DEA
Congressional Testimony
April 26, 2006
Statement
of
Michael Braun
Chief of Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration
Before the
House Government Reform Committee
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Regarding
“ Transit Zone Operations: Can We Sustain Record Seizures With
Declining Resources?”
Good afternoon,
Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee. On behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s
(DEA) Administrator Karen P. Tandy, I want to thank you for your continued
support of the men and women of DEA, as well as the opportunity to
testify on our enforcement efforts throughout the transit zone and
how DEA continually adapts to the increasingly complex challenges we
face in the region.
My testimony today will focus on the Central America region of the transit
zone, where a vast majority of the cocaine destined for the United States transits,
and I will discuss DEA’s enforcement strategy as well as our bilateral
initiatives with our Latin American counterparts.
The United States
is finding smarter and better ways to leverage its resources to continue
to address important -- and inter-connected -- priorities such as our
drug interdiction program in the Western Hemisphere and other types
of global threats. The good news is that, today we know more about
how drug trafficking organizations operate. We are able to work more
effectively, work smarter, and interdict more. Governments throughout
Latin America, who in the past may have been reluctant to work with
us, are now asking for more assistance and collaboration.
Today, we have better
intelligence and better interagency coordination to act on this intelligence.
We have been able to develop, and continue to expand upon a “defense
in-depth” strategy. The DEA’s strategic deployment of approximately
38 percent of our foreign workforce to Latin America demonstrates the
importance of the region and how our agency continually adapts to the
increasingly complex challenges we face in the Transit Zone.
We believe that
to effectively combat drug trafficking in Central America and the transit
zone, the United States must maintain a sustained, multi-agency approach.
The DEA focuses on improving the region’s counter drug capabilities
through developing personal liaisons with host nation law enforcement
authorities, institution building with host nation governments, conducting
bilateral investigations, and by attacking the command and control
structures of major drug trafficking organizations. In April 2005,
the DEA proposed to the counter-narcotics community and has taken the
lead in implementing a multi-agency International Drug Flow Prevention
Strategy (IDFPS) designed to significantly disrupt the movement of
drugs, money and chemicals between source zones and the United States.
Challenges in Central
America
Mexico and countries
in Central America lie directly between the traditional drug producing
countries in South America and drug consumers in the United States.
Geographically, these nations provide a natural conduit for illicit
drug trafficking organizations that threaten our national security
through not only their trafficking activities, but also their corrupting
influence on governments throughout the region. This region will remain
the primary transit zone for U.S.-bound drugs produced in Mexico and
South America for the foreseeable future and the billions of dollars
that flow back to the drug trafficking syndicates.
All seven Central
American countries are actively used by major trafficking organizations
to smuggle drugs and money between South America and the United States.
With few exceptions (notably Costa Rica and Panama), the countries
in Central America are ill-equipped to handle the threat of drug trafficking.
Weak economies, and fragile institutions can further exacerbate the
challenges. Police and other drug enforcement agencies are often under-funded
and receive inadequate training. Consequently, some officials are susceptible
to the substantial bribes that drug traffickers can offer. The corrupting
power of illicit drug trafficking organizations on the governmental
institutions of Central America significantly increases the difficulties
of mounting successful drug enforcement and interdiction efforts.
Complicating this
picture is the increased involvement by major Mexican and Colombian
drug trafficking organizations in Central America. These powerful organizations
rely on the hallmarks of organized crime to carry out their operations,
namely, corruption, intimidation, and violence. Both South American
and Mexican drug trafficking organizations are linking up with host-country
transportation organizations that are highly compartmentalized, so
that if one member is arrested, or one cell is dismantled, the operation
as a whole is not compromised. Traffickers also use the latest technology
such as cellular and satellite phones, text messaging, HF/UHF/VHF radio
communications, global positioning systems and voice-over-internet
protocol. The rapid expansion of secure communications provides additional
challenges to law enforcement.
Challenges in the
Eastern Pacific and Caribbean
The Eastern Pacific
(EPAC) and the Western Caribbean present unique challenges to detection
and monitoring: the EPAC due to its vast size, and the Western Caribbean
because of the relatively short transit for smuggling events, particularly
those using go-fast boats, and the fact that many occur in or near
the territorial waters of the surrounding countries.
The DEA Special
Agents and Intelligence Analysts assigned to Central American offices
work with host country anti-narcotics agents in developing enforcement
operations against those drug trafficking organizations with ties to
the United States. In order to conduct these operations, the DEA works
jointly with and relies heavily on U.S. resources provided by the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the Customs and Border Protection, (CBP), Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).
Within the past
ten years, there has been a decline in U.S. Government counter-narcotics
assets in Guatemala as the air threat shifted to an overwhelmingly
maritime threat. Previous Guatemalan Administrations, which were riddled
with corruption scandals, responded by gutting the Guatemalan military
units that had worked effectively in-country.
Evidence began to
appear in 2003/2004 that cocaine traffickers might be returning to
trafficking flights through Central America and into southern Mexico,
mainly because of an increase in the number of unidentified but assumed
suspect Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) tracks fading into
that region. Although in the second half of 2004 the number of unidentified
but assumed suspect tracks dropped markedly; in 2005, there were 128
unidentified but assumed suspect tracks, an increase over the 2004
level. The U.S. continues to monitor the situation, but traffickers
still utilize maritime for more than 90 percent of the documented cocaine
flow moving toward the United States.
Aerial photographs provided by the DEA and other U.S. assets reveal an “aircraft
graveyard” in the northern Peten area of Guatemala. These photos demonstrate
that drug traffickers are successfully flying drug shipments into the area;
the area represents the final destination for many of these drug laden aircraft,
which are either damaged on landing or are intentionally destroyed by the organizations.
The area also provides the traffickers with logistical advantage over host
country anti-narcotics police through a quick egress from Guatemala into Mexico
via unpaved and unmonitored roadways. Because the Guatemalan government lacks
helicopters to transport law enforcement or military personnel into this and
other remote areas, there is no end game capability. Recently, the Guatemalan
Government established an interagency task force to destroy clandestine airstrips
in the national park areas of the Peten, but these strips can be quickly reconstituted.
El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Honduras, Guatemala and Panama each maintain a small naval contingent
with limited resources available for counter drug operations. The Coast
Guard assets in Belize and Costa Rica face the same resource challenges
as the other Central American countries. Furthermore, the maritime
assets of these countries depend on DEA’s reimbursement for fuel
and other operational costs in order to conduct operations.
Mobile Inspection
Teams (MITs) have been established in each of the Central American
countries. These are specialized units trained in identifying false
compartments within conveyances, as well as interview techniques, and
rapid deployment. The MITs are limited in their ability to travel throughout
the country due to lack of fuel, subsistence and aircraft capable of
moving them quickly into remote areas when a smuggling event is know
to have taken place. This has relegated them to one, possibly two,
ports of entry leading in and out of their country. Specific overland
operations requested by the DEA can occur only if funding is provided
by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) of the Department of State or the DEA.
Working Smarter
According to the
Office of National Drug Control Policy’s Interagency Cocaine
Movement Assessment (IACM), the majority of cocaine destined for the
United States transits the Mexico/Central America corridor, as opposed
to the Caribbean corridor. The IACM’s preliminary numbers for
2005 indicate an estimated 91 percent of the cocaine destined for the
United States transited this corridor which includes the maritime routes
in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. These numbers have remained
fairly constant for the last several years.
There is no comparison
between the typical size of seizures that occur on the Southwest border
of the United States and the ones encountered in the Transit Zone.
Along the Southwest border, seizures are most always under 50 kilograms,
usually around 20 kilograms. In the Transit Zone and the Eastern and
Western Pacific corridor, seizures are often multi-ton in size. The
DEA is committed to attacking those drug trafficking organizations
operating within Central America and recognizes that interagency cooperation
and coordination are fundamental to increase the efficiency of our
operations in the transit zone. To combat this level of drug smuggling,
the DEA strongly believes we must take an offensive approach to prevent
the bulk drug shipments from moving further into the transportation
chain where fragmentation occurs, in most instances on the Mexican
side of the Southwest border. Accordingly, DEA’s efforts are
focused on stopping the drugs before they get to Mexico, reflecting
defense in-depth.
In response to
the President’s National Control Strategy calling for market
disruption by attacking the flow of drugs, the DEA is working closely
with JIATF-South and the inter-agency community developed and is implementing
a multi-faceted and multi-agency International Drug Flow Prevention
Strategy (IDFPS). This enforcement effort is based on gathering, compiling
and analyzing intelligence from multiple participating agencies including
the Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
JIATF-S, and host national law enforcement and military counterparts
from Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala, Belize and Mexico.
The three pillars
supporting this strategy are: (l) intelligence-driven enforcement,
(2) innovative, well-planned and coordinated multi-agency operations
incorporating sequential planning processes based on predictive intelligence,
and (3) leveraging of all intelligence and operational assets available
through the multi-agencies, including the U.S. military and Intelligence
Community. Since this is a multi-agency strategy, all available resources
and assets have been brought to bear in response to credible intelligence
queries. By concentrating law enforcement efforts in the Central America
corridor, bulk drug shipments, typically multi-ton in quantity, could
be interdicted before they reach Mexico, where the drugs are normally
broken down into smaller quantities for transshipment north.
In order to maximize
the effectiveness of U.S. resources in the transit zone, well-coordinated,
interagency efforts are crucial to the achievement of our objectives
and the effectiveness of the IDFPS. I am proud to say that this strategy
has been proven effective, and is one of the key factors responsible
for the successful seizures we had in the past year.
The bottom line is that even the greatest intelligence in the world is ineffective
if there are no response capabilities to carry out the end game. DEA agents
and analysts in Central America tell us that the drug traffickers are highly
attuned to the actions of law enforcement, are procedurally experienced
and extremely adept. For example, in air smuggling operations, the traffickers
are working faster than ever, and within 7-10 minutes of the landing the
drugs are off-loaded and moved out, whether that occurs on a remote beach
or on an airstrip. Because of the speed of these off-load operations, even
if the authorities can respond, only some of the load is seized. We must
have good intelligence and pre-positioned assets to respond to that kind
of threat because of the speed at which these air and maritime smuggling
operations conclude. Timely coordination with multi-agencies and our host
country counterparts is critical to the success of our enforcement operations.
Current DEA Operations
Operation All Inclusive
The first initiative
developed under the auspices of the IDFPS (International Drug Flow
Prevention Strategy) is Operation All Inclusive (OAI), which targets
the Eastern Pacific (EPAC) and West Caribbean transit zones of Central
America and Mexico and also includes the land mass of the isthmus.
OAI attacked the drug trade’s main arteries and support infrastructure
in Central America with innovative, multi-faceted and intelligence
driven operations. The Intelligence Community, The Department of Defense,
other U.S. government agencies and host nation law enforcement and
military supported both operational and intelligence aspects of this
operation. Due to the enormous volume of illicit drugs and money moving
within this region, this operation targeted four areas in the movement
of drugs and monies: maritime, overland, commercial air and private
air smuggling.
The initial implementation
of Operation All Inclusive (OAI 2005-1) was a resounding success and
proved it was a strategy that can and will have a significant impact
on drug trafficking organizations and operations. While I cannot get
into specific details of this operation in an open environment, intelligence
clearly identified the disruption of maritime, air and overland and
smuggling. The following are a few examples of our successes:
• Largest
cocaine seizure in Belize – Over 2,300 kilograms
• Largest currency seizure in Nicaragua - $1.2 million
• Significant currency and cocaine seizure in Panama – 3.9 metric
tons and over
$5.7 million
• Significant marijuana seizure as a result of a Mexico road interdiction
operation – 21 metric tons
• Over 40 metric tons of cocaine seized during this operation.
The second phase
of this initiative, Operation All-Inclusive 2006-1 (OAI 2006-1) built
upon some of the lessons learned in 2005 and has proven similarly successful.
We have also seen an expansion of the participants including the first
time participation of the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador. This
is particularly significant because of the increasing use by drug trafficking
organizations of Ecuadorian boat crews, and the high number of maritime
departure points from both countries. Some of the successes for OAI
2006-1 are:
• Over 38
metric tons of cocaine seized
• Over 13 metric tons of marijuana seized
• The seizure of 58 kilograms of heroin (South American and Mexican origin)
• In Colombia, 10 cocaine processing laboratories were dismantled and 75
tons of precursor chemicals were seized.
• Also in Colombia, many of the smaller cocaine seizures (10 kilograms
or less)
at the airports and from parcel interdictions were destined for Spain.
• Seizure of 5.6 tons of cocaine in Mexico from a DC-9 that originated
in Venezuela. This seizure is one of the largest in recent history in Mexico,
and may be a sign that interagency coordination efforts with our counterparts
such as JIATF-South and the U.S. Coast Guard are forcing traffickers out of the
waters and back into the air.
Throughout these
initiatives, the participating agencies and the DEA offices in the
Western Hemisphere provided immediate feedback through investigative
means regarding the reactions that traffickers made in response to
our enforcement operations.
We know from both OAI initiatives, traffickers reacted to the actions of law
enforcement either through sources or through simple observation and adjusted
their operations accordingly. During the course of both OAI initiatives, DEA
was able to determine through intelligence sources that traffickers postponed
or canceled their operations, modified their methods of conveyance, varied
smuggling routes, and jettisoned loads as a result of the our enforcement efforts.
I don’t want
to leave you with the impression that everything worked perfectly for
OAI. The DEA identified several vulnerabilities in both phases of OAI.
Corruption within host nation governments, law enforcement and military
was prevalent and in some instances, led to the DTOs becoming immediately
aware of any ongoing law enforcement operations. The DTOs would often
employ “scouts” along the highways to look for police checkpoints
and postpone operations until they felt it was safe to operate. In
addition, successful operations were also hampered because of the host
nation’s lack of land interdiction assets, such as personnel,
checkpoint stations, drug detection dogs and fuel availability for
air and maritime operations, and helicopters that could quickly move
law enforcement into the fight. Those issues continue to be a problem
today, and there are problems maintaining the mechanical readiness
of host country ships and aircrafts. Despite these difficulties, DEA
considers the OAI a successful operation, and further deployments are
anticipated in the region. This operation demonstrated what can be
accomplished through strong multi-agency level information sharing
and will serve as a foundation to build further cooperative relationships
throughout the region. Furthermore, I have to say that some of this
would not have been possible without the outstanding support and coordination
of assets by JIATF-South.
Operation Panama
Express
Operation Panama
Express (PANEX) is an interagency “Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Force” comprised of agents and analysts from DEA, FBI, ICE
and the Coast Guard engaged in long-term investigations targeting the
highest levels of traffickers responsible for the financing, production,
transportation and distribution of cocaine throughout North America
and Europe. PANEX became a proactive investigation in January of 2000.
Since that time, this operation has continued to expand by obtaining
the intelligence necessary to effect the interdictions of vessels operated
by cocaine smuggling organizations. The following are arrest and seizure
statistics for Operation Panama Express for fiscal years (FY) 2003
through 2006. The seizure amounts include shipments that were scuttled.
• FY 2003
- arrests - 216; seizures - 63,000 kgs
• FY 2004 - arrests - 261; seizures - 110,109 kgs
• FY 2005 - arrests - 310; seizures - 130,508 kgs
• FY 2006 - arrests - 103; seizures - 62,794 kgs
(thru 04/01/06)
There have been
approximately 225 interdictions credited to Operation Panama Express
since its inception in 2000.
Operation Firewall
The north coast
of Colombia is a major embarkation zone for go-fast vessels laden with
multi-ton quantities of cocaine destined for the United States via
the Caribbean and Central America. It is estimated that several hundred
go-fast boats leave the Colombian north coast annually and each go-fast
has the capability to transport between 1.5 and 2 metric tons of cocaine.
To combat this situation, the DEA Cartagena Resident Office, in conjunction
with the Cartagena Tactical Analysis Team and JIATF-S, developed a
maritime interdiction program on the Colombian north coast called Operation
Firewall. This program works in tandem with Panama Express and other
maritime initiatives to target and maximize interdiction capabilities
against Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTS), as well
as Colombian transportation organizations operating in the Caribbean.
Since the inception
of Operation Firewall in July of 2003, and through December 2005, the
program has resulted in the seizure of more than 29.2 metric tons of
cocaine.
Recent Progress
in the Region
Colombia
DEA works closely with host nation counterparts to aggressively pursue, apprehend
and extradite the senior leadership of Consolidated Priority Organization
Targets (CPOTs) to the United States. The leaders of the most significant
international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) threatening the United
States have been identified on the Consolidated Priority Organization Target
(CPOT) list. Today, 38 of the 44 organizations on the CPOT list are based
in Latin America and l7 are based in Colombia.
Through close cooperation
with the Colombian government, we continue to make great strides against
the Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia (FARC). The FARC continues
to use the drug trade as its major financing source. The recent Federal
indictment which was handed down on March 1, 2006, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, naming 50 leaders of the
FARC as defendants clearly demonstrates the progress we have made.
Three of those charged are presently in custody in Colombia, and the
United States will seek extradition of these individuals. In addition,
the United States Department of State has also offered rewards ranging
from $5 million each for the top seven leaders, to $2.5 million each
for 17 of the second-tier leaders, for information leading to their
capture. It is well-documented by DEA that individual FARC fronts are
involved in multiple levels of the drug trade, ranging from coca cultivation
and cocaine production, to taxation and providing security at processing
laboratories and clandestine airstrips, to cocaine distribution and
transportation. This indictment is the first of its kind, where the
entire leadership of a Foreign Terrorist Organization was shown to
be involved in narcotics distribution to the U.S. and further demonstrates
DEA’s resolve to combat narcotics distribution at the source
and to contribute significantly to our Nation’s war on terrorism.
Guatemala
In June, 2005, I
traveled to Guatemala and met with President Oscar J. Berger where
I communicated the DEA’s support for Guatemala’s legal
reform. President Berger concurred with the need for a vetted police
unit to gather intelligence, conduct undercover operations, and conduct
international controlled deliveries. As a demonstration of both the
United States’ and Guatemala’s commitment to this effort,
the DEA has provided funds for the initial startup of this unit, and
the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the Department of State has committed
additional funding and support for this initiative.
The Government of Guatemala has realized that the police require investigative
tools to accomplish the difficult task of combating drug trafficking organizations
operating within their country. An Organized Crime Bill (OCB) in the Guatemalan
Congress was introduced that will permit the police to conduct national and
international controlled deliveries, undercover operations, conspiracy investigations
and Title III intercepts. On March 30th, the Legislature passed the OCB; however,
a Presidential Review identified concerns over the decreased penalty portion
of the conspiracy law. President Berger has vowed to veto the legislation until
the original penalties are reinstated in the bill. The OCB will be revisited
once these changes are made.
Panama
Judicially authorized
wiretap investigations are legal in Panama, and can be used for investigating
a variety of crimes, including drug trafficking. The Panama Attorney
General authorizes law enforcement to intercept telephone communications
for the purpose of obtaining evidence against the targets of an investigation.
The evidence is then presented in a Panamanian Court of Law to assist
in the prosecution of the targets of investigation. This evidence can
also be shared among law enforcement agencies within the region in
an effort to completely dismantle the drug trafficking organization.
The DEA Panama Country Office telephone intercept project is currently being
developed by the Office of the Panama Attorney General, the Panama Judicial
Police and the United States Embassy in Panama (DEA/NAS). The purpose of
the project is to establish an effective, judicial cellular telephone intercept
capability in Panama that will facilitate significant international investigations
and DEA Priority Target Organization (PTO) cases. We anticipate that this
project will be fully operational by June 1, 2006.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the
DEA is committed to working both harder and smarter in dealing with
the threat of transnational drug trafficking that affects our country.
We recognize that joint service interagency, and multi-national coordination
and cooperation are essential elements of the President’s National
Drug Control Strategy. Drug trafficking organizations operating within
production countries in South America use the Mexico/Central America
corridor as the primary transit zone for illicit drugs destined for
the United States. These organizations have the ability to overwhelm
the limited defenses of these transit zone countries, and the vast
illicit funds available to them enables them to endure, despite anti-drug
efforts put forth by countries in Central America. We are working tirelessly
to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of our enforcement operations
in the Transit Zone.
We thank you for
your continued support of DEA and for the opportunity to testify here
today. This concludes my formal statement and I look forward to answering
any questions you may have at this time.
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