Report of Investigation Concerning Alleged Mismanagement and Misconduct by Carl J. Truscott, Former Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
Special Report
October 2006
Office of the Inspector General
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I. Truscott’s Hiring Policies and Their Budget Impact During the course of our investigation, numerous witnesses told us that Truscott’s hiring policy led to excessive hiring, which in turn had a serious negative impact on ATF’s operating budget. This issue was not among the original allegations raised in the anonymous complaint. However, the OIG decided to examine the issue because the anonymous complaint alleged that many of Truscott’s spending decisions were inappropriate given ATF’s fiscal constraints. Thus, before discussing allegations of mismanagement of public funds, such as those related to the new Headquarters building and other space management issues, we describe in this section the extent to which Truscott’s hiring decisions affected ATF’s overall financial circumstances, particularly with respect to support of operations. This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of ATF budget and personnel practices, but is meant to provide context for other allegations addressed in this report. According to several witnesses, ATF has been facing critical budget problems during the past few years that can, in part, be traced back to the agency’s transition from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2003. A senior financial management official told us that when ATF was split between the Treasury Department and the DOJ, the budget for the portion of ATF that transferred to the DOJ was reduced by $80 million in order to fund the former ATF operations that remained at the Treasury Department. The official stated that the actual cost of the former ATF operations that stayed at Treasury was about $50 million. The official said that the transfer to DOJ resulted in overstaffing and a strain on ATF’s budget when it moved to DOJ. A senior official who worked in ATF’s Budget Office since before the transition told us that former Director Buckles instituted a hiring freeze after the transition. This senior budget official said Buckles’ decision reflected an acknowledgement at that time that ATF could not hire new personnel and still have the money it needed in the operating budget to carry out its day-to-day missions. When Truscott became ATF Director on April 19, 2004, ATF had approximately 4,659 employees, including 2,313 special agents.4 Truscott told us that shortly after joining ATF, he visited each of the ATF’s 23 Field Divisions. He stated that the most consistent thing he heard from both field and Headquarters personnel was that ATF could not perform its job because it did not have an adequate number of staff. Truscott said he accordingly made hiring a priority during his tenure. He told us that the entire Strategic Leadership Team endorsed his hiring program. As a result of this decision, in the fourth quarter of FY 2004 ATF hired approximately 178 new employees, more than had been hired in the preceding three quarters. During all of FY 2004, ATF hired a total of 324 new employees while losing 313, resulting in a net gain of 11 employees for the year. Hiring activity increased significantly in FY 2005.5 Truscott told us that ATF hired approximately 550 people in FY 2005.6 By the end of FY 2005, ATF had 4,921 employees on board, a net increase of 161 employees over the year before. Truscott continued his hiring initiative into FY 2006. ATF hired approximately 214 new employees through the first three quarters of FY 2006, while approximately 157 employees left ATF during that period, for a net gain of approximately 57 employees. Most of the new agents and investigators were brought on in the first quarter of FY 2006. According to the senior budget official, ATF had 4,951 employees as of May 1, 2006. As discussed in greater detail below, Truscott planned to hire several hundred more agents and investigators in FY 2006. However, many of these prospective hires were not brought on due to government-wide and DOJ-specific rescissions to the ATF’s FY 2006 budget in December 2005 and to a decision by the ATF Deputy Director to cancel several new recruit training classes after Truscott had relinquished budget decision making authority to him in February 2006, after Truscott was informed of the allegations against him.7 A senior management official told us that Truscott’s “vision” was to hire to the maximum FTE level authorized by the agency’s annual budget. This official said that Truscott believed that a budget request to fund a given number of people, once endorsed by the President and approved by Congress, represented a Presidential and Congressional mandate to hire that number of people. The official said, however, that it is widely recognized that a lot of agencies have “hollow” FTEs, meaning FTEs that an agency does not have sufficient funds to support. One SAC we interviewed stated that Truscott’s priority was to hire up to the FTE ceiling, but that in his nearly 20 years with ATF, no Director had ever hired to the FTE ceiling because ATF never had sufficient operational funds to support the positions. ATF budget documents and witnesses’ statements reflect that while Truscott was directing an aggressive effort to hire new employees in late FY 2004 and throughout FY 2005, ATF’s ability to support its expanding staff with training, equipment, and space was decreasing. Although appropriated funding (excluding emergency supplemental funding) for ATF had steadily increased during that period, the ATF’s allocation for its operational budget had steadily decreased. Senior ATF managers told us that as it became apparent to them that this trend was likely to continue in FY 2006, they began to voice their concerns to Truscott about his hiring policy. In FY 2004, ATF’s appropriated funding was $827 million. Funding increased to $878 million in FY 2005, and to $911 million in FY 2006.8 In contrast, ATF’s operational budget in 2004 was $176 million, or approximately 21.3 percent of appropriated funds. In FY 2005, the operational budget was approximately $155 million, or 17.7 percent of appropriated funds. ATF’s Office of Management estimates that in FY 2006, the operational budget will remain at $155 million, or 17 percent of appropriated funds.9 As described above, the number of employees supported by the operational budget has increased by nearly 300 over this 3-year period. Domenech and other witnesses cited three primary reasons for the decrease in operational funds during this period. First, the growth in ATF personnel resulted in greater spending on salaries. Second, a clerical error in the calculation of FICA benefit contributions resulted in an $11 million underestimation of projected payroll costs. Finally, as described in Section II of this chapter, ATF had to take several million dollars out of its operational budget in FY 2005 to cover its share of expenditures for the new Headquarters building. According to these witnesses, ATF anticipated having to move money from its operational budget into the Headquarters project again in FY 2006.10 Truscott told the OIG that no one in ATF’s leadership ranks objected to his hiring initiative. He made a similar statement during his testimony on April 26, 2006, before the House Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies Subcommittee on FY 2007 appropriations for ATF. In response to questions regarding whether hiring was impacting operational funds, Truscott defended his hiring policy in part by stating, “it was the consensus and has been the consensus that it was important” to hire new personnel so that ATF could carry out its mission. (Emphasis added.) However, many senior managers told us that although they supported Truscott’s decision to hire new agents, investigators, and other employees throughout FY 2005, they told Truscott they were opposed to his decision to continue the hiring policy into FY 2006 because of the strain it would place on the operating budget. We also were told by several witnesses that field division managers expressed concern to Truscott at a November 2005 SAC conference that any continued hiring should be balanced against ATF’s ability to support the new hires. We discuss below the concerns expressed to Truscott about his hiring initiative by senior managers at Headquarters and in the field. Deputy Director Domenech told us that he agreed it was necessary to hire new employees in FY 2005. However, he said that he had told Truscott repeatedly that the rate of hiring could not be continued in FY 2006. Domenech noted that while the hiring decisions for FY 2006 were being made, ATF was also facing an approximately $7.9 million shortfall in funding its share of the new Headquarters building (discussed in Section II of this chapter, below). Domenech said he told Truscott at the time that they would have to take the money to pay for the Headquarters building out of the operational fund, and that any money they took from operations would affect all ATF directorates. He said he also explained to Truscott that the operational fund was smaller than it had been the year before, but that ATF was bigger and was being asked to do more, and that the amount of fixed account spending had increased. In sum, he said he told Truscott “[w]e have less money with more people. It’s going to impact the agency’s ability to function. That is why, Director, do not hire anymore and increase [salary expenses].” Domenech said Truscott reacted by telling him that the new Headquarters building and hiring were “critical” for ATF, so they would continue to hire agents and investigators. He also said that Truscott accused him of “trying to derail [Truscott’s] vision.” Two senior ATF Office of Management officials told us that they and Domenech had numerous meetings with Truscott as early as June 2005 to present him with various hiring scenarios and to explain to him how the number of projected hires in FY 2006 would affect funds remaining for operational expenses. These briefings culminated in a formal presentation to Truscott on October 7, 2005, in which the senior Office of Management officials sought to convince him that ATF could not sustain the same level of hiring in FY 2006 that it had in the prior fiscal year. Materials from the October presentation show that if ATF were to hire up to the projected authorized FTE limit of 5,128 in FY 2006, the agency would have to spend $603 million on salaries, leaving $118 million for operational expenses. However, if ATF were to hire up to the authorized FTE limit in effect for the prior fiscal year (4,940), it would spend $583 million on salaries, leaving $137 million available for operational expenses.11 One of the senior officials at the October meeting stated that she advised Truscott to hire fewer new people and to stagger their entry-on-duty dates to conserve funds. She said that she also would have liked to hire more personnel, but the realities of the budget did not permit it. She said that Truscott told her, “You keep raining on my parade.” She said that part of the problem was that Truscott did not appreciate “how bad things were in the operational accounts.” This official also stated that Truscott had an unrealistic assessment of how operational funds could be replenished by reprogramming expired accounts that had been used in the past to support specific programs, but which would no longer be available in FY 2006.12 She stated that Truscott never explained to her where new funds could be found, and she believed Truscott discounted her advice because he thought she was being “pessimistic.” The two senior Office of Management officials’ account of these meetings and the October 7, 2005, presentation is supported by a senior member of Truscott’s staff who also attended them. This witness stated, “I’m not sure that the Director ever fully grasped the whole issue of FTE” and the continuing cost of hiring people. The witness said Truscott was focused instead on how many people were on the payroll at the time. The witness said that the budget officials emphasized to Truscott that continuing the current pace of hiring would leave “so little in the operating funds.” The witness said that Truscott was determined to continue to hire and that he wanted his “legacy” to be the creation of a new work force. Truscott’s Chief of Staff also attended the October 7, 2005, budget presentation. The Chief of Staff was hired in June 2005, and thus had little direct knowledge about the expanded hirings in FY 2005. He confirmed that a senior management official advised Truscott to defer any FY 2006 hiring until the end of the fiscal year, but that Truscott brought on the new hires despite this advice. However, the Chief of Staff said that at the time Truscott had been asking his Assistant Directors to “scrub” their accounts and they were coming up with additional money to fund hiring. He said that as a result, Truscott was not confident that he was being presented with a “true picture” of ATF’s budget situation. The Chief of Staff said Truscott was optimistic that other sources of funding, such as reprogramming requests, would come through.13 The Chief of Staff also said that Truscott did not want to see the hiring gains made in FY 2005 lost in FY 2006. Domenech confirmed that during the period surrounding the October 7 briefing, the various directorates were “scrubbing their accounts” to find money that was to be used for future purchases of equipment and services but which had not yet been obligated. Domenech said that Truscott referred to these funds as “found money.” Domenech stated, however, that for each dollar “found,” there was a commensurate loss in funding for ATF operations going forward. A senior budget official we interviewed also supported Domenech’s description that the directorates were finding additional funds by cutting future spending on such items as telecommunications equipment. Regarding new FY 2006 hires, Domenech stated that he and the two senior Office of Management officials advised Truscott to defer any new FY 2006 hiring until the end of the fiscal year, by which time a continuing resolution would have been lifted and the impact from any rescissions to that fiscal year’s budget would be known. Domenech said Truscott disregarded their advice and instead insisted on scheduling three new classes of agents and investigators during the first half of FY 2006.14 Domenech and one of the senior management officials told us about how the timing of new agent and investigator training classes also impacted the ATF budget. Domenech and the senior management official told us that in December 2005, after being notified of a government-wide rescission, Truscott was persuaded to cancel one of the three training classes for new agents scheduled for the first half of FY 2006.15 Domenech and the senior management official stated that they had recommended to Truscott that if he were unwilling to cancel FLETC classes, he should at a minimum schedule them for later in the fiscal year as a way of saving money.16 Domenech told us that Truscott, however, could not be persuaded to defer two other basic agent and investigator training classes until the latter half of FY 2006. Domenech stated that Truscott’s decision to go forward with these classes so early in FY 2006 cost ATF several million dollars more in salaries and expenses than it would have cost had the classes been deferred or cancelled entirely. In February 2006, after the OIG investigation began and Truscott turned over agency budget authority to Domenech, Domenech told us he cancelled at least four more basic agent and investigator classes.17 Other senior managers also told us that Truscott dismissed their concerns that ATF lacked sufficient funds to support continued hiring. The Assistant Director for the Office of Training and Professional Development (TPD) told us that he and the Assistant Director for the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations (OPRSO) talked to Truscott and the Chief of Staff about Truscott’s plan to continue hiring in FY 2006. The TPD Assistant Director said that he told Truscott that ATF did not have sufficient funds to train the proposed number of new hires. He said that Truscott responded that they would find the money. The OPRSO Assistant Director told us that he expressed concerns to Truscott about the costs related to conducting background investigations on new hires, but that Truscott was dismissive of these concerns. This Assistant Director told us that Truscott was intent on adding at least four basic training classes at the beginning of FY 2006, despite contrary advice “from the majority of the Senior Leadership Team.”18 He said that even after Truscott agreed to cancel one class scheduled for February 2006, Truscott still urged him to go forward with background checks and to keep the recruits “on the shelf” in case the agency’s financial situation improved. He said Truscott did not understand that there is a cost associated with conducting background checks. He told us that the total cost of the investigations performed on recruits who were scheduled to attend the FLETC classes that have since been cancelled was $280,000 for 112 special agents and $149,500 for 65 investigators.19 Domenech and the Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations also told us that early in FY 2006 staff in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General expressed concern over ATF’s aggressive hiring. Domenech said that in either October or November of 2005, he and the Assistant Director met with an Associate Deputy Attorney General to discuss the hiring issue.20 According to this Assistant Director, the DOJ official asked why ATF was hiring so many people and stated that this was “gross mismanagement on the part of ATF.” The Assistant Director and Domenech said that the DOJ official asked how ATF could be hiring all these new employees when the agency was “broke.” The Assistant Director and Domenech said that they told the DOJ official that Truscott was making these decisions, that they and others had advised against it, and that they had informed Truscott of the repercussions.21 Domenech said that he later told Truscott of the Associate Deputy Attorney General’s concerns, and that Truscott responded, in essence, that he would rather cut spending than curtail hiring. We asked Truscott whether anyone from Field Operations had ever expressed any concern that they did not have sufficient resources to support new employees. Truscott responded that no one had expressed such concerns to him. He said that concerns from the field would generally first be raised to the Deputy Assistant Directors for Field Operations, then to the Assistant Director, then to the Deputy Director, and then to him. However, we received information from numerous witnesses that such concerns were expressed to Truscott. A senior official in the Office of Field Operations told us that she attended the SAC conference in St. Simons Island, Georgia, in early November 2005. She said that the field managers made Truscott aware at the conference that they had problems supporting personnel in terms of adequate space, training, and equipment and did not need to hire any more people at that time. At the November 2005 SAC conference, the Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations gave a PowerPoint presentation to Truscott to explain the current and projected status of field divisions, primarily in terms of available office space for personnel. The Assistant Director told us that the presentation emphasized the need to keep an appropriate balance between hiring new people and maintaining sufficient operational funds to support existing personnel. According to a memorandum prepared by the Assistant Director summarizing the information conveyed to Truscott at the conference, the SACs “stressed the importance of maintaining sufficient funds to equip and house our people, support current employees and... maintain [existing] equipment.” He said they also told Truscott that many ATF employees did not have ATF office space, and that many projects to obtain space were not funded. We reviewed the materials that the Assistant Director and others told us were presented to Truscott at the November 2005 conference. The materials show that at that time, a total of 84 space projects were unfunded, 105 special agents were working in non-ATF space, and 140 ATF employees did not have workstations “as the result of hiring emphasis and lack of funding space expansion projects.” The materials also stated that agents and investigators were sitting in conference rooms, foyers, common spaces, and file rooms, and listed “space and work stations for all ATF employees” as SAC priorities. Also listed as priorities for the field divisions were vehicles and equipment, task force support, training, and strategic placement of employees. One SAC who attended the conference told us that on the first two days of the conference just the SACs, the Assistant Director for Field Operations, and possibly Deputy Director Domenech were present. He said that there was a general sense among the SACs that they had insufficient operational funds, and that they decided to put forth a unified message to Truscott that there should be a balance between the number of agents ATF hired and ATF’s ability to adequately support those employees. He said that the SACs’ comments were in response to the large scale hiring that had occurred in FY 2005 and the “big hit” in resources such as vehicles and travel funds that the field offices took that year. He said that Truscott appeared to be taken aback by the presentation. Moreover, although Truscott told us that he had widespread support for continuing to aggressively hire new personnel going into FY 2006, an overwhelming majority of senior executives at Headquarters told us that they opposed the policy. Several of these senior executives, including budget officials from the Office of Management, stated that they had conveyed their recommendation to Truscott that he either not continue to hire so extensively, or at a minimum defer basic training classes and start dates until the end of the fiscal year. As noted above, in spite of recommendations to the contrary, Truscott scheduled several basic training classes in early FY 2006 before agreeing to cancel one of the classes after learning of a budgetary rescission in December 2005. After Truscott recused himself from decisions affecting ATF’s budget shortfall in early February 2006, the Deputy Director cancelled all remaining FY 2006 basic training classes. Domenech told us that it became apparent to him in late 2005 that ATF would be facing continued severe shortfalls in operational funds in FY 2006. Accordingly, in December 2005 Domenech instructed the Assistant Directors for each directorate to prepare an “Impact Statement” discussing how a 20 percent reduction in resources would affect operations during FY 2006. Domenech stated that the 20 percent figure was a reasonable “worst case scenario” estimate. The ATF’s Office of Management subsequently summarized the most critical points raised in each of the directorates’ statements. The January 2006 Summary, entitled “FY 2006 Allocation Levels – High Level Impacts” (Summary) stated that “ATF has had a significant base shortfall since FY 2003 and has had to make many difficult decisions to operate within resource levels.” The Summary then addressed key impacts of FY 2006 allocation levels, stressing a lack of sufficient funds for investigative equipment, vehicles, purchase of information and evidence, contractor support, training, and travel. Domenech told us that he personally gave a copy of the Impact Statements to Truscott on January 19, 2006, and reviewed the document with Truscott on January 23. Domenech said that Truscott reacted to the anticipated cutbacks by blaming the Assistant Directors for not properly managing their directorate budgets and stating that the Assistant Directors were “crying wolf” over the lack of adequate funding. According to the Summary, FY 2006 allocations for investigative equipment were “almost zero” and “[t]he lack of investigative equipment is becoming an agent safety issue.” The Summary stated that as a point of comparison, ATF spent $9 million on investigative equipment in FY 2002.22 According to the Summary, investigative equipment includes firearms, body armor, ballistic vests, electronic surveillance equipment, ballistic helmets, auxiliary weapons, and respiratory equipment, among other items. The Summary stated that ATF has “more than 1,000 vests that have either expired or will expire this fiscal year.”23 The Office of Field Operations Impact Statement indicated that the purchase of ballistic vests and other investigative equipment “will be substantially reduced or eliminated” due to the lack of funding. One SAC told us that the use of expired ballistic vests was a “significant issue.” He said he was not sure how many such vests were in his division, but said that he can guarantee that “quite a few” are. Another SAC stated that as of March 2006 some of his agents were using expired vests. A third SAC told us that he did not believe any of his agents had expired vests, but said there was a problem in the field securing funding for respirators for his investigators. An e-mail exchange on February 1 and 2, 2006, between officials within ATF’s Office of Management and the Technical Operations Branch indicated that at that time ATF agents were wearing expired vests, and more vests were about to expire. According to a Technical Operations Branch official, “The 404 vests sent out in 2000 have already expired and the 648 vests sent out in 2001 will expire this year.” Truscott told us that he felt very strongly about the issue of ballistic vests, stating that “the idea of buying anything at ATF instead of ballistic vests for our agents simply turns my stomach.” However, he also gave us somewhat inconsistent accounts of whether he was aware of any problems with ballistic vests. He first stated that “never since the day I got there has anybody ever indicated to me that ballistic vests were an issue of any sort.” He later conceded that in January 2006 he became aware that some of ATF’s ballistic vests “might expire at some point in the not too distant future.” Both the Summary and the Office of Field Operations Impact Statement, which were presented to Truscott in January 2006, stated that ATF had requested funds from DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund to purchase vests.24 An ATF senior budget official told us that the Administration authorized ATF to seek $4 million from the Super Surplus Fund for investigative equipment and “intelligence research tools”; however, documents indicate that the Attorney General approved recommending $2.5 million for ATF. Ultimately, ATF only received $1,367,000. The budget official told us that the money has been used to purchase critically needed investigative equipment.25 The budget official told us that enough vests have now been purchased to assure that ATF agents will have current vests through FY 2007.26 The Summary stated that no funds were allocated for vehicle purchases in FY 2006. It also stated that over 36 percent of the vehicles in ATF’s fleet had accumulated over 100,000 miles, which significantly increased the cost of vehicle maintenance. We learned from the Office of Management that ATF bought 297 vehicles in FY 2003, 319 in FY 2004, and 366 vehicles in FY 2005. ATF’s Budget Officer also confirmed to the OIG that, with the exception of eight vehicles bought to support the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), a moratorium was in effect as of June 2006 on the purchase of new vehicles in FY 2006. Domenech told us in July 2006 that ATF almost certainly will not be able to purchase new vehicles through the remainder of FY 2006. We asked Truscott whether ATF has an adequate fleet of vehicles, and he responded that he had been told by his staff that “our fleet is not inconsistent with other DOJ components.” He said that purchases of vehicles are generally made at the end of the fiscal year, as had been done in FY 2005, and that it was too early to tell whether ATF would be able to purchase vehicles at the end of the current fiscal year. When asked specifically whether, given the current constraints on the budget, he believed funds would become available at the end of the current fiscal year for the purchase of vehicles, he replied, “I don’t have any idea.” According to the Impact Statements, almost all the ATF directorates expected to encounter problems in funding contractor services, training, and travel. For example, the Office of Enforcement Programs and Services (EPS), which relies extensively on contractors to staff the National Tracing Center (NTC) and National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN), anticipated that cuts to its operating budget would “seriously reduce support to State and local law enforcement in pursuit of criminal investigations and jeopardize public safety.” The Assistant Director for EPS told us that, in fact, many of the problems forecast in the Impact Statement for his directorate are occurring. He told us, for example, that the NTC is not fully funded, and as a result it is taking longer to complete firearms tracing requests. The Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations (OPRSO) projected that its Inspections Division, which investigates allegations of misconduct within ATF, would be severely compromised in its mission because travel funds would be exhausted by March 2006. The Statement noted that 90 percent of its investigations require travel. Domenech told us that OPRSO is now deferring programmatic reviews and is sending fewer investigators out in the field to respond to misconduct allegations. The OPRSO Assistant Director told us that he reprioritized OPRSO’s budget to ensure that some funds would be available for limited travel. He also stated that $910,000 worth of security-related projects, such as installation of cameras, access control systems, and alarm systems in new field facilities have been deferred indefinitely. He stated that approximately $100,000 worth of security upgrades at existing facilities have also been indefinitely put on hold. The Office of Training and Professional Development (TPD), which supports mandatory and other training of all ATF employees, wrote in its Impact Statement that its proposed FY 2006 budget of $13.9 million was a reduction of almost 30 percent from its FY 2002 budget, yet there had been no corresponding decrease in hiring, mandatory training, and other mission requirements that drive training costs. The Assistant Director for TPD told us that to be able to fund the training for the new hires and the mandatory training for existing employees, he had to cut back on leadership training, certified fire investigators recertification, accelerant detection K-9 recertification, investigator training, and travel. He said that he also made tremendous cuts in mandatory training to state and local law enforcement personnel. In addition, a SAC told us that due to budget constraints, there has been no “out-bureau” training for the past couple of years. Finally, Domenech told us that ATF usually funds approximately 180 permanent changes of station (PCS) each year. However, he said that because of the decrease in available funds, he can only authorize approximately 90 for FY 2006. Although the issue of office space was not addressed in the Impact Statements, it was raised to Truscott during the November 2005 SAC conference described above. We interviewed several SACs about the current status of office space for their field divisions. Each told us that finding sufficient space for ATF field personnel was still a problem. They stated that some personnel were stationed in U.S. Attorney’s Offices and local sheriff’s offices, although they also pointed out that stationing ATF agents in non-ATF space was sometimes necessitated by ATF’s participation in Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).27 Truscott told us he was aware that some field divisions did not have sufficient space for their personnel. He said that hiring of personnel and expansion of space does not happen simultaneously. He added, “So in some cases, you may need to have people double up... and, you know, make the best of things until you can expand a little bit.” Truscott also stated that many ATF agents were located in non-ATF space, such as U.S. Attorney’s Offices and local police departments, because of ATF’s commitment to PSN. Truscott said that this arrangement may actually benefit ATF because ATF can use other agencies’ space “albeit not quite as nice space as we would like to have.” Truscott implemented a very aggressive hiring policy during his tenure, and in particular during FY 2005. The ATF hired approximately 950 new agents, investigators, and other personnel between the third quarter of FY 2004 and the end of the second quarter of FY 2006. During that same period, ATF separations totaled approximately 630, resulting in a net gain of approximately 320 employees between April 2004 and March 2006. During this same time period, ATF’s operating budget decreased by approximately $21 million. Truscott’s hiring policy was one of several factors that contributed to the decrease in the operating budget. Other factors included funding for ATF’s share of new Headquarters building construction costs (see Section II of this chapter) and an apparent error in the calculation of employee benefits for FY 2006. Truscott told us that his decision to aggressively hire during FY 2005 was supported by most senior managers, both at Headquarters and in the field. Senior managers said they supported this action initially, because ATF had not hired many employees in the preceding two years and needed more agents and investigators to fulfill its mission. However, we found that contrary to Truscott’s statements to the OIG, he did not have senior management support to continue the pace of FY 2005 hiring into FY 2006. Specifically, we found that Truscott was told repeatedly by senior budget and management officials that ATF could not continue aggressively hiring new agents and investigators without serious negative consequences to the operating budget. These officials presented the facts supporting this assessment to Truscott throughout the end of FY 2005, and most compellingly in a meeting on October 7, 2005. In addition, the Deputy Director of ATF warned Truscott against bringing in new classes of agents and investigators early in the 2006 fiscal year because doing so would unnecessarily consume salary and expense funds, thereby compounding the drain on operational funds. Moreover, during a November 2005 conference, the SACs told Truscott that the FY 2005 hiring was contributing to a shortage of adequate work space for field personnel and that Truscott needed to be mindful of finding a balance between additional hiring and making adequate resources available to support the new employees. Truscott rejected the recommendations of the Deputy Director, senior budget and management officials, and SACs that he not continue the robust pace of hiring during FY 2006. We found that Truscott was not responsive to the concerns and was at times dismissive of them. We concluded that Truscott’s hiring policies affected ATF’s ability to carry out its missions. For example, ATF’s capacity to purchase new investigative equipment, including ballistic vests, was constrained by diminished resources. In addition, we found that vital contractor services, particularly with respect to support of criminal investigations involving the tracing of firearms, have been reduced. We further found that many of ATF’s internal security upgrades and investigations programs have been deferred indefinitely, in part due to reduced travel funds. We also found that ATF has cut back on important training and recertification programs for its employees. In sum, Truscott’s decision to increase the size of ATF through aggressive hiring contributed to a decrease in funds available to support ATF operations. These reductions in funds for ATF operations were occurring at the same time that costs were escalating on the construction of the ATF’s new Headquarters building, in part because of decisions by Truscott. The next section of this report examines that issue. II. Design Changes to ATF’s New Headquarters Building
The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott was responsible for unnecessary design changes to ATF’s new Headquarters building, particularly in the areas of the Director’s Suite, the Joint Support Operations Center, and the gym. According to the complaint, these design changes have significantly driven up ATF’s share of the construction costs for the project. The complaint letter also alleged that Truscott prioritized the unnecessary design changes ahead of the purchase of vehicles and other critical law enforcement equipment. Finally, the complaint letter alleged that Truscott spent an excessive amount of his time and that of senior managers on the Headquarters project. This section provides a brief overview of the new Headquarters building project, including a discussion of ATF’s share of expenses to fund the project. It then examines Truscott’s involvement in the project generally, and his specific involvement in design changes to the Director’s Suite, the Joint Support Operation Center (JSOC), and the gym. Lastly, we discuss the events of January and February 2006, when ATF was advised to scale back the project, and the actions that were taken to mitigate the cost implications of Truscott’s design changes. In the wake of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, and under authority of the Anti-Terrorism Emergency Supplemental Act of 1995 and Executive Order 12977, ATF and the General Services Administration (GSA) jointly undertook a study of options for the relocation of ATF from its current headquarters at 650 Massachusetts Avenue in downtown Washington, D.C., to a more secure facility.28 GSA and ATF jointly conducted financial and security evaluations for over 80 occupancy options for ATF between 1997 and 1999. The agencies concluded that the option that would produce the best return on investment for the federal government would be to construct new headquarters rather than to lease and upgrade existing facilities. In 2000, Congress appropriated $83 million to GSA for construction of the new Headquarters, and ATF was given $15 million in funds from the Department of the Treasury’s Asset Forfeiture Fund for site acquisition. The site for the new Headquarters building was acquired from the District of Columbia government for $15 million in 2001, and the new building design contract was awarded to Moshe Safdie and Associates, a Boston architectural firm, in that same year. A groundbreaking ceremony at the site of the new Headquarters building was held on April 10, 2002.29 The design for the building and detailed plans for ATF’s use of the space were nearly complete by the end of 2002. Actual construction of the new building began in the summer of 2004. In early 2004, GSA sought to reprogram an additional $47 million to meet what had grown to be $130 million in anticipated total GSA construction costs. Congress approved the reprogramming request in early 2005. The Chief of ATF’s Space Management Branch told us that ATF was responsible for paying the costs of the new building design and layout requirements, and for the costs of any specific features ATF needed for programmatic reasons that were in excess of what GSA identified as necessary for “initial tenant build-out.” The Space Management Branch Chief said that the formula for GSA’s funding of the new Headquarters called for GSA to pay $33.00 per square foot of space and for ATF to pay anything above that amount. According to a senior ATF budget official, ATF’s share of the project covering design changes, security features, furnishings, equipment, and relocation expenses, will have cost approximately $90 million by the end of the project. This official told us that of this amount, $60 million has been funded through Congressional appropriations, leaving ATF to find at least $30 million in additional funds. The additional $30 million in costs was driven in part by construction design changes made after the plans for the new Headquarters had been drawn up.30 The New Building Project Office (NBPO) attributed some of the design changes to ATF’s internal reorganization after moving from Treasury to the DOJ. According to the New Building Project Manager, ATF’s move resulted in the loss of the alcohol and tobacco tax and trade regulation offices. This, coupled with the formation of the Office of Strategic Information and Intelligence directorate (OSII), resulted in significant changes to the layout of the new Headquarters. The project manager told us that the changes to the layout consisted mainly of reconfiguring walls, entranceways, and other features related to office space. One of the more significant modifications involved the JSOC, which is operated by the OSII directorate. However, as discussed later in this section, witnesses disputed the need for the changes to the JSOC even with the creation of the new directorate. Other design changes to the new Headquarters building, such as a redesign of the blast curtain in front of the structure, resulted from errors and omissions in the original design, or from unforeseen conditions at the site of the new Headquarters. Finally, some of the design changes, such as changes to the Director’s Suite, were alleged to be unnecessary or frivolous changes and were proposed or authorized by Truscott. We focus on those changes in subsection 3, below. ATF officials recognized that ATF would have to pay for any increased costs associated with deviations from and corrections to the original new Headquarters building plans. The Project Manager told us that Truscott was made aware within the first three to six months of his tenure that ATF would need to “take money out of hide” – meaning out of ATF’s budget – in order to pay for the design changes to the new Headquarters. Internal e-mails from ATF’s Office of Management in May 2005 reflect that Truscott was frustrated by ATF’s inability to get a reprogramming request for additional funding approved by DOJ in 2004, especially in light of GSA’s ability to gain approval for a $47 million reprogramming of its funds.31 The Project Manager told us that the Assistant Director for the Office of Management (who has since retired from the ATF) and Deputy Director Domenech had to explain to Truscott that ATF was “new to the Department [of Justice]” and that ATF would not be getting everything it asked for in terms of financial support for its new Headquarters. On June 16, 2005, ATF’s Office of Management submitted another request to DOJ to reprogram $13.5 million in funds from expired ATF accounts for use in funding the new Headquarters. The request was approved by the DOJ and subsequently by Congress in September 2005. A senior budget official explained that even after this reprogramming, ATF had to use money from its operational funds to cover outstanding construction and other costs remaining from the initial $30 million shortfall. This official told us that since September 2005 ATF had been seeking DOJ approval to reprogram another $8.3 million to replenish the operational funds that were being applied toward construction of the new Headquarters. In June 2006, officials in the Office of Management told us that it appeared unlikely the request would be granted.32 According to Domenech, Truscott had “set aside” $7.9 million from ATF’s FY 2006 budget to apply to this shortfall. The budget official told us that, in fact, Truscott had approved setting aside $21.4 million in FY 2005, but that with the $13.5 million in reprogrammed funds approved by Congress to be used toward the new Headquarters, only $7.9 million in additional funds was needed to cover the remaining shortfall.33 Domenech told us that he made clear to Truscott that the $7.9 million being set aside was coming from FY 2006 operational expenses. Domenech stated that Truscott responded by telling him that the new Headquarters project, along with more hiring, was “critical” for ATF. Many witnesses we interviewed expressed concern and frustration over the extent to which Truscott became involved in the new Headquarters building project. When Truscott arrived at ATF in April 2004, the design for the new Headquarters was complete and construction had begun. The Project Manager told us that Truscott met weekly with the New Building Project Office staff about the project, and that Truscott’s Executive Assistant, Chief of Staff, and often the Deputy Director would attend these meetings as well. Several Assistant Directors told us that they were not included in the weekly meetings until about January 2006, when it became necessary to find ways to cut costs (as discussed in subsection 4, below); however, they were often required to visit the new Headquarters site with Truscott, and the project was discussed occasionally at Senior Leadership Team meetings. Several senior managers and other officials were critical of what they described as Truscott’s excessive involvement in the project. The Project Manager, who has had extensive experience with other major federal government construction and relocation projects and who worked most closely with Truscott on this project, told us that Truscott’s involvement with the new Headquarters was more extensive than necessary. She stated when Truscott first arrived at ATF, he sought to familiarize himself with “core” aspects of the new building, such as gathering points, traffic flow within the building, use of space, and the adequacy of the restrooms in terms of size. She stated that some of his ideas on these areas were quite helpful, and that she was “thrilled at first” that he was taking such an interest in the project. She stated that her enthusiasm dissipated over time as she found herself having to spend a lot of time preparing to brief him on many details of the project. She said he was “inordinately involved and preoccupied” with the project and tried to “put his fingerprint” on every aspect of the building. She said that the areas of the project in which Truscott had the most input were the Director’s Suite, the JSOC, and the gym. Domenech said that Truscott was “obsessed” with the project and seemed to view the building as his “legacy.” Many other witnesses described the Director’s involvement in similar terms. One Assistant Director told us that Truscott was exceptionally “in the weeds” on the project. Another Assistant Director stated that Truscott was a “little too far down in the weeds” regarding the project and that there were other matters the executive staff would have liked to see him engaged in instead. A third Assistant Director stated, “[Y]ou almost got the impression he was building this for himself.” Several witnesses commented on the excessive amount of time they believed Truscott devoted to the project and, in particular, to his office suite. Of the numerous ATF officials we interviewed on this matter, only one witness, a senior official in ATF’s Office of Management, stated that he thought Truscott’s level of involvement with the project was appropriate. This official also said he would have questioned a Director who was not involved in the project. However, this official had not attended the meetings regarding the new Headquarters, and he did not have first-hand knowledge of Truscott’s degree of attention to the project. Another official who had attended several meetings concerning the project told us that although Truscott was “intimately” involved in the project, he saw the project as former Director Magaw’s legacy because it had been started under Magaw’s tenure. This official said that regarding the executive suite, Truscott would say that “this is for the Director of ATF, not Carl Truscott.” Several witnesses told us that Truscott was involved to some degree in virtually every aspect of the new Headquarters project. However, our review of Truscott’s actions focused on the three areas of the project identified by knowledgeable witnesses as being of the highest priority to Truscott: the Director’s Suite, the JSOC, and the gym. The Director’s Suite – Suite 500 – will be located on the fifth floor of the new Headquarters, and will encompass space for the ATF Director, the Director’s Executive Assistant and Chief of Staff, the Deputy Director, two administrative assistants, and two Executive Protection Branch (EPB) personnel. According to the Project Manager, the design for the Director’s Suite has undergone significant revisions since Truscott’s arrival in April 2004. Major structural revisions to the suite included the removal of an internal spiral staircase, which had been included in the original plan for security reasons and removed at Truscott’s request. The overall size of the suite was also enlarged to accommodate an increase in the staff to be located within Suite 500.34 The Project Manager, as well as another senior official in the Office of the Director, told us that these structural revisions were largely functional, not aesthetic, and were designed to facilitate “flow” within the suite. The Project Manager told us that even before Truscott joined ATF, a senior official in the Office of the Director who had been hired shortly before Truscott arrived told the New Building Project Office staff that the suite was “inadequate for an executive suite.” The Project Manager stated that when Truscott arrived, he also felt that the suite as originally designed was “inappropriate for an executive,” and that it needed to have wood finishes and other upgrades. The Project Manager said Truscott asked her many times, “So, before I came on board, the original design didn’t have any wood trimming, and the doors weren’t wood; there wasn’t anything in there at all?” In July 2004, Truscott began meeting regularly with the New Building Project Office staff, which included the Project Manager and other ATF employees, interior design contractors, and others involved with the building. Representatives from Moshe Safdie and Associates sometimes attended the meetings. One issue discussed at the meetings was where to locate an internal conference room within the suite, whether it should be located in the Director’s office, and whether to make it a secure compartmented facility. According to the Project Manager, there were “too many meetings to count” on this one matter. It was decided that a conference room within the Director’s Suite but outside of the Director’s office would be sufficient. In contrast, Truscott told us that the Project Manager repeatedly requested to meet with him about the Director’s Suite, stating that at one point they met “briefly.” Truscott said he recalled one meeting in particular in which he was asked several questions about his new suite. He said the meeting involved architect Moshe Safdie, the Project Manager, Truscott’s Executive Assistant, “probably” his Chief of Staff, and Domenech.35 Truscott characterized many of the decisions regarding the furnishing of his suite as originating with others, and he described his own role in selecting the furnishings as passive. For example, he said the conversation about bookcases and other items for his suite went as follows:
However, other witnesses said Truscott actively participated in detailed discussions about the interior furnishings and that he identified special features he wanted for the suite. For example, a regular participant in these meetings stated that Truscott and the group spent “hours and hours” going over the layout, the millwork, the built-ins, and some of the finishings in the Director’s Suite. This witness said that Truscott constantly suggested changes to the type of wood walls he thought were needed to display photographs. The witness said that Truscott specified that in his office he wanted a shelf for 14-inch books, a shelf for 12-inch books, and a shelf for displaying small items. The witness said Truscott also spent several hours discussing the pantry area adjacent to his office with the group, including what should be inside the cupboards and the built-in closets, where to store linens and silverware, how many drawers would be needed, and where to put the sink and refrigerator. Similarly, the Project Manager told us that the group “spent a lot of time [on] what’s wood, what’s carpet, what treatment is made for each of these areas.” She said that Truscott insisted on having “executive” style wood doors leading to his office, and asked that they be able to open and close by a remote control device. She said that executive doors are larger and more imposing than standard doors, and cost more than the standard doors in the original plans. The Project Manager also told us that Truscott wanted wood floors in his office. She said the specific style he preferred had been selected by the architect, and was modeled on the parquet wood floors in the ceremonial vice presidential office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. Domenech also told us that Truscott made known his desire for built-in bookcases, the wood doors, and wood floors. He also said Truscott re-designed the Executive Assistant’s desk so it would match the wood finish of the walls, and wanted the pantry room designed in a certain manner. In contrast, Truscott said that he did not specifically request built-in bookcases, but that “it was understood that they would be built in” based on what others suggested to him. Truscott told us that he did ask for wood floors, but said he told the others that he was not looking to spend a lot of money on it. He said that the Project Manager told him she would look at the prices and would let him know if they were reasonable. The Project Manager said the cost estimate for the wood flooring was $62,564. Truscott also denied requesting “executive” style wood doors leading into his suite. He stated that “there was discussion” about it, and that he merely agreed with the idea. Truscott acknowledged that it was his idea to install remote controlled doors in his suite, and that he suggested it after seeing a similar device in the office of the Commissioner for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. After reviewing independent government estimate and contractor estimate documents, the Project Manager told us that the millwork alone for Suite 500 cost $243,000.36 The millwork would have included five executive wood doors, matching chair rails, wood wall facing, and a wood table with leather inlay. Truscott’s requests and suggestions for upgrades to his office and the surrounding suite are discussed in numerous e-mails and other documents we reviewed. In August 2005, an interior design contractor with the New Building Project Office prepared a 5-page document entitled “ Suite 500 – Requests/preferences/requirements of Director Truscott.” (See Appendix B) The Project Manager stated that the document was the result of a “brain dump” from a big meeting the New Building Project Office had with Truscott, and that it listed everything requested or approved by Truscott that they were “supposed to design to in the Director’s office.” She said the list, which was intended to be shared with the architect and was not shown to Truscott, is an indication of how detailed Truscott’s requests were. The list includes 15 pieces of furniture for Truscott’s office, plus a detailed description of a wall unit and closet, window treatments, “formal entry vestibule,” a credenza with trash storage baskets mounted on retractable arms, and a “[f]lat panel TV monitor, approx. 42” diagonal – hidden when not in use.” In addition to the furniture, wood flooring, special doors and other accents in the Director’s office, the list included Truscott’s requests for other areas of the suite. For instance, the list includes several items Truscott requested for the Director’s bathroom, including “[t]elephone, TV flat panel and radio speakers to listen/view news,” quartzite tile floor to match the floor in the building atrium, a bench with a water resistant wood seat, tile wall “in horizontal straight stacked layout vs brick,” and sconces. Other than for the millwork and the conference table, no cost estimates were provided for Truscott’s list of requests and preferences for his suite. Truscott acknowledged to us that he did request a television for his new bathroom. With regard to the television for his office, he said the idea for installing a television in his new office was raised by others.37 Truscott said that “[s]omebody came up with a screen that somehow dropped away.... I wasn’t involved in those discussions.” The Project Manager told us that Truscott was the one who requested a television in his new office and that he wanted to be able to stow it out of sight when not in use.38 She said the architect interpreted Truscott’s request for a concealable television in his office by designing a hydraulic lift for the television, a feature which Truscott never specifically requested. The Project Manager also told us that the architect, not Truscott, selected a $65,000 conference table for the suite. Domenech told us that he and the Project Manager scaled down the cost of the conference table to one that cost $28,000. The list of Truscott’s requests and preferences also addresses furnishings in other offices within the Director’s suite. For instance, the list specified that the offices of the Chief of Staff and Executive Assistant were to have “Furniture style to match Director’s.”39 However, Truscott said that “others” decided that other offices within the suite would have built-in desks. He said there was “lots of discussion about the design” but that he did not make the decision. Truscott also stated that it was his understanding that all new furniture in Suite 500 was to be paid for out of approximately $675,000 that had been “set aside” from the 2001 budget for executive staff furniture.40 The Project Manager and other witnesses also told us that the cost of revising the design of Truscott’s suite was driven up by delays resulting from his excessive involvement. The Project Manager expressed frustration over the numerous lengthy and often “indecisive” meetings held with Truscott on the project. She said she believed the cost of the project was affected because of “the time that it took to make decisions and the level of detail that he wanted to get into.” She said that the New Building Project Office had a March 2005 “drop dead date” to submit all changes to GSA’s contractor, but that as of July 2005 “we were still talking about the Director’s suite.” She said that Truscott was warned in March 2005 that further delays would result in additional costs to the project and that he needed to finalize his decisions. She stated that Truscott did not listen when told about the need to make decisions and the cost implications of delay, and that he “never really responded” to those concerns. Domenech also expressed frustration about the meetings. He described one meeting in particular in which Truscott met for hours with the architect staff and the interior designers discussing fabric swatches, marble finishes for a conference table, wood finishes, and which type of leather would match the walls. ATF has a Joint Support Operation Center (JSOC) in its current Headquarters.41 The JSOC is run by the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information (OSII), a directorate that was created in 2003.42 According to a former senior official in the OSII directorate, the JSOC initially was “literally an answering service.” One Assistant Director of a directorate that routinely interacts with OSII also described the JSOC generally as a “call-in center” for law enforcement officers to call in requests to trace weapons or to reach the ATF “duty agent” for other information. The former senior OSII official said that Truscott took an interest in the JSOC after he arrived, and upgraded its mission to require staff to notify field offices of any critical incidents throughout the country. This official said that the JSOC staff now monitor several news channels, answer phones, and take reports of stolen explosives and firearms, among other tasks. The OSII Assistant Director told us that the JSOC is now designed to provide ATF and its federal, state, local, and international constituents with around-the-clock “situational awareness.” The former OSII official said that Truscott directed the OSII Assistant Director to upgrade the physical facility of the JSOC shortly after he was hired as Assistant Director for OSII in December 2004. The former OSII official described the facility prior to the Assistant Director’s changes as a conference room containing chairs pushed up against the wall and two televisions but no flat screen models. She said the Assistant Director’s changes consisted of taking down one or two walls, moving chairs around, putting up some flat screen televisions, and making it “much more operationally efficient looking.” An agency-wide e-mail announced that an “opening ceremony” would be held for the “newly redesigned” facility on June 1, 2005. The former OSII official said that after one meeting Truscott asked her opinion about the plan for the JSOC in the new Headquarters. The official told us that the design for the new JSOC looked very much like the JSOC in the current Headquarters prior to the renovations. She said it was designed to be outfitted with cubicles and that the space was “disconnected.” She said she told Truscott that if she could propose changes, she would start by removing some walls. The former OSII official said Truscott told her that he wanted her to look at other agencies’ operations centers and make recommendations to him about what the new ATF JSOC should look like. She stated that Truscott specifically asked her to visit the operations center at the U.S. Secret Service. She told us that she had already been to operations centers at the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the FBI as a result of her position in OSII. The former OSII official told us that her discussions with Truscott about the JSOC in the new Headquarters centered on Truscott’s “vision” for how the facility should look. She said that she and Truscott had “a lengthy conversation” about making the new JSOC look “like the 21 st Century.” She stated that one of Truscott’s objectives was to make the JSOC a place that could be shown to people. Domenech told us that Truscott felt that the original design for the new JSOC was “not elaborate enough” and that Truscott had said he wanted “a star wars type of center.” The Project Manager also told us that the JSOC was described to her as the “nerve center of ATF,” and that when people come to visit ATF, “they should be able to see our nerve center.” The former OSII official said that after she had seen several operations centers as instructed by Truscott, she met with the Project Manager and the architect. She said that the Project Manager and the architect told her that they had spoken with Truscott and understood that there would be some design changes to the JSOC. She said the Project Manager and the architect “weren’t happy” because everyone had already approved the design and new changes would cost additional money. The official said she told them that her only major proposal was to remove the walls. She said that the Project Manager and the architect came back to her with a proposal to move the entire JSOC to a different area on the same floor, thereby avoiding the need to remove walls. She stated that the decision to relocate the JSOC entailed relocating some OSII offices, but said she was not aware of the need to make changes to space in other directorates. The Assistant Director for Field Operations, however, told us that the revisions to the JSOC resulted in a net loss of space for his directorate. The Project Manager told us that other design changes related to seating configurations and audio-visual and other technical upgrades all came from the OSII directorate, and possibly from the OSII Assistant Director. The OSII Assistant Director also told us that when he first joined ATF in December 2004, Truscott told him to look at the plans for the JSOC “from a technical standpoint” to ensure that nothing had been overlooked. The Assistant Director told us that at that time, the plans for the new Headquarters were “98 percent complete.” He stated that he met with the Project Manager and the architect regarding the incorporation of secure communications capabilities in the JSOC. The JSOC will be located on the seventh floor of the new Headquarters building. From descriptions provided to us by both the OSII Assistant Director and the former OSII official, the JSOC, as revised and upgraded from the original design, was to have theater-style seating, with the supervisor or shift leader seated at the top. A video wall would have had 17 monitors to display various news broadcasts and closed circuit television channels simultaneously. The JSOC’s 15 workstations were each to have adjustable pneumatic desks, which, the OSII Assistant Director told us, was the architect’s idea. He said that typically staffing on each shift ranges from 3 to 6-7 people, and that the reason for having 15 workstations was to accommodate additional staff in the event of an incident. Millwork was also added to the JSOC reception area. The OSII Assistant Director also said that the JSOC will have a glass area through which people can view operations. He said he recalled something similar in the Secret Service Operations Center where “VIPs” could walk by and see how the “nerve center” is operating. He said it is an opportunity to showcase ATF. The senior ATF officials we interviewed provided a range of views as to why the JSOC design was revamped. The Project Manager said she was told that the JSOC had to be larger than originally designed in order to accommodate more people due to the upgraded mission of the facility. The Project Manager said she was also told that the JSOC “had to incorporate more of a theater style.” The Project Manager agreed with the characterization that the JSOC was primarily “for show,” and stated that “[a] lot of [the changes to the JSOC] were aesthetic, and I think that there’s some controversy as to what was necessary or not in terms of the size of it and the number of people.” Some witnesses questioned the need for the redesign to begin with. Domenech said that the original design for the JSOC “wasn’t going to look like star wars,” but was “functional.” Domenech stressed that ATF is “not an intel agency.” One Assistant Director described the JSOC as a very simple facility needing good telephones and access to databases. This witness said that “[t]he most important thing about a JSOC is having a trained staff that can run the damned thing. That’s where I think we’ve fallen down.” Another Assistant Director told us that the essential function of the JSOC as a point-of-contact for other law enforcement agencies had not changed and thus the redesign was unnecessary. Truscott told us that he did not “have anything to do with” the proposed redesign of the JSOC, including the increase in its size, the theater-style layout, and the electronic upgrades. He stated that the OSII Assistant Director worked out the design changes with the New Building Project Office. Truscott stated that his involvement with the redesign was limited to being briefed “after the fact” about the new JSOC. In contrast, the former OSII official stated that her task was to facilitate Truscott’s “visions” and “expectations” for the new JSOC. The official said that although she did not recall Truscott making specific suggestions, she discussed with him what the finished facility would look like in terms of having monitors, screens, chairs, and other features “in general.” The OSII Assistant Director said that other than Truscott’s request that he make technical recommendations, Truscott had no direct involvement in the revisions to the plans for the JSOC. However, he stated to us that after the former OSII official had visited other operations centers and had discussed the proposed revisions with Truscott, he heard that Truscott had told her, “Now you’ve got it.” Both the former OSII official and the Project Manager told us that Truscott was also involved in approving the design changes. The former OSII official said that after she reviewed and concurred with the architect’s proposals, the revisions were forwarded to the Office of the Director for approval. The official stated that this approval process occurred a few times. The Project Manager told us that the New Building Project Office worked with the OSII directorate, primarily the former OSII official, on the design changes to the JSOC. The Project Manager stated that she briefed Truscott on the design changes and discussed the cost of the changes with him. She told us that “he was concerned that it would cost something,” and that his attitude was one of “hoping it would all be paid for.”43 The former OSII official said that Truscott never spoke to her about limitations on the cost of her proposed changes to the JSOC. She said she was unaware of any budget constraints for the revisions or the cost of the proposed changes. She said that other than the Project Manager’s initial resistance to the changes due to the fact that the JSOC design had already been finalized and that changes would cost money, she had never been made aware of any budget concerns throughout the rest of her involvement in the revisions. Domenech estimated that the redesign of the JSOC, along with the associated changes to the seventh floor of the new Headquarters, cost approximately $1.5 million. The OIG was unable to confirm this figure, but it is consistent with GSA’s estimate.44 The gym in the new Headquarters will be located on the first floor. According to the Project Manager, Truscott was very involved with redesigning the gym and in selecting equipment for the gym. The Project Manager stated that Truscott is an “exercise fanatic” and that Truscott wanted to ensure there would be “adequate workout facilities” at ATF. Truscott emphasized to us that one of his priorities is to encourage ATF employees to maintain physical fitness.45 The Project Manager said that Truscott proposed minor structural changes for the layout of the gym. She said the proposals entailed moving a wall to expand the workout area and to reduce the size of the aerobics area. She stated that these modifications did not necessitate any additional changes to the overall design of the gym in terms of the heating and ventilation, electrical, or mechanical systems.46 Domenech also told us that Truscott “just didn’t like the layout” of the gym as it was initially designed and so he redesigned it. Witnesses we interviewed gave varying accounts of what Truscott directed regarding equipment for the new gym. The Project Manager and another senior staff member in the Office of the Director both stated that Truscott had insisted that all the equipment in the gym be new. The senior staffer told us that Truscott was “adamant” about having the new equipment. The Project Manager told us that Truscott thought the new Headquarters should have all new gym equipment, and that he intended to give the existing ATF gym equipment to the field divisions. Truscott said that when he had first been briefed about the gym, he was told that $100,000 had been “set aside already” for new gym equipment. Truscott said that he believed the $100,000 was still available, but that the amount would not be sufficient to buy all new equipment.47 He said that the plan for the new gym calls for using most of the existing equipment rather than buying all new equipment. Similarly, the Chief of Staff said that Truscott had determined that it would be too expensive to buy all new equipment; however, it is not clear whether the Chief of Staff was referring to a conclusion that Truscott reached only after ATF was forced to make cutbacks on the cost of the new Headquarters. Truscott acknowledged to us that he had asked the Chief of the Executive Protection Branch (EPB) and an ATF fitness center staffer to come up with a “comprehensive plan” for outfitting the new Headquarters gym. Several other witnesses confirmed that two ATF employees – an EPB official and a member of the fitness center staff – were responsible for compiling information on gym equipment and furnishings, and on options for the layout of the new gym. The EPB Chief responsible for compiling information on gym equipment and facilities told us that Truscott had not requested all new gym equipment. He stated that Truscott made suggestions for the new gym based on features he had seen in other gyms. The EPB Chief said he prepared a “cost benefit analysis” to evaluate whether the existing equipment would be adequate for the new Headquarters gym or whether new equipment would be needed. The analysis, attached to an October 14, 2005, e-mail from the Chief to the Project Manager and others, showed that buying all new equipment would cost $136,879, and buying only necessary replacement items would cost $79,683. The e-mail indicated that the analysis was prepared in contemplation of a meeting with Truscott. Domenech told us that a briefing and discussion on the new fitness center was held on December 12, 2005, that it lasted approximately one hour, and that between seven and nine people, including Truscott, attended. This meeting appears to be the meeting for which the EPB Chief had prepared the cost analysis. The agenda for the meeting reflects that subjects for discussion were the purchase of new equipment and the disposition of the existing equipment. Truscott told us that a “working group” decided to use most of the existing gym equipment in the new Headquarters, but he was imprecise as to when that decision was made. An interior design contractor with the New Building Project Office summarized in an e-mail to the Project Office staff the issues discussed at the December 12 meeting. According to the list, Truscott requested very detailed but relatively minor design changes to the gym. Certain items were listed as being at the “Director’s request,” including adding padding to the wall under the pull-up bars to protect the wall from scuffing; adding more mirrors to the weight room; adding telephones to several areas of the facility; adding a magazine rack to the wall outside the fitness center office; adding “framed inspirational photos of ATF athletic endeavors”; and “[c]onfirm soap dish or dispensers in showers.” Truscott’s Chief of Staff, who had attended the meeting, told us he recalled wondering why Truscott was involved in these discussions. According to Domenech, Truscott had also wanted “executive showers” in the gym because the Secret Service had them, but Domenech said he had told Truscott “no” to the idea. A senior staff member in the Office of the Director also recalled that Truscott had asked for executive showers. Domenech told us that in December 2005, ATF was in jeopardy of obligating funds it did not have toward construction of the new Headquarters building. Accordingly, he ordered the New Building Project Office to issue a “Do Not Proceed” directive to GSA with respect to certain non-critical design change orders. According to Domenech, the directive placed on hold ATF’s authorization to GSA to go forward with the change orders, which included the millwork in Truscott’s suite and in other locations, as well as certain modifications to the JSOC. On January 18, 2006, a staff member from the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Science, Justice, and Related Agencies told Domenech and other ATF officials that he had been receiving complaints that ATF was spending money on the new Headquarters building instead of on ATF operations. The Senate staffer then told Domenech and the others that ATF would not be permitted to use any FY 2006 appropriated funds to cover expenditures on the new Headquarters project. Domenech told us that after the January 18 meeting, he met with the members of the Senior Leadership Team, including Truscott, to brief them on his meeting with the appropriations staff member. Domenech said that the Project Manager was also at the meeting, and that he instructed her at that time to find and eliminate unnecessary changes that had been requested to the plan for the new Headquarters. Several Assistant Directors told us that they only became aware of upgrades to the Director’s Suite, the JSOC, and the gym during this and subsequent meetings. One Assistant Director stated that he was “outraged” to learn of the upgrades that had been requested for the new Headquarters and told Truscott at the January 18 meeting that the Assistant Directors were being “asked to bless decisions that had already been made.” By all accounts, Truscott’s involvement in the project changed in January 2006, after ATF was told not to spend FY 2006 funds on the new Headquarters. As one Assistant Director stated, “By the time we started discussing [rescinding the change orders], there seemed to have been sort of a change in the air.... [Y]ou could sense he was disassociating himself with... the building project because he had previously been ultra engaged in it.” On January 30, 2006, an official in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General showed Truscott a copy of the anonymous complaint letter that had been sent to the OIG.48 Domenech told us that within a few days of Truscott’s January 30 meeting, Truscott told Domenech that he was “recusing” himself from making further budget decisions, including those affecting the new Headquarters, and that he verbally delegated that authority to Domenech. When we asked Truscott whether he had ever expressly delegated budget authority to Domenech, he stated, “I think if Edgar cut something, I wouldn’t question it. I mean if I... heard about it and thought it was important, I might say something to him, but I don’t remember.”49 On February 14, 2006, ATF’s Senior Leadership Team met to view a presentation by the New Building Project Office on issues concerning funding of the new Headquarters and then to make a final determination of which items to cut from the project. According to the Project Manager, Truscott attended the meeting through the presentation, but left before the cost-cutting decisions were made by the group. One of the Assistant Directors at the meeting also told us that Truscott and his Chief of Staff left before the meeting concluded. After that meeting, a formal notification was sent to GSA to cancel the items decided on by the group. According to a March 2006 tally of “Do Not Proceed” items compiled by the New Building Project Office, a total of $1,375,186 was saved as a result of this effort.50 Items cut at that meeting included several displays in the building atrium and “entry promenade,” and a library. From the Director’s Suite, it was agreed to cut the millwork, the parquet wood flooring in Truscott’s office, televisions in Truscott’s and Domenech’s restrooms, the remote controlled door mechanism, and other upgrades. As described earlier, the millwork was estimated to cost $243,000 and the wood flooring $62,564. Truscott told us that he was never “made aware” that changes to the Director’s Suite “actually hadn’t been budgeted for yet.” He said that when he learned that the millwork cost “$283,000” he was “surprised, to put it mildly.”51 He stated that he was the one who pointed out the cost of the millwork to the executive staff and said that they did not need to spend that amount. Truscott said he made these statements at a meeting in January 2006. However, Truscott added that the Senior Leadership Team eliminated several other items after the millwork had been cut.52 Truscott also stated that he never went through an itemized list of the millwork. The Project Manager told us she was uncertain whether Truscott first was told the cost of the millwork in December 2005, when the first “Do Not Proceed” directive was sent to GSA, or in late January 2006, when the Senior Leadership Team began meeting to cut items from the project. However, the Project Manager, Domenech, and others told the OIG that Domenech, not Truscott, initiated the effort to cut items, including the millwork, from the Director’s Suite. The Project Manager also told us that even after the executive staff began to rescind the upgrades to Truscott’s suite, Truscott on two occasions asked her to try to keep the wood floors in his office.53 The executive staff also cut items from the JSOC. According to a March 14, 2006, memorandum from the New Building Project Office to the Assistant Director for OSII, “Do Not Proceed” orders were issued for eight flat panel televisions and support stanchions, other audio-visual equipment, desks, and millwork for the JSOC reception area. The total cost of these items was approximately $145,000. Domenech told us that the structural changes to the JSOC were not rescinded because it would have been more expensive to undo them at that point. Domenech told us that $100,000 worth of new gym equipment was also cancelled. However, according to a summary of costs saved as a result of the February 14 meeting, the New Building Project Office estimated that $75,000 would be saved by not purchasing new gym equipment. Domenech stated that in addition to canceling unnecessary change orders, the Senior Leadership Team also agreed to reuse their furniture rather than draw upon funds that had been set aside in earlier budgets for the purchase of new furniture.54 Domenech told us that approximately $3 or $4 million ultimately was saved as a result of all of these cost-cutting measures. He said that the executive staff was able to find additional money to cover the remaining project costs of approximately $4 million from “no year” accounts.55 An ATF budget official confirmed that ATF had met its obligation to fund the remaining shortfall through “no year” accounts, but noted that these funds would have been used for operational expenses if they were not applied to the new Headquarters. ATF was responsible for funding approximately $30 million in costs associated with its new Headquarters building. This sum included approximately $9.5 million for construction and the remainder for security, telecommunications and relocation expenses. In order to meet its costs on the project, ATF sought to raise money by securing approval to reprogram expired funds, internally reallocating operational funds, and ultimately by canceling approximately $1.3 million in proposed design modifications and upgrades, among other measures. We determined that the extra construction costs borne by ATF were attributable to several factors, including errors and omissions in the original design, changes to the layout resulting from ATF’s reorganization after moving to the DOJ from the Treasury Department, the creation of a new intelligence directorate, but also from optional upgrades. We concluded that the errors and omissions in the original design and the ATF reorganization were factors that largely predated Truscott’s arrival at ATF. However, some of the extra costs resulted from Truscott’s direct involvement in or influence over design changes and enhancements, including $245,000 in proposed upgrades to the Director’s Suite, $145,000 in upgrades to the JSOC, and approximately $75,000 in new gym equipment.56 We found that Truscott requested or approved these modifications after being fully and repeatedly advised that any modification or upgrade to the new Headquarters building would have to be paid from ATF operating expenses. With regard to the Director’s Suite, the evidence shows that Truscott invested considerable time in and attention to nearly every facet of its redesign, from fundamental structural issues to relatively minute aesthetic details. We concluded that Truscott had substantial and direct input into the selection of furnishings, millwork, bathroom tiling, fixtures, and other largely aesthetic features, particularly within his office. We based this finding on a comprehensive list of upgrades compiled by the New Building Project Office staff which purported to reflect Truscott’s stated requests and preferences for the suite, as well as on numerous accounts provided by witnesses who had attended meetings at which Truscott discussed his preference for the items on the list. Specifically, Truscott requested a more expensive style of wood doors for his suite and wood flooring for his office than contemplated in the original design, as well as matching woodwork throughout the suite, and certain other amenities such as a flat panel television for his bathroom and a flat panel television and remote controlled doors for his office.57 We found that Truscott did not select a $65,000 conference table for the Director’s Suite. We also concluded that although Truscott requested that the television in his office be concealed when not in use, he was not responsible for the elaborate hydraulic mechanism devised by the architect for this purpose, an upgrade that subsequently was cancelled. Truscott’s requested or approved design changes and upgrades to the Director’s Suite would have added at least several hundred thousand dollars to the cost of the new Headquarters building had some of his requests not been cancelled. The evidence was inconclusive concerning when Truscott first became aware of the precise cost of these requested upgrades. Truscott also appears to have spent an inordinate amount of time on redesigning his suite, including his weekly meetings with the New Building Project Office staff. We believe the time and attention he devoted to the aesthetic details of this project exceeded the investment of time to be expected of a director a major federal law enforcement agency. With regard to the JSOC, we found that Truscott had indirect involvement in but ultimate responsibility for the changes made to its design. We based our finding largely on the testimony of a former senior OSII official and to a lesser extent the Assistant Director of OSII, whose statements to us were supported in key respects by the Project Manager and others who were knowledgeable about the new Headquarters project. We determined that Truscott’s assertion that he “had nothing to do with” the redesign of the JSOC was inaccurate. While Truscott delegated much of the detailed decision-making for the redesign to a former OSII official, we found that he guided her in this process by conveying to her his vision and expectations for the final design. Truscott emphasized to that official and others that he wanted the JSOC to look high-tech and to be a showcase for visitors. He instructed the official and others to inspect other agencies’ operations centers, particularly the U.S. Secret Service facility. In addition, Truscott subsequently reviewed and approved the changes proposed by the former OSII official and the New Building Project Office. We cannot make a definitive conclusion regarding whether the changes to the JSOC were necessary to its functionality. We found a divergence of opinions by the witnesses regarding the role of the JSOC in ATF’s mission. Some told us that the JSOC was merely a communications center used to collect and relay information, and that it was adequate for this purpose as originally designed. In contrast, others said that Truscott wanted the JSOC to have an enhanced role in ATF operations, to include monitoring news broadcasts and providing “real time” information to relevant field personnel. However, we believe that Truscott’s interest in the redesign was focused more on the JSOC’s appearance than its function. With regard to the gym, Truscott asked the Chief of EPB and a fitness center staff member to investigate the cost of purchasing new equipment for the facility. We were unable to reconcile the witnesses’ conflicting accounts regarding the degree to which Truscott insisted on replacing existing gym equipment with new equipment, although witnesses’ statements indicate that Truscott, at a minimum, expressed an interest in purchasing new equipment. Truscott did ask for a wall to be moved to facilitate expansion of the workout area, although the cost of doing so was negligible. However, we found that, as with the Director’s Suite, Truscott was involved in relatively minor details concerning the gym, although it did not appear that he spent an inordinate amount of time doing so. Finally, we determined that Truscott was aware that the upgrades he requested and approved would have to be paid from ATF’s operational funds. As discussed above, he repeatedly was told that the upgrades he requested for Suite 500 and the redesign he authorized for the JSOC would have to be paid for out of operational funds. The Project Manager told us that she had advised Truscott as early as 2004 that changes to the existing design of his suite would result in additional costs, and based on what others said they told Truscott he knew those extra costs would have to be borne by ATF. The Project Manager also told us that she had warned Truscott in 2005 that his lengthy deliberations over the details of his office upgrades would further drive up costs. Similarly, Domenech stated that he had emphasized to Truscott that revisions to the design of the new Headquarters building would have to be funded out of operational expenses. Moreover, as evidenced by an internal e-mail exchange between Office of Management and New Building Project Office staff in May 2005, Truscott appeared to be frustrated by the fact that ATF had to pay a portion of the project costs “out of our own hide,” indicating his awareness at that time that there were unfunded expenses associated with the building. III. Other Construction and Renovation Projects
The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott ordered a major expansion and renovation of the gym at ATF’s current Headquarters, necessitating the relocation of several employees. He allegedly ordered the renovations in June 2004, just over two years before ATF was scheduled to move into its new Headquarters, despite being advised that the benefit of the build-out was extremely limited in light of the timing of the forthcoming move. The gym in ATF’s current Headquarters building was renovated in November 2004, two years in advance of the anticipated move to the new Headquarters. The gym was expanded by annexing adjoining office space. As a result of the renovation, four ATF contractors in the annexed office space were relocated to offices elsewhere in the building that were reconfigured to accommodate the move. Documents reflect that the cost of the demolition, minor construction, electrical, and painting work in the gym totaled $13,288; and the cost of reconfiguring and painting the new office space for the contractors totaled $2,261. The documents also reflect that in or about February 2005, a portion of a ceiling was raised in the gym to make more room to use a chin-up bar. The Chief of the Space Management Branch, the office responsible for projects such as the gym renovation, told us that Truscott made the decision to expand and renovate the gym and that Truscott “had a lot of input” into the project. He also said that the decision to proceed with the gym project was not reviewed or approved by other senior managers, as would be the case for more expensive projects.58 Truscott told us that he requested the changes to the current gym. He said that when he made this decision, the move to the new Headquarters was two years away. In addition, he said the contractors who were relocated as a result of the renovation did not really belong in that space “because they were kind of in the middle of the gym and there was vacant space that was bigger and nicer and had windows.” We asked whether anyone had expressed reluctance to undertake the renovations given that ATF would be moving in two years. Truscott replied, “No, I talked to the deputy director about it and I can’t tell you how thrilled the people have been.”59 Truscott stated that he typically uses the gym every morning. Domenech told us that when he spoke to Truscott about whether to go forward with the renovation of the gym, he stressed that it should be a “business decision” in which the cost of the work should be weighed against the benefit of the improvement given the limited time ATF was to remain in the building. Domenech said he never advised Truscott not to go forward, but made clear to Truscott that it was his decision. Domenech also told us that as a result of the expansion, several new treadmills and stationary bicycles were purchased at an estimated cost of $10,000. However, he said he believed the new equipment will be used in the new Headquarters. Two Assistant Directors we spoke with stated that the gym in the current Headquarters was adequate before the renovation and expansion project. However, Domenech stated that prior to the expansion, the gym tended to get crowded. None of the witnesses we interviewed about Truscott’s decision to expand the gym told us that they advised Truscott against doing so. We concluded that it was within Truscott’s discretion to determine that the expenditure of $16,449 was warranted for expansion and renovation of the gym at the current Headquarters building. According to the anonymous complaint, Truscott instructed the Budget Office to set aside at least $700,000 in appropriated funds for the design and building of gymnasiums and conference rooms at facilities into which ATF field divisions are relocating. ATF has subsidized gym membership for its employees in the past, which, according to the complaint, is more cost effective than constructing new gyms. According to the allegation, numerous ATF employees across the country either lack adequate workspace or are stationed in non-ATF space, and a more appropriate use of the funds would be to provide adequate workspace for these employees. ATF formed a Space Resources Board (Space Committee) in 2000 to examine the agency’s space needs.60 The Space Committee is comprised of Deputy Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director-level representatives from each directorate, and includes a SAC subcommittee. It meets twice a year to allocate funds for space projects. The Chief of ATF’s Space Management Branch told us that he, in consultation with the Space Committee, drafted an ATF Order establishing procedures and standards for the administration of ATF’s space management program. He stated that a SAC subcommittee made specific recommendations that the Order provide for building conference rooms and gyms for field division offices. According to the Chief, a draft of the Order was circulated to each Assistant Director and the Deputy Director for comment. The final Order became effective on December 21, 2004, after approval by the Senior Leadership Team.61 The Order provides that each ATF field division may have a training room of 3,500 square feet and large enough to accommodate 80 percent of total field division personnel. The Order states that field offices with more than 30 employees may have a 4,200 square foot physical fitness facility (defined to include a gym, showers, and lockers).62 The Branch Chief told us that Truscott was not involved in any of the meetings discussing the contents of the Order, and that he never briefed Truscott on the drafting of the Order. The Chief stated that neither Domenech nor Truscott was present when the Senior Leadership Team voted to approve the Order, although he added that “every major office within ATF” had signed off on it. Domenech also told us that each directorate had participated in developing the Order. Truscott told us that the Space Committee was already in existence when he joined ATF. Truscott said he “encouraged the dialogue” among the committee members to consider including training rooms and gyms in the Order, but that he did not participate in the decision-making process.63 He told us he supported the idea of adding training rooms to field division space as offices relocated because he found that the field divisions he had visited had inadequate space to hold meetings. He also said that the SACs supported adding training rooms and small gyms to the field divisions. The Branch Chief told us that the SAC subcommittee wanted more and larger conference rooms, and wanted the rooms to be multipurpose so that they could accommodate a Critical Incident Management Support Team (CIMST), if necessary. The Chief stated that the chair of the SAC subcommittee in particular was a strong proponent of the larger conference rooms. One SAC told us that his field division was preparing to move into new space when Truscott visited as part of his introductory tour in August 2004. He said Truscott viewed the new space while it was still under construction and that Truscott was concerned that there would be no space to hold a “town hall” type of meeting. As a result, construction was halted and the facility was redesigned to include a training room. The SAC said that the room added to the cost of renting the new facility, but that he is “tickled to death” to have it. No gym was added. This SAC told us he currently has major space problems in his field and satellite offices, and that his employees are sitting in hallways and are using U.S. Attorney’s Office and local sheriff’s office space. The chair of the SAC subcommittee told us that he proposed the idea of requiring build-outs for gyms in field division offices. He said that collectively the Space Committee agreed with him, but that only about half of the SACs agreed. He said that some SACs were opposed to building gyms because it would drain money from a limited pot of operational funds. The SAC subcommittee chair said that he was very outspoken on the committee regarding the need to build gyms and that he was unaware of Truscott’s position on the issue. The chair stated that the requirement for expanding training or conference rooms was less contentious because SACs considered these to be part of operations. The Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations told us that he believed the plan to incorporate gyms for field divisions as they relocated was not a prudent use of resources. He said that field division personnel can be given a subsidy of approximately $150 per year for gym membership fees. He said this practice was more cost effective than building gyms. Another Assistant Director told us that Truscott was told that it was more cost effective for the field to contract out for gym services, but that Truscott ignored this advice. The Space Management Branch Chief stated that some SACs are “extraordinarily supportive” of having gyms and others are “less supportive.” He said that if money were not an issue, he believed all SACs would rather have a gym than have a gym membership subsidy. The Chief said that the $150 subsidy was a “false number” because actual membership was usually more expensive, thereby forcing special agents to subsidize their own fitness plans. The Chief also said that Truscott told him he was a strong proponent of having gyms in field divisions. An amount of $750,000 was set aside in ATF’s FY 2006 budget to support the establishment of gyms and conference rooms in field office relocations. ATF’s Fiscal Year 2006 Balance Sheet (dated November 17, 2005) shows a line item of $750,000 for “Space Directive” listed under “Bureau Priorities.” Witnesses disagreed regarding who ordered the $750,000 to be set aside. The Space Management Branch Chief told us that Domenech was responsible for partitioning off the $750,000, although he said he did not know whether Domenech acted on his own or at Truscott’s behest. A senior budget official stated that she understood that Truscott ordered the set-aside and that he did so based on a comparison of ATF field division space to FBI, U.S. Secret Service, and other agency field space and his feeling that ATF lacked adequate training room, conference room, and gym space. Truscott told us that he never gave an order to set aside $750,000 to support gyms and conference rooms in the field. He said he did not “know anything about that dollar figure.” Truscott told us that the SACs were happy with the upgrades they would receive under the Order, but that “obviously, it was all based on whether or not there’s adequate funding” for it. Domenech told us that Truscott directed that $750,000 be set aside to purchase equipment for future gym and conference room build-outs in the field divisions. He stated that at that time the Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, and St. Paul Field Divisions were scheduled to be relocated. He told us that the money was specifically to be used for those projects, but that the New Orleans project is now “on a separate track” due to Hurricane Katrina. Domenech told us that building out the new field division space to the specifications in the Order would cost approximately $4 million.64 He stated that as ATF’s financial situation became difficult, one of the recommendations made to Truscott was that ATF curtail the build-out projects that had not already been initiated. Domenech said that Truscott rejected this recommendation because he felt that it was “inappropriate” and “would send a wrong message.” Domenech stated that during one briefing with Truscott in December 2005, a senior official in the Office of Management suggested that ATF apply the $750,000 to other needs, but Truscott strongly opposed the idea. The senior Office of Management official said that in January 2006 she suggested to Truscott that the space directive be revisited. She said that Truscott was visibly unhappy with that recommendation, and that he cited the need for “professionalism” in the field. This official stated to us that the Secret Service and the FBI have gyms in their field divisions, but noted that they do not have agents sitting in hallways as ATF does. Domenech said that because Truscott rejected the recommendation to cancel the build-outs according to the specifications in the Order, the construction and relocations for the Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia; and St. Paul projects have gone forward, and it is now necessary to purchase the equipment to furnish the new space. Domenech added that after Truscott gave him budget authority in February 2006, Domenech decided that $485,000 of the $750,000 will be used for conference rooms at those field divisions, but not for the gyms. He said the balance of the money will “go back to operational accounts to help us with our shortfalls.” The Space Committee was primarily responsible for authorizing field divisions relocating to new space to add or expand training rooms and gyms. The Space Committee was created years before Truscott’s arrival and was comprised of ATF representatives from all directorates and field divisions. The evidence reflects that Truscott supported the committee’s decision, but did not direct the decision-making process. We found that Truscott intervened in one field division relocation project in August 2004 by urging that a training room be built during construction of that field division’s new space; however, Truscott’s involvement was consistent with the what the Space Committee independently agreed to in the final December 2004 Order. As the Director of ATF, Truscott was responsible for the $750,000 set aside in the FY 2006 budget to equip and furnish gyms and training rooms in recently relocated field divisions. Our determination in part is based upon the statements of a senior budget official who told us that Truscott actively reviewed the details of ATF’s budgets until approximately February 2006 and was aware of each line item. Although the decision to authorize the gym and training room build-outs was collectively, if not unanimously, made by senior ATF managers both at Headquarters and in the field, we were troubled that Truscott did not revisit this decision when ATF’s budget situation worsened, as advised by Domenech and a senior Office of Management official. As Director, Truscott was responsible for prioritizing how available space should be used and how scarce resources should be deployed. We concluded that, in particular, allowing gyms to be built in new field division space while field personnel had inadequate workspace in other field divisions reflected poor fiscal management on Truscott’s part. Given the limitations on ATF’s budget for funding space projects, we questioned why Truscott would allow new gyms to be built. The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott ordered that a garage be built to house a National Response Team vehicle at ATF’s explosives training facility at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. According to the allegation, the vehicle was used solely for training purposes, and the cost of building the garage was an unnecessary expense at a time of extreme budget constraints. ATF’s National Center for Explosives Training and Research ( Training Center) is located at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. In December 2004 or January 2005, the Senior Leadership Team held an “off-site” meeting at the Training Center to discuss potential capital improvements at the site. Truscott, Domenech, all the Assistant Directors, and Training Center staff attended the meeting. Truscott toured the facility, which at that time consisted of two doublewide trailers, a garage for storing equipment, an explosives range, and downrange from the trailers and the garage, a picnic area with an overhang used to provide shelter for participants in training exercises during inclement weather. Among the proposed capital improvements under discussion at the meeting was the construction of permanent classrooms to replace the trailers. According to several witnesses who were at the meeting and took part in the tour of the site, Truscott noticed a National Response Team (NRT) truck parked in the open. National Response Team trucks are large vehicles used to support investigations and gather evidence at critical incident scenes. Several witnesses told us the trucks cost between $200,000 and $500,000, depending on the equipment with which they are outfitted. The NRT truck at the Fort A.P. Hill facility had been “contaminated” in New York City during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Witnesses told us that because of its condition, the truck could not be used for evidence collection and other response activities; however, it was operable and was used for training at the Fort A.P. Hill site. The witnesses said that Truscott told the Assistant Director for Training and Professional Development (TPD) that the truck should not be outside.65 Truscott told us that he asked about the truck and was told that it was kept outdoors. He said he was concerned about leaving it outdoors because NRT trucks cost about $200,000 each and he felt it should be protected from the elements. Witnesses largely agreed that Truscott told the TPD Assistant Director to build some kind of housing for the truck, but their accounts varied about what kind of structure Truscott told the Assistant Director to build. Truscott told us that he asked that an “enclosure” be built for the truck. Domenech said that Truscott instructed the TPD Assistant Director to build a garage for the vehicle. The Assistant Director for the Office of Public and Governmental Affairs (PGA) said he thought Truscott mentioned that he wanted a structure built for the truck similar to an equipment storage garage at the site. The TPD Assistant Director said that Truscott directed him to build a “structure” to house it so it would not be exposed to the elements. This Assistant Director also stated to us that although it would have been possible to move the truck into the equipment storage garage, Truscott wanted a separate dedicated building for the truck. ATF documents reflect that a garage was constructed for the truck at a cost of approximately $156,000, including $40,000 to run electricity to the building. However, Truscott told us that he did not intend that such an “elaborate” structure be built. He said when he suggested the enclosure for the truck, he was thinking only about “something that would at least keep the weather off” it. He said he had seen “enclosures” on the “side of the road” that sell for $895 and so he expected the structure he envisioned for the truck to cost $1,000. When asked whether he had conveyed this price to the group, Truscott stated, “Apparently, maybe not forceful enough.... I never had any intentions other than, you know, [building] something over the top of [the truck]. I learned about it after the fact.” We also asked Truscott whether he tracked the expense of building the garage. He responded “no” and again stated: “I learned about it after the fact that they had decided to build a more elaborate garage....” Truscott also stated that he did not know how the garage was funded. He said the funding was arranged “in coordination with the deputy and the ADs... that’s something that Edgar Domenech handled.” Ultimately, Truscott told us that he would accept “responsibility” for deciding to build a garage, “but not to build a $100,000 garage.” However, he said that he was not suggesting that the decision to build the garage was a bad one. He said it was something the Training Center personnel wanted and needed. In contrast to Truscott’s statements that he did not track the progress or cost of the garage construction, the TPD Assistant Director stated that Truscott told him that he wanted the structure constructed “right away” and that it was a “number one priority.” He said that Truscott also asked him to provide a cost and time estimate for completion of the project. The TPD Assistant Director said that at a second Assistant Director off-site meeting on January 24, 2005, he presented the plan for the garage to Truscott. The Assistant Director said that he told Truscott that it would cost $118,000 to construct the garage with an additional $40,000 needed to provide electricity to the structure. He said that when Truscott was told the cost, he responded, “We’ll find the money.” The Assistant Director said he did not recall Truscott ever telling him that the project was too expensive. The TPD Assistant Director provided us with the materials he said had been presented to Truscott during the second “off-site” at Fort A.P. Hill. The materials include a PowerPoint display showing an estimate for “Construction of NRT truck storage building” at a cost of $158,000 (including electricity).66 Another Assistant Director who was at the second meeting confirmed that Truscott was at this meeting and that the cost estimates for the garage were included in the presentation. The TPD Assistant Director told us that initially he had to figure out where to find the funds within his directorate’s budget. He said that subsequently the Office of Management came up with the funding. Domenech also told us that he had to work with this Assistant Director to find the money for construction of the garage. The TPD Assistant Director also stated that sometime in late summer 2005, as the garage construction was progressing, Truscott asked him for updates on the project and photographs of the structure. The Assistant Director said that he had to keep Truscott apprised of the progress because “that’s the way [Truscott] is.” He said that Truscott would look at the photographs and then hand them back to him. He said that Truscott also asked for photographs when the garage was completed. The Assistant Director also said that Truscott stopped at Fort A.P. Hill on his way back from Charlottesville to Washington, D.C., one evening in December 2005 to see the completed garage.67 The TPD Assistant Director stated that at the time Truscott ordered the garage to be built, the Assistant Director did not think the project was a good use of money and that he believed the funds could have been better used for other priorities. However, he also said the garage was a good idea because the explosives training personnel now have a structure at the range which they can also use for other purposes. As an example, he told us that when the weather is bad, they can pull the NRT truck out of the garage and hold classes in the new structure. The dual use of the garage is supported by a February 3, 2005, e-mail from the Chief of the Explosives Training Branch to the TPD Assistant Director, which states: “The building will act as a range classroom during adverse weather conditions....” Truscott also seemed to acknowledge that the structure was used as a classroom “when it gets cold and everything else,” as well as to store equipment. Truscott also stated that after the garage was built, the Training Center staff indicated that they had “always wanted to put a garage over at the range area.” We concluded that Truscott ordered the construction of the garage and, contrary to his assertions, he was informed about and approved of its cost. While it was within his discretion to do so, we agree with the TPD Assistant Director’s opinion that the construction could have been deferred to a later time because of other higher priorities, such as training and equipment. In addition, we were told that the structure, which by most accounts was constructed to shield the NRT truck from the elements, is used as a classroom during inclement weather. We therefore questioned whether the structure was the result of a well thought out capital improvement strategy for the Fort A.P. Hill site. The OIG was most troubled by Truscott’s account of his role in the construction of the garage. Several Assistant Directors and the Deputy Director told us that Truscott ordered a structure to be built to house the NRT truck, and that based on their recollection of the event, Truscott’s stated purpose for the request was to protect the truck from the weather. Truscott himself told us that he “asked them to look at some sort of enclosure” for the truck. However, he stated that he did not decide to build the “more elaborate” garage ultimately constructed. Moreover, Truscott sought to distance himself from the resulting expenditure of $156,000 by claiming that he had only contemplated spending $1,000. When asked whether he “tracked the expense” of the garage, Truscott twice stated he had only learned about it “after the fact.” However, the TPD Assistant Director told us that Truscott requested a cost estimate of the project in advance of the construction. He and another Assistant Director told us that materials containing the cost estimate of the garage were presented to Truscott during an “off-site” meeting at Fort A.P. Hill in late January 2005, several months before the purchase order for the garage had been executed. According to the TPD Assistant Director, Truscott stated “We’ll find the money” when told how much construction of the garage would cost, indicating that he knew the cost of the project. Further, the TPD Assistant Director told us that Truscott had asked for photographs of the garage to monitor the progress of the construction. The evidence shows that Truscott not only was aware of the projected cost of the garage, but was interested enough in the construction to have requested updates from the TPD Assistant Director on its progress. The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott expanded the scope of a feasibility study of the relocation of ATF’s Federal Firearms Licensing Center (FFLC) beyond that required by Congress by ordering that the feasibility study also include adding a gym, increasing the size of the Joint Support Operations Center and Continuity of Operations Center, and building a Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility. According to the allegation, the feasibility study cost $250,000, portions of which were unnecessary. As part of ATF’s general appropriations in FY 2005, Congress included an earmark of $5.6 million for “the construction and establishment of the Federal Firearms Licensing Center at the [ATF] National Tracing Center....” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, H.R. 4818. The legislation required that ATF’s Federal Firearms Licensing Center (FFLC), currently in Atlanta, Georgia, be relocated to ATF’s National Tracing Center (NTC) in Martinsburg, West Virginia.68 The GSA conducted a study to determine the feasibility of the relocation of the FFLC and the expansion of ATF’s National Tracing Center in West Virginia. A GSA contractor was awarded the contract to perform the feasibility study in June 2005 and the study was completed in September 2005. According to the “Summary of Project Objectives” in the feasibility study, ATF asked the study team to include within the scope of the study possible expansion at the site of other critical functions, including the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Center, the JSOC, and the Secure Compartmentalized Information facility (SCIF). The feasibility study produced four alternative expansion scenarios, ranging in cost from $5.37 million to $22.4 million. The more expensive alternatives included expansion of the COOP and JSOC and included construction of a SCIF. The feasibility study did not include a gym. The Space Management Branch is actively involved in the relocation project. The Branch Chief told us that Truscott never spoke with him directly about expanding the feasibility study to include the COOP, JSOC, and SCIF enhancements.69 The Branch Chief said that the requests for these features came from Deputy Assistant Director-level managers within directorates that had an interest in the Martinsburg facility. He told us that the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations staff requested that the COOP facility be enlarged and include an office for the Dire |