudged by this Court." 21 In essence, I think they're acknowledging there that 22 their proposal for a remedy here -- 23 THE COURT: What page of their reply? 24 MR. QUINN: Page 97 of their reply, Your Honor, they 25 say, "The relief that plaintiffs request," citing their opening 0040 1 brief -- 2 THE COURT: By the way, from now on, anybody who wants 3 to file a brief longer than 35 pages has to accompany it by a 4 motion for leave to exceed the page limitation, which I usually 5 grant by saying, you can file any length you want to, I'll read 6 the first 35 pages. 7 Page what? 8 MR. QUINN: 97 of the reply brief, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: 97, all right. 10 MR. QUINN: I believe the quote is -- and I don't have 11 the page in front of me, I just have the extract. It says, "The 12 relief the plaintiffs request," citing plaintiffs' brief at 19 13 and 20, "is all equitable in nature, and alternative available 14 remedies in light of the inability to account, and is 15 independent of any monetary recovery" -- it's at page -- oh, 16 there's another reference to that, yeah. "Adjudged by this 17 Court." 18 And also at page 66 of their brief they make a similar 19 statement, Your Honor. Page 66 of their brief, the first full 20 paragraph, at the very end of the paragraph they say in the last 21 clause, "Plaintiffs now seek the equitable remedies of 22 restitution and disgorgement independent of their previous 23 accounting claim." 24 So I think we have another preceding question about 25 what the nature of this remedy is that they're actually seeking. 0041 1 Because if it does more than anything to address the accounting 2 claim, which we understood coming in is the only thing the Court 3 wanted to address, those claims should be carved out, or those 4 remedies, to the extent they try to remedy some other wrong, 5 need to be pared back. 6 And those are all things that I submit would need to be 7 addressed before we go into any trial. 8 THE COURT: Well, I'm interested in hearing -- that's 9 an interesting sentence, that sentence on page 66, and I don't 10 know what it means either. 11 MR. QUINN: But you take that together with plaintiffs' 12 other representations about there not being really -- they're 13 not having any assurance of any kind of finality about what an 14 award in this case would foreclose in terms of finality, I think 15 that runs into one of the legs that concerned the Court in 16 Veneman that they expressly addressed about the defendant having 17 standing to make sure that when the case comes to conclusion, 18 there are certain claims that are going to be foreclosed, and we 19 know what those are. And if you can't know what those are, I 20 think you have problems in terms of the remedy that you're 21 trying to confer on the parties. 22 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Quinn. Anything further? 23 MR. QUINN: Mr. Stemplewicz has something on 24 distribution. 25 THE COURT: Mr. Stemplewicz? 0042 1 MR. STEMPLEWICZ: Good morning, Your Honor. I had been 2 prepared to address the jurisdictional and sovereign immunity 3 issues. I'm not going to belabor those points after Your 4 Honor's introductory comments. 5 However, I think that the problem Your Honor identified 6 as far as distribution is concerned highlights one of the key -- 7 the fundamental jurisdictional problem here, the sort of 8 jurisdictional runaway train that this proposed remedy would get 9 us on in light of where Bowen went, and later with the Blue Fox 10 decision. 11 And that is, no matter how large a sum of money we come 12 up with, or how small, and no matter how we divide it up, 13 whether it's pro rata or we come up with some way of identifying 14 categories, subcategories of class, however it's done, not one 15 single member of the plaintiff class is going to learn one 16 single scrap of information about the transactional activity in 17 his or her IIM account. 18 And that is what they came here for, ostensibly. That 19 is what the 1994 Act is intended to provide, to sort of open 20 this curtain of disinformation or lack of information that was 21 out there. And the point is, that is clearly substitutionary 22 relief. 23 Judge Lamberth said that the very thing to which 24 plaintiffs are entitled under the Bowen analysis is an 25 accounting. We've been on that path all this time, and now, 0043 1 suddenly, the very thing, as they point out now in their brief, 2 is a refund of monies wrongfully withheld and the disgorgement 3 of profits. Those are very different very things. 4 And when you look at the direction the Supreme Court 5 signaled in 1999 in the Blue Fox case, that is exactly the wrong 6 direction that the Court should proceed with. 7 Thank you, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: I hear you. Fine. I got it. There are 9 certain forms of words that both sides have latched on to like 10 grim death in this case. One of them is "substitutionary 11 relief," one of them is "repudiation," which appears about 45 12 times in the plaintiffs' brief, I have no idea why. Maybe 13 they'll tell me why "repudiation" is such a magic word and why 14 "substitutionary relief" is such a magic word. 15 But the problem with both sides' arguments here is that 16 these magic words that come from 200 years of equity 17 jurisprudence just don't fit here. And I've got to find some 18 way to get this case over with, and getting it over with by 19 dismissing it because it's impossible, because an accounting is 20 impossible, makes no sense to me, and getting rid of it by 21 remanding it to the government to do what is impossible makes no 22 sense to me. So you can call it substitutionary relief if you 23 want to. I don't, at this point. 24 MR. STEMPLEWICZ: With all due respect, Your Honor, 25 that's not our term. That's right out of Blue Fox. 0044 1 THE COURT: I understand. I understand. 2 MR. STEMPLEWICZ: And at least remanding -- 3 THE COURT: But you have latched on to it. 4 MR. STEMPLEWICZ: Well, certainly. That's what the 5 standard is. Unfortunately, there's no different standard for a 6 12-year old case. 7 And, you know, however questionable it may be in the 8 Court's view to remand this to Interior to do the best 9 accounting that can be done, the fact is, at least doing so will 10 provide answers to questions or at least information that the 11 IIM account holders have about their accounts that are not going 12 to be answered by a check. That check is nice, everybody likes 13 money, but it is not going to solve the problem, it's going to 14 raise more problems. Why isn't my check larger? Why did my 15 cousin get $50 more than I did? What does this have to do with 16 the transactional activity? 17 THE COURT: Or why did my cousin get the same amount 18 that I got? That rotten cousin of mine got the same amount per 19 capita. What sense does that make? That's more likely what 20 you're going to get. 21 MR. STEMPLEWICZ: But the money is not going to answer 22 those questions, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 24 Let's move on to the time value of money. Who's going 25 to talk about that for the plaintiffs? And then on to the 0045 1 merits, or the merits, if that's the right word, the content of 2 the trial. 3 Mr. Gingold? 4 MR. GINGOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Stemplewicz 5 is right, to a certain extent; terms do have significant 6 importance with respect to whether or not this is a damages 7 action, as the government says it is, or whether or not it is 8 what plaintiffs say it is, which is an action in equity, Your 9 Honor, to enforce the trust. And Your Honor, we sought to 10 enforce the accounting duty for some years, and that accounting 11 duty has been rendered impossible. 12 Many judges have looked at that very issue, from 13 Learned Hand to Justice Alito when he sat on the 3rd Circuit, to 14 Judge Posner in the 2nd Circuit, to Judge LaValle in the 15 2nd Circuit. And they have all come down the same way. There 16 is no disagreement, there is no ambiguity. Equity and 17 restitution is the opposite of damages. It's a substantive 18 issue, it's not a form over substantive issue. It never has 19 been, Your Honor. And it particularly applies in a situation 20 like this where we have an express trust. 21 When we're looking at the time value of money, that's 22 one of the standards, as a matter of fact, Your Honor, and it's 23 a term of art that is used and has been used even in this 24 circuit, but clearly with respect to the 3rd Circuit, with Judge 25 Alito, when he was sitting in the 3rd. 0046 1 And it has been discussed in detail by all the 2 authorities, whether you're dealing with a restatement of 3 restitution, whether you're dealing with restatement third or 4 restatement second or you're dealing with the various drafts 5 that go through March 12th of this year. That is expressly 6 identified as one of the measurements available to plaintiffs 7 when they are seeking equitable restitution as opposed to 8 damages. 9 Plaintiffs were well aware of the jurisdictional issues 10 between the claims court and the District Court when this action 11 was filed on June 10th, 1996, and plaintiffs were also well 12 aware of the preclusive issues that could arise, and also 13 evaluated whether or not it was appropriate to file 14 contemporaneously in the claims court with regard to the damages 15 issues, and in the District Court with regard to the pure 16 traditional equitable relief. 17 The decision was made to file in this court solely, for 18 several reasons, one of which, Your Honor, is the fact it would 19 be rank speculation to determine the nature and scope of 20 damages, if any, until an accurate and complete accounting is 21 rendered. 22 The accurate and complete accounting was related to the 23 fact, notwithstanding counsel for the government's opposition, 24 that this is now and always has been a commingled trust. The 25 funds are collected in common, they're deposited in common, 0047 1 they're invested in common, they're allocated in common, and 2 from that common fund the distributions are made. 3 Whether you're looking at common law, which explains 4 what a common trust fund is, or commingled trust, or the federal 5 government's own regulations under 12 CFR 9.18 dealing with 6 bank-administered common trust funds, it's all the same thing 7 and these criteria are met. As a matter of fact, 12 CFR 9.18 8 tracked common law, and that's the reason that regulation was 9 imposed not only on national banks but also on all member banks, 10 and ultimately on thrifts, because the Federal Home Loan Bank 11 Board adopted that same regulation vis-a-vis the trust 12 departments. 13 So Your Honor, we're not dealing with ambiguities here, 14 we're dealing with facts. We're dealing with record evidence of 15 admission that this is a common trust fund. 16 As this Court knows, equity, equitable restitution, is 17 in fact the mirror image of damages. And that is, Your Honor, 18 it's not a cute phrase or anything else; you look in the mirror 19 and you're seeing the opposite of what you are. It is 20 substantive. It has been that way for 700 years in restitution, 21 and it's preceded the first 100 years of trust law development. 22 And it moved for the most part in accordance with each other as 23 the development evolved, including in this country, Your Honor. 24 The confusion started in this country in 1937, when 25 equity and law were merged, and because equity and law were 0048 1 merged, the issues with regard to the specifics and precision in 2 pleadings were no longer necessary because there was no 3 consequence. That didn't eliminate the fact that the 4 substantive distinctions exist, and in fact, this Court 5 correctly pointed out in its January 30th decision that this 6 area of the law is murky. 7 If you read the authorities, whether you're looking at 8 Dobbs or you're looking at Scott or you're looking at Bogart, or 9 you're looking at the comments from the draftsmen of the 10 restatement, they all say the same thing. There has been casual 11 use of the terms because it was unnecessary to be more specific. 12 We, however, are in a different situation. The 13 uniqueness of law in equity exists and has existed since this 14 government consented to its waiver -- or waived its sovereign 15 immunity. Actions for damages at a certain level are brought in 16 the United States Court of Federal Claims, actions with regard 17 to equitable issues have always been, since the Constitution and 18 since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the province of this Court. 19 That's what we invoked. We were not trying to be cute 20 to get around issues that exist. These issues were stated quite 21 clearly. We never sought damages. What was stricken from the 22 complaint were common law claims, and what the Court of Appeals 23 in Cobell VI stated was, the statutory duties are informed by 24 common law. It was absolutely unnecessary to have common law 25 claims. 0049 1 Cobell VI also determined that unless there is a clear 2 statement by Congress to the contrary, all traditional trust 3 duties apply to the government. With respect to the management 4 of the Individual Indian Trust, it's one trust with many 5 designated accounts, like every other commingled trust in the 6 history of this country exists, Your Honor. 7 So we are dealing with a situation that there was no 8 cuteness, there was no attempt at semantical games. As a matter 9 of fact, on November 23rd, 1998, in the beginning of a two-day 10 hearing before Judge Lamberth, that very issue was argued again 11 by defendants -- 12 THE COURT: Mr. Gingold, with respect, I imagine you 13 are responding to what I said a few minutes ago about watching 14 the plaintiffs try to dance around this rock that was in their 15 way. But to use another metaphor, you are kind of kicking in an 16 open door here. I have accepted the proposition that what 17 you're seeking is equitable relief and not damages. That's why 18 we're still here. 19 What I want to know is why you think you are also 20 entitled to something that most people would consider interest, 21 and what I've carefully not called interest but have called the 22 time value of money. 23 I understand, too -- well, I've read Judge Boggs and 24 $277,000 of U.S. Currency, and I'm generally familiar with the 25 rulings in that and a couple of other currency forfeiture cases, 0050 1 but you must know that the general thrust of case law considers 2 what you're talking about prejudgment interest, as to which 3 there are serious jurisdictional issues. That's what I want to 4 hear about. 5 And if you want to bring yourself within the ruling 6 that Judge Boggs made, how do you expect to pin down the 7 particulars that he required in the remand in that case? 8 MR. GINGOLD: Well, Your Honor, first of all, we are 9 not asking for the time value of money. That's why we were 10 asking for the costs saved by the government. 11 But with respect to the time value of money - and Your 12 Honor, it's an important distinction - several measurements are 13 established throughout case law and throughout the various 14 authorities as to the measure of the unjust enrichment, one of 15 which, which is probably more frequently used than any of the 16 others, is referred to, as you note, as the time value of money. 17 That necessarily implicates, Your Honor, the interest 18 that was earned by the trustee on the assets of the trust 19 beneficiary. It wasn't interest earned that was to be payable 20 to the trust beneficiaries if they sought that, it was the 21 actual benefit that was obtained as a result of the breach of 22 trust. 23 Your Honor, but the cases go further in that regard. 24 Again, we're not asking for time value of money, but I would 25 just like to explain the distinction. 0051 1 THE COURT: Actually, well, I think I understand the 2 distinction. But since you insist on the distinction, it seems 3 to me the proof that the government actually benefitted is a lot 4 harder than just taking T-bill rates or Treasury bond rates over 5 the number of years. You've got to prove something more than 6 that, I think. 7 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, with all due respect, I am 8 assuming a couple of items here. Number one, this is a trust, 9 number one, that the trust duties that apply to ordinary 10 trustees in this country apply to the government as trustee for 11 the Individual Indian Trust, unless Congress unambiguously 12 states to the contrary. And I'm assuming, Your Honor, this is a 13 commingled trust, and I'm assuming, Your Honor, that the duty to 14 account has been breached. 15 And I'm assuming, Your Honor, what funds have been 16 withheld improperly, and therefore we're looking at another 17 breach based on what every authority that I've looked at agrees 18 is a breach, and that's the failure to disburse funds to the 19 trust beneficiaries that are obligated to be disbursed. 20 But maybe I can start off more easily with Cobell XVIII 21 and Judge Williams' statement on December 10th, 2004. 22 Judge Williams stated, "As trust income beneficiaries are 23 typically entitled to income from trust assets for the entire 24 period of their entitlement, to income and for imputed yields 25 for any period of delay in paying over income or principal, we 0052 1 do not see and plaintiffs make no effort to explain how the 2 accounting delay could deprive them of interest or any 3 comparable returns." Your Honor, Judge Williams also cited 4 Bogart at Section 814, 321 to 325. 5 Your Honor, prejudgment interest would reflect 6 something that would be -- that is an entitlement simply based 7 on the delay of payment as opposed to the interest earned and 8 has been credited. One of the distinctions this Court has 9 correctly made, when it identified the collection issue as 10 distinguished from funds that should have been collected and 11 that weren't, we aren't looking in this litigation -- which is 12 one of the reasons Mr. Smith was correct on his statement of 13 preclusion and what's available. We never were looking at what 14 should have been collected and isn't, whether or not it was $5 a 15 barrel as opposed to $105 a barrel. That's not part of this 16 case. The accounting would have revealed that. 17 We're not looking at whether our clients were paid 18 three percent, when the prevailing rate, let's say in the 19 1980's, was 20 percent. That's not part of our case. 20 What we're looking at, Your Honor, is what has been 21 collected, what has been deposited, what has been invested in 22 common, and what in this case has been withheld. 23 So Your Honor, we are not looking at what this Court 24 has accurately characterized as a damages claim, and therefore, 25 Your Honor, the prejudgment interest would fit in that same 0053 1 category. To the extent we are asking for interest that should 2 have been paid to our clients, and as a result, an injury is 3 sustained, we would agree that would be prejudgment interest so 4 long as that met within the standard set forth by 5 Judge Williams. 6 But that's not what we're asking for, Your Honor. When 7 we point out, as we have with regard to cost savings, it's what 8 the government benefitted from the withholding. There are a 9 line of cases -- and again, I'm saying as opposed to the time 10 value of money, which is the principal way plaintiffs have 11 established the amount for restitution, we chose not to do 12 that -- 13 THE COURT: All right. Let's just -- let's get rid of 14 the term "time value of money," since it upsets you so much. 15 MR. GINGOLD: I'm not upset, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Let's talk about actual gains to the 17 defendant from using the benefits. Okay? 18 MR. GINGOLD: Yes, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: How are you going to prove actual gains to 20 the defendant from use of the benefits? 21 MR. GINGOLD: Well, first of all, Your Honor, 22 Commissioner Gregg in his testimony in 1999 specifically 23 testified, as we've cited in our briefs, that the money that is 24 not disbursed to the trust beneficiaries is in the Treasury 25 general account, and that that money is used either to reduce 0054 1 the amount of debt that exists or allows the government not to 2 borrow based on the funds that are held in the Treasury general 3 account, which, Your Honor, is also a commingled account. 4 There is admission that that benefit accrues to the 5 government. The commissioner at that time specifically said 6 that. He was examined several times on that issue, and each 7 time the conclusion was consistent with what I just stated. So 8 there is an admission with regard to the benefit conferred, Your 9 Honor. 10 Calculating that raises interesting issues as well, 11 because there are separate and special rules when trust funds 12 are commingled, whether they're just commingled with other 13 members who are trust beneficiaries of the same trust, whether 14 they're commingled with third parties, or they're commingled 15 with the government. In our case they've been commingled with 16 everybody, including tribes. 17 Therefore, the proofs after the admission that there's 18 a benefit conferred would be shifted to the government. That's 19 an important factor, because it's the government that has all 20 the records, it's the government that determines what's 21 invested, it's the government that has the records to determine 22 where the funds are allocated within the entire Treasury 23 Department at any point in time. 24 So we would have hoped, Your Honor, that an accounting 25 would have revealed all of this so we wouldn't have to rely on 0055 1 presumptions. But because the accounting hasn't been revealed, 2 we're left with alternative remedies. 3 Now, let me point out, the reason we said in our brief 4 that these remedies are independent, equitable remedies are 5 independent whether or not you ask for an accounting, Your 6 Honor. The fact that an accounting has been deemed to be 7 impossible only means that our choices become more limited on 8 what we would have wanted to do if the accounting was rendered. 9 Once the accounting was rendered, choice could have been a 10 variety of things, as we've stated ad nauseam in our briefs, so 11 I'm not going to repeat that. 12 But nevertheless, those remedies existed because of the 13 nature of the trust itself, just as the duty to account inheres 14 in the nature of the trust itself. 15 Going further, with regard to -- I think you pointed 16 out there are periods of time that the government may not have 17 borrowed and there are periods of time when the government 18 borrowed quite a bit. And we can take the Depression, where the 19 borrowing was thin except from JP Morgan, because there was no 20 money available for the government to borrow. 21 The key question that is raised in each one of those 22 cases is in fact not what the breaching trustee actually 23 benefitted, it's what he could have benefitted if he used those 24 funds properly. 25 In the example that's given in one of the cases, Your 0056 1 Honor, that we've cited, an individual who took control of an 2 apartment building, the question -- 3 THE COURT: Wait a minute. You've cited all these 4 cases that say actual gains, not theoretical gains or what the 5 gains might have been. 6 MR. GINGOLD: No, we've also cited cases -- I know our 7 briefing is voluminous. We've also cited cases that identify -- 8 as a matter of fact, I think it's in one of our footnotes that 9 identified cases which establish the measurement by what either 10 the breaching party would have had to pay if the property wasn't 11 misappropriated, and that involved egg-washing machines and the 12 theft or conversion of accounting papers. 13 There was another case, Your Honor, that was referenced 14 with regard to a party that took over an apartment building, 15 only leased out certain of the apartments, but the 16 restitutionary award was based on the amount that the party 17 could have rented those apartments for during the time it had 18 unlawful possession. 19 So Your Honor, we cited -- most cases deal with the 20 actual; many cases deal with the position that the breaching 21 party was in during the period of time that party had 22 possession. All those cases are cited. And they also reference 23 provisions of the restatement of restitution in that regard, and 24 I believe Dobbs as well. 25 So this is an area of law that is complicated and it's 0057 1 materially different from damages. Every time the case is 2 identified as an example or not an example of whether or not it 3 should be an opt-out or not an opt-out case, those cases, Your 4 Honor, in fact are damages cases, and there's a different theory 5 and different policy with regard to that. 6 I would like to turn this Court's attention, for 7 example, to footnote 11 of page 14 of plaintiffs' reply brief, 8 which deals explicitly with two cases dealing with the issues I 9 was referencing. Dobbs is identified as well in that footnote 10 at 5.8(3), at 933, note eight, when there's a negative unjust 11 enrichment issue raised. 12 Your Honor, one of the key factors, whether we're 13 dealing with Dobbs or we're dealing with any other authority, 14 and that's Bogart or Scott or the restatement, which 15 Professor Langbein says is the premier authority on trust law in 16 this country, and I presume he also means restitution, since he 17 has contributed to it, we're dealing with the same thing. We're 18 dealing with a measurement solely of whatever is determined to 19 be a reasonable benefit -- or a benefit that can be calculated 20 reasonably to be obtained through either a violation of law or a 21 breach of trust, or some other interference with a plaintiffs' 22 rights. 23 In our case, Your Honor, we have all of those here. So 24 therefore, when plaintiffs need to make the determination 25 because of the absence of the accounting that has been an 0058 1 obligation of the government since the beginning of this trust - 2 and Your Honor, as Cobell VI pointed out in noting Mitchell 2, 3 it's a duty that inheres in the nature of the trust relationship 4 itself - so without that, we're left to something that is 5 extremely rare in the law, a trustee that has been found and 6 noted by the Court of Appeals to have mismanaged this trust as 7 long as this trust has been in existence, and now the failure to 8 render the accounting that has been an obligation that is 9 inherent in the nature of the relationship. 10 The fact that that accounting duty has been deemed to 11 be rejected -- I will not use the term "repudiation," but 12 rejecting the rendering of the accounting duty and making the 13 accounting impossible leads plaintiffs as a class with one 14 remedy, and that is restitution. 15 And as a matter of fact, Your Honor, all the 16 authorities say the same thing as well. One of the reasons that 17 plaintiffs seek restitution as opposed to damages is because of 18 the difficulty, or in some cases impossibility, of quantifying 19 what the damages would be, whether it's because trust records 20 have been destroyed or whether or not there's another factor 21 that makes that impossible. 22 So Your Honor, the remedy that we're talking about 23 exists independently of the duty to account in the context of an 24 express trust. And, Your Honor, it also exists as one of the 25 remedies that are available once the accounting is completed, 0059 1 and once this Court determined it was acceptable, and once the 2 individuals had the ability to make an informed judgment as to 3 what next should be done. That has been taken away from them, 4 Your Honor, after 12 years in this litigation. 5 Your Honor, from the very beginning we've had these 6 same arguments. And again on November 23rd, 1998, Mr. Holt, in 7 response to questions from Judge Lamberth, responded, Your 8 Honor, we want the return of our money that has been wrongfully 9 withheld, and we believe that -- as a matter of fact, we 10 explained that funds have been collected into the Treasury that 11 are revenues from the Individual Indian Trust corpus, but they 12 weren't designated properly. Therefore, if 10 items were 13 collected, six of them could conceivably be identified as not 14 trust money, although it was deposited and held by the 15 government, and for it could be held. We wanted the six that 16 was collected and deposited, and then -- we wanted recovery of 17 that, and then we wanted the accounts restated to reflect 18 accurately what had occurred. Your Honor, this was from the 19 very beginning. We didn't dance around anything. 20 Now, another important point in that regard. When it 21 is determined, and the government has acknowledged through its 22 own various uses of throughput and other documents that have 23 been provided to this Court that money has been withheld, or it 24 cannot account for the funds that it acknowledges are collected 25 but are not distributed, those funds, Your Honor, are 0060 1 presumptively determined, or should be presumptively determined 2 to be withheld, unless, as every single authority states, 3 whether you're dealing with a trustee generally or a commingled 4 trust in particular, the trustee identifies why those are not 5 the funds of the beneficiary, why that particular number is in 6 error, and it's able to prove that. 7 That is in every single authority, Your Honor. It's 8 not just plaintiffs' -- 9 THE COURT: Mr. Gingold, with respect, you're kind of 10 starting to repeat yourself. I mean, we've all been over this 11 many, many times. 12 Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Suppose, just 13 suppose that the funds that cannot be accounted for were not in 14 fact withheld, that everybody knows that they were actually 15 paid, it's just that we can't account for them. 16 Now, one might conclude in responding to that, if that 17 were the fact, too bad, government, pay it again because you 18 can't account for it. That's what a trustee has to do. You 19 can't account for it; you say you paid it, we're not going to 20 assume you withheld, you just blew it way back 50 years ago. 21 Somebody wasn't keeping records or you lost those records in a 22 barn, and they were eaten by rats or whatever else you assert 23 actually happened. Yeah, the money was probably paid, yeah, 24 most of it was probably paid; you can't account for it, pay it 25 again. Okay? That's the hypothetical. 0061 1 Why should the plaintiffs be entitled to any more than 2 just the money, if that were the fact? Why should they be 3 entitled to money that the government did not in fact withhold 4 and use and keep in some other way? Why should I make the 5 presumption that the money was withheld and kept? 6 MR. GINGOLD: Well, I'll answer your last question 7 first, if I may, Your Honor. Because that's what the law is. 8 Where the trustee is maintaining the books, where the trustee is 9 maintaining the funds, where the trustee is making the 10 distributions, and in many cases the checks are sent through the 11 trustee's own superintendents, the law says the obligation is 12 the trustee's. And particularly, Your Honor, where it's a 13 commingled trust, where it's even more complicated. That's what 14 the law says. 15 THE COURT: I mean, the government points out correctly 16 that in my findings and conclusions back in January, a major 17 element of the finding that the shortfall may be between 3 and 18 3.6 billion dollars is the fact that for a whole long period of 19 time, there are no records of what disbursements were made. And 20 I said from the bench, come on, everybody knows these 21 disbursements were made, or some of them or most of them; you 22 just can't prove it. 23 Now, what benefit did the government, actual benefit do 24 you think the government retained from the use of monies that it 25 in fact paid but just can't account for? 0062 1 MR. GINGOLD: If in fact it paid for it and can't 2 account for it, Your Honor, I don't know how you can make the 3 assumption they were paid. 4 Your Honor, we assumed in our model that we presented 5 in our opening brief and I discussed during the hearing we had 6 previously, we assumed every check that was cut and identified 7 in the CP&R, the Treasury database from Interior information, we 8 assumed every one of those payments were made to the 9 beneficiaries. 10 And actually, Your Honor, whether it's 3 or 3.6 or 11 4 billion dollars, or a little more than that, that has nothing 12 to do with the checks they say were cut. We're looking at their 13 data. Their data doesn't support that assumption, Your Honor. 14 The assumption we made is an assumption that's not 15 required for any beneficiary in a case such as this, with regard 16 to an express trust or with regard to an express trust that's 17 commingled independently. 18 The assumptions are that the funds were not spent 19 unless the trustee can prove they were. That is the presumption 20 in the law, and it's been that way forever. Judge Lamberth in 21 one of his summary judgment decisions, I believe it was in March 22 of 2003, explicitly identified what needed to be done for 23 proof -- 24 THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. My question is, 25 does the presumption extend the next phase to the amount of 0063 1 money that you are calling the actual benefit to the government? 2 MR. GINGOLD: Yes, it does, Your Honor. And it's very 3 explicit in that regard for all the reasons that we've mentioned 4 in our briefs. It is the duty of the trustee to maintain 5 adequate records, it is the duty of the trustee to maintain 6 adequate systems, and it is the duty of the trustee to maintain 7 adequate staffing. Cobell VI explicitly stated those are 8 subsidiary duties of the duty to account, and the duty to 9 account cannot be discharged unless that is done. And that is 10 precisely the situation we're into today. 11 As a result, Your Honor, the amount that has been 12 identified that the government cannot prove -- and as a matter 13 of fact, Your Honor, in reality the government should have to 14 prove every single disbursement out of the trust, because 15 otherwise it's presumably, based on the law, not to be a 16 disbursement of the plaintiffs' money; rather where it's 17 commingled in a case like this, it would be a disbursement of 18 the trustee's own funds. 19 So Your Honor, that is the problem when you breach the 20 trust duty. That is the problem when you don't maintain 21 adequate records. The Court of Appeals didn't say there's an 22 exception in this case for Indians, Mitchell 2 didn't say 23 there's an exception for Indians, and you'll never see anything 24 in a restatement of trust that says that either, Your Honor. 25 A trustee is a trustee is a trustee. That's been the 0064 1 foundation of the law in this country since the time it was 2 founded. The government has provided no statutory authority 3 where Congress has explicitly and by necessary implication 4 changed those trust duties, notwithstanding all the action that 5 has occurred in the 12 years of this litigation with regard to 6 issues on the Hill. 7 So Your Honor, that is precisely why those presumptions 8 are in play, because of the recognition that there's no way the 9 trust beneficiaries would be able to have that sort of 10 documentation. The government has had years to make those 11 proofs in this case, and hasn't done so, and, by its own 12 admission, as a matter of fact, destroyed, if not all, nearly 13 all of the checks prior to 1992. 14 And Your Honor, this is an important factor. Equitable 15 restitution and disgorgement is two components. One is to 16 divest what has been characterized as unjust enrichment by the 17 courts and by all the authorities, and that which the trustee 18 profited as a result of its breach of trust. 19 THE COURT: But in my hypothetical they haven't 20 profited. 21 MR. GINGOLD: By your hypothetical, Your Honor, they 22 haven't proved it, so as a result, they lose. That's what the 23 law is. 24 THE COURT: But the question is, does the burden shift 25 on that issue? 0065 1 MR. GINGOLD: Well, every single authority that I've 2 read for 700 years says so, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: You've been reading for 700 years? 4 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, I went back to the 5 original -- as a matter of fact, the original restitutionary 6 cases - yes, I did - to look at those cases, and Your Honor, the 7 only thing that's happened is it's actually become worse for the 8 trustee. And the original cases were principally cases dealing 9 with the claims between the beneficiary and creditors of the 10 trustee. That's the reason the concept of the res and 11 subrogation and constructive trusts were established. So yes, I 12 did go back that far, and yes, Your Honor, this is what the law 13 is. 14 But this is an important point. Restitution involves 15 deterrence as importantly as it involves divestment of unjust 16 enrichment. What is necessary to encourage the trustee -- 17 THE COURT: You're losing me on your deterrence point. 18 I'm sorry, deterrence -- I have tried very hard in what I have 19 written on this case so far not to start allocating blame. I'm 20 not doing that. 21 MR. GINGOLD: It's not a question of -- Your Honor, 22 this can be on a neutral basis. Let me explain. We're not 23 trying to allocate blame either. Let's take a simple issue. 24 There's a duty to account, and there are subsidiary duties 25 that have been -- 0066 1 THE COURT: How about incentive instead of deterrence? 2 I'll accept that. 3 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, however Your Honor -- 4 THE COURT: More positive thinking, Mr. Gingold. 5 MR. GINGOLD: Encouragement. 6 THE COURT: All right. Good. 7 MR. GINGOLD: So Your Honor, one of the important 8 points of restitution is encouragement, to encourage the trustee 9 to discharge the trust duties prudently. 10 And Your Honor has pointed out that it's necessary to 11 make sure that the trustee understands how much he is encouraged 12 to do his job as well as he can, prudently, under the 13 circumstances. It's a reasonable, prudent man standard, Your 14 Honor, it's not an absolute standard. But as this circuit 15 pointed out, and this Court itself has pointed out numerous 16 times, one of those duties is to maintain adequate records. You 17 don't do so, you're going to be encouraged. 18 THE COURT: I think we've flogged this moribund animal 19 long enough. But let me say in the nature of fair warning to 20 the plaintiffs, don't assume that the actual gains to the 21 defendant from using the benefits are proven by the inability of 22 the government to account for disbursements. I want to think 23 about this a little bit more, and this has been a useful 24 discussion, but I think the presumptions go in opposite 25 directions and I think the burdens go in opposite directions. 0067 1 And I think the plaintiff will have the burden of proving that 2 actual gain proposition that supports something like 55 million 3 of your 58 -- 4 MR. GINGOLD: Billion. 5 THE COURT: -- billion dollar ad damnum. 6 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, we understand that. We would 7 like to note that a fiduciary who does not maintain adequate 8 records is not permitted to take advantage of that circumstance. 9 That is another rule of law with regard to management of the 10 trust and the fiduciary duties that have existed in this 11 country. 12 So to the extent the government doesn't have the 13 records, that trustee would be taking advantage of exactly what 14 the Court of Appeals identified in Cobell VI as a breach of a 15 subsidiary duty, and as a matter of law, the trustee is not 16 permitted to take advantage of that. 17 So the position that trust beneficiaries would be 18 placed in is exactly what every major, every decision that I'm 19 aware of in this country and elsewhere under these circumstances 20 has said, this is the burden that's shifted to the trustee. 21 Once plaintiffs are able to establish a reasonable 22 approximation of what the award should be - and Your Honor, the 23 reasonable approximation is based solely on the government's 24 production and the government's data, it is not based on 25 anything that has been manufactured by plaintiffs - is it a 0068 1 large amount of money, Your Honor? Yes, it is. But billions of 2 dollars have come into this trust; from the very beginning there 3 have been serious issues with regard to how the trust has been 4 managed. It doesn't make any difference which administration it 5 is, Your Honor. And as a result, we are dealing with an 6 accumulation of problems that is unfortunate, but it is reality. 7 To place that burden on the trust beneficiaries, where 8 the trustee has not discharged the trust duty that is inherent 9 in a trust relationship itself, Your Honor, would be 10 unprecedented based on my understanding of the law. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, you've said what you have to 12 say, I've said what I have to say, and we have to move forward 13 toward our June 9th trial. And I'm just telling you what I 14 think you better consider trying to prove. 15 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, one last thing in that regard 16 and I won't say anything further. 17 As I mentioned, plaintiffs are assuming that every 18 check that the government says were cut to trust beneficiaries 19 were actually paid to them, without any proof of that. We are 20 assuming that 100 percent. That is a burden that we have lifted 21 from the government that is not necessary with regard to any of 22 the cases that I've ever seen. Your Honor, we're using the 23 government's data to do that. We're using the CP&R data, and we 24 explained that both in our opening and our reply brief. 25 So we are not suggesting that even a check that went to 0069 1 a superintendent in care of a beneficiary, and where there's no 2 endorsement, even if a check exists, we're not talking about the 3 fact that -- we're not presuming the check that was identified 4 to the beneficiary hasn't been paid. 5 The government itself, whether you're looking at I 6 think -- and by the way, you'll find that on page 48 of our 7 reply brief. Whether you're looking at any of the major 8 documents that we've cited, whether it's AR-171, AR-176, or 9 DX 356, this is the government's data, and we didn't create it, 10 we didn't segregate it. It wasn't identified to us, it just 11 wasn't presented to you, Your Honor. 12 The issue that did remain that we excluded, Your Honor, 13 was the issue of the ACH or electronic funds transactions, where 14 there's absolutely no evidence that has been presented in that 15 regard. And Your Honor, I think that accounts, for the limited 16 period of time that that was available, upwards of one and a 17 half percent of the transactions. So at least on its face it 18 may not be material. 19 I would also like to point out, Your Honor, electronic 20 funds transactions didn't really exist in substantial form until 21 the mid '80s, and there weren't too many EFT or ATM terminals on 22 Indian reservations. So the reality is, that's the one area we 23 did not give the government full credit. 24 We also did not give the government full credit when it 25 arbitrarily established a 15 percent amount of money in the 0070 1 so-called Tribal IIM Trusts. Your Honor, there is absolutely no 2 evidence to support that whatsoever, and in fact, to combine 3 tribal money in an Individual Indian Trust was in violation of 4 the government's own regulations. 5 So we tried to accommodate what we thought the Court 6 wanted, and that is to use concrete information that has been 7 provided by the government so we could avoid some of the issues 8 as to whether our data is better than the government's data, and 9 so we can streamline the proceeding. We used that and presumed 10 100 percent disbursement for checks the government was able to 11 identify, or at least where a beneficiary was the payee. So we 12 did that, Your Honor. 13 But the government admits in its various documents and 14 even in testimony that distributions from the trust went to 15 third parties, whether you're dealing with corporations that 16 were lessees or whether you're dealing with tribes or you're 17 dealing with something else, including the government, with 18 regard to the payment of administrative fees. 19 So Your Honor, it's not every disbursement from the 20 trust that is a disbursement to the trust beneficiary, and the 21 government's owned admissions and documents demonstrate that. 22 So we tried to do what this Court asked for. That's 23 the reason we have this 70 percent disbursement rate. That 24 reflects the checks the government identified for the period of 25 time that it was available that were paid out, and it compares 0071 1 the amount of money the government acknowledges was collected. 2 That is the shortfall. 3 THE COURT: Look, Mr. Gingold, if we're talking about 4 the 69 or 70 percent factor and the way you've calculated it, if 5 you're going to stick with that, then that's something we're 6 going to have to sort out on June 9th. I can't sort all of that 7 out today. In fact, I didn't quite follow it in your briefs. 8 And it is a method of proof that is -- you know, when I 9 was in law school, there used to be a whole stack of books in 10 the library called Proof of Facts. I don't think they do Proof 11 of Facts anymore. I'm not sure that would have made it into 12 Proof of Facts. 13 But -- 14 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, it may have in the trust. 15 THE COURT: -- we'll see. If that's your proof, we'll 16 see. 17 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, that's the proof that the 18 government acknowledged with regard to the difference between 19 the amount it acknowledged it collected and the amount that's 20 reflected in the checks distributed. 21 Further, Your Honor, we applied that proof all the way 22 back from 1991 back to the beginning of the trust, even though 23 there's not an element of proof -- 24 THE COURT: You will forgive me, Mr. Gingold, if I tell 25 you that on this issue I have reached some sort of plateau, and 0072 1 I expect to hear testimony about it in June. Because arguing it 2 at this point isn't getting either one of us anywhere. 3 MR. GINGOLD: No, I understand that, Your Honor. I was 4 just pointing out, we were relying on what we understood this 5 Court wanted to give some certainty to a number as opposed to 6 every number in dispute, and we made assumptions in that regard. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. GINGOLD: Further, Your Honor, we were also relying 9 on what the law is with regard to presumptions in the trust 10 situation. 11 THE COURT: Now, what's your view of what needs to be 12 proven and -- proven, and by whom, at the June 9th trial, 13 Mr. Gingold? 14 MR. GINGOLD: The view that we expressed in our brief, 15 Your Honor, as tempered by the consideration, at least as we 16 understand your comments today, we understand that there's been 17 approximately, based on, again, using solely the government's 18 production, something over $15 billion that's been collected in 19 the trust; based on the government's production, something over 20 $10 billion has been paid out of the trust by check. 21 THE COURT: Does that include the Osage headrights 22 dollars? 23 MR. GINGOLD: Yes, it does, Your Honor. It includes 24 that -- 25 THE COURT: Let me ask you this. 0073 1 MR. GINGOLD: Sure. 2 THE COURT: If a billion dollars of the asserted 3 shortfall is related to the Osage headrights, how are you going 4 to support per capita distribution of that to all Native 5 Americans, no matter what their tribes are? 6 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, that's precisely why we 7 explained that this restitutionary award, historically and 8 today, is irrelevant to the injuries sustained by any individual 9 plaintiff. The class as a whole is entitled to it. 10 To the extent -- Your Honor, the cases, as Mr. Smith 11 pointed out correctly, are the following: There are cases that 12 say plaintiffs can elect an award, and if that award is 13 restitution - and generally, Your Honor, if you look at those 14 cases, it's where the restitutionary award is actually more than 15 the damage sustained by the beneficiaries, because there's no 16 correlation between the two - then they would be precluded from 17 seeking damages claims either in that same court or in another 18 court. 19 There is also a case that specifically says that 20 damages claims in the same court can be tried by a jury, where 21 the equitable restitution claims must be determined by the 22 judge, and then the judge fashions that out. They've always 23 been recognized as different. 24 There's also a situation where if in fact they can't 25 prove the damages because the evidence isn't there, the trust 0074 1 beneficiaries are generally left to a particular restitutionary 2 amount because the damages can't be proven. All of this is the 3 reason that restitution has evolved to where it is. 4 We have a unique situation in that regard because this 5 Court has certain jurisdiction and the claims court has certain 6 jurisdiction. We did not, when we filed this case, and do not 7 now, attempt to recover damages for any member of the class. We 8 hoped that the accounting would reveal, with adequate 9 information, what the issue is, whether or not the beneficiary 10 chose to go after an oil company, for example, because of an 11 underpayment that would be disclosed in the accounting. Not 12 that this Court should do anything about that, but if an 13 underpayment in royalties existed vis-a-vis Exxon, why shouldn't 14 the beneficiary be able to go, if that beneficiary chose, into 15 in U.S. District Court to recover that in damages? 16 If in fact it was determined that the money was 17 collected but not paid out, that isn't damages, Your Honor. If 18 it wasn't collected pursuant to a lease term, then that would be 19 damages. And if it would be identified in the accounting, then 20 they could do so. 21 What Mr. Smith was identifying was there is a pragmatic 22 consequence to not having an accounting, and that's to being put 23 in a position to make an informed decision about what remedies 24 to seek in the trust. That's the reason the accounting is 25 always the starting point, Your Honor, and the documents are 0075 1 always a starting point. Once the information is rendered, then 2 the decisions are made. 3 Here, there is no choice, from the class point of 4 view -- 5 THE COURT: Now hold it. I'm still waiting for an 6 answer to my question. I'm not sure that I've got it. My 7 question was, if a billion dollars of this amount that you're 8 starting with is the corpus from which you add all of the, what 9 we've both decided we will not call the time value of money, if 10 a billion dollars of that is attributable directly to the Osage 11 headright claim, why shouldn't a billion dollars of it go back 12 to the Osage? You've got it in this undifferentiated cloud 13 somehow. 14 MR. GINGOLD: Well, Your Honor, if we're dealing with a 15 benefit conferred on the government -- 16 THE COURT: Yeah, okay. 17 MR. GINGOLD: -- so without any injury to the 18 individual -- and that's what the concept of the benefit 19 conferred is. It distinguishes the two. Your Honor, there's an 20 argument that can be made that inasmuch as there is no 21 correlation between the award and the injury to any member of 22 the class, that the award should be per capita. 23 On the other hand, Your Honor, if this Court determined 24 that that is unfair, pursuant to a fairness hearing, this Court 25 could determine whatever it wants to do. 0076 1 All we were pointing out is this reinforces strongly 2 the distinction between an allegation that we have a damages 3 claim that's characterized or cast as a restitutionary award. 4 It isn't, Your Honor. Restitutionary award is based solely on 5 what benefit has accrued to the trustee. It has nothing to do 6 with any injury to a single beneficiary. 7 Under those circumstances, it would seem to me, Your 8 Honor, that allocation based on amount of interest or 9 speculative recoveries or collections is irrelevant to what is 10 involved in a restitution. On the other hand, if this Court 11 wanted to make that allocation under those circumstances, we 12 wouldn't object. 13 We want to do a couple of things, Your Honor. We want 14 it to stay as far from the line, wherever that is, between 15 damages and restitution as possible. And there are issues. 16 THE COURT: I got that part. That's loud and clear. 17 MR. GINGOLD: But once you start making an assessment 18 on an individual basis, then the argument can be made with 19 regard to whether or not you're dealing with an element of 20 compensation or substitutionary relief to the beneficiary, or 21 are you truly dealing with a restitutionary award that is 22 independent of the injuries sustained. 23 We wanted to stay on the right side of the line. We 24 didn't want to have obfuscation or confusion above. This area 25 of the law, as Dobbs says, is one of the most confused areas of 0077 1 the laws that exists, and we wanted to keep it simple. But Your 2 Honor, we wouldn't have an objection if you chose to allocate 3 differently. 4 THE COURT: Well, and of course that begs the question 5 of whether the Osage headrights belong in this corpus at all -- 6 MR. GINGOLD: That's correct. 7 THE COURT: -- since the money never came into the IIM. 8 MR. GINGOLD: And Your Honor, the money came into the 9 government or was held in the Treasury, and the fact it didn't 10 go into the system is irrelevant to the fact that it wasn't 11 deposited in the Treasury. It was deposited and held in the 12 Treasury, Your Honor. It wasn't held in a third party, it 13 wasn't held in the Osage tribe. 14 That is a distinction we were making, and we were 15 trying to identify this in conformity with how this Court 16 distinguished direct pay and compacting and contracting issues. 17 With the compacting and contracting issues, at least as we 18 understood it, one of the reasons -- and with direct pay as 19 well, one of the reasons this Court excluded those monies is 20 because the funds were not held at the Treasury, or an 21 unauthorized representative of the Treasury, whatever that might 22 be. 23 In this case the funds are held in the Treasury, 24 Treasury checks are written to disburse the funds. 25 THE COURT: Did I say anything about Osage headrights 0078 1 in the January 30th opinion? I don't remember that I did. 2 MR. GINGOLD: I don't believe you did, Your Honor, 3 except for the fact that the $13 billion total that was 4 reflected by the government's throughput analysis is a total 5 that incorporates part of the headright revenues, Your Honor. 6 So we were dealing with the statutory authority 7 regarding those headrights, the fact that the funds were always 8 held in the Treasury, the fact that disbursements were made with 9 Treasury checks. Whether a system is a good or bad system or 10 inaccurate or complete system doesn't determine the nature and 11 scope of the trust responsibility. 12 As Mitchell 2 says, it would be an anomalous situation 13 where the trustee discharges his duty and he's accountable, but 14 when he does not, he is not accountable. 15 That's what we have here, Your Honor, with regard to 16 the Osage. The fact that the government does not issue checks 17 on the 4844 ALC, but it does issue checks with a different 18 agency locator code, doesn't exclude Individual Indian Trust 19 funds that are generated from trust lands and deposited in the 20 Treasury and held in the Treasury, and then disbursed with 21 Treasury checks to be other than Individual Indian Trust funds 22 outside this litigation. That's not what is reflected either in 23 the class certification order or in what we understand this 24 Court decided on January 30th. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see. The government has 0079 1 suggested that although they mightily resist the notion of any 2 award that has a dollar sign in front of it, that such an award 3 in any event would have to be adjusted from the numbers we've 4 been talking about earlier to encompass the accounts for 5 individuals who are dead and have no representatives in the 6 plaintiff class, they would have to net out previous judgments 7 and settlements; they want to argue with you, I'm sure, about 8 the Osage headrights, and they probably want to review much of 9 the material that was covered in the January 30th findings of 10 fact about what the actual unaccounted for amount of money is. 11 Now, what do you think we're going to be doing in June? 12 MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, to the extent -- what we 13 understood, and in the briefing that we provided to this Court, 14 was the government would be able to reduce the award or the 15 amount that plaintiffs request based on what it could prove 16 should be outside the scope of this case or what it could prove 17 has been paid out. 18 Let's take an example, Your Honor, the one that was 19 just raised by Mr. Quinn, the previous judgments and 20 settlements. Your Honor, it was suggested there might be a 21 handful, six. I can tell you we're not aware of any that deals 22 with equitable restitution with regard to the benefit conferred 23 on the government for the use of funds. Perhaps the government 24 would be able to provide some insight in that regard so we can 25 look at those cases. 0080 1 And Your Honor, to the extent that an individual did 2 recover previously a damages award that would be in excess of 3 what he may be awarded by this Court, arguably there should 4 be -- it may be appropriate for an adjustment if in fact a 5 correlation is established between the two. And I'm not sure, 6 Your Honor, there is a correlation between damages under any 7 circumstances and unjust enrichment, based on my understanding 8 of the law. 9 With regard to Osage headrights, to the extent, in my 10 view, Your Honor, that the government can demonstrate that what 11 we've said with regard to the law and practically how the funds 12 have been held are incorrect, that can also be reduced from the 13 amount. 14 With regard to the deceased beneficiaries, as this 15 Court noted, whatever funds should have been inherited by the 16 successors in interest would continue, or at least as we 17 understood what this Court said. So to the extent the 18 government can demonstrate that the successors in interest who 19 are part of the class, and living beneficiaries, either had been 20 paid that money or that the deceased beneficiaries had paid that 21 money so it never was inherited through probate or otherwise, 22 the award should be reduced by that as well. 23 Your Honor, as the government itself pointed out in 24 this court - not in this courtroom, but in this court - with 25 regard to Philip Morris, whatever in that case the government 0081 1 said Philip Morris could prove to reduce the, in that case, 2 $280 billion restitutionary amount that it was seeking under 3 RICO, the government can do that and the award would be reduced 4 accordingly. 5 Your Honor, this is a proceeding in equity and it's a 6 court of law; therefore, whatever proof is provided satisfactory 7 to this Court, plaintiffs concede should be used to reduce the 8 award. Plaintiffs also suggest, Your Honor, that there is more 9 latitude provided in the District Court in an action in equity 10 than there is in a matter of law. 11 Therefore, fairness, as this Court has pointed out, I 12 think with regard to if we know someone has been paid but there 13 isn't any proof - Your Honor, if we know someone is paid, there 14 isn't any proof, I don't know how we get there - but if we know 15 someone is paid and the proof is lousy, Your Honor, fairness 16 would suggest that that not be credited to plaintiffs, it should 17 be deducted from the amount as well. 18 But Your Honor, part of what occurs in a court of 19 equity involves fairness, involves encouragement, involves 20 dealing with unjust enrichment in this case, and Your Honor, it 21 involves making sure that this case is resolved fairly. And we 22 are in favor of that. That's the reason we adopted the 23 presumptions we did, notwithstanding the fact that in our 24 reading of the law, it wasn't necessary. But we did that to try 25 and reach that fair result. 0082 1 So Your Honor, we believe this Court does have 2 substantial latitude to fashion a remedy that renders a fair 3 judgment, and does not -- it is not considered Draconian from 4 the point of view of paying beneficiaries this Court knows were 5 paid. We're not interested in that, because we're not 6 interested in what they were paid; we're interested in what the 7 government obtained as a result of its breaches of trust. 8 And Your Honor, this Court found the breaches, the 9 Court of Appeals affirmed them on numerous occasions. So it's 10 not a pejorative term, it's just a statement of fact, and I 11 don't intend it to impugn anyone's integrity. 12 But Your Honor, we believe that the government has an 13 obligation to demonstrate why the information that has been 14 provided to the plaintiffs and this Court for 12 years is 15 incorrect. And they've provided it, there's been testimony with 16 regard to the benefit, there is a throughput analysis that has 17 been started in 1996, Your Honor, so for 12 years they've been 18 working on this very issue, and they haven't presented that to 19 plaintiffs. 20 We believe, Your Honor, to the extent that information 21 is available that is suggested in defendant's brief, that that 22 information be presented either in the form of an identified 23 potential exhibit or otherwise, so plaintiffs aren't surprised 24 at the proceeding. 25 We believe in that regard -- 0083 1 THE COURT: Wait a minute. There are a couple of 2 places in your brief where you suggest you want production. 3 We're finished with that, counsel. We are finished with that. 4 There is not going to be any more discovery of any kind. If 5 they present stuff at this hearing in June that you are 6 surprised by, that's why it's a bench conference (sic); we can 7 have a recess and you can explore it. 8 MR. GINGOLD: So Your Honor, we thought it would be 9 done not in the context of discovery, in the context of at a 10 point in time this Court determines the parties' exhibits should 11 be identified and explained. We're not asking for discovery. 12 That's all. 13 So Your Honor, we did not use discovery -- 14 THE COURT: I'm running out of time here, and the 15 government hasn't even begun to talk about what they want to 16 call interest and what they want to call the proceedings in 17 June. So I think we ought to let -- 18 MR. QUINN: Your Honor, if I may beg your indulgence, 19 just one thing Mr. Gingold addressed, just going back to the 20 class issue for a moment and the claims -- the class definition, 21 Mr. Gingold made a reference that it's related to this 22 disgorgement claim. The definition actually is much broader 23 than that. It relates to anyone in effect who -- a class is 24 exclusive of those who prior to the filing of the complaint in 25 this case had filed actions on their own behalf alleging claims 0084 1 included within the complaint. 2 So it's not necessarily limited to anybody who sought 3 disgorgement or restitution or unjust enrichment. It can be a 4 broader category than. 5 THE COURT: The court reporter needs a break. We will 6 take a short break. I mean short break. We'll reconvene in 7 15 minutes. 8 (Recess taken at 12:27 p.m.). 9 THE COURT: All right. Let's continue. 10 MR. WARSHAWSKY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 12 MR. WARSHAWSKY: John Warshawsky for the United States. 13 Mr. Gingold, as we understand it, pretty much addressed the last 14 two questions that the Court presented. I'm going to be 15 addressing more what I believe was the Court's question four; 16 Mr. Kirschman can address Judge Boggs and the interest issue. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. WARSHAWSKY: Your Honor, both parties agreed, at 19 least in their briefs, that in a restitution case, the plaintiff 20 bears the burden of initially establishing a reasonable 21 approximation of the amount to be disgorged. We both cited the 22 same case law on that. 23 Where the parties I think diverged is that the 24 plaintiffs seek to transform that into a very, very light 25 burden. In essence, they seek to discharge their burden with 0085 1 this document here, Attachment A, which is their adaptation from 2 Administrative Record 171, and this document here, Defendant's 3 Exhibit 365, which was the government's -- one of the 4 government's preliminary draft documents provided at the October 5 hearing. 6 The Court, I would submit, should bear in mind that 7 under the law cited by both parties, in a restitution case the 8 plaintiff starts at zero. Now, the fact that there are trust 9 overtones to the case doesn't change that. And the Court said 10 something this morning which I thought was particularly on 11 point, if I may. You said, "Magic words from 200 years of 12 equity jurisprudence don't fit here." 13 And that's important, Your Honor. Because it's true 14 that if one looks at a basic trust case and asks a trustee to 15 justify a transaction that occurred in a couple of years, and 16 you have a discrete number of transactions, you may, in a common 17 law setting, apply one set of standards. 18 It's quite different for a beneficiary to come back 19 decades later in any setting, but particularly in a government 20 setting, and to seek to impose upon a trustee a duty to prove 21 every single transaction going back a century, o