The task forces and councils have distinct functions that are generally not duplicative.
Although there was some concern that the task forces and councils may be duplicating efforts, we found that their functions are largely distinctive and complementary, and generally not duplicative. There is some overlap in information sharing with a few individuals who are members of and attend meetings of both an ATAC and a JTTF. However, the overlap is minimal. The following provides a brief description of the distinction between the various task forces and councils:
NSCC
The NSCC, coordinated by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, is the Department's executive level forum for the Deputy Attorney General and agency heads (FBI, DEA, USMS, OIPR, BOP, and others) to meet at least monthly and discuss issues related to counterterrorism and national security. The agency heads told us that the NSCC provides them with terrorism information that they would not receive ordinarily, and allows them to identify intelligence gathering capabilities that exist across agencies that could assist them in achieving their agencies' missions.
JTTF
The JTTFs, headed by the FBI, are the operational and investigative arm of the Department's counterterrorism initiative. Consisting largely of federal, state, and local law enforcement agents in shared office space hosted by the FBI, the 103 JTTFs in FBI field offices and RAOs respond to reports of threats and conduct terrorism investigations on a daily basis in their respective jurisdictions. The JTTFs also host monthly executive meetings with local law enforcement officials and heads of partner agencies who have members on the JTTFs to share information on relevant terrorism topics.
ATAC
The ATACs are based out of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices in each of the judicial districts. Their primary mission is to share information and provide or coordinate terrorism-related training for their members, which can include some JTTF members. The ATAC meetings also serve as a focal point to discuss local or regional vulnerabilities, and to identify resources and plan exercises and training to reduce those vulnerabilities. The ATAC Coordinators and Regional ATAC Coordinators work closely with the JTTFs by coordinating prosecutorial and investigative strategies across JTTFs to achieve nationwide consistency in investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases.
NJTTF
The NJTTF, headed by the FBI and located in Northern Virginia, provides administrative and strategic support to the 103 nationwide JTTFs. It also provides coordination on special information and intelligence gathering initiatives assigned from FBI Headquarters to the field JTTFs. The NJTTF does not conduct investigations but rather acts as a liaison and conduit of information on threats from FBI headquarters to the JTTFs and to the 40 member agencies participating on the NJTTF.
FTTTF
The FTTTF, headed by the FBI, also supports the JTTFs and other law enforcement agencies. Located in Northern Virginia, the FTTTF uses its data searching and data mining capabilities to respond to requests from the FBI, CIA, or other agencies to electronically locate and track known or suspected terrorists and generate leads that are then funneled through the NJTTF for JTTF follow-up. The information provided by the FTTTF enhances on-going terrorism investigations or contributes to the initiation of a new investigation. The FTTTF also is developing a risk assessment tool to proactively evaluate foreign individuals, who want to enter or remain in the United States, to determine the level of national security risk or criminal risk.
JTTF and ATAC Duplication Issues
Regarding duplication, a few of the JTTF and ATAC members we interviewed stated that information sharing by the JTTFs and ATACs was duplicative. This concern was raised primarily among those who were members of and attended meetings of both a JTTF and an ATAC. However, those who attend each other's meetings are only a small percentage of the JTTF and ATAC membership. To the majority of JTTF and ATAC members, this information is not duplicative, especially to the ATAC members. The ATACs include a much broader membership who are not law enforcement officials and are thus not a part of the JTTF information sharing network. They include first responders, (fire, emergency medical services, state, local or federal public health officials, hospital staff, pharmaceutical companies, representatives from governor's offices, district attorneys, public utility representatives (gas, water, electric, pipelines, telecommunications), railroad police, Coast Guard, park rangers, tribal law enforcement, and the more remote police and sheriff's offices that do not have the resources to commit a full-time officer to the JTTF or who do not have a JTTF in their jurisdiction. We asked ATAC and JTTF members if there was information they received that they no longer wanted to receive. The majority responded that they would rather continue to receive all information regardless of duplication, rather than receive too little information or none at all.
In January 2004, language appeared in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for 2004 recommending that the U.S. Attorneys should continue to participate in the JTTFs rather than maintain a separate set of U.S. Attorney task forces.
The OIG disagrees with this recommendation and believes that the U.S. Attorneys through the ATACs provide a distinct and vital role separate from the JTTFs. This role includes the development of an expanded information sharing network that reaches beyond law enforcement, the provision of training to this expanded network, opportunities for planning and conducting responder exercises, and coordination of investigative and prosecutive strategies for terrorism cases. All the U.S. Attorneys we interviewed believed so strongly in the mission and effectiveness of the ATACs, they stated they would still find a way to continue the functions even if they were ordered to disband the ATACs and merge with the JTTFs. The U.S. Attorneys believed that the benefits of the new partnerships forged as a result of the ATACs were invaluable to both the USAOs and to the ATAC members.
The role of the JTTFs is primarily investigation oriented. Although the FBI field offices engage in information sharing, they meet primarily with law enforcement officials, and the information sharing is more narrowly focused than the information disseminated by the ATACs. The OIG believes that to assume the expanded role of the ATACs would divert scarce resources away from what the JTTFs are set up to do, investigating terrorism threats. When we asked the FBI field office managers their views on merging the ATACs and JTTFs, the response was mixed. Some believed that they could not assume this expanded role of information sharing and training for larger groups outside of those law enforcement officials that they meet with now, either because they do not have the time, staff, or resources, or they viewed this role as outside the mission of the JTTFs. Other managers stated that they would take on this role if required but only with additional staff, funding, and resources.
The establishment of the task forces and councils has facilitated sharing of information and expanding of partnerships with federal, state, and local law enforcement and other government agencies, and private industry.
The Task Forces and Councils Have Improved the Sharing of Information
We concluded that the terrorism task forces and advisory councils have created a foundation for improving information sharing among law enforcement, the intelligence community, and private industry by broadening the pool of individuals with security clearances and providing forums for information exchange about terrorism matters.
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Information Sharing Has Improved One of the main problems identified before September 11, 2001, was the lack of information sharing among federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies. However, through our interviews and survey we found that information sharing has improved as a result of the task forces and councils:
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A March 2003 report issued by the Police Executive Research Forum suggested that local police believed problems existed in information sharing between state and local law enforcement and the FBI.18 In our interviews, we found this perception has changed, especially in metropolitan areas. For example, the commissioners, chiefs of police, or their designees for the cities of Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C. told us that information sharing with the FBI in their metropolitan areas has improved since September 11, 2001, and that the FBI has worked hard to develop relationships with local law enforcement. One local police official stated that information sharing is "far, far better than it used to be," that sharing of terrorism information is better coordinated, and that his department does not currently face obstacles in obtaining terrorism information needed from the FBI. Law enforcement officials in these metropolitan areas stated that they believed that the FBI provides them with the information they needed specific to the threats for their immediate areas.19
Task Forces Have Expanded the Cadre of People With Security Clearances
We found that the task forces have taken steps to ensure that a broader group of law enforcement officers have the security clearances needed to receive and share information about terrorism issues to a larger group within the law enforcement community. Much of the terrorism information is classified and can only be shared with those holding appropriate security clearances. The level of security clearances required by task force, council, and type of member are:
- Top Secret clearance required - NSCC, NJTTF, FTTTF, and JTTF participants working in an FBI office who are assigned leads, cases, and other terrorism investigative matters.20
- No clearance required - ATAC and JTTF liaisons who serve as an agency's point of contact and do not work in an FBI office.21
While not required to have a security clearance to access ATAC information, 20 percent of the ATAC survey respondents had a Secret clearance and 58 percent had clearances of Top Secret or Top Secret with Secure Compartmented Information (SCI) Access. These clearances give ATAC members access to a wider range of information if they have a "need to know." We found that some ATAC Coordinators can share classified information with those members that have appropriate clearances.
The FBI conducts background investigations to obtain Top Secret security clearances for state and local law enforcement task force members to allow them to work in FBI office space and conduct terrorism investigations. It also obtains Secret security clearances for higher ranking state and local law enforcement personnel (e.g., chiefs or sheriffs) to facilitate greater information sharing between agencies. The following table shows the number of clearances processed by the FBI between September 11, 2001, and September 2004.
Table 3: Security Clearances Processed by the FBI for
State and Local Officials and Task Force Members
September 11, 2001 to September 2004
| Applicants | Clearance Requests Received |
Clearances Granted1 |
Undergoing Review |
Discontinued or Administratively Closed2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| State and Local Law Enforcement Executives |
3,553 | 3,082 (87%) | 344 (9.6%) | 127 (3.5%) |
| Task Force Members |
1,957 | 1,757 (90%) | 200 (10%) | 0 |
| Total | 5,510 | 4,839 (88%) | 544 (9.8%) | 127 (2.3%) |
The total number of state and local law enforcement members cleared and assigned on the JTTFs changes continually as members join or are reassigned by their parent agencies. Therefore, we requested a "snapshot" of JTTF members by clearance levels and agency, shown in the following table.
Table 4: Clearance Levels of JTTF Members - State and
Local Government and Private Industry
April 2004
| Type of Clearance | Number of Full-Time Members |
|---|---|
| Top Secret or Top Secret with SCI | 566 (80%) |
| Interim Top Secret or Interim Secret | 37 (5%) |
| Undergoing Review | 108 (15%) |
| Total | 711 (100%) |
Source: NJTTF and the FBI's Personnel Security Unit Note: In April 2004, the FBI also had 397 part-time JTTF members. |
The FBI has shortened the length of time taken to process security clearance applications. In February 2003, the FBI's Security Division created the Initial Clearance and Access Unit - 2 (ICAU2) to process and adjudicate background investigations for non-FBI JTTF members, law enforcement executives, and elected officials who require access to classified information. The ICAU2 receives a clearance application from an FBI field office, assigns it to an adjudicator who reviews the application in accordance with the government-wide adjudicative standards and recommends whether to grant a security clearance. Provided that no derogatory information emerges during the background investigation, the ICAU2 estimated that it should take no more than or 180 to 270 days for non-FBI JTTF members to receive a Top Secret clearance and 30 to 45 days to receive a Secret clearance. If derogatory information arises in the clearance process, the ICAU2 works to resolve the matter, which can add time to the process. A GAO review found that between September 11, 2001, and March 2004, the FBI decreased the processing times for Top Secret clearances from an average of 244 to 36 days, and for Secret clearances from an average of 90 to 40 days.22 The GAO attributed the decrease in processing times to the guidance the FBI provided to its field offices and state and local law enforcement on the security clearance process and its modifications to the security clearance unit.23
Task Forces and Advisory Councils Provide Broad Audiences With
Opportunities for Exchanging Information About Terrorism
Each task force and council attracts a variety of members that have a need for terrorism-related information and shares this information with members through meetings or electronic forums. To increase ATAC membership, CTS and EOUSA advised the USAOs' ATAC Coordinators to be as inclusive as possible when determining ATAC membership and to include any relevant organization that has a need for terrorism-related threat information.24 Leaders of the NJTTF, JTTFs, FTTTF, and NSCC also share information with broad audiences by including chief executive officers from private agencies or non-law enforcement members in their information exchanges. At times, guests with expertise or interest in the information being discussed are invited by the ATACs, FTTTF, JTTFs, NJTTF, and NSCC to participate in a meeting.
Meetings: Our interviews and survey of task force and council leaders and members showed that the primary purposes of the meetings are to share information and intelligence, provide updates on cases with a terrorism nexus, discuss threat assessments, and obtain member agency updates. The majority of ATAC, FTTTF, JTTF, and NJTTF members we surveyed characterized the task force and council meetings as "useful" in preparing them to plan for and respond to terrorism. Our survey showed that of those who were able to evaluate the task force or advisory council meetings, 90 percent of ATAC respondents, 75 percent of FTTTF respondents, 86 percent of JTTF respondents, and 100 percent of NJTTF respondents rated meetings as "useful" or "very useful."
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Other Mechanisms for Information Sharing Information Sharing With Parent Agencies: Task force members, who work daily in FBI office space, also share information with their parent agencies in reports or e-mails, or by telephone. For example, one NJTTF member told us that he calls his supervisor to share relevant information from meetings and the daily FBI Director's Briefing Book. Information Sharing Between Task Force Members: To maximize the sharing of information and knowledge, the FTTTF, JTTFs, and NJTTF use an open office space design and co-locate members. The directors of these task forces stated that the open office design is as vital to information sharing as the members themselves because it allows for enhanced communication and immediate input on information or intelligence. |
Most of the task forces and councils hold regular meetings, although the frequency varies based on the mission and functions performed. NJTTF meetings are held daily, sometimes twice a day, depending on the threat and task force activity. Meetings include discussions of current threats, updates on special projects, and the sharing of information and intelligence. The FTTTF does not have a need for daily meetings; instead, the Director convenes all members at least once a month to discuss administrative issues and current projects. Also, since December 2003, the FTTTF meets monthly with liaisons from DHS components, international intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the El Paso Intelligence Center.25 The NSCC meets at least once a month, and sometimes twice a month, to share information across Department components. The Deputy Attorney General sets the agenda based upon input received from the NSCC members, interagency councils, the DHS, and the President's National Security Council.
At the field level, the ATACs and JTTFs do not have standard meeting schedules, but rather adjust meeting frequency and type to respond to members' needs, threats, cases, or special projects. We found most ATACs meet monthly to quarterly, and the topic and type of the meeting vary widely. Each USAO attempts to fit the ATAC meeting to the needs of its membership. ATAC members repeatedly stressed the need to have focused, useful meetings; one member stated:
I do not think pro-forma, regular meetings enhance information flow or otherwise meaningfully contribute to improving anti-terrorism abilities. Those benefits come from maintaining and developing working relationships with law enforcement through working cases, through providing meaningful training, and through jointly participating in outreach activities in the community. Agents and officers know when a meeting is called for the sake of having a meeting, and do not seem to appreciate it.
Often, ATAC meetings include an anti-terrorism training session. Approximately two-thirds of the ATACs have subcommittees that have specific focuses appropriate for that jurisdiction (e.g., Maritime Issues Subcommittee in districts with ports).
Most JTTFs meet as an entire group, or as squads, on a regular basis to discuss case updates and administrative issues and to share information and intelligence. Also, the JTTFs individually host Executive Board meetings for agency heads and other top-level managers from participating organizations, including leaders from federal, state, and local law enforcement, to share information about upcoming events and to discuss administrative matters related to the task force's operations. The JTTF Executive Board meeting we observed during one of our site visits was well attended by federal, state, and local participating organizations on the JTTF, declassified information for the jurisdiction was shared, and the U.S. Attorney made a presentation. The frequency of Executive Board meetings varies across JTTFs, but they occur at least every quarter.
The following table outlines information we collected through interviews and surveys about task force and council meetings.
Table 5: Meetings Held and the Members' Ratings
of the Quality of Information Shared
| Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meeting Type(s) | Meeting Frequency |
Quality of Information Shared in the Meetings |
Audiences | Impact of the Meetings on Members |
Full Meeting Type(s) of Information Shared - Majority is specific to region or locale. Some national or international. Level(s) - Most unclassified, law enforcement sensitive by exception. Some ATACs have dual meetings that begin with a regular agenda for all members, those in law enforcement then stay on to receive any law enforcement sensitive information. |
Weekly - 0.4% Every two weeks - 3.5% Quarterly - 43.8% Other - 17.3% |
Percentage of respondents rating the following as "excellent" or "good" - Information/intelligence sharing - 80% Member agency updates - 73% Discussion of threat assessments - 72% Case updates - 61% |
Chaired by the AUSA/ATAC Coordinator. Members - ATAC and JTTF members from local area or region, including law enforcement, first responders, private industry, intelligence community, military, and other federal agencies. Guests periodically attend. |
90% of respondents rated the meetings as "very useful" or "useful" in preparing them to plan for or respond to terrorism. Only 7.8% rated the meeting as "not useful at all." |
|
Subcommittee Meeting Type(s) of Information Sharing - Topic specific to region or locale. Level(s) - Law enforcement sensitive or unclassified |
Weekly - 2.3% Every two weeks - 1.9% Monthly - 11.9% Quarterly - 11.1% Other - 24.5% Don't have subcommittees - 33.2% |
Percentage of respondents rating the following as "excellent" or "good" - Information/intelligence sharing - 82% Member agency updates - 73% Threat assessments discussed - 70% Case updates - 70% |
Chair(s) appointed by the ATAC Coordinator. Members - ATAC members with expertise or interest in subject. |
61.7% of respondents rated the meetings as "very useful" or "useful" in preparing them to plan for or respond to terrorism. Only 7.4% rated the meetings as "not useful as all." |
| Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force | ||||
| Meeting Type(s) | Meeting Frequency |
Quality of Information Shared in the Meetings |
Audiences | Impact of the Meetings on Members |
|
Full Meeting Type(s) of Information Sharing - Specific to FTTTF units or agencies; administrative matters discussed. Level(s) - Secret, Top Secret, or unclassified |
Staff meetings occur on at least a monthly basis.† † This data came from interviews with FTTTF members. |
Percentage of respondents rating the following as "excellent" or "good" - Information/intelligence sharing - 69% Member agency updates - 67% Threat assessments discussed - 50% Case updates - 56% |
Members - Headquarters-level law enforcement, intelligence community, military, and other federal agencies. Support staff and agents detailed to FTTTF from FBI field offices or functions. |
75% of respondents rated the meetings as "useful" in preparing them to plan for or respond to terrorism. 16% rated the meetings as "not useful at all." |
| Joint Terrorism Task Forces | ||||
| Meeting Type(s) | Meeting Frequency (how often) |
Quality of Information Shared in the Meetings |
Audiences | Impact of the Meetings on Members |
|
Full Meeting Type(s) of Information Shared - Specific to field office's authority, national and international matters impacting office, and administrative issues. Level(s) - Secret, law enforcement sensitive, or unclassified |
Daily - 4.2% Weekly - 22.8% Every two weeks - 12.7% Monthly - 22.0% Quarterly - 19.3% Other - 12.0% |
Percentage of respondents rating the following as "excellent" or "good" - Information/intelligence sharing - 79% Member agency updates - 76% Threat assessments discussed - 81% Case updates - 75% |
Chaired by the ASAC or JTTF Supervisor with jurisdiction over JTTF squads. Members - Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel, FBI agents, JTTF liaisons from local area or region, including law enforcement, first responders, private industry, intelligence community, military, and other federal agencies. Guests are periodically invited. |
85.9% of the respondents rated the meetings as "very useful" or "useful" in preparing them to plan for or respond to terrorism. Only 8.8% of the respondents rated the meeting as "not useful at all." |
|
Squad Meetings Type(s) of Information Shared - Specific to field office's authority, local cases or leads, national and international matters impacting office, and administrative issues. Level(s) - Secret, law enforcement sensitive, or unclassified |
Daily - 3.9% Weekly - 14.3% Every two weeks - 8.9% Monthly - 19.7% Quarterly - 7.7% Other - 10.4% Don't have squads - 32.3% |
Information/intelligence sharing - 83% Member agency updates - 75% Threat assessments discussed - 79% Case updates - 78% |
Chaired by the JTTF's Supervisory Special Agent(s). The SAC and ASAC may attend. Members - JTTF members from local area or region assigned to the particular squad (e.g., international terrorism, domestic terrorism, others). |
84.1% of the respondents rated the meetings as "very useful" or "useful" in preparing them to plan for or respond to terrorism. Only 9.3% of respondents rated the meetings as "not useful at all." |
| National Joint Terrorism Task Force | ||||
| Meeting Type(s) | Meeting Frequency (how often) |
Quality of Information Shared in the Meetings |
Audiences | Impact of the Meetings on Members |
|
NJTTF Meeting Type(s) of Information Shared - Intelligence briefings, case updates, threats Level(s) - Top Secret, Secret, law enforcement sensitive, or unclassified |
Daily |
Percentage of respondents rating the following meeting activities as "excellent" or "good" - Information/intelligence sharing - 86% Member agency updates - 69% Threat assessments discussed - 85% Case updates - 75% |
Chaired by the NJTTF Unit Chief or Deputy Chief. Members - Headquarters-level law enforcement, military, intelligence community, and other federal agencies, rotating state and local members. |
100% of the respondents rated the meetings as "very useful" or "useful" in preparing them to plan for or respond to terrorism. No NJTTF respondents rated the meetings as "not useful at all." |
| National Security Coordination Council | ||||
| Meeting Type(s) | Meeting Frequency |
Quality of Information Shared in the Meetings |
Audiences | Impact of the Meetings on Members |
|
Full Meeting Type(s) of Information shared - Threats, budget information related to national security, national security initiatives, requests for information, general briefings. Level(s) - Top Secret, Secret |
Every two weeks to once a month. |
NSCC members were not asked specifically about quality of information shared. |
Chaired by the Deputy Attorney General. Members - All DOJ agency heads, to include ATF, BOP, DEA, FBI, USMS; as well as the heads of CTS and OIPR; CIA, DHS, and other government agencies are invited to share information and coordinate on specific issues. |
All those members interviewed, stated the meetings were very useful in helping them plan and coordinate national security and counterterrorism initiatives, as well as share information. |
Source: |
Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, Office of the Inspector General, January 2004, and interviews. |
Notes: |
The "Meeting Type(s)" column presents responses to, "In the last year, how often did the entire task force/advisory council meet?" and "In the last year, how often did the entire task force's squad or advisory council's subcommittees meet?" The data is from survey respondents, but the table also includes data obtained through interviews and observations of meetings. The "Quality of Information Shared in the Meetings" column presents data that excludes those respondents answering don't know or not applicable. The response choices to the survey question were excellent, good, average, poor, very poor, don't know and not applicable. The "Impact of the Meeting on Members" column presents data that excludes those respondents answering not able to evaluate. The response choices were very useful, useful, not at all useful, not able to evaluate, and no opinion. The data related to "meeting frequency" for the NJTTF came from interviews with NJTTF members. |
We also found that task force and council leaders and most members participate in additional anti-terrorism meetings chaired by federal, state, or local officials. They attend these meetings as a form of outreach, to share information with other audiences, and to build relationships. The information gained through these meetings is then shared with the task forces and councils. The following table shows the types of meetings attended.
Table 6: Other Meetings Attended
| Some Task Force or Advisory Council Members... |
May attend... |
|---|---|
| ATAC | JTTF meetings, local terrorism task force meetings, and where applicable, state homeland security task force meetings |
| JTTF | ATAC meetings, local terrorism task force meetings, and where applicable, state homeland security task force meetings |
| NJTTF | FBI's daily Security Video Teleconferencing System meetings, NCTC meetings |
| FTTTF | NCTC meetings, DHS, and/or CIA Counterterrorism Center meetings |
Electronic Systems: Task force and council members routinely use electronic data systems for quick, often real-time, exchange of information and intelligence related to terrorism issues. JTTF members stated that they use the following systems to receive and share information outside of the FBI: Law Enforcement Online (LEO), National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), and Regional Information Sharing System (RISS). The FBI has expanded its use of LEO by requiring all JTTF members to have LEO accounts, and by establishing Special Interest Groups for the NJTTF and JTTFs that law enforcement personnel can use to exchange terrorism information. The LEO system is interconnected with RISS and NLETS. Appendix III outlines the content of these systems.
The NJTTF is developing other systems to increase its ability to share information. For example, the Guardian system was deployed in all JTTFs in August 2004. Guardian is a terrorism reporting management system used by the JTTFs to automate all terrorism complaints, document terrorist activity, and report suspicious activity and pre-operational surveillance incidents. When local and state law enforcement agencies call their local JTTF and report suspicious activity, the JTTF enters the information directly into Guardian. JTTF members from other government agencies also can access Guardian and share information with their agencies.
The ATACs have invested in communications equipment to increase information sharing between state and local law enforcement, first responders, and the USAOs. When formed, each ATAC received an allocation of $100,000 for improving the communication ability of state and local law enforcement or for training ATAC members. By December 2004, the ATACs had spent approximately $4.9 million (52 percent) of the $9.3 million they received for communication items. For example, the ATAC in West Virginia purchased computers for each sheriff and police department throughout the state. Many of these rural law enforcement agencies did not previously have computers or access to e-mail. Additionally, the Middle District of Alabama purchased computers and internet access, as well as radios that linked with an existing dispatch center, for those law enforcement agencies that did not have this equipment. The Connecticut ATAC purchased six transmitters to improve a communication system used by local agencies.
CTS has increased information sharing in the field through the development and expansion of a CTS website available to ATAC Coordinators and USAO Intelligence Research Specialists. The CTS website includes the following:
- CTS Daily Report - Each ATAC Coordinator is required to report to a CTS Regional ATAC Coordinator any information related to terrorism that may be occurring in the district, whether a case, prosecution, event, or threat. CTS compiles this information and produces a CTS Daily Report, which is posted on the website so that ATACs nationwide can see what is going on in other jurisdictions. CTS also provides this report to the Attorney General and the FBI.
- Counterterrorism Resource Library - This library assists prosecutors working on terrorism-related matters by providing materials related to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases. It includes Department guidance, past indictments, sample pleadings, model jury instructions, and related materials. According to the User's Guide, the resource library serves as a tool to enable prosecutors to share materials and draw on the experiences of others in terrorism-related cases.
- CTS Process Tracking Database - This database was created for use in the event of a national crisis to facilitate the tracking, issuance, and deconfliction of the criminal investigative process across multiple districts. AUSAs working on terrorism prosecutions can enter information used in subpoenas, court orders, and other investigative processes into this searchable database, which can reduce duplication and unintended conflicts in nationwide investigations.
- Case Notification Forms - AUSAs can complete the case notification forms online and forward them electronically to CTS to advise of the opening of an international or domestic terrorism investigation or prosecution. These electronic forms promote additional information sharing and assist CTS in coordinating terrorism matters across the nation. Additionally, CTS can link intelligence information from investigative agencies to matters opened by terrorism prosecutors.
New York City's Perception on Information Sharing
During a March 2003 public hearing, Raymond Kelly, the Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), noted that information sharing with the FBI had improved. He stated:
I have been in law enforcement a long time, both on the federal and local level. And clearly there were some issues in the past with the flow of information. I can tell you that has changed significantly in the aftermath of September 11.There is a palpable difference in [the FBI and CIA's] approach to doing business. They want to get that information out. They are getting it out.26
One year later, during a March 2004 House Appropriations Committee hearing, Representative John Sweeney raised some concerns about information sharing between the FBI and state and local law enforcement. In this hearing, Congressman Sweeney directed the following comments to FBI Director Mueller:
...There is a general perception beginning to develop out there that we're slipping back into some old patterns. And, in particular, the sharing of information between state and local officials has been raised as a concern, and specifically raised as a concern by my friends in.New York City.Given the priority New York City is and the target that it is, that it possibly could be happening all over the country, and I think it's a worry that we all have. Specifically, the complaint is once people receive top secret clearances, cooperation with the bureau has not been what the anticipation was there.
To assess concerns that the information sharing between the FBI and the state and local law enforcement may have diminished since the months immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, we returned to New York City in April 2004 and conducted additional interviews on this topic. Senior officials from the NYPD told us that the relationship between the FBI and NYPD was good and had improved since September 11, 2001. One official said that information sharing with the FBI had become "bigger and better." According to these officials, the NYPD has a chief, captain, lieutenants, and detectives participating in every JTTF squad who partner with the JTTF special agents. They informed us that NYPD supervises its own officers on the JTTF, but the FBI and NYPD work together on the JTTF squads and are co-located.
NYPD officials stated that to some extent, information sharing and reporting between officers and their sergeants depends on the personalities involved and their relationships. NYPD officials said that in most cases if a NYPD detective on the JTTF obtains information or intelligence, the NYPD detective tells his FBI supervisor and NYPD Sergeant and each will share the information up though their chain of command. The JTTF members also share information either directly with the NYPD intelligence unit or with staff from the NYPD's Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism. If the need arises, the Police Commissioner also directly contacts the FBI Assistant Director in Charge (ADIC) of the New York City field office.27
NYPD officials also acknowledged that due to their expanded presence on the New York City JTTF, they now have access to CIA and NSA information that they did not have prior to September 11, 2001. Officials stated that they also are pushing for full integration of the JTTF by requesting that an NYPD official be placed as a "Deputy" to the SAC to act as the number two person or co-manager in charge of the JTTF. This, they believe, would further promote "real-time" information sharing. When asked if the NYPD supports placing FBI agents in its intelligence unit, the NYPD officials stated that they are interested in more aggressive interaction at the working level, not integration of the FBI in NYPD's intelligence office.
NYPD officials did complain that their NYPD officers on the JTTF can access only certain parts of the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system.28 Specifically, NYPD believes it should have access to three automated screens in the system that included information on management of caseloads and assignments, management of leads, and confidential informants. NYPD officials stated that they are not always pleased with the information the FBI allows them to see and are not convinced they "see everything." When asked how the lack of access to this information impacts their work, the NYPD officials said they could not state for certain that the lack of information impacts them, but they believe that they have a right to know and the FBI has an obligation to inform them.
NYPD officials also expressed concern about the security levels of some FBI meetings. For example, there is a case being worked by a group of detectives from the NYPD intelligence unit who are not on the JTTF, but the detectives are not permitted to attend an FBI meeting about the case because they do not have SCI clearance. NYPD officials believed the security threshold of the meeting should be lowered (from SCI to Top Secret) to enable these detectives to participate.
One NYPD official summarized his concern about the need for information:
We need information because we are at the top of the target. As NYPD has increased its involvement, the greater the commitment made. Capabilities, interests, and needs have increased as our involvement has increased. We have 1,000 employees daily devoted to counterterrorism. We don't know how the lack of information has impacted us because we don't know what is out there. We have a right to know immediately about cases that tangentially are related to New York...The more we know about plots, plans, and events can influence what we do to protect our system. The more we know, the better our protective processes... We don't have unlimited resources, so the more informed we are, the better decisions we can make on deploying people. The more details we know about a plot, this can influence what we do to protect that target. Generic information only helps you make generic deployment decisions.
The FBI's Perspective
We interviewed the FBI's Acting SAC in New York City for her perspective on the state of information sharing with the NYPD. She told us that nothing had changed in the FBI's relationship with NYPD since our first visit in July 2003, and that the FBI's door is wide open. The 14 JTTF squads in New York City are matched almost one for one with FBI agents and NYPD officers; that is, for every FBI agent on the 14 squads, there is an NYPD detective. There is an NYPD sergeant assigned to every JTTF squad to supervise the detective(s). Additionally, the NYPD has officers assigned to the New York City FBI's three surveillance squads.
The Acting SAC also noted that information sharing with NYPD occurs through the following additional methods:
- NYPD JTTF members attend the FBI's daily threat briefings for the (FBI's) ADIC. The NYPD JTTF members then brief the NYPD Commissioner and his Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism.
- NYPD JTTF members attend the FBI's weekly "threat" meetings.
- NYPD JTTF lieutenants "surf" through the FBI's ACS system daily.
- NYPD lieutenants read all CIA and NSA intelligence "traffic" daily in the FBI SCIF.29
- New York City FBI has threat briefings or meetings on specific cases (called a Principal's Briefing) that the NYPD Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism may attend.
- The FBI has a computer terminal with access to NYPD's Orion database. All terrorism-related calls that come into NYPD's intelligence unit are entered into NYPD's Orion database. The NYPD detectives follow through on each call and their actions are entered into the Orion database. The FBI maintains an Orion terminal to show the NYPD that all calls have been addressed.
The Acting SAC told us that this level of information sharing means that anything an FBI agent on the JTTF has, the NYPD has. NYPD officers are co-case agents on almost every investigation the JTTF runs, and there is rarely a deployment overseas when NYPD does not accompany the FBI. She also informed us that the NYPD has made additional requests for an NYPD lieutenant for every three squads and to add a senior manager to the FBI New York City field office who would serve as a Deputy to the FBI's SAC to facilitate information exchange.
Regarding ACS system access, the Acting SAC stated that NYPD has full access to the screens in the ACS system that the FBI's other JTTF members have: counterterrorism investigations, drug cases, and organized crime cases. They do not have full access to police/public corruption cases, white collar cases, or foreign counterintelligence cases. All JTTF members, including the FBI members, are blocked from access to these screens, but there are procedures to obtain this information through the FBI for those with an established "need to know."
The Acting SAC stated that NYPD complains that information sharing is not a two-way street, but she expressed concern that the New York City FBI does not receive any of NYPD's intelligence. The FBI has made requests to NYPD's Office of Intelligence for NYPD to disseminate information to the New York City field office so the FBI can review NYPD's intelligence. Additionally, the New York City FBI has offered to place FBI agents in the NYPD intelligence unit but NYPD has declined. The Acting SAC stated that if the FBI is not able to review NYPD's intelligence, links to terrorism may go undetected. She also stated that the FBI needs the intelligence from NYPD's sources but is not receiving it. She said that the FBI "does not intentionally hold back information from the NYPD."
Task Forces and Councils Have Improved and Expanded Partnerships in the Field and Headquarters
The Task Forces and Councils Have Improved Partnerships
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"Partnership" is a Major Theme in the "We are committed to continuing and strengthening collaborative efforts with other federal agencies, states and localities, tribal governments, community groups, foreign countries, and others. Since critical crime and justice issues transcend traditional jurisdictional and functional boundaries, effective partnerships are a key ingredient to achieving results. This is especially true with information-sharing among law enforcement and intelligence communities to prevent acts of terrorism against the United States." Source: U.S. Department of Justice FY 2003-2008 Strategic Plan |
We found that, contrary to the conditions that existed before September 11, 2001, the federal (non-FBI), state, and local agency representatives assigned to the JTTFs, FTTTF, and NJTTF are given similar responsibilities and duties as FBI members on the task forces and actively contribute to the task forces' missions. When describing pre-September 11, 2001, partnerships in an April 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Staff Statement, Executive Director Philip Zelikow, stated that "state and local entities believed that they would gain little from having representatives on the JTTF. Detailees were there as liaisons rather than a full working member."30
Our interviews and survey results indicate that the situation has changed since September 11, 2001. Agency representatives regularly lead cases, receive taskings in their areas of expertise, and participate in the initial stages of the investigative process. The following table provides our survey results.
Table 7: Non-FBI Task Force Representatives' Perceptions of the
Work Performed and Assignments Received
| Survey Question: Considering your taskings for this task force, please rate the following statements: | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| FTTTF respondents answering "strongly agree" or "agree" |
JTTF respondents answering "strongly agree" or "agree" |
NJTTF respondents answering "strongly agree" or "agree" |
|
| I receive taskings in my area of expertise. | 86% | 78% | 79% |
| I am assigned as the lead investigator when appropriate. | N/A | 62% | N/A |
| I am included in the initial stages of tasking. | 83% | 71% | 77% |
| I make worthwhile contributions to the task force's mission. | 88% | 86% | 86% |
Source: |
Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Survey, January 2004. |
Note: |
The data above excludes responses received from FBI staff assigned to the task forces and those respondents who provided answers of not applicable or unknown. The percentages shown above represent those respondents who selected strongly agree or agree from a scale that included strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree, not applicable, or unknown. N/A = Not applicable. |
Within the Department, the task forces and councils also have improved partnerships between the FBI and the USAOs in the following ways:
- FBI JTTF supervisors also are members of the ATACs and brief the ATAC members on the latest terrorism-related information and incidents nationwide or internationally that may have relevance or significance to that district.
- Some ATAC Coordinators have assigned their Intelligence Research Specialists to work at the JTTF to facilitate the exchange of intelligence and case information. This arrangement has benefited both the JTTF and the ATAC Coordinator, because the Intelligence Research Specialist offers analytical assistance to the JTTF and shares information directly with the ATAC.
- ATAC Coordinators and other AUSAs work with the JTTFs from the initial point of surveillance and investigation through prosecution and sentencing to ensure that appropriate legal requirements and strategies are followed.
The ATACs also have developed a closer partnership between the USAOs and CTS. The six Regional Coordinators assigned to CTS work with the ATAC Coordinators within a region to identify national trends or legal issues and develop investigative and prosecutive strategies to address those issues. Deputy Attorney General Comey told us that the U.S. Attorneys historically prided their independence, but now there is greater coordination and information sharing between the USAOs and the Criminal Division.
To further promote this information sharing, Deputy Attorney General Comey issued a memorandum in January 2005 setting forth guidance on how the USAOs and CTS should coordinate on international and domestic terrorism matters.31 This memorandum provides interim guidance on information sharing between USAOs and CTS for terrorism-related topics and notification requirements that include CTS contact information.
To further develop and coordinate investigative and prosecutive strategies in terrorism matters, CTS, with assistance from EOUSA, has provided training sessions to the ATACs and other AUSAs who prosecute these cases. Training has included such topics as Prosecuting Terrorism Hoaxes, and Fundamental Principles Governing Extraterritorial Prosecutions - Jurisdiction, Venue and Procedural Rights. Additionally, CTS has issued memoranda to the ATAC Coordinators providing guidance and advice on the applicability of charges stemming from situations such as using Ricin as a terrorist weapon, and hostage taking and bombing incidents involving schools or educational facilities.
Regional training sessions, conferences, and several live teleconferences broadcast by satellite also have been provided by EOUSA's Office of Legal Education with coordination and assistance from the FBI. Topics have included:
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Partnerships at Work While servicing a rear lavatory at approximately 11:30 p.m., on October 16, 2003, a Southwest Airlines maintenance technician in New Orleans discovered a plastic storage bag containing bleach, molding clay, box cutters, matches, and an anonymous note. At the same time, identical materials were found on a Southwest aircraft in Houston. The Federal Air Marshal notified the FBI's Counterterrorism Watch Unit (CT Watch) of these incidences, and at 6:00 a.m. on October 17, the NJTTF was informed of this matter. Because of its partnerships and co-location of its members, the NJTTF simultaneously notified the agencies needed to investigate these incidents and directed each agency to search its databases and notify the NJTTF of any potential leads or suspects. The NJTTF also held a meeting with all FBI SACs about the threat incidents and sought the field's assistance in identifying potential leads. An NJTTF member from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) searched the TSA's databases and found that on September 15, 2003, Nathaniel T. Heatwole had sent an e-mail to its Contact Center claiming that he had committed these acts, and he characterized his deed as an "act of civil disobedience with the aim of improving public safety." Through the coordinated efforts of the NJTTF, Baltimore JTTF, CTS, TSA, and the Federal Air Marshals, Mr. Heatwole was apprehended by 2:00 p.m. that afternoon. Without the partnerships, a key FBI official estimated that it would have taken at least five days to solve this case. Mr. Heatwole was originally charged with a felony violation of Title 49 United States Code, Section 46505(b)(1), "carrying or attempting to carry a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft that is accessible to the individual in flight," which carries a maximum sentence of ten years. Instead, Mr. Heatwole pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of entering an airport area in violation of security requirements. On June 24, 2004, the U.S. District Court sentenced Mr. Heatwole to two years of supervised probation and a $1,000 fine. |
- Handling of Classified Information,
- Information Sharing,
- Overview of Anti-Terrorism Efforts,
- Community Threat Assessments,
- Attorney General Guidelines in Domestic Terrorism Investigations,
- Anthrax Investigations,
- Financial Investigations,
- Methods of Operations by Al Qaeda; and
- FBI intelligence briefings.
CTS and EOUSA also have worked jointly to plan and provide annual training conferences for the ATAC Coordinators with sessions that focused on terrorism-related legal issues and guidance for prosecutors.
The Task Forces and Councils Have Expanded Partnerships
We also found that the post-September 11, 2001, terrorism task forces and councils have expanded partnerships by including a wider range of participants. The task forces and councils now include members from law enforcement, the intelligence community, private business, and federal, state, and local governments.
The JTTFs combine FBI personnel with hundreds of investigators from various federal, state, and local agencies, who are considered important "force multipliers."32 JTTFs increased 194 percent, from 35 task forces pre-September 11, 2001, to 103 task forces in March 2005. The number of JTTF members has grown 458 percent, from 912 members pre-September 11, 2001, to 5,085 members in January 2005.
The ATACs also have increased their membership. While the number of ATACs is fixed at one per USAO district (Guam and Northern Mariana Islands operate one joint ATAC), membership on ATACs increased by 83 percent from 6,000 members in FY 2002 to approximately 11,000 members in FY 2005.
The NJTTF expanded its number of member agencies from 30 in July 2002 to 40 in January 2005, and its number of members from 55 to 62. It also increased its partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies by permanently accepting representatives from the District of Columbia's and New York City's police departments and by participating in the FBI's Police Executives Fellowship Program.33 The program enables police officers from state and local law enforcement agencies nationwide to work at the NJTTF (and other FBI divisions) on a 6-month rotational basis to gain first-hand knowledge of how the FBI operates and to access FBI information. The two fellowship program representatives assigned to the NJTTF during our fieldwork told us that the program allowed their agencies to work together and provided valuable contacts for future coordination. The fellowship program representatives also worked on specific initiatives designed to improve state and local agencies' abilities to detect and deter terrorism, such as:
- Developing the Terrorism Quick Reference Card used by state and local law enforcement officers to spot the warning signs of potential terrorist threats, and
- Increasing state and local law enforcement's use of the LEO system.
In July 2004, the NJTTF moved its operations to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), now known as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NJTTF now has direct access to the centralized intelligence generated by NCTC. The NJTTF Unit Chief stated that the move to NCTC increased the NJTTF's workspace capacity from 40 to 82 members.
The FTTTF has a critical partnership with the DOD CIFA/Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group that has assisted the FTTTF in its efforts. At the inception of FTTTF, DOD/CIFA provided financial resources, hardware, software, systems and procurement expertise, and office space to the task force. DOD/CIFA has a complementary mission to the FTTTF, as well as the technical expertise that assisted the FTTTF in development of a database warehouse and analytical tools. Additionally, the FTTTF has attempted to increase the number of its participating agencies, especially DHS components because of the importance of immigration and customs data to tracking and locating foreign terrorists. The DHS informed the FTTTF Director that they would look into adding more members, but indicated that a severe shortage of resources has limited its ability to do so as of January 2005. To attract more participants, the FTTTF Director holds monthly liaison meetings with a broad range of agencies, including DHS components, as well as international law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The JTTFs are implementing the FBI's new counterterrorism investigative strategy that has provided them with increased capabilities to help the Department achieve its strategic goal of preventing terrorism and promoting the nation's security. The FBI also has improved its agents' access to automated investigative information.
During his February 24, 2004, congressional testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller reported, "The Joint Terrorism Task Forces have played a central role in virtually every terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the United States over the past year."34 The FBI reports that since 2001 it has disrupted and dismantled multiple terrorist operations.
Developing Intelligence
Before September 11, 2001, the FBI classified its terrorism investigations as either criminal (265 file code) or intelligence (199 file code). Sharing of intelligence between the criminal and intelligence components of the FBI was difficult even when the subject of the criminal and intelligence investigations was the same person.35 Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has changed its counterterrorism investigative strategy from emphasizing criminal prosecutions to developing intelligence. It consolidated the former 199 and 265 file codes and initiated a new intelligence investigation (315) file code. With the 315s, the FBI defines the primary purpose of its counterterrorism investigations as "developing intelligence regarding the subject or the threat." The work performed by the JTTFs focuses upon identifying terrorists, terrorists groups, and the efforts used by terrorists to support their operations such as financial, recruitment, communication, and other support networks.
JTTF task force members, participating agency executives, and FBI headquarters managers stated that developing human assets (i.e., informants and sources) is an integral part of developing intelligence. The JTTFs focus on developing human assets and the FBI tracks the number of human assets developed by field offices. Although the numbers fluctuate as assets are opened and closed, the FBI reported that from August 30, 2001, through September 30, 2003, its international terrorism human assets increased by more than 60 percent and the domestic terrorism human assets increased by more than 40 percent.36
Addressing All Leads and Threats
The Director of the FBI requires that no counterterrorism leads or threats go unaddressed.37 To meet this mandate, the JTTFs use task force members and agents assigned to other squads in the FBI's field offices to cover JTTF taskings. Some JTTFs (such as the New York City and Los Angeles JTTFs) assign specific squads to handle all incoming leads, perform preliminary checks of the information provided, and then assign the leads to the appropriate team. This helps to streamline the preliminary work performed by the JTTFs and minimizes the intervention needed from non-JTTF agents. The work performed by the members of the JTTF squad and other FBI agents temporarily assigned to support the squad is combined and reported by field offices in two categories: international terrorism and domestic terrorism.
The JTTFs use the FBI's Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy as a "blueprint" for conducting these intelligence driven and intelligence focused investigations. The JTTFs can use various techniques in international terrorism investigations to gather information on national security threats without opening a full or preliminary investigation.38
Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)
Our interviews and survey results showed that the majority of non-FBI task force members with clearances did not have direct or complete access to the ACS system, even though such access was permitted by policy, which caused delays in their investigations. However, subsequent to our site visits the FBI developed an information technology system, known as IDW, to enhance investigative information available to JTTF agents. From the IDW demonstration we observed, it appears that the IDW has the capability to resolve the ACS system access problems we encountered in the FBI field offices.
The IDW is a "centralized, web-enabled repository for relevant intelligence and investigative data that allows users to query the information utilizing advanced software tools."39 The IDW is not a case management system but rather a "pointer system" that allows a user to enter different search terms and conducts a "Google" search of a variety of FBI and non-FBI databases, including: ACS Electronic Case File, ICE arrival and departure information on non-immigrants (I-94) data, Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network data from the Department of Treasury, No Fly List, FBI Terrorist Watch List, Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF), open source news (foreign and domestic), U.S. Department of State VISA fraud data, lost or stolen passport data, and other intelligence community information. Search results are displayed in a web format, and users can click directly on "links" to the highlighted documents as well as search within the results for a more focused analysis. Additionally, IDW can conduct "batch queries" where sets of data (such as names, phone numbers, or addresses) are run through all the databases in IDW.
As of April 2005, the IDW was populated with one billion records in a variety of databases, and the FBI estimates that within six months IDW will have access to one and a half billion records. There are approximately 7,000 IDW users in the FBI, including JTTF members. The FBI plans to have one-third of all the field offices trained on IDW by the end of 2005. IDW allows FBI and non-FBI JTTF members access to a variety of information that enables them to conduct terrorism investigations in a more efficient manner because IDW queries multiple databases simultaneously.
Although the task forces and councils have facilitated the Department's counterterrorism efforts, we believe there are areas in which their performance and effectiveness can be improved. We begin with issues that are Department level or commonly found across task forces and councils, followed by issues that are specific to an individual task force or council.
National Security Coordination Council
Although the National Security Coordination Council (NSCC) is an important and beneficial forum for Department leaders, the NSCC's role is unclear for long-term counterterrorism planning, centralizing and coordinating counterterrorism policy and operations, and monitoring policy implementation by the components.
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NSCC Functions The Attorney General established the NSCC with the principal mission of ensuring "a more seamless coordination of all functions of the Department relating to national security, particularly the Department's efforts to combat terrorism directed against the United States," and directed it to:
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In March 2002, the Attorney General established the NSCC and defined six functions for it to implement. We found that the NSCC does not fully perform two of these Attorney General mandated functions: 1) centralizing and coordinating policy, operations, and long-term planning of DOJ components, and 2) monitoring implementation of Department policy regarding counterterrorism issues. The NSCC also has not delegated these responsibilities to another Department entity. We also found that no guidelines have been developed defining responsibilities of NSCC member in carrying out the NSCC's functions. These functions may therefore be interpreted differently and some functions may not be carried out at all as the NSCC's leadership and members change.
We also found during interviews that the members have differing views on the functions of the NSCC which may affect its performance of some mandated functions. When asked about two of the NSCC functions related to the Department's counterterrorism policy monitoring and long-term planning, some NSCC members either could not explain how these occurred or did not see their role on the NSCC as carrying out these functions. As examples of the varied views on these functions, some of the members made the following comments when asked: "How does the NSCC monitor the implementation of the Department's counterterrorism policies? What form of policy direction has the NSCC given to shape the agency's counterterrorism operations?"
- We don't monitor them; we don't hear feedback that something has happened. There is no policy direction as it relates to my agency.
- I don't know. This comes out of the Deputy Attorney General's office.
- The NSCC does not compartmentalize the Department's counterterrorism operations into policies.
- No one sits there and writes policy. Often times an issue comes up which will eventually become policy. Attorneys are there to share concerns on existing law - congressional folks are there. We're framing policy in a general sense; we discuss advantages and disadvantages of issues that come up.
Additionally, some members provided the following responses when asked: "What long-term planning has been carried out for the task forces through the NSCC?"
- Not by the committee as a whole. We don't push a certain direction as a group.
- For most of the time, we were so reactive, it was hard to do long-term planning. Allocation of resources was discussed which has long-term implications, and a discussion of FISA.
- The NSCC has used the budget process to plan for the DOJ's counterterrorism initiative. Terrorism task forces are part of the DOJ's long-term plan; however, the NSCC doesn't have a set mission statement.
- There's a general construct in which they operate - but we're dealing with a shifting issue [terrorism]. Two years ago, there was a concentrated hierarchical structure in Afghanistan. Now we're looking at the distributed mode (e.g., IMDs (or IADs) and the link between bombs that strike targets and those responsible.
Some NSCC members, however, were able to provide us with examples of past or present policy coordination. One example was that the NSCC provided guidance to the Attorney General for defining the roles of the ATACs in relation to the JTTFs. In addition Deputy Attorney General Comey stated that the NSCC is planning to play a role in the development of policy through the Justice Intelligence Coordination Council, which will determine how law enforcement agencies share intelligence information.40
On questions related to the remaining four functions, however, NSCC members were able to articulate clearly how the NSCC carried these out. These functions are:
- coordination and information sharing within or between the Department and other federal state and local bodies;
- centralizing and coordinating resource allocation;
- framing national security issues for resolution by the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General; and
- ensuring that positions advanced by the Deputy Attorney General at interagency meetings reflect input from the Department national security components.
Members described the positive role the NSCC played in carrying out these functions by:
- keeping the DAG apprised of terrorism issues important to each component;
- receiving briefings by outside agencies or other non-member components on national security or terrorism related issues;
- providing an information sharing forum for senior DOJ officials who would not ordinarily meet w/one another; and
- annually reviewing the DOJ's budget submission and resources related to the department's terrorism initiative.
Based on these interviews, we concluded that the NSCC has not emphasized its role in centralizing and coordinating terrorism policy and operations, conducting long-term counterterrorism planning, or monitoring the implementation of counterterrorism policy in the Department.
Although the NSCC members could not address all the NSCC's functions, we found that the NSCC does serve as an effective forum for sharing counterterrorism information among its members. Comments from the former and current Deputy Attorneys General emphasized the NSCC's coordination and information sharing functions:
Former Deputy Attorney General Thompson
NSCC was created as a formal coordination mechanism within the DOJ to reinforce that prevention and disruption of terrorism is the Department's first priority; and to ensure that information sharing and open discussions continue in a formal setting. The NSCC allows the component heads to get together and talk from a policy and procedural standpoint.
Deputy Attorney General Comey
[The NSCC's purpose is] To bring together everyone in the Department that is touching on national intelligence and justice issues. To have people in the same room on a regular basis who don't usually meet...
In addition, all NSCC members informed us that the meetings are beneficial. They said that the NSCC discusses terrorism matters and threats, and reviews the Department's annual budget for counterterrorism resource allocations. The NSCC also receives project status updates on various agency initiatives and national security issues such as a DEA briefing on terrorist operations in South America, a CIA briefing on foreign terrorist threats, or a BOP briefing on terrorism in the prisons. Additionally, the NSCC has a broader mission beyond our focus of the task forces: coordinating all Department functions relating to national security issues. Toward that end, sub-groups of the NSCC have undertaken coordination of several national security initiatives as described previously in the Background section of this report.
CONCLUSION
The NSCC has not fully performed the policy, operations, planning, and monitoring functions mandated by the Attorney General. We believe that if the NSCC performed all its functions, it could address larger or overarching issues unresolved at the task force level (which we have discussed in this report) as part of the Department's counterterrorism efforts. These issues include: information sharing with law enforcement agencies and first responders in remote and rural areas; additional funding for the ATACs; FTTTF's acquisition of databases from agencies outside the Department; DEA's participation on the JTTFs; DHS's participation on the JTTFs; and coordinating activities and information sharing between the ATACs, JTTFs, DHS, and the states' homeland security task forces.
Further, the NSCC has not developed guidelines to fully define for its members their responsibilities in implementing the functions of the NSCC. Therefore, as the NSCC's leadership and members change, the functions may be interpreted differently or not fully performed.
1. The Department should assess the counterterrorism functions outlined in the Attorney General's memorandum establishing the NSCC and determine if they are still appropriate for the NSCC. If they are, the Department should ensure that written guidance describes the responsibilities of the NSCC and that the NSCC carries out its assigned functions. If the functions are not appropriate for the NSCC, they should be assigned to another Department entity.
The FBI has not developed a national training plan for the task forces, defined minimum training standards, or conducted a training needs assessment to determine the training needs of task force members. Similarly, neither EOUSA nor CTS has developed a training plan or conducted a training needs assessment for the ATAC Coordinators or members. Notification of available training is ad hoc, and non-FBI task force members believe that FBI members get preference for training notification and attendance.
The majority of task force and council members we interviewed or surveyed had no prior experience with either domestic or international terrorism before joining the task force or advisory council. Identifying terrorists and terrorist threats, conducting a terrorism investigation, developing sources, or planning for terrorist incidents were all new subjects for a majority of those members. More than half (51 percent) of the survey respondents reported that they required training in counterterrorism. The prolific growth of the JTTFs and ATACs, combined with task force and council members' widespread lack of experience and exposure to all facets of terrorism, has increased the need for additional training with a well-defined training plan and minimum training standards.
No Training Plan Exists for Task Forces or Advisory Councils
Although training courses are available to task force and council members, neither FBI, CTS, nor EOUSA officials have developed national training plans for task force and council members.41 Without a national training plan, counterterrorism training for task force and council members is determined locally, varies widely, and results in training inequities. For example, some FBI field offices required their task force members to complete two FBI interactive multimedia instruction CD-ROMs entitled "Basic International Terrorism" and "Basic Domestic Terrorism." Other field offices stated that they send their JTTF members to a basic counterterrorism course at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Others developed their own training and brought in speakers on topics such as identifying terrorist groups and their characteristics, cultural sensitivity, terrorism financing, and terrorism investigative strategies. Yet, other field offices told us they sometimes hold their agents back from training due to the high workload of the task force and lack of resources.
Some ATACs meet on a regular basis (either monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly) and try to present speakers who address terrorism-related topics at each meeting, while others may not conduct meetings or training for almost a year. Some ATAC survey respondents told us they had never received training from the ATAC or needed more detailed training, and stated for example:
- I have not received training due to no budget being provided. Recommend providing a budget for both basic and advanced training initiatives.
- The limited training was provided in-house at quarterly meetings in the form of briefings. It all has value, but from my perspective as a member, I require more related information and training.
FBI
In the last three years, oversight for counterterrorism training in the FBI has changed three times, with no one assigned responsibility to develop a national training plan for the task forces. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the Counterintelligence Division at FBI headquarters had responsibility for counterterrorism training. In December 2002, the Training Division located at the FBI Training Academy in Quantico was given the responsibility of providing counterterrorism training to FBI employees as well as to state and local law enforcement personnel. One staff member from the Counterterrorism Division was loaned to the Training Division to assist with this large undertaking. While the FBI Counterterrorism Division worked with the FBI Academy Training Division to provide guidance and assistance on the type of training to be offered, Academy officials stated that due to their limited staff and resources (housing, space, and budget), they were not able to absorb a comprehensive counterterrorism curriculum for task force members nationwide into their existing program at the Academy.
In October 2003, following a major restructuring of the Training Division, responsibility for counterterrorism training was given to the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters. The Counterterrorism Division is now responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing all counterterrorism training for FBI personnel, both in field offices and FBI headquarters, and for JTTF members. Two SSAs initially were assigned to develop a new Counterterrorism Training Unit, and in May 2004 written approval was given to officially establish the unit. The Counterterrorism Training Unit was staffed with two SSAs, two Intelligence Analysts, and a Secretary. As of November 2004, the two SSAs had transferred to other divisions and been replaced by two new SSAs.
Developments in FBI Counterterrorism Training: In January 2004, the FBI implemented a new training curriculum designed specifically for JTTF members entitled, "Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach." The FBI contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton to design this 4½ day course with input from subject matter experts from the FBI's Counterterrorism and Training Divisions. The course covers approximately 20 topics, including "The Threat Based Approach to Counterterrorism," "Developing Sources," "Undercover Operations," and "Working with Your Community." The majority of those who had attended this course rated it very favorably on the course evaluation sheets, stating that it was valuable and informative; but they also commented that the course is needed by task force members shortly after they begin on the task force or within 90 days of their arrival to effectively perform their duties as soon as possible.
The "Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach" course covers topics previously identified as needed by task force members. However, this course is not mandatory for task force members and selection for participation is left up to the task force supervisor's discretion. The course has been provided to 258 JTTF members and analysts from January through October 2004 with the goal of continuing to offer it until the majority of JTTF members have attended. While this is a positive development, because the course is offered monthly to only a small percentage of JTTF members from a few field offices, at the current rate it will take 14 years to train all 5,085 JTTF members.
In addition to the "Counterterrorism: A Strategic and Tactical Approach" course, the FBI also has a Counterterrorism Training section on the FBI's intranet. Task force members can access counterterrorism virtual training, CD-ROMs, the FBI and CIA's course catalogues, and other online information resources on terrorism. The FBI also reported that it has other new terrorism related training initiatives under way for new and existing employees:
- The expansion of time devoted to terrorism topics from 55 hours to 110 hours in the FBI New Agent Training course, and
- The addition of in-service training courses such as "FISA/Patriot Act," "Human Source Recruitment," and language training.42
Lack of Minimum Training Standards May Affect Some Task Force Members Receipt of Training
Although many task force members had received some counterterrorism training, we found that a significant percentage had no basic introductory training on terrorism for months, and sometimes years, since becoming members of the task force Task force members are normally experienced criminal investigators, but as stated previously, most have no experience in the counterterrorism field. Our survey results showed that 29 percent of all task force members (JTTF, NJTTF, and FTTTF) have not received any terrorism-related training since becoming members. Some respondents complained about this lack of training, stating for example:
- Needs are known, training hasn't been available. "Basic" training became available after 2+ years on the job.
- I haven't had any training regarding terrorism, counterterrorism or anything else regarding this task force.
- There has been no training offered, other than how to deal with paperwork - of which there has been none.
- I have never received any terrorism training. [I am] unsure of my role on the task force.
The FBI had stated that by the end of 2003, basic counterterrorism training would be provided to every JTTF member, and it has made progress in its training efforts.43 However, we found that in January 2004, 16 percent of the JTTF survey respondents, 37 percent of the NJTTF survey respondents, and 38 percent of the FTTTF survey respondents still had not completed any terrorism training since becoming members. Of the 16 percent of JTTF members who reported no training, half had been members of the JTTF for more than a year (the time on the task force without training was a median of 390 days for JTTF survey respondents). Two task force members had been on the JTTF for over 800 days without any counterterrorism training.
Thirty-seven percent of the NJTTF survey respondents reported that they had received no training (the time on the task force without training was a median of 375 days for NJTTF survey respondents), although some NJTTF survey respondents had been on the task force as long as 600 days without training. Thirty-eight percent of the FTTTF survey respondents had received no training (the time on the task force without training was a median of 240 days for FTTTF survey respondents), some for as long as 540 to 810 days. The following figure shows the length of time task force survey respondents spent on a task force without training.
Figure 5: Length of Time on Task Force Without
Training
[ Not Available Electronically ] |
We visited an FBI field office that had one of only three onsite training offices nationwide. Yet even this office had no minimum training standards or organized training plan for task force members.
EOUSA and CTS
One of the main functions of the ATACs is to provide counterterrorism training to members. However, in our survey of ATAC members, 47 percent reported that there was training they needed or should have received but did not. Yet, EOUSA and CTS have not developed a national training plan, minimum training standards, or a training needs assessment for ATAC Coordinators and members.
While CTS and EOUSA's Office of Legal Education have provided training sessions for the ATAC Coordinators, the focus has primarily been on the legal and investigative aspects of terrorism-related cases to ensure a consistent and unified prosecutorial approach to these cases. However, the ATACs need training and guidance on the administrative aspects of managing the ATAC. The ATAC Coordinators we interviewed stated that they want guidance on the type of training that should be offered to ATAC members and on how to identify trainers. The ATAC Coordinators also said that the provision of training, particularly training on terrorism prevention and planning, to law enforcement personnel and community members is a new responsibility for which they have little or no experience. Therefore, the ATAC Coordinators need guidance and assistance from CTS and EOUSA.
Training Needs Assessments Were Either Outdated or Never Completed
The FBI Training Academy staff at Quantico told us that a JTTF training needs assessment was conducted in the spring of 2002. However, despite our repeated inquiries, they did not provide information on whether the results from this assessment were analyzed or applied to develop any courses for JTTF members.44 No training needs assessment has been conducted since that time even though the number of JTTFs has increased from 56 to 103, and the number of JTTF members also has increased.
In lieu of a training needs assessment, we surveyed task force and council members to inquire how their training needs were determined at the task force and council level. Sixty percent of all task force and advisory council survey respondents indicated that their terrorism training needs were "undetermined," "self-determined," "determined without their input," or they were "uncertain" of how their terrorism training needs were determined.
Table 8: Task Force and Council Members' Perceptions of
How Training Needs Were Determined
Method Used |
ATAC | FTTTF | JTTF | NJTTF |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Task Force supervisor determined with my or my agency's input. |
N/A | 44% | 29% | 21% |
| ATAC Coordinator determined with my or my agency's input. |
27% | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Task force supervisor determined without my or my agency's input. |
1% | 12% | 11% | 16% |
| ATAC Coordinator determined without my or my agency's input. |
9% | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Self-determined | 13% | 19% | 14% | 5% |
| Not determined | 18% | 0% | 16% | 32% |
| Other method | 13% | 6% | 7% | 0% |
| Uncertain of method used | 16% | 19% | 20% | 26% |
|
Source: OIG's Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004. Notes: N/A = Not applicable |
Without a training needs assessment that is current and reflects the members' needs, task force and council managers or training staff cannot gauge an individual's or region's training needs. While a majority of task force and council members had no terrorism experience prior to joining the task force, some do have terrorism experience and their training needs would therefore be different. Additionally, the nature of the terrorist threat varies by region and some regions such as the northwestern states may require more emphasis on domestic terrorism topics, such as eco-terrorism or white supremacist groups, than the northeastern states.
More than half of the survey respondents stated that there is training they need or should receive, as evidenced by the following figure.
Source: | Analysis of OIG's Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004 |
Note: | Survey Question: "Is there counterterrorism training that you need or should receive that you have not taken?" |
Some Members Receive No Notification of Training
Many of the non-FBI task force members we interviewed and surveyed stated that they received no notification of training, and they were unaware of what training was available. The following were among the comments we received from survey respondents indicating a lack of notification of training:
- [I] don't know what is out there to submit a list of what I think I need.
- Don't know but I am sure there is training that is offered and I don't know about it.
- I have not been aware of any training or training opportunities.
- I assume there is training that could benefit me, but I am not aware of what it would be.
- It [training] would have been useful. I would still like to go to anything available, very little is available. We don't receive any notices of it.
- I still lack access and training to systems/resources that will allow me to perform my job much better.
- I would like to see what the FBI is doing [regarding terrorism training]. No one has shared what the FBI has for training.
- We have received very little training.. Agencies need to do a better job of informing members of training availability. Lack of training has impacted my work on the task force, both the JTTF and the ATAC.
JTTF
NJTTF
FTTTF
ATAC
The FBI informed us that to facilitate counterterrorism training it has included training information, training sources, and training courses on the Counterterrorism Division website on the FBI intranet. The FBI stated that each task force member has access to this website and is encouraged to take advantage of these training packages.
Perceived Inequities in Training Offered to FBI Versus Non-FBI Task Force Members
Some non-FBI task force members believe that FBI agents are offered more opportunities for counterterrorism training or believe that training is available only to FBI members. Several non-FBI task force members also informed us that they requested various training courses several times but had not been approved to go by the FBI.
An assessment of terrorism training equities between non-FBI and FBI task force members was beyond the scope of this review. However, our survey results show that only 11 percent of FBI agents reported that they had not completed any counterterrorism training since joining a task force, but 26 percent of federal non-FBI agents and 21 percent of state and local agents reported that they had not completed any training. Additionally, a significantly higher percentage of federal (non-FBI) and state and local survey respondents, 55 and 53 percent, respectively, did not review the FBI's international terrorism CD-Rom. Only 29 percent of FBI survey respondents did not review the international terrorism CD-Rom.
Survey respondents also commented on perceived inequities in training:
- Upon entering the JTTF 7 years ago, I fulfilled the background tasks to be selected to attend formal training. As a non-federal CT [counterterrorism] task force member, we are routinely overlooked for training positions. All of my experience has been on the job or research conducted on my own.
- Occasional training is available but very few seats are available or the training is not available to all team members.
JTTF
FTTTF
We also found in our review of attendance rosters from two specific training courses that targeted JTTF and NJTTF members that differences in training participation existed in a few offices.45 While the majority of the field offices sent a mix of FBI and non-FBI JTTF members to one of the courses, three field offices sent only FBI members to fill the six slots each was allotted.
CONCLUSION
The lack of training notification and the perceived training inequities can undermine the concept of full partnership on the task forces and councils and impact work productivity. Without a national training plan that includes minimum training standards and a needs assessment to identify and address training deficiencies, actual and perceived training inequities and deficiencies will continue.
2. The FBI should develop a national training plan for each task force that includes:
- Responsibility for developing and managing the training plan and program,
- Initial needs assessment,
- Frequency of future needs assessments,
- Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time frames for completion of training, to include completion of the introductory training session within 90 days of joining the task force.
- Required minimum annual training hours,
- Target audience - training equities for FBI and non-FBI task force members, and
- Responsibility for training notification to the field.
3. EOUSA's Office of Legal Education, along with CTS, should develop a national training plan for ATACs that includes:
- Initial needs assessment of ATAC Coordinators,
- How to manage and structure an ATAC (membership, frequency of meetings, methods and sources of communication, how to conduct an ATAC members' needs assessment, identify trainers, and develop a local training plan),
- Frequency of future needs assessments for ATAC Coordinators and ATACs,
- Development of minimum mandatory training standards and time frames for completion of training for ATAC Coordinators,
- Required minimum annual training hours for ATAC Coordinators, and
- Responsibility for training notification to the ATAC Coordinators.
4. The ATAC Coordinators should conduct training needs assessments and develop a training plan for ATAC members.
The FBI has not developed a structured, systemwide orientation program for new JTTF and NJTTF members. Additionally, the FBI has not provided written guidance that defines the roles and responsibilities of its task force members.
The FBI Has Not Developed a Structured, Systemwide Orientation Program for New JTTF and NJTTF Members
We found that a significant number of both FBI and non-FBI members of the JTTFs and the NJTTF did not receive an orientation to the task force on which they served and when an orientation was provided the type varied and content was inconsistent. Given the rapid pace with which the NJTTF, FTTTF, and many of the JTTFs started up after September 11, 2001, the lack of a formal orientation was understandable. However, three years later, a more formal, standardized, and functional orientation for all new task force members to enable them to perform as efficiently as possible, as quickly as possible, still does not exist for JTTFs or the NJTTF. The FTTTF informed us that it began a formal orientation for all new members in September 2004; however the OIG completed its fieldwork for this report before having the opportunity to review the impact of the orientation.
With 5,085 members, the JTTF program has the largest number of task force members. Approximately 55 percent of these task force members are from outside the FBI. They come from state, local, and other federal law enforcement agencies and therefore may be unfamiliar with FBI and JTTF policies and procedures. Orientation to JTTF and FBI procedures is needed to assist non-FBI law enforcement officers in shifting their focus from conducting criminal investigations to working intelligence cases. Because these career officers were trained previously to conduct criminal investigations culminating in an arrest as quickly as possible, they need orientation on working terrorism cases with the emphasis and end-goal of intelligence gathering, surveillance, and source development. Yet, we found through our survey that 38 percent of JTTF members received no orientation at all and the following table outlines our survey results.
Table 9: Orientation Completion by Task Force
| Survey question: Upon joining the task force, were you given an orientation to the task force and the FBI's policies and procedures? |
|||
|---|---|---|---|
| Agency | Response | ||
| Yes | No | Don't Know | |
| JTTF | 58% | 38% | 4% |
| NJTTF | 42% | 42% | 16% |
Source: OIG Counterterrorism Survey, January 2004. |
The following table shows that overall, 59 percent of the FBI, 60 percent of federal non-FBI, and 54 percent of state and local task force members that responded to our survey received an orientation when they joined their respective task forces. However, many described the orientation as "elementary," consisting of one or more of the following activities: a brief or informal overview, a document review, an introduction to the staff and workspace, learning from other task force members, or on-the-job training.
Table 10: Orientation Completion by Law Enforcement Agency
| Survey question: Upon joining the task force, were you given an orientation to the task force and the FBI's policies and procedures? |
|||
|---|---|---|---|
| Agency | Response | ||
| Yes | No | Don't Know | |
| FBI | 59% | 36% | 5% |
| Federal/Non-FBI | 60% | 36% | 5% |
| State and Local | 54% | 40% | 5% |
Source: OIG's Counterterrorism Task Force Survey, January 2004. Note: Numbers are rounded and may not add to 100%. |
Similarly, there was no formalized orientation for NJTTF members. Orientation to the NJTTF consisted of an introduction to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, a one-day session in which a representative from each unit within the Counterterrorism Division gave an overview of their office functions. At the time of our field work, interviews, and survey, the content and provider of FTTTF orientation briefings varied for each member.
We found that in the absence of any FBI headquarters-developed orientation program and no policy or directive requiring any orientation, orientation occurs sporadically and inconsistently for the FTTTF, JTTFs, and NJTTF. The majority of task force managers we interviewed believed that FBI headquarters should develop a standard orientation so that it is available consistently across all task forces.
While FBI task force members stated that the lack of an orientation program did not affect their task force performance, the many non-FBI members believed otherwise. The following comments received from non-FBI JTTF members during interviews suggest that the lack of orientation had an impact on their ability to perform their duties efficiently:
JTTF
From a 25-year veteran police officer:
Everyone on the task force is a seasoned investigator. You have a preliminary foundation and bring tools with you when you arrive. . You refer back to your own experience and then you ask [questions]. Federal procedures are very different - there are very specific guidelines in the federal system. I was a fish out of water. I wanted to know. what is your process? ...if there had been an orientation, the learning curve would have been much shorter. Even today, 10 months later, there's still a lot I don't know.
From an 18-year veteran police officer:
If you have a question, you go to your supervisor. If he's absent, you're sunk. We have a lot of resources but haven't got a clue how to use them. We need someone to let us know what all the resources are: we need an index or contact person from any organization, INS, CIA, Workman's Comp... There should be training on 302s [interviews]; inserts [an insert is used to document non-testimonial information for an investigative file]; papers for statistical reports; use of the ACS program; Rapidstart; the difference between a criminal vs. intelligence investigation; a mini-academy - even 5 days just to learn the paperwork. They should have terrorism training in the beginning also. When you're working intelligence cases - there's so much involved. There should be a packet for each instance, [referring to National Security Letters and FISAs] with the FBI guidelines.
From a veteran Department non-FBI agent:
A lot of training we had was on-the-job. It was frustrating in the beginning - the language was different. Orientation would be helpful - it was as if we were thrown into the aquarium. Is there a right way to do 302's? We all shared the same frustration. We pushed for a class - the SSA saw we were committing so many errors on the paperwork ... But as long as there were some seasoned FBI agents along with the new, [the FBI thought] it was ok. The SSA created a template of: 1) an FD 302; 2) an Electronic Communication (EC). But if you don't know what to put in the EC, it doesn't matter what's on the template. The language the FBI uses doesn't translate to our agency; and, 3) an Insert - [an insert is used to document non-testimonial information for an investigative file]. It was very haphazard - you were thrown into a squad, administratively it was a nightmare - everyone had questions, no one knew the right answer. the way files were set up and the numbering system. If they had provided an informal class, flyers, or samples. an overview would have been terrific.
The following are additional comments from task force survey respondents when asked about the impact of having no orientation to the task force:
- It considerably hindered my ability to understand the JTTF organization, who to talk to about issues, have people know who I am, know how to use the systems such as ACS.
- I did spend and continue to spend a major portion of my time researching appropriate procedures in order to send out communications.
- Most of what we did over the first nine months on the task force was wrong. We are still fixing paperwork from the first nine months to a year and we still aren't always sure what is the right way to do things.
- I was completely lost. Do not understand the I.T. [international terrorism] lingo, laws, etc.
- Didn't know what was expected, what we could and couldn't do as far as information sharing.
- Took me a while to understand role and mission - had to learn the system on my own by continually asking questions. It took me a longer time to get familiar with how things are done.
- Orientation would have lessened the time necessary to become familiar with basic FBI specific report formats and computer systems.
- Slowed me down some, and made it frustrating in trying to figure out what I should be doing.
- Made life difficult. Hard to be a productive task force member without proper training.
- I can't do much until I get a handle on case opening procedures and access to the computer system.
- Not being able to assess what role I play within the FBI structure.
- A lot of guess-work and halts to find out proper procedures.
- It slowed my effectiveness. It took longer than it should have to figure out such things as passing clearances, chain of command, who the members of the FTTTF were.
- ...[D]ue to the lack of information, I wasn't aware of all the resources (provided through other units or agency members) that were available to assist me in my job.46
JTTF
NJTTF
FTTTF
The FBI Has Not Provided Written Guidance That Defines the Roles and Responsibilities of Task Force Members
The FBI still does not have written Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with all of the agencies participating on the FTTTF, JTTFs, and NJTTF. The NJTTF Unit Chief told us that post-September 11, 2001, "members were assigned to the [JTTF and NJTTF] to immediately address the crisis and the MOUs were supposed to follow." The absence of MOUs was a problem that existed on the JTTFs before September 11, 2001. We found that the FBI did not have MOUs with all of the agencies assigned to the pre-September 11, 2001, JTTFs, and those that existed have not been updated to reflect the post- September 11, 2001, JTTF mission. Since November 2003, the FTTTF has had draft MOUs pending with the DHS (only related to DHS databases) and intelligence community participants.47 As of November 2004, FTTTF has MOUs signed with CIFA, the Office of Personnel Management, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
The impact of the lack of written guidance concerning the task force members' roles and responsibilities differed. The non-FBI JTTF members and most NJTTF members we interviewed said they understood their task force roles and responsibilities in the absence of the MOUs. However, most of the non-FBI FTTTF members that we interviewed and surveyed were unclear of their roles and responsibilities and believed that an MOU for information sharing between the FBI and member agencies was needed. An FTTTF survey respondent stated that one of the FTTTF's greatest challenges was "defining roles and responsibilities." Another survey respondent stated:
Supervisors need to understand their roles as well but they can't do this until organizations higher than them understand their roles. Once roles are established, respected, and performed, supervisors will be able to give guidance and support to the rest of us. I have encountered several members who are lacking an overall picture of the game plan and the players that are involved. A complex diagram has been provided but I think some details seem to still be trying to work themselves out.
The lack of role definition did not rest solely with the FBI's FTTTF, JTTF, and NJTTF leaders; we also found that task force members received limited guidance from their parent agency concerning their task force membership. Many of the task force members described the impact of this lack of guidance as being "lost by the parent agency."
CONCLUSION
The lack of a formal orientation program for the JTTF and NJTTF members affected the efficiency and productivity of the task forces. Since a majority of task force members are not from the FBI and have not worked in counterterrorism previously, they struggle to understand their role and mission and how to operate in their new environment. State, local, and other federal law enforcement members would benefit from a timely, relevant, and comprehensive orientation to the FBI's policies and procedures and task force mission, as well as defined roles and responsibilities of each task force member.
5. The FBI should develop a formal, standardized orientation program for all new task force members and provide it within 30 days of the new member's start date. Orientation should include:
- FBI policies and procedures,
- Access and use of the ACS system, IDW, and any other case management system,
- Intelligence gathering versus criminal investigations,
- Definition of task force member roles and responsibilities,
- Roles of other Department terrorism task forces and other FBI units,
- Sources of information and contact information for other organizations frequently used by the terrorism task forces (e.g., DHS, Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S. Postal Service), and
- Information sharing protocols.
6. The FBI should finalize MOUs with all agencies participating on the Department's terrorism task forces.
The JTTFs and ATACs have not fully coordinated their efforts to reach out to and share information with law enforcement agencies, first responders, and other relevant organizations in remote areas.
Although the FBI and a few ATACs have ongoing efforts to interact and share information with law enforcement agencies and first responders in remote areas within their jurisdictions, some ATACs and JTTFs have not coordinated their activities to target remote agencies that do not have representatives on the task forces and councils.48 The state and local law enforcement agencies that we interviewed with representatives on a JTTF or ATAC were satisfied with the amount and type of terrorism information shared. In contrast, those law enforcement agencies that were outside of the metropolitan areas where the JTTF or ATAC is located, and did not have task force or council members, were not as satisfied.
Because terrorism and information about terrorism threats may be located throughout the country, remote areas should not be overlooked. Most remote law enforcement agencies do not have the financial resources to commit a full-time representative to the JTTF, but still need information on terrorism matters from the federal government and terrorism-related training. These remote law enforcement officials, as well as first responders and representatives of high-priority targets, are sometimes members of the ATAC and receive terrorism and threat-related information from the ATAC. However, communication with the remote agencies does not occur in every jurisdiction. The JTTFs and ATACs do not have coordinated strategies to address the gaps in information sharing, intelligence sharing, and training.
Geography and Infrastructure Constraints Complicate Outreach Efforts of the ATACs and JTTFs and Limit Participation
Because some ATACs and JTTFs are responsible for providing coverage for the entire state or across multiple states, their outreach to remote areas is difficult. The ATACs and JTTFs operate within the traditional jurisdictional lines of the USAOs and the FBI's field offices, and the areas covered are expansive.49 For example, because of the way judicial districts are drawn, 26 of the 93 ATACs are responsible for the terrorism training, information sharing, and prosecutorial coordination for their entire state.
Some JTTFs also have problems due to the size of the area for which they are responsible. At the time of our fieldwork, six JTTFs were responsible for providing terrorism investigative coverage for more than one state. The FBI SAC we interviewed in Salt Lake City stated that communication with the state and local partners in Montana, Idaho, and the remote areas in Utah was both a geographical and technological challenge.
Table 11: JTTFs Responsible for More Than One State
| The JTTF Location in ... | Also has responsibility for ... |
|---|---|
| Albany, New York | Vermont |
| Baltimore, Maryland | Delaware |
| Boston, Massachusetts | Maine New Hampshire |
| Denver, Colorado | Wyoming |
| Minneapolis, Minnesota | North Dakota South Dakota |
| Salt Lake City, Utah | Montana Part of Idaho |
Note: Unlike other JTTFs listed above, the Albany, New York, and Denver, Colorado, JTTFs share terrorism coverage within their state with one or more JTTFs. As of September 2004, the FBI had approved JTTFs in Maine and Montana; and in March 2005, the FBI approved JTTFs in Bedford, New Hampshire; Boise, Idaho; and Wilmington, Delaware. |
In addition, some jurisdictional lines create anomalies. Two examples of jurisdictional lines not matching the region's geographic realities are described below.
- The Washington, D.C., national capital region includes the District of Columbia and the surrounding jurisdictions in the states of Maryland (Prince George's and Montgomery) and Virginia (Alexandria City, Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William). However, because of how the jurisdictional lines are drawn for the FBI's field offices and the USAOs, the terrorism matters affecting this region are coordinated by two separate JTTFs and ATACs.50 In Maryland, both the JTTF and ATAC are based in Baltimore. These two offices cover the entire state of Maryland, including the two counties that border the District of Columbia (Prince George's and Montgomery). The FBI's Washington, D.C., field office covers the District of Columbia and the Northern Virginia jurisdictions that are in close proximity to the District of Columbia (Alexandria City, Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William). A law enforcement official told us that this arrangement does not take into account the commonality of the regions when the terrorism focus is coordinated by separate offices.
- The state of Alaska has 33,904 miles of shoreline and 365 million acres (one-fifth of the size of the lower contiguous 48 states), of which only 160,000 acres are developed (less than 1/20th of 1 percent). As a result, Alaska's limited infrastructure and large undeveloped territory make it very difficult to provide counterterrorism coverage. JTTF members we interviewed told us that there are no roads that connect the entire state and some locations are only accessible by air, which during the winter months is problematic. The JTTF leadership also stated that due to infrastructure and budgetary constraints the JTTF was not effectively reaching the broader Alaska community. The ASAC for the Alaska Field Office told us that the FBI and JTTF members should be traveling to cities in various parts of Alaska proactively collecting intelligence. Unfortunately, lack of financial resources, as well as geographic and weather constraints, only allow these trips sporadically in the summer months. An ATAC member told us that the harsh weather and terrain posed a challenge to addressing Alaska's vulnerabilities to terrorism. He believed that law enforcement in Alaska work together to minimize the vulnera