|
DEA
Congressional Testimony
February 29, 2000
Statement
by:
William
E. Ledwith
Chief of International Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice
Before
the:
Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Date:
February 29, 2000
Chairman Mica, Congresswoman
Mink and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the issue
of the U.S. and Mexican Counter-narcotics efforts. I would like first
to thank the Subcommittee for its continued support of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and overall support of drug law enforcement. My testimony
today will provide you with an objective assessment of the law enforcement
issues surrounding the drug threat posed by international drug trafficking
organizations operating from Mexico. These criminal organizations based
in Mexico pose the greatest challenge to U.S. law enforcement agencies
charged with enforcing narcotics laws. Due to the ever-increasing legitimate
cross-border traffic and commerce between the U.S. and Mexico, several
international organized crime groups have established elaborate smuggling
infrastructures on both sides of the U.S./Mexico border. Furthermore,
it has long been established that in addition to drug trafficking, these
international criminal organizations spawn violence, corruption, and intimidation
that threaten the safety and stability of our cities and towns across
America.
The complex and sophisticated
international drug trafficking groups operating out of Mexico are oftentimes
vicious, destructive entities, that operate on a global scale. The four
largest drug trafficking organizations in Mexico --- operating out of
Guadalajara, Juarez, Mexicali, Tijuana, Sonora, and the Gulf region ---
under the auspices of Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, Armando Valencia-Cornelio,
Miguel Caro-Quintero, Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix, and Osiel Cardenas-Guillen
are in many ways, the 1990's versions of the mob leaders and groups that
U.S. law enforcement has fought against since the beginning of last century.
These international organized crime leaders, however, are far more dangerous,
far more influential and have a greater impact on our day-to-day lives
than did their domestic predecessors.
Those international
traffickers and their organizations make operational decisions from places
like Sonora, Mexico and other locations outside U.S. borders, which detrimentally
affect the quality of life of our citizens and directly support drug-related
crime in cities and towns across our country. These groups have reached
new levels of sophistication and have become a threat not only to the
United States and Europe, but also to their own countries. Their power
and influence are unprecedented. Unless innovative, flexible, multi-faceted
responses are crafted, these drug trafficking organizations threaten to
grow even more powerful in the years to come.
The Damage
to the United States:
In order to understand
the extent and nature of the damage caused by international drug trafficking
organizations, it is crucial to look at how these organizations work,
and how they infiltrate and position themselves in U.S. communities in
order to further their goals.
On any given day
in the United States, business transactions are being arranged between
the major drug lords headquartered in Mexico and their surrogates who
have established roots within the United States, for the shipment, storage
and distribution of tons of illicit drugs. In the past, Mexico-based criminal
organizations limited their activities to the cultivation of marijuana
and opium poppies for subsequent production of marijuana and heroin. The
organizations were also relied upon by Colombian drug lords to transport
loads of cocaine into the United States, and to pass on this cocaine to
other organizations who distributed the product throughout the U.S. However,
over the past several years, Mexico-based organized crime syndicates have
gained increasing control over many of the aspects of the cocaine, methamphetamine,
heroin and marijuana trades, resulting in increased threats to the well-being
of American citizens as well as government institutions and the citizens
of their own country.
In the recent past,
traffickers from Mexico had maintained dominance in the western part of
the United States, and in some Midwest cities. Today, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, along with other law enforcement agencies, developed evidence
leading to indictments demonstrating that associates of organized crime
groups based in Mexico have established themselves on the East Coast of
the United States, thus becoming significant participants in the nationwide
drug trade.
Mexican
Traffickers Rise to Prominence:
During 1995 and 1996,
intense law enforcement pressure was focused on the Cali leadership by
the brave men and women of the Colombian National Police. As a result,
all of the top trafficking leaders from Cali were either jailed or killed.
During that time frame, U.S. law enforcement agencies were effectively
attacking Colombian cells operating within the United States. With the
Cali leaders imprisoned in Colombia and the successful attacks by law
enforcement on their U.S. cells, traffickers from Mexico took on greater
prominence. A growing alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the
organizations from Mexico worked to benefit both sides. Traffickers from
Mexico had long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine
across the U.S.-Mexico border, using established distribution routes to
deliver drugs throughout the United States. The Mexico-based organizations'
emergence as major methamphetamine producers and traffickers also contributed
to making them a major force in international drug trafficking. The Mexican
traffickers, who were previously paid in cash by the Colombian traffickers
for their services, began to routinely receive up to one-half of a shipment
of cocaine as their payment. This led to Mexican traffickers having access
to multi-ton quantities of cocaine and allowed them to expand their markets
and influence in the United States, thereby making them formidable cocaine
traffickers in their own right.
With the disruption
of the Cali syndicate, Mexican groups such as the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes
organization, the Arellano-Felix cartel, the Amezcua-Contreras brothers,
and the Caro-Quintero group, consolidated their power and began to dominate
drug trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border and in many U.S. cities.
Recent events in Mexico and along the southwest border emphasize the fact
that trafficking groups from Mexico have developed into a significant
force in international organized crime.
Overview
of Narcotics Smuggled along the U.S./Mexican Border:
Recent estimates
indicate that approximately 55% of the cocaine available in the United
States is transported across the U.S.-Mexico border. Typically, large
cocaine shipments are transported from Colombia, via commercial shipping,
fishing and "Go-fast" boats and off-loaded in Mexico. The cocaine is transported
through Mexico, usually by trucks, where it is warehoused in cities like
Guadalajara, Tijuana or Juarez, that are operating bases for the major
criminal trafficking organizations. The extremely high volume of vehicular
traffic over the U.S./Mexico border allows cocaine loads to be driven
across the border and taken to major distribution centers within the U.S.,
such as Los Angeles, New Jersey, Chicago or Phoenix. Surrogates of the
major drug lords wait for instructions, often provided over encrypted
communications devices-- --phones, faxes, pagers or computers---telling
them where to warehouse smaller loads, who to contact for transportation
services, and who to return the eventual profits to. Individuals sent
to the United States from Mexico and often here illegally, have been shown
to have contracted with U.S. trucking establishments to move loads across
the country. Once the loads arrive in an area that is close to the eventual
terminal point, safehouses are established for workers who watch over
the cocaine supplies and arrange for it to be distributed by wholesale
dealers within the vicinity. These distributors have traditionally been
Colombian nationals or individuals from the Dominican Republic, but recently,
DEA has come upon evidence that Mexican trafficking organizations are
also directly involved in cocaine distribution in New York City.
We have not only
identified the drug lords themselves, but in most cases, the key members
of their command and control structure. The combined efforts of the DEA,
FBI, DOJ, the U.S. Customs Service and members of state and local police
departments have resulted in the seizure of hundreds of tons of drugs,
hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds and most importantly,
several significant indictments. In fact, some of the leaders of these
organizations---Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix, Jesus Amezcua-Contreras,
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes----have become familiar names in every major
law enforcement department in the United States. Despite this evidence,
along with the notoriety, these traffickers have continued to evade arrest
and prosecution.
The primary reason
they have been able to avoid arrest and continue their criminal enterprise
is their ability to intimidate witnesses and assassinate and corrupt public
officials. Clear examples of this point may be cited in recent efforts
to apprehend members of the Arellano Felix cartel and the Cardenas Guillen
cartel, based in Tijuana and Matamoros, Mexico, respectively. In Tijuana
over the past year, Mexican officials, with support from the DEA, have
unsuccessfully attempted to apprehend key traffickers working for the
Arellano Felix organization. In November 1999, major Gulf cartel drug
trafficker Osiel Cardenas Guillen illegally detained and assaulted two
U.S. drug enforcement agents in Matamoros, Mexico, across the international
border from Brownsville, Texas.
Methamphetamine traffickers,
oftentimes associated with major Mexican organized crime groups, obtain
the precursor chemicals necessary for methamphetamine production from
sources in other countries, such as China and India, as well as from rogue
chemical suppliers in the United States. In fact, Mexico-based transnational
criminal organizations have become the most significant distributors in
the U.S. of methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals. Several
bulk ephedrine seizures destined for Mexico have focused attention on
the magnitude of ephedrine acquisition by Mexican organized crime groups.
Super methamphetamine labs, capable of producing hundreds of pounds of
methamphetamine on a weekly basis, are established in Mexico or in California,
where the methamphetamine is provided to traffickers to distribute across
the United States.
These methamphetamine
organizations based in Mexico also have well established, polydrug distribution
networks in place throughout our country. The Mexican trafficking organizations
have single-handedly created a new booming demand for methamphetamine,
moving it in mass quantities eastward across the country-far beyond the
traditional West and Southwest markets.
Heroin from Mexico
now represents 14% of the heroin seized in the United States by federal
authorities, and it is estimated that 43 metric tons of opium gum was
produced in 1999 in Mexico. A recent study conducted by the DEA indicates
that as much as 29% of the heroin being used in the U.S. is being smuggled
in by the Mexico-based organized crime syndicates. Mexican black tar heroin
is produced in Mexico, and transported over the border in cars and trucks.
Like cocaine and methamphetamine, it is trafficked by associates of the
organized criminal groups in Mexico, and provided to dealers and users
in the Southwest, Northwest, and Midwest areas of the United States. At
one time, it was commonplace for couriers to carry two pounds or so of
heroin into the United States; recently, quantities of heroin seized from
individuals has increased as is evidenced by larger seizures in a number
of towns in Texas. This heroin is extremely potent, and its use has resulted
in a significant number of deaths.
Marijuana from Mexico
still dominates the illicit U.S. import market although U.S. experts estimate
Mexico's marijuana production at 3,700 metric tons (compared with 4,600
in 1998 and 4,800 in 1997). In addition, during 1999, the GOM eradicated
some 23,547 hectares of marijuana (down from 24,200 in 1998). Seizures
of Mexican marijuana have increased from 102 metric tons in 1991 to 836.3
metric tons in 1999. Marijuana organizations from Mexico are very powerful
and violent. In some places, traffickers from Mexico have established
growing operations within the United States. In a recent case in Idaho,
DEA , working with other federal, state and local law enforcement officials,
arrested a group of illegal aliens from Zacatecas, Mexico. A total of
114,000 marijuana plants, weighing almost 20 tons, were seized. This operation
represented the largest marijuana seizure ever in the state of Idaho.
It is important to
note that although many of the transactions relating to the drug trade
take place on U.S. soil, the major organized crime bosses direct each
and every detail of their multi-billion dollar business while situated
in Mexico. They are responsible not only for the business decisions being
made, but ultimately for the devastation that too many American communities
have suffered as a result of the influx of cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin
and marijuana. These powerful and organized syndicates can frustrate the
ability of the Mexican anti-drug police. Their ability to place obstacles
such as corruption and unlimited resources in the path of police can oftentimes
impede investigations. In the past year, none of the major Mexican trafficking
organizations have been dismantled or significantly disrupted by Mexican
authorities.
Law Enforcement
Response:
Reporting indicates
that the Southwest border (SWB) remains a major point of entry for approximately
70% of all illicit drugs smuggled into our country by Mexican trafficking
groups. In response to this continued threat along the border, the DEA
has established several initiatives that facilitate and improve intelligence
and information sharing, while identifying and removing impediments to
cooperation. These initiatives employ a multi-pronged strategy, which
utilizes and combines law enforcement operations, intelligence operations,
and provides for law enforcement assistance in order to achieve success
in combating criminal drug trafficking organizations along the border.
The objective of these initiatives are to disrupt and ultimately dismantle
criminal organizations that smuggle illicit drugs into the U.S. by linking
Federal, state and local investigations domestically and mobilizing multilateral
enforcement efforts abroad. Based upon past trends, intelligence, and
recent seizures along the border, the DEA has established the following
priorities for the SWB Field Divisions: (1) cocaine investigations involving
violent organizations; (2) methamphetamine investigations, (3) heroin
investigations, (4) marijuana investigations, (5) money laundering investigations
and (6) diverted/dangerous drug and chemical investigations.
Enforcement
Operations/Strategies:
In response to the
emergence of these Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization's (MDTO), it
became apparent that a coordinated strategy for law enforcement counterdrug
activities needed to be implemented. In order to combat drug production
and trafficking networks operating along the U.S./Mexican border, DEA,
in concert with other Federal agencies established the Southwest Border
Initiative - an integrated, coordinated law enforcement effort designed
to attack the command and control structure of organized criminal operations
associated with the Mexican Federation. This strategy focuses on intelligence
and enforcement efforts which target drug distribution systems within
the U.S. and directs resources toward the disruption of those principal
drug trafficking organizations operating across the border.
As such, DEA, in
cooperation with other Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies
is focusing increased intelligence, technical resources and investigative
expertise on the major MDTO's responsible for smuggling vast quantities
of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine across the border.
Apart from this effort,
DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also provide operational
planning, intelligence and training to Government of Mexico (GOM) law
enforcement authorities, to strengthen their capacity to combat these
organizations. The Southwest Border strategy targets specific Mexican
trafficking organizations operating across the border and attacks their
command and control infrastructures wherever they operate.
Further, the Special
Operations Division (SOD)is a joint national coordinating and support
entity comprised of agents, analysts, and prosecutors from DOJ, Customs,
FBI, DEA and IRS. Its mission is to coordinate and support regional and
national criminal investigations and prosecutions against trafficking
organizations that most threaten the U.S. SOD performs seamlessly across
both investigative agency and district jurisdictional boundaries, providing
field offices with necessary support, assistance, intelligence analysis
and "leads" for investigative action. Within SOD, no distinction is made
among the participating investigative agencies. Where appropriate, state
and local authorities are fully integrated into coordinated operations.
As presently configured, SOD consists of five sections; each of which
has both DEA and FBI personnel assigned. One section targets Colombian
Trafficking Organizations, a second concentrates on cocaine and heroin
trafficking in Europe and Asia, a third targets money laundering organizations
and the remaining two sections are the heart of the Southwest Border Project
and focus their efforts on the principal MDTO's. These two sections target,
among other things, the command and control networks of the identified
MDTO's, and their supporting organizations operating along the Southwest
border. As such, the interagency regional objectives are as follows; (1)
Intelligence collection and analysis, (2) Investigations, (3) Interdiction
and Enforcement and (4) Prosecution and Incarceration. The following operation
delineates the need and significance for such a multi-agency project:
Operation
Impunity:
In September 1999,
the DEA announced the conclusion of a two-year international investigation
that culminated in the arrest of over 106 individuals linked to the Amado
Carrillo Fuentes (ACF) drug trafficking organization, headquartered in
Cancun, Mexico. This investigation, known as "Operation Impunity", was
a multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency investigation which directly linked
drug trafficking activity in the United States to the highest level of
the Mexican cocaine trade.
This investigation
began in January 1998 and was conducted jointly by the DEA, FBI, USCS,
U.S. Attorney's Office, DOJ/Criminal Division and a host of state and
local law enforcement agencies. The investigation encompassed 53 DEA,
FBI and USCS case investigations which spans 14 Federal judicial districts.
Since 1998, this investigation has resulted in 36 seizures, netting 12,434
kilograms of cocaine, a half a kilo of heroin, 4,806 pounds of marijuana,
more than $19 million in U.S. currency, and the arrest of 106 individuals.
The above statistics
only tell part of the story. Operation Impunity demonstrated an unparalleled
coordinated and cooperative effort among the law enforcement community.
Overall, this investigation allowed the law enforcement community to ascertain
this organization's method of operation from the narcotic distribution
in Colombia to the transportation through Mexico to the ultimate distribution
networks throughout the U.S. Such success clearly demonstrates the need
for the continuation of long term, multi-agency investigations.
Cooperative
Efforts with the Government of Mexico/Status of Vetted Units:
Subsequent to the
arrest of General Gutierrez Rebollo in 1997 and the establishment of mechanisms
within the Mexican law enforcement infrastructure, such as the Bilateral
Task Forces (BTF's) and the Vetted Unit program, DEA became cautiously
optimistic relative to the prospects of the GOM's commitment to bilateral
investigations. The DEA has supported these programs financially and with
other resources in hope that our efforts would result in a successful
attack against the drug lords who are creating so much havoc throughout
communities in the United States. However, continuing reports of corruption
and the rapidly growing power and influence of the major organized criminal
groups in Mexico cause us great concern about the long-term prospects
for success. Perhaps, the arrest of Operation Impunity target Jaime Aguilar
Gastelum and Operation Millennium target Guillermo Moreno-Rios, by Mexican
authorities, is indicative of the GOM's future commitment to such joint
ventures.
However, in the last
year the Vetted Units Program in Mexico has not achieved the potential
as originally envisioned by both governments. In order to presently address
this issue, the DEA and the Government of Mexico's equivalent to the DEA,
the Fiscalia Especializada Para la Atencion de Delitos Contra la Salud
(FEADS), have agreed to carefully review the Program and establish ways
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness against mutually agreed investigative
targets. The DEA and FEADS also continue to conduct joint investigative
endeavors throughout Mexico. The joint investigations are being conducted
with the primary investigative component of the FEADS vetted units --the
Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's). However, the DEA has not worked with the
remaining vetted units due to diminished efforts of the Government of
Mexico/PGR to better organize them into a well-engaged work force.
However, the investigative
achievements by the BTF and the SIU as related to cases against the major
drug trafficking organizations are minimal. The inability of these units
to fully employ the provisions of the Organized Crime Law to properly
investigate these major organizations has been equally disappointing.
Further complicating investigative efforts, the Mexico City-based SIU
was compromised in February 1999 by a Mexican news exposé describing
the operations of that unit, to include its location, activities and investigative
targets. Because of this setback, the SIU has been largely shut down,
and throughout 1999 to present, the GOM has failed to revive the unit
and is still in the process of searching for a new site to relocate the
SIU. In addition, throughout 1999 police personnel from the Mexico City
SIU were separated into smaller groups and often deployed to various regions
throughout Mexico in order to work other investigations, such as the search
for Mexico fugitive and former Governor of the State of Quintana Roo Mario
Villanueva-Madrid.
In addition, vetted
unit personnel of the Organized Crime Unit (OCU), of which the SIU is
a part, have been investigating a drug smuggling network of the Carrillo-Fuentes
organization in Cancun, headed by Alcides Ramon-Magana. During the course
of this investigation, DEA has shared three principal witnesses with the
OCU who have provided information regarding this organization . The information
gleaned from these witnesses has contributed to the seizure of real estate
in Quintana Roo and the arrest of several defendants in this case, including
mid-level drug trafficker and money-launderer Carlos Colin-Padilla. In
addition, the GOM issued arrest warrants for a total of 44 individuals
associated with Ramon-Magana including an arrest warrant issued on April
5, 1999, against former Governor Villanueva Madrid on 28 counts of drug
related offenses.
The governments of
Mexico and the United States will continue to conduct cooperative and
bilateral investigations. Just this month, based upon information provided
by the DEA to the GOM, two such operations were conducted, resulting in
the seizure of a cocaine laboratory and a methamphetamine laboratory in
Mexico. Ultimately, DEA believes that the vetting process is our best
chance at ensuring integrity with our counterparts. As mentioned in previous
testimony today with respect to the ongoing bilateral Vetted Units Program
survey, DEA will remain actively engaged with our GOM counterparts relative
to this process. DEA will also encourage the GOM to fully staff and support
the BTF's and the SIU's with FEADS personnel that have already been vetted
and to supply the resources that these operations require.
Corruption
Issues:
Although the Mexican
government is attempting to address the issue of corruption, it continues
to be a serious problem in Mexican law enforcement institutions. The Federal
Preventive Police (FPP) was created in early 1999 in response to the existing
corruption in the police ranks, but recently reported that several FPP
agents were under investigation for corrupt activities. In December 1999
the Government of Mexico/PGR reported that between April 1997 through
1999 more than 1,400 of the 3,500 federal police officers had been fired
for corruption and that 357 of the officers had been prosecuted. Additionally,
the National Public Safety System established a national police registry
to prevent corrupt police officials from being rehired by another law
enforcement entity. However, the PGR has not fully implemented these programs
to deal with corruption. For example, in 1999, the former Director of
Investigations for the PGR's SIU and OCU, Cuauhtemoc Herrera Suastegui,
was reassigned to a high-level position within the PGR despite failing
a USG-administered polygraph examination in 1998. Additionally, there
are indications that he provided assistance to the Carrillo-Fuentes drug
trafficking organization. Although several FEADS vetted "floater" units
have had several successes during 1999, the Vetted Unit Program failed
to adhere to internal security principles involving the polygraph process,
which may lead to potential compromises and corruption. The Mexican military
also has experienced narco-related corruption within its ranks.
As of July 1999,
an amendment to the Judicial Organic law mandated that PGR officers, prosecutors,
police agents, experts, and pilots assigned to narcotics eradication duties
are required to undergo an evaluation process, to include background checks
and polygraphs.
Judicial efforts
to stop corruption are underway. On January 11, 2000, a Mexican Federal
judge issued an arrest warrant for the magistrate who wrongly freed Adan
Amezcua-Contreras, a major methamphetamine trafficker. On February 3,
2000, the Mexican Federal Supreme Court ruled that the suspended Morelos
Governor, Jorge Carrillo-Olea, could be brought to trial for protecting
drug trafficking and kidnapping activities. Olea, a retired general and
former Director of Mexico's civilian intelligence agency (CISN) and former
anti-drug Commissioner for the Attorney General's Office (PGR), was ordered
by the Federal Supreme Court to be placed under house arrest by the PGR.
The PGR, however, has yet to take him into custody. This is the first
time the Federal Supreme Court ruled to refer a Governor or Executive
Branch official to trial.
Perhaps the most
alarming incident involving Mexican officials occurred on November 9,
1999, when a DEA Special Agent, along with a FBI Special Agent debriefed
a Confidential Source in Matamoros, Mexico. During the course of this
debriefing the Special Agents and Confidential Source were surrounded
and physically threatened by documented Mexican trafficker Osiel Cardenas-Guillen
and approximately 15 associates. Each of these associates, one brandishing
a gold-plated automatic assault weapon, were either municipal or state
police officers. Furthermore, despite monitoring the entire incident over
the DEA Special Agent's cellular telephone, whom had called to request
assistance, the Tamaulipas State Judicial Police Commander took no action.
Due only to their resourcefulness and ability to diffuse this potentially
fatal encounter, were the agents and the confidential source able to survive
unscathed. Among other issues, this incident highlights the vulnerability
of DEA and FBI Special Agents working in Mexico.
Status
of Extraditions:
The principal leaders
of major drug trafficking organizations fear the threat of extradition
to the United States more than any other law enforcement or judicial tool.
Extradition of significant traffickers ensures that those responsible
for the command and control of illicit activities, including drug smuggling
and money laundering, will be held totally accountable for their actions
and serve a prison sentence commensurate with their crimes.
No major drug traffickers
were extradited to the United States in 1999. The Mexican Government did
extradite 10 fugitives on narcotics related or money laundering offenses
in 1999 -- eight U.S. citizens and two Mexican citizens. One Mexican citizen,
a drug trafficker, was sought on drug charges after escaping from a U.
S. prison while serving a sentence on drug related crimes. The other Mexican
citizen, who killed a United States Border patrol agent, was sought on
murder and marijuana smuggling charges.
In September 1998,
the Government of Mexico arrested U.S. Citizen and DEA fugitive Randall
Jeffrey Spradling in Guadalajara which, given Spradling's strong ties
to both Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers, was an important event.
He is fighting extradition to the United States.
In the past twelve
months, some Mexican Courts have denied extradition of significant drug
traffickers, such as Jaime Ladino-Avila, to the U.S. due to a variety
of reasons, such as outstanding Supreme Court decisions holding life imprisonment
unconstitutional in Mexico. At the end of 1999, there were 40 persons
in Mexican custody and subject to extradition proceedings based on U.S.
provisional arrest warrants and extradition requests. However, DEA has
not observed any positive developments with respect to the extradition
of significant drug traffickers in the last year.
Conclusion:
The Road Ahead:
The United States'
long experience with confronting and dismantling organized criminal activity
has necessitated the development of an aggressive, cohesive and coordinated
strategy to identify, target, arrest and incapacitate the leadership of
these organizations . DEA=s role in addressing the drug problem is to
continue to attack the leadership of these international criminal organizations.
With a strategy consisting of mounting attacks on the organizational command
and control of major Mexican trafficking syndicates that operate along
the U.S./Mexico border, the DEA is able to attack the ability of these
organizations to conduct business and impede their efforts to import drugs
into the U.S.
The effectiveness
of national and bilateral efforts against drug organizations will depend
largely on demonstrable progress in disrupting and dismantling these transnational
narco-trafficking organizations. This includes apprehending, prosecuting
and convicting major drug traffickers, as well as exercising extradition
laws against those defendants facing federal drug trafficking charges
in the United States, and exposing and prosecuting individuals and businesses
involved in providing critical support networks such as front companies,
security , transportation and the like.
Therefore, it is
imperative for law enforcement to continue to facilitate the flow of information
and intelligence while identifying and removing impediments to cooperation.
In this vein, it is vital for the DEA, along with other USG agencies,
to continue to support the GOM in the field of counternarcotics operations.
In turn, DEA encourages and expects the GOM to provide adequate investigative
manpower, ongoing integrity testing, financial resources, equipment and
reciprocal drug intelligence in support of bilateral drug law enforcement,
which should significantly improve both governments' ability to counter
and eliminate transnational drug trafficking organizations.
However, the true
sign of success regarding anti-drug efforts in Mexico is best recognized
with tangible results from concerted law enforcement efforts, i.e. the
arrest and successful prosecution of significant leaders of these major
drug cartels in Mexico and; where applicable, their extraditions to the
United States to face federal drug trafficking charges. We are not yet
there. |