



WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
September 3, 2004 — Issue 4

This newsletter is a collaborative effort of the Northern District of Alabama's United States Attorney's Office Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Group (FIG)

WARNING: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities.

Report all suspicious terrorist activities to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) at the Birmingham Federal Bureau of Investigation

(205)326-6166



Priority Intelligence Requirement
Of the Week # 3



FBI Intelligence Bulletin
#142, 143, 144 and 145



Home Land Security
Threat Advisory

SLATT TRAINING APPLICATIONS
BIRMINGHAM FLORENCE
A.P.O.S.T.C. Credit—7 Hours C.E.U.



- ➔ **FBI Intelligence Assessments**
 - ➔ **Identity Theft Used for "Legal" Employment by Illegal Aliens**
 - ➔ **Southern California Check Fraud Ring Targets Construction Companies**
 - ➔ **Concerns Surrounding the Anniversary of Paul Hill's Execution**
- ➔ **Officer Safety**
 - ➔ **Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004**
 - ➔ **Improvised Explosive Devices**
- ➔ **Possible Sabotage to Railroad Track Switches**
 - ➔ **Indicators of Suspicious Activities on Railways**
- ➔ **Storage Facilities—Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity**
- ➔ **NOTABLE INCIDENTS**
- ➔ **RECENT EVENTS IN REGION 4 (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN)**
- ➔ **LETTER TO ATAC MEMBERS REGARDING SCHOOL SAFETY**

If you have any questions regarding this newsletter, please contact Terri Phillips at (205) 244-2228
(RETURN TO HOME PAGE)



The Seven Intelligence Requirements From FBI Headquarters (U//LES)

(U//LES) Requirement One (1): Identify any persons of investigative concern who may be in place to facilitate an attack.

(U//LES) Requirement Two (2): Identify any persons of investigative concern who may possess a commercial driver's license (CDL) with authority to transport hazardous materials (HAZMAT). Identify any suspicious activity related to the transport of hazardous materials.

U//LES) Requirement Three (3): Identify any purchases or modifications of heavy vehicles by or for any persons of investigative concern. (Heavy vehicles may include ambulances, buses, vans, postal vehicles, armored cars or utility vehicles.)

(U//LES) Requirement Four (4): Identify any persons of investigative concern who are interested in the purchase of airplanes (full-size or model), rockets or electronic components that could be used in the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

(U//LES) Requirement Five (5): Identify any persons of investigative concern soliciting assistance from or in contact with Islamic extremist organizations. (Consult with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) for the identification of extremist organizations.)

(U//LES) Requirement Six (6): Identify any persons of investigative concern who may have traveled to or from, and/or had regular contact with others in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen within the past two years.

(U//LES) Requirement Seven (7): Identify any suspected surveillance activities of potential targets for attack.



(U//LES) Requirement Three (3): Identify any purchases or modifications of heavy vehicles by or for any persons of investigative concern. (Heavy vehicles may include ambulances, buses, vans, postal vehicles, armored cars or utility vehicles.)

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 142

[\(Return to Home Page\)](#)

TITLE: POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES OF U.S. DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES TO INSIDER TERRORISM

DATE: AUGUST 23, 2004

THIS IS A JOINT FBI AND DHS BULLETIN--STANDARD DISSEMINATION.

THREAT LEVEL: ON AUGUST 1, 2004, THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM (HSAS) LEVEL FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTORS IN NEW YORK CITY, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AND WASHINGTON, D.C., WERE RAISED FROM YELLOW-ELEVATED TO ORANGE-HIGH. THE THREAT LEVEL FOR THE REST OF THE NATION REMAINS AT YELLOW-ELEVATED.

THE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN PROVIDES LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH CURRENT, RELEVANT TERRORISM INFORMATION DEVELOPED FROM COUNTERTERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS AND ANALYSIS. THE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOES NOT CONTAIN THREAT WARNING INFORMATION.

HANDLING NOTICE: RECIPIENTS ARE REMINDED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN IS DESIGNATED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" AND SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT CIRCLES.

THE FOLLOWING BULLETIN WAS DISSEMINATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ON AUGUST 11, 2004, AND IS BEING PROVIDED TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY AS REFERENCE.

POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES OF U.S. DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES TO INSIDER TERRORISM
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 142, AUGUST 23, 2004

ALTHOUGH DHS AND FBI HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT IDENTIFIES A CURRENT CREDIBLE THREAT TO U.S. DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES, WATER UTILITY OWNERS AND OPERATORS SHOULD BE AWARE OF POTENTIAL TERRORIST THREATS TO FACILITIES' PHYSICAL AND CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TERRORIST THREATS TO U.S. DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES, PLEASE REFER TO AN EXPANDED VERSION OF THIS BULLETIN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLINE (LEO). LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL INTERESTED IN REQUESTING A LEO ACCOUNT MAY CALL 202-324-8833.

FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES SHOULD REMAIN VIGILANT TO POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF PRE-OPERATIONAL

PLANNING, SUCH AS TARGETING INFRASTRUCTURE AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES. INFORMATION ON SUSPICIOUS OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES POTENTIALLY RELATED TO U.S. DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT FACILITIES AND TERRORISM SHOULD BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY TO THE LOCAL FBI JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE-- THE FBI REGIONAL PHONE NUMBERS CAN BE FOUND ONLINE AT [HTTP://WWW.FBI.GOV/CONTACT/FO/FO.HTM](http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm) --AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER (HSOC). THE HSOC CAN BE REACHED VIA TELEPHONE AT 202-282-8101 OR BY EMAIL AT HSCENTER@DHS.GOV.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FBI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. NO PORTION OF THIS BULLETIN SHOULD BE RELEASED TO THE MEDIA, THE GENERAL PUBLIC OR OVER NON- SECURE INTERNET SERVERS. RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OR JEOPARDIZE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES. SPECIFIC COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE CONTENT OR FORMAT OF THIS BULLETIN CAN BE PROVIDED TO LESC@LEO.GOV.

END TRANSMISSION ([Return to Home Page](#))



INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 143

Title: Potential Terrorist Threat to Department of Veterans Affairs Hospitals

Date: August 26, 2004 ([Return to Home Page](#))



THIS IS A JOINT FBI AND DHS BULLETIN.

THREAT LEVEL: ON AUGUST 1, 2004, THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM (HSAS) LEVEL FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTORS IN NEW YORK CITY, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AND WASHINGTON, D.C., WAS RAISED FROM YELLOW-ELEVATED TO ORANGE-HIGH. THE THREAT LEVEL FOR THE REST OF THE NATION REMAINS AT YELLOW-ELEVATED.

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**Potential Terrorist Threat to Department of Veterans Affairs Hospitals
Intelligence Bulletin No. 143, August 26, 2004**

OVERVIEW

In light of the current threat environment and Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups' history of attacking symbolic targets, this Bulletin is being issued to alert recipients to the potential for terrorist attacks against military targets in the United States, particularly soft targets such as Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. These facilities may be considered attractive targets due to their association with the military and a perception that such an attack may be more successful than an attack against traditional military targets, which generally maintain a more robust security posture.

DETAILS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stress that they are currently unaware of any credible information indicating a specific terrorist threat to VA hospitals in the United States. However, there have been reports of suspicious activity concerning U.S. military medical facilities in general, including reports in 2004 of possible

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reconnaissance activities at facilities in Bethesda, Maryland, and Aurora, Colorado. Although investigations of these incidents have revealed no links to terrorist activity, law enforcement, security personnel and Department of Veterans Affairs Chiefs of Police should be alert to indicators of similar surveillance activities at VA hospitals and other key facilities.

The following activities may suggest terrorist surveillance, particularly when they are observed at or near key facilities such as government, military, utility or other high profile sites. Alone, each indicator can result from legitimate recreational or commercial activities or criminal activity not related to terrorism; however, multiple indicators combined with other information can possibly suggest a terrorist threat:

- Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points and access controls or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls.
- Unusual behavior such as staring or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving designated facilities or parking areas.
- Observation of security reaction drills or procedures.
- Increase in anonymous telephone or e-mail threats to facilities in conjunction with suspected surveillance incidents--indicating possible surveillance of threat reaction procedures.
- Foot surveillance involving two or three individuals working together.
- Mobile surveillance using bicycles, scooters, motorcycles, cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles, limousines, boats or small aircraft.
- Prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, shoe shiners, food or flower vendors, news agents or street sweepers not previously seen in the area.
- Discreet use of still cameras, video recorders or note taking at non-tourist locations.
- Use of multiple sets of clothing and identification or the use of sketching materials (paper, pencils, etc.).
- Questioning of security or facility personnel.

Law enforcement agencies, security personnel and Department of Veterans Affairs Chiefs of Police should be aware of the potential terrorist threat to soft targets such as VA hospitals and remain alert to indicators of terrorist surveillance. Law enforcement officers are encouraged to maintain liaison with VA hospitals in their respective jurisdictions and ask personnel to report suspicious activities.

Information on suspicious or criminal activities potentially related to terrorism should be forwarded immediately to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force--the FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm>--and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The HSOC can be reached via telephone at 202-282-8101

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or by email at HSCenter@dhs.gov.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 144

Title: Possible Al-Qaeda Interest in Targeting Highly Populated Public Areas in Large U.S. Cities Prior to November Elections

Date: August 27, 2004 ([Return to Home Page](#))



THIS IS A JOINT FBI AND DHS BULLETIN.

THREAT LEVEL: ON AUGUST 1, 2004, THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM (HSAS) LEVEL FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTORS IN NEW YORK CITY, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AND WASHINGTON, D.C., WAS RAISED FROM YELLOW-ELEVATED TO ORANGE-HIGH. THE THREAT LEVEL FOR THE REST OF THE NATION REMAINS AT YELLOW-ELEVATED.

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**Possible Al-Qaeda Interest in Targeting Highly Populated Public Areas in Large U.S. Cities Prior to November Elections
Intelligence Bulletin No. 144, August 27, 2004**

As indicated in recent Intelligence Bulletins, Al-Qaeda may be interested in conducting terrorist attacks in the United States prior to the November 2004 elections. Recent intelligence suggests Al-Qaeda may still be planning an attack, possibly targeting highly populated public areas in large U.S. cities, in the weeks immediately prior to the elections. Although the FBI and DHS possess no further, specific information identifying targets, tactics or locations for operations, law enforcement officials should be alert to potential indicators of terrorist planning.

The following indicators may suggest possible terrorist planning, particularly when they are observed at or near key facilities such as government, military, utility or other high profile sites. Alone, each indicator can result from legitimate recreational or commercial activities or criminal activity not related to terrorism; however, multiple indicators combined with other information can suggest a terrorist threat.

Surveillance and probing of potential targets is consistent with known practices of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that seek to maximize the likelihood of operational success through

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careful planning. Possible indicators of surveillance include:

- Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points and access controls or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls.
- Unusual behavior such as staring or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving designated facilities or parking areas.
- Observation of security reaction drills or procedures.
- Increase in anonymous telephone or e-mail threats to facilities in conjunction with suspected surveillance incidents--indicating possible surveillance of threat reaction procedures.
- Foot surveillance involving two or three individuals working together.
- Mobile surveillance using bicycles, scooters, motorcycles, cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles, limousines, boats or small aircraft.
- Prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, shoe shiners, food or flower vendors, news agents or street sweepers not previously seen in the area.
- Discreet use of still cameras, video recorders or note taking at non-tourist locations.
- Use of multiple sets of clothing and identification or the use of sketching materials (paper, pencils, etc.).

The following indicators may suggest logistical planning for terrorist attacks:

- Attempts to gain sensitive information regarding key facilities or personnel through personal contact or by telephone, mail or e-mail.
- Attempts to penetrate or test physical security/response procedures at key facilities.
- Attempts to improperly acquire explosives, weapons, ammunition, dangerous chemicals, flight manuals or other materials which could be used in a terrorist attack.
- Suspicious or improper attempts to acquire official vehicles, uniforms, badges, access cards or identification for key facilities.
- Presence of individuals who do not appear to belong in the workplace, business establishment or near a key facility.
- Behavior which appears to denote planning for terrorist activity, such as mapping out routes, playing out scenarios, monitoring key facilities and timing traffic flow or signals.
- Stockpiling suspicious materials or abandoning potential containers for explosives (e.g., vehicles or suitcases).

Law enforcement officers should remain alert to potential indicators of pre-operational surveillance and planning activities. Information on suspicious or criminal activities potentially related to terrorism should be forwarded immediately to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force--the FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at

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<http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm>--and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The HSOC can be reached via telephone at 202-282-8101 or by email at HSCenter@dhs.gov.

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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 145

Title: Potential for Terrorist Use of Sodium Azide

Date: September 1, 2004 ([Return to Home Page](#))



THIS IS A JOINT FBI AND DHS BULLETIN--STANDARD DISSEMINATION.

THREAT LEVEL: ON AUGUST 1, 2004, THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM (HSAS) LEVEL FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTORS IN NEW YORK CITY, NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AND WASHINGTON, D.C., WAS RAISED FROM YELLOW-ELEVATED TO ORANGE-HIGH. THE THREAT LEVEL FOR THE REST OF THE NATION REMAINS AT YELLOW-ELEVATED.

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**Potential for Terrorist Use of Sodium Azide
Intelligence Bulletin No. 145, September 1, 2004**

Sodium azide, an odorless white solid chemical best known for its use in automobile airbags, is readily available and familiar to terrorists for its toxic and explosive properties. Although the FBI and DHS possess no specific information indicating terrorists plan to use sodium azide in an attack against the United States, law enforcement agencies should be aware of the threat posed by sodium azide and the ease with which it can be obtained.

For further information on the potential for terrorist use of sodium azide, please refer to an expanded version of this Bulletin on Law Enforcement Online (LEO). Law enforcement personnel interested in requesting a LEO account may call 202-324-8833.

In any case where chemicals such as sodium azide are encountered in an investigation with a potential terrorism nexus, investigators should notify both the bomb squad and the hazardous materials units in their jurisdiction. Due to the toxic and explosive properties of sodium azide, this material should only be assessed and handled by trained personnel.

Information on suspicious or criminal activities potentially related to terrorism should be

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forwarded immediately to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force--the FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm>--and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The HSOC can be reached via telephone at 202-282-8101 or by email at HSCenter@dhs.gov.

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***U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Northern District of Alabama
ATAC
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council***

Date: September 30, 2004

To: Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Members and Invited Guests

From: Alice H. Martin
United States Attorney Northern District of Alabama

Subject: State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT)

Location: Municipal Center (See attached map.)
100 Municipal Drive
Hoover, AL 35216
Phone: (205) 444-7500

*****A. P. O. S. T. C. Credit - 7 Hours C.E.U.*****

The Northern District of Alabama United States Attorney's Office is sponsoring The Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) who will be presenting State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) at the Municipal Center located at 100 Municipal Drive, Hoover, Alabama 35216. This training will be held Thursday, September 30, 2004. This packet will provide training information, a tentative agenda, and a training pre-registration form for your attendance.

Training check-in will be at the Hoover Municipal Center on Thursday, September 30, 2004 between 7:30 and 8:00 am. The training begins at 8:00 and concludes at 4:00 pm.

Please forward the pre-registration form to: *Terri Phillips, U.S. Attorney's Office, 1801 4th Avenue North, Birmingham, Alabama 35203, Phone: (205)244-2228, Fax: (205) 244-2177 no later than Wednesday, September 29, 2004.*

We hope that you will make your plans now to attend this training. Should you have any questions, please contact Terri Phillips at the phone number above. We look forward to seeing you in Hoover!



U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Northern District of Alabama
ATAC
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council

TRAINING REGISTRATION FORM

State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT)

Thursday, September 30, 2004

Municipal Center, Hoover, Alabama

**PLEASE COMPLETE AND SEND THIS FORM DIRECTLY TO THE
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE TO:**

*Terri Phillips
U.S. Attorney's Office
1801 4th Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
Fax: (205) 244-2177
Phone: (205) 244-2228*

NAME(S)	TITLE	E-MAIL ADDRESS
AGENCY/DEPARTMENT:		
BUSINESS STREET ADDRESS:		
CITY, STATE, ZIP:		
TELEPHONE NUMBER:		
FAX NUMBER:		



**STATE AND LOCAL
ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING
(SLATT)
HOOVER, ALABAMA
SEPTEMBER 30, 2004**

TENTATIVE AGENDA

7:30 - 8:00 am

Check-in

8:00 - 10:00 am

Religious Terrorism (emphasizes the understanding of religious terrorists' culture in order to recognize indicators)

Dr. Jonathan White

10:00 - 12:00 pm

Recognizing Terrorist Indicators and Warning Signs (emphasizes recognizing indicators of both international and domestic terrorists)

Mr. Richard Marquise

12:00 - 1:00 pm


Lunch (On Your Own)

1:00 - 4:00 pm

Explosives, Suicide Bombers, and Officer Safety (includes many different aspects of explosives that will aid law enforcement in determining possible terrorist attacks)

Mr. Jerry Taylor

Municipal Center
100 Municipal Drive
Hoover, AL 35216
Phone: (205) 444-7500



DIRECTIONS

From Birmingham: Take I-65 South to I-459 (Exit 250). Take I-459 West (Toward Tuscaloosa) and get off at first exit Hoover/Pelham– Highway 31 (Exit 13). Turn right, go to first stop light (Municipal Drive) and turn right. Municipal Center is first building on right. ([Return to Home Page](#))



STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING (SLATT)



Date: September 28, 2004

To: Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Members and Invited Guests

From: United States Attorney Northern District of Alabama
University of North Alabama Police Department

Subject: State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT)

Location: Guillot University Center (See attached map - Building #25)
University of North Alabama
Florence, AL 35632
Phone: (256)765-4357

*****A. P. O. S. T. C. Credit - 7 Hours C.E.U.*****

The Northern District of Alabama United States Attorney's Office and The University of North Alabama Police Department are co-sponsoring The Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), who will be presenting State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) at the Guillot University Center on the campus of the University of North Alabama in Florence, Alabama. This training will be held Tuesday, September 28, 2004. This packet will provide training information, a tentative agenda, and a training pre-registration form for your attendance.

Training check-in will be at the Guillot University Center on Tuesday, September 28, 2004 between 8:00 and 8:30 am. The training begins at 8:30 and concludes at 4:30 pm. It is highly recommended you arrive early - **PARKING IS LIMITED.**

The training provided by IIR is free. However, the University of North Alabama will be providing refreshments during the day, as well as lunch, for each participant for \$15.00 per student.

Please forward the pre-registration form to: *Sgt. Bobby Inman, University of North Alabama Police Department, Attn: SLATT, Box 5067, Florence, AL 35630, Phone: (256)765-4357, Fax: (256) 765-4827 no later than Thursday, September 23, 2004.*

We hope that you will make your plans now to attend this training. Should you have any questions, please contact Sgt. Bobby Inman at the phone number above. We look forward to seeing you in Florence!



**STATE AND LOCAL
ANTI-TERRORISM
TRAINING
(SLATT)**



TRAINING REGISTRATION FORM

*State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT)
Tuesday, September 28, 2004
Guillot University Center, University of North Alabama
Florence, Alabama*

Checks and Purchase Orders should be made out to
University of North Alabama Police Department.

PLEASE MAIL OR FAX REGISTRATION TO:

*University of North Alabama Police Department
Attn: SLATT
Box 5067
Florence, AL 35630
Fax: (256) 765-4827
Phone: (256) 765-4357*

NAME(S)	TITLE	E-MAIL ADDRESS
AGENCY/DEPARTMENT:		
BUSINESS STREET ADDRESS:		
CITY, STATE, ZIP:		
TELEPHONE NUMBER:		
FAX NUMBER:		



STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING (SLATT)




TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR UNIVERSITY OF NORTH ALABAMA SEPTEMBER 28, 2004

- | | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8:00 - 8:30 am | <i>Check-in</i> |
| 8:30 - 10:30 am | Religious Terrorism (emphasizes the understanding of religious terrorists' culture in order to recognize indicators)
<i>Dr. Jonathan White</i> |
| 10:30 - 12:30 pm | Recognizing Terrorist Indicators and Warning Signs (emphasizes recognizing indicators of both international and domestic terrorists)
<i>Mr. Richard Marquise</i> |
| 12:30 - 1:30 pm | <i>Lunch (Provided by University of North Alabama for \$15.00 fee)</i> |
| 1:30 - 4:30 pm | Explosives, Suicide Bombers, and Officer Safety (includes many different aspects of explosives that will aid law enforcement in determining possible terrorist attacks)
<i>Mr. Jerry Taylor</i> |

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH ALABAMA

Florence, Alabama



- | | | | |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Alumni Garden & Dr. Huckaba Sundial | 17. (Drs. Jack & Margie) Crocker Fountain | 33. (George H. Carroll) Lion Habitat | 48. ROTC Commemorative Garden |
| 2. Appleby Apartments & Parking* | 18. (Lurleen B. Wallace) Fine Arts Center | 34. Lions Gate Apartments | 49. Steam Plant |
| 3. Amphitheatre | 19. Flowers Hall | 35. Maintenance Building | 50. (Roy S.) Stevens Hall |
| 4. Art Building | 20. Flowers Hall Annex | 36. Mathematics Building | 51. Student Recreation Center* |
| 5. Baptist Student Center | 21. Floyd Hall (Science Building) | 37. Music Building | 52. Tennis Courts |
| 6. Baseball Press Box | 22. Forensic Science Building | 38. (E.B.) Norton Auditorium | 53. Towers Complex Dining Hall |
| 7. Bennett Infirmary | 23. Greek Row | 39. (Nancy B. & Jack) Opler Street Clock | 54. University Apartments (1-50) |
| 8. Bibb Graves Hall | 24. Greenhouse | 40. Parking Facility | 55. University Apartments (A 1-17; B 1-13) |
| 9. Braly Municipal Stadium | 25. (Robert M.) Guillot University Center | 41. Planetarium | 56. University Art Gallery (Visual Arts) |
| 10. Christian Student Center | 26. (Laura M.) Harrison Plaza | 42. Powers Hall | 57. University Relations |
| 11. Coby Hall | 27. International House | 43. President's Home | 58. Varsity Tennis Courts |
| 12. Collier Library | 28. Keller Hall/Raburn Wing | 44. Public Safety Building | 59. Wesley Foundation |
| 13. Communications Building | 29. Kilby School | 45. Rice Hall | 60. Wesleyan Hall and Annex |
| 14. Computer Center | 30. Lafayette Hall | 46. Rivers Hall | 61. (Mary Frances Potts) Wilbanks Memorial Garden |
| 15. Cooperative Campus Ministries | 31. LaGrange Hall | 47. Rogers Hall | 62. Willingham Hall |
| 16. (Dr. Luckey) Crocker Fountain | 32. Leo's (Stone Lodge) | | |

*under construction

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(RETURN TO HOME PAGE)

An armed robbery occurred at the **Fitzpatrick, AL Post Office**, located at 9575 Highway 110, Fitzpatrick, AL 36029 on August 30, 2004, at approximately 3:20 p.m. The first subject is described as a white male, 55 -65 years old, approximately 6 feet tall and weighing 200 lbs. The second subject was a white female, early 20's, approximately 5 feet 6 inches, dirty blond hair, acne, and weighing 115 lbs. The suspects left in a cream or white colored older model Lincoln. See photo below of robbers.

The suspects stole the following stolen postal money order numbers: **9151878774 through 9151878799**

Update 9/1/04

The white female robber is in the custody of the Postal Inspection Service. The white male is driving a silver or light colored Lincoln town car with Alabama State license plate **4 A6975 F** and may be heading to Florida (Panama City) via Alabama. Subject is wanted in questioning for robbery. Suspect is believed to be armed.



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UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

Identity Theft Used for “Legal” Employment by Illegal Aliens

August 27, 2004

Prepared by

**FBI CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION**

UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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Intelligence Assessment

August 27, 2004

Identity Theft Used for “Legal” Employment by Illegal Aliens

Illegal aliens are gaining legal employment inside the United States by targeting naturalized Hispanic citizens for their identities. The ease with which false documentation can be obtained to establish a new, legal identity is exploited by illegal aliens determined to secure legal employment. By obtaining employment under a false identity, the revenue earned by illegal aliens undermines the US economy by depriving the government of taxable income.

Identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes, affecting approximately 9.9 million victims within the US each year. To gain employment, illegal aliens are obtaining false documentation through staffing or temporary employment agencies. These agencies are not adequately checking a potential employee's documentation before they hire or refer the individual to a company. Companies in the Northwest and Southeast regions of the country are contracting these agencies to provide individuals with employment in secretarial, janitorial or farm/manual labor positions. As a result of the illegally obtained employment, the victims of the identity theft are receiving tax bills from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for unreported income.

- According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 11 percent of identity theft is employment-related fraud. The FTC's Identity Theft Clearinghouse database reveals a significant number of consumers reporting their identity has been used for employment purposes and that they have received a tax bill to confirm the theft. Until the IRS sends a tax notice, the victims do not know that their identity has been fraudulently used.
- FBI investigative data reveals that staffing and temporary employment agencies have also been targeted for a counterfeit payroll check scheme. The individuals perpetrating this identity theft scheme are obtaining the employee's payroll checks. Once the checks are received, the criminals scan the check into a computer graphics program and counterfeit/reproduce the employee's check. FBI Oklahoma City has reported a similar scheme wherein an individual can purchase counterfeit payroll checks as well as receive new identification cards as supporting documentation for the deposit.
- FBI investigative data reveals that individuals are trafficking fraudulent social security cards and fraudulent resident alien cards to illegal aliens for employment purposes. These fraudulent documents are available for purchase at a price of \$50 to \$150. The illegal alien telephones an unidentified individual who gives instructions for the requestor to provide a photograph of him/herself. Within days, the illegal alien obtains the necessary documents to gain employment in the United States.

To date, there are no identified active FBI investigations associated with identity theft-related employment fraud. However, the ease of obtaining fraudulent documents and establishing a new identity facilitates exploitation by organized criminal and/or terrorist groups to provide a covert

method for the movement of illegal migrants into the United States. Through established Identity Theft Task Forces, the FBI is working with other law enforcement agencies to identify and prosecute identity thieves.

This assessment was prepared by the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI. Comments and queries may be addressed to UC Greg Coon at 202-324-8632 or IA Jennifer Rose Minton, Financial Crimes Intelligence Unit, at 202-324-8630.

FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey

Return to: FCIU, FBIHQ, Room 3214

Marking Instructions: Circle the appropriate response accordingly.

- 1 Strongly Disagree
- 2 Disagree
- 3 Neither Agree or Disagree
- 4 Agree
- 5 Strongly Agree
- NA Not Applicable

Dear Customer:

Please take a moment and complete this survey to help evaluate the quality and value of FBI products. Your response will help us to serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future.

Product Title Identity Theft Used for "Legal" Employment by Illegal Aliens Product Date: August 27, 2004

Customer Field Office ASACs

Intelligence Function/Investigative Program Financial Crimes Intelligence Unit

Quality

1 2 3 4 5 NA This product was delivered within established deadlines.

1 2 3 4 5 NA The product was timely and relevant to your mission, programs, priorities or initiatives.

1 2 3 4 5 The product was clear and logical in the presentation of information with supported judgments and conclusions.

1 2 3 4 5 The product is reliable i.e., sources well documented and reputable.

Value

1 2 3 4 5 NA The product contributed to satisfying intelligence gaps or predicated cases or intelligence operations, especially in previously unknown areas.

1 2 3 4 5 NA The product resulted in change in investigative or intelligence priorities and/or a shift from unaddressed to addressed work, or vice versa.

1 2 3 4 5 NA The product resulted in more informed decisions concerning investigative or intelligence initiatives and/or resource allocation.

1 2 3 4 5 NA The product identified new information associated with pending matters or offered insights into information that could change the working premise in a program or initiative.

Comments

UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

Southern California Check Fraud Ring Targets Construction Companies

August 27, 2004

Prepared by

**FBI CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION**

UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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Intelligence Assessment

August 27, 2004

Southern California Check Fraud Ring Targets Construction Companies

Members of a Los Angeles, CA-based Mexican group are burglarizing construction companies throughout the United States and stealing blank payroll check stock. The checks are subsequently counterfeited and cashed throughout the country through the use of fraudulent identification. Illicit proceeds obtained from the check-cashing scheme are wired through Western Union to the organization's hierarchy in Mexico. As the ring is connected to corrupt border officials, the proceeds likely facilitate the smuggling of aliens into the United States.

FBI investigations indicate that individuals belonging to a Los Angeles-based Mexican group are illegally entering construction companies after hours and stealing the blank payroll check stock. The group recruits illegal aliens, the homeless, and unemployed individuals to cash the checks, which typically range from \$800 to \$1,000, at the bank from which the check was drawn. They provide the "check cashers" with fictitious identification cards to support the transaction and transport them on Fridays after 5:00 pm and Saturdays to cash the counterfeit checks. As such, the bank cannot validate the authenticity of the check because the construction company is closed. Traditional bank policy is to cash payroll checks from customers' payroll accounts when identification is presented. Some banks have attempted to require a thumb print, but the check cashers are purposely smearing the print. After a percentage of the profits is distributed to group members, the remainder of the money is wired through a money transmitter to group leaders in Mexico.

- The Albuquerque, Chicago, Charlotte, Oklahoma City and Salt Lake City field divisions are currently conducting separate investigations on members of the Los Angeles-based check fraud ring. Group members typically conduct surveillance of the companies before the crimes are committed. The burglaries are not detected until the victims are notified by the bank that counterfeit payroll checks were cashed against their business bank accounts.
- FBI data reveals that the Los Angeles-based check fraud ring discourages cooperation with law enforcement when the check cashers are arrested by depositing their proceeds into a personal bank account or wiring the money to their family in Mexico. After the arrest, illegal aliens are frequently deported without prosecution or with a credit for time served. The ring has affiliations with former Mexican government officials that assist in allowing the individuals that were deported to cross the border and re-enter the United States.
- According to FBI information, the Los Angeles-based check fraud ring is recruiting individuals in Los Angeles to travel throughout the United States and earn money by cashing checks. This group allows the individuals to purchase the counterfeit payroll

checks as well as receive new identification cards as supporting documentation for cashing the checks.

- FBI data indicates that a majority of the Los Angeles-based check fraud ring members are former drug traffickers. They apparently prefer involvement in check fraud-related activities over drug trafficking as the penalties are less stringent should they be apprehended.
- The Denver, Buffalo, New Haven, Seattle, and Portland Divisions have received complaints from financial institutions and both local and state law enforcement, which indicates that the Los Angeles-based check fraud ring is operating within their territorial jurisdictions.

The FBI is determining the overall extent of the counterfeit payroll check fraud through analysis of investigations and complaints and identifying connectivity throughout the United States. The money derived from the fraud provides a covert method for drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and money laundering activity.

This assessment was prepared by the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI. Comments and queries may be addressed to UC Greg Coon at 202-324-8632, SIA Susan Davidson at 202-324-8629 or IA Jennifer Rose Minton, Financial Crimes Intelligence Unit, at 202-324-8630.

FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey

Return to: FCIU, FBIHQ, Room 3214

Marking Instructions: Circle the appropriate response accordingly.

- 1 Strongly Disagree
- 2 Disagree
- 3 Neither Agree or Disagree
- 4 Agree
- 5 Strongly Agree
- NA Not Applicable

Dear Customer:

Please take a moment and complete this survey to help evaluate the quality and value of FBI products. Your response will help us to serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future.

Product Title Southern CA Check Fraud Ring Targets Construction Companies Product Date: August 27, 2004

Customer _____ Field Office ASACs _____

Intelligence Function/Investigative Program Financial Crimes Intelligence Unit

Quality

1	2	3	4	5	NA	This product was delivered within established deadlines.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product was timely and relevant to your mission, programs, priorities or initiatives.
1	2	3	4	5		The product was clear and logical in the presentation of information with supported judgments and conclusions.
1	2	3	4	5		The product is reliable i.e., sources well documented and reputable.

Value

1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product contributed to satisfying intelligence gaps or predicated cases or intelligence operations, especially in previously unknown areas.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product resulted in change in investigative or intelligence priorities and/or a shift from unaddressed to addressed work, or vice versa.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product resulted in more informed decisions concerning investigative or intelligence initiatives and/or resource allocation.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product identified new information associated with pending matters or offered insights into information that could change the working premise in a program or initiative.

Comments



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

(U/LES) Concerns Surrounding the Anniversary of Paul Hill's Execution

24 August 2004

Prepared by
FBI
Counterterrorism
Division

**(U/LES) Concerns Surrounding the Anniversary of Paul Hill's Execution**

(U/LES) The one year execution anniversary on 3 September of anti-abortion extremist Paul Jennings Hill in Florida could serve as a catalyst for retaliatory threats and violence.

(U/LES) On 3 September 2003, in Starke, Florida, Hill was executed for shooting and killing Dr. John Britton and clinic escort James Barrett at a Pensacola, Florida, clinic. Barrett's wife, June, was seriously wounded but survived the attack. Hill became the first anti-abortion extremist to be executed. Emotions surrounding the anniversary of Hill's execution may run high for some anti-abortion extremists, particularly former close associates or supporters of Hill who advocate anti-abortion violence as a viable option to end abortion.



Hill, holding the sign, faces an unidentified woman.

(U/LES) The "Paul Hill Memorial Tour" is scheduled from 1 September to 3 September 2004 in Florida. Extremists with known criminal records for anti-abortion activities are expected to participate, to include affiliates who identify with the Army of God (AOG). AOG affiliates attended a vigil in Starke, Florida, in early September 2003, in support of Hill and his violent actions. Participants intend to visit the Florida State Capitol; Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida; and the reproductive health care clinic in Pensacola, Florida, where Hill fatally shot Britton and Barrett. Hill supporters are expected to advocate violence against abortion providers and to denounce the execution of Hill. An AOG website promoting the "Paul Hill Memorial Tour" refers to the clinic in Pensacola as "where Paul Hill performed his act of love." Hill is also referred to as an "American Hero" on the AOG website and some consider Hill a martyr.

- Extremist rhetoric advocating violence against abortion providers and denouncing Florida State Government officials could serve as a catalyst for retaliatory threats and violence from anti-abortion extremists.
- Unknown subject(s) who sent threat letters containing live rifle cartridges to public officials in Florida shortly before Hill's execution may consider similar threat activity shortly prior to and/or on 3 September 2004.

UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT

(U/LES) In response to possible violence surrounding the anniversary of Hill's execution, law enforcement officials should:

- (U/LES) Contact intelligence sources to identify potential retaliatory threats directed against reproductive health care providers/facilities and government and judicial officials, particularly in Florida;
- (U/LES) Increase liaison efforts with reproductive health care clinics to enhance detection capabilities and encourage security countermeasures.



Paul Hill, identified above at a pre-execution news conference on 2 September 2003. Hill stated the following: "I believe in the short and long term, more and more people will act on the principles for which I stand. I'm willing and I feel very honored that they are most likely going to kill me for what I did."

This assessment was prepared by the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI. Comments and queries may be addressed to the Unit Chief, Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit at 202 324-8664.

UNCLASSIFIED/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey

Return to: DTAU/CTD, FBIHQ, Room 11741

Marking Instructions: Circle the appropriate response accordingly.

- 1 Strongly Disagree
- 2 Disagree
- 3 Neither Agree or Disagree
- 4 Agree
- 5 Strongly Agree
- NA Not Applicable

Dear Customer:

Please take a moment and complete this survey to help evaluate the quality and value of FBI products. Your response will help us to serve you more.

Product Title: _____
Product Date: _____
Customer _____
Intelligence Function/Investigative Program CTAS/Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit

Quality

1	2	3	4	5	NA	This product was delivered within established deadlines.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product was timely and relevant to your mission, programs, priorities or initiatives.
1	2	3	4	5		The product was clear and logical in the presentation of information with supported judgments and conclusions.
1	2	3	4	5		The product is reliable i.e., sources well documented and reputable.

Value

1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product contributed to satisfying intelligence gaps or predicating cases or intelligence operations, especially in previously unknown areas.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product resulted in change in investigative or intelligence priorities and/or a shift from unaddressed to addressed work, or vice versa.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product resulted in more informed decisions concerning investigative or intelligence initiatives and/or resource allocation.
1	2	3	4	5	NA	The product identified new information associated with pending matters or offered insights into information that could change the working premise in a program or initiative.

Comments

UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAWS
108th Congress - Second Session
Convening January 7, 2004

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Additions and Deletions are not identified in this database.
Vetoed provisions within tabular material are not displayed

PL 108-277 (HR 218)
July 22, 2004

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS SAFETY ACT OF 2004

An Act To amend title 18, United States Code, to exempt qualified current and former law enforcement officers from State laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed handguns.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,

<< 18 USCA § 921 NOTE >>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004".

SEC. 2. EXEMPTION OF QUALIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FROM STATE LAWS PROHIBITING THE CARRYING OF CONCEALED FIREARMS.

<< 18 USCA § 926B >>

(a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 926A the following:

"§ 926B. Carrying of concealed firearms by qualified law enforcement officers

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof, an individual who is a qualified law enforcement officer and who is carrying the identification required by subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, subject to subsection (b).

"(b) This section shall not be construed to supersede or limit the laws of any State that--

"(1) permit private persons or entities to prohibit or restrict the possession of concealed firearms on their property;
or

"(2) prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on any State or local government property, installation, building, base, or park.

"(c) As used in this section, the term 'qualified law enforcement officer' means an employee of a governmental agency who--

"(1) is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of any person for, any violation of law, and has statutory powers of arrest;

"(2) is authorized by the agency to carry a firearm;

"(3) is not the subject of any disciplinary action by the agency;

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"(4) meets standards, if any, established by the agency which require the employee to regularly qualify in the use of a firearm;

*866 "(5) is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and

"(6) is not prohibited by Federal law from receiving a firearm.

"(d) The identification required by this subsection is the photographic identification issued by the governmental agency for which the individual is employed as a law enforcement officer.

"(e) As used in this section, the term 'firearm' does not include--

"(1) any machinegun (as defined in section 5845 of the National Firearms Act);

"(2) any firearm silencer (as defined in section 921 of this title); and

"(3) any destructive device (as defined in section 921 of this title)."

<< 18 USCA prec. § 921 >>

(b) Clerical Amendment--The table of sections for such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 926A the following:

"926B. Carrying of concealed firearms by qualified law enforcement officers."

SEC. 3. EXEMPTION OF QUALIFIED RETIRED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FROM STATE LAWS PROHIBITING THE CARRYING OF CONCEALED FIREARMS.

<< 18 USCA § 926C >>

(a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is further amended by inserting after section 926B the following:

"§ 926C. Carrying of concealed firearms by qualified retired law enforcement officers

"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof, an individual who is a qualified retired law enforcement officer and who is carrying the identification required by subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, subject to subsection (b).

"(b) This section shall not be construed to supersede or limit the laws of any State that--

"(1) permit private persons or entities to prohibit or restrict the possession of concealed firearms on their property; or

"(2) prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on any State or local government property, installation, building, base, or park.

"(c) As used in this section, the term 'qualified retired law enforcement officer' means an individual who--

"(1) retired in good standing from service with a public agency as a law enforcement officer, other than for reasons of mental instability;

"(2) before such retirement, was authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of any person for, any violation of law, and had statutory powers of arrest;

"(3)(A) before such retirement, was regularly employed as a law enforcement officer for an aggregate of 15 years or more; or

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"(B) retired from service with such agency, after completing any applicable probationary period of such service, due to a service-connected disability, as determined by such agency;

"(4) has a nonforfeitable right to benefits under the retirement plan of the agency;

*867 "(5) during the most recent 12-month period, has met, at the expense of the individual, the State's standards for training and qualification for active law enforcement officers to carry firearms;

"(6) is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and

"(7) is not prohibited by Federal law from receiving a firearm.

"(d) The identification required by this subsection is--

"(1) a photographic identification issued by the agency from which the individual retired from service as a law enforcement officer that indicates that the individual has, not less recently than one year before the date the individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been tested or otherwise found by the agency to meet the standards established by the agency for training and qualification for active law enforcement officers to carry a firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm; or

"(2)(A) a photographic identification issued by the agency from which the individual retired from service as a law enforcement officer; and

"(B) a certification issued by the State in which the individual resides that indicates that the individual has, not less recently than one year before the date the individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been tested or otherwise found by the State to meet the standards established by the State for training and qualification for active law enforcement officers to carry a firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm.

"(e) As used in this section, the term 'firearm' does not include--

"(1) any machinegun (as defined in section 5845 of the National Firearms Act);

"(2) any firearm silencer (as defined in section 921 of this title); and

"(3) a destructive device (as defined in section 921 of this title)."

<< 18 USCA prec. § 921 >>

(b) Clerical Amendment--The table of sections for such chapter is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 926B the following:

"926C. Carrying of concealed firearms by qualified retired law enforcement officers."

Approved July 22, 2004.

PL 108-277, 2004 HR 218
END OF DOCUMENT

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NEBRASKA STATE PATROL
INTELLIGENCE/CRIME ANALYSIS DIVISION
P.O. Box 94907 State House
Lincoln, NE 68509-4907
(402) 471- 4545



OFFICER SAFETY ALERT

Improvised Explosive Devices

Below is a photo of a VCR Improvised Explosive Device that was opened by a Pennsylvania State Police Fogelsville member while cataloging evidence in a child porn case. A basement room at Fogelsville was being used to catalog and view hundreds of seized tapes as part of a large scale Child Pornography case under investigation. The tape was opened and the mouse trap which was inserted in the hollowed out tape was found to have been in the tripped position. The spring loaded bar was already making contact with the wire that completed the circuit with the batteries which is connected to a blasting cap.



Anyone with inquiries or information contact Trooper Daniel Onisick, Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Criminal Investigation/Operations Intelligence, (215) 560-4162.



►►► POSSIBLE SABOTAGE TO RAILROAD TRACK SWITCHES ◀◀◀

(U//FOUO//LES) The Providence Worcester Railroad operates daily freight service on a single track that runs through Woonsocket, RI. Sometime during the evening of Aug. 30 2004 and 0410 on Aug 31, unknown subjects gained control of two track switch levers and changed the tracks from their proper position on the main track to Providence, to a position half way between fully switched to an alternate closed track and the main track to Providence. At 0410 hours on 8/31, a PWRR train passed through the Woonsocket yard on its way to Providence. Upon striking the switches left partially open, the train wheels closed the switch by force, keeping the train on the main track. This signaled an emergency to the crew who then stopped the train. The crew then exited the train, observed the sabotaged switches and notified Woonsocket Police.

The FBI and Woonsocket PD responded to this incident. Further investigation disclosed that the subjects also cut eight bond wires between the switched tracks. These bond wires provide an open circuit to any RR intersections in the area. A break in the circuit's signal causes the intersection gates to close automatically. Since the subjects did not cut the back-up wires, the circuits remained open and there was no effect at the rail intersection.

The switch levers were accessed by cutting the hasps on the levers and then removing the locks. The locks are made of hardened material but the hasps were not, allowing the subjects to break through the hasps and then remove the locks.

PWRR personnel advised that if the train had been traveling in the opposite direction, the wheels would have been forced off of the track by the open switch and would have certainly derailed. The train in question was carrying Ethylene Glycol, Liquefied Petroleum Gas, Sodium Hydroxide, and Liquefied Chlorine Gas.

RR personnel also advised that a fully opened switch could have caused this train to run out of alternate track depending on the speed at the time it hit the switch.

Investigators and RR personnel have concluded that this was not a random vandalism incident, rather sabotage by a person(s) who knew what they were doing.

At the present time, there are no suspects. The FBI Evidence Team has seized evidence from the scene for processing.



ATTENTION: RAILROAD LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES/LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WITH RAILWAYS/HOMELAND SECURITY, ANTITERRORISM AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNERS/PROVOST MARSHALS

NOTE: LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

READ-IN: Railways continue to be a vulnerable mode of transportation to introduce a WMD (CBRNE) event into the heart of a municipality or dense populated area by causing a derailment and/or explosion to hazardous cargo, typically a MINIMUM of 10 tons or more. Additionally, an event to a passenger train could, in and of itself, have massive impacts to both the economic strength of the nation, as well as, instill panic and disruption to communities throughout the US. It is strongly recommended that local and state law enforcement and consequence management agencies have a close/frequent working relationship with the railway industry and their respective law enforcement agencies. Most railways cut through, by, or into city centers, dense populated apartment areas, ports, airports, civic centers, stadiums, business centers, major causeways, bridges, and highways. Many jurisdictions have contracted security to protect key railway named areas of interest (NAIs). Many of these security contractors are NOT Special Police Officers, nor possess US Government clearances, in addition to having limited information from local law enforcement on real-time threat or training to detect it. Anti-terrorism, Homeland Security, and Consequence Management Planners must consider all stakeholders into the equation, develop and staff a plan, exercise the plan, and finalize it into a working - living - document.

►► POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES ON RAILWAYS ◀◀

The following is a non exhaustive list of possible suspicious activities to look for when providing security on railways and mass transport systems. This document was put together by the FBI. This information is provided to aid in training the individuals who are responsible for security on rail lines and should not be disseminated beyond those individuals. A list of possible indicators of terrorist activity (which is not meant to be exhaustive) may include the following:

1. Individuals observed filming or photographing passing trains, locomotives, various types of rail cars, rail yard operations, tracks, rail facilities, bridges and tunnels. This would also include incidents where individuals are observed with audio recording devices as passing trains go by.
2. Individuals observed filming or photographing commuter rail trains, passenger cars, subway trains, transit trains, station stops, platforms, bridges, tunnels and yards.
3. Individuals who may appear to be noting arrival and departure times of passenger, transit and subway trains.
4. Individuals who may appear to be noting stops on maps of passenger, transit and subway trains.
5. Individuals who may enter rail property for the purpose of speaking with employees about rail operations, rail equipment, locomotive fueling stations, locomotive fuel capacity or security issues.
6. Individuals sitting in vehicles nearby to rail operations as well as commuter and transit station parking lots and do not board any train.
7. Individuals who act suspiciously or nervous while riding passenger, transit and subway trains.

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(RETURN TO HOME PAGE)



8. Individuals who appear to be noting the size and capacity of passenger cars and who may ask train crew questions about the passenger cars.
9. Individuals who inquire about the operations at both rush and non rush hour or when the commuter, transit and subway trains are operating at peak capacity.
10. Individuals observed near rail switches, switch stands, signal bungalows and other locations along the railroad tracks and right of way.
11. Individuals observed watching switching operations by train crews at power plants, chemical industries and other facilities that ship and receive commodities by rail.
12. Individuals trespassing along the railroad, transit and subway property. Trespassing is an unfortunate common occurrence on railroad and transit property.
13. Individuals who appear to be out of place while on railroad property. These individuals are not dressed to be employed by a railroad company.
14. Vehicles parked along railroad or transit right of way, shops, yards and facilities.
15. Incidents where passing trains are rocked or shot at (COULD BE OBSERVING RESPONSES AND TIMES)
16. Incidents where obstructions are placed on the tracks for passing trains to strike. These incidents may involve the placement of track equipment (rail spikes, railroad ties, tie plates) which can be found along the railroad property. Some incidents involve placing other types of debris which have been dumped or abandoned on railroad property.
17. Incidents where rail or transit property, equipment, vehicles, buildings, signal structures, trains, locomotives are vandalized or broken into resulting in some theft of rail property and equipment. In some cases rail and transit vehicles are stolen. Most of these types of incidents are categorized as criminal mischief, vandalism or larceny (including item 15, 16).

The above listed indicators are activities observed on the rail systems each day. Railroad companies and transit agencies typically fall victim to various property crimes. The best resource on related incidents is making contact with the railroad and or transit police (to include Amtrak police) for assistance, guidance and clarification. Railroad companies and transit agencies have also focused on "Employee Awareness" programs and videos on observing and reporting of suspicious incidents occurring on railroad property. Transit, subway and commuter rail systems have initiated public awareness campaigns on reporting unattended baggage as well as reporting of suspicious person(s) to law enforcement authorities.

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Storage Facilities

Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

Historically, terrorist plots that involve Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have utilized rental storage facilities to house parts of the bomb or supplies until the plotters have the time to assemble the weapon or prepare for the attack:

It is imperative that law enforcement make operators and employees of storage facilities in their respective areas aware of the following concerning activities and/or behaviors.

Customer behavior that may be cause for concern:

- Insist on paying in cash, sometimes weeks or months in advance.
- Seem overly concerned about privacy.
- Visit the storage facility late at night or at unusual times.
- Exhibit suspicious behavior by customers when approached by rental employees or security personnel.
- Have unusual fumes, liquids, residues or odors emanating from storage units
- Display burns or chemical exposure symptoms and provide vague or irrational explanations for injuries.
- Discarded chemical containers in storage unit dumpsters.

Storage of the following items may also be cause for concern:

- Quantities of fuel.
- Agriculture or industrial chemicals.
- Agricultural equipment, such as commercial sprayers.

- Explosives, blasting caps or fuses.

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- Flight manuals or other similar materials.
- Laboratory materials (e.g., flasks, sealed containers) or protective clothing (e.g., surgical masks, gas masks, rubber gloves, self-contained breathing apparatuses), incinerators, incubators, cell cultures, agricultural sprayers, improvised showers and eye baths.
- Textbooks and journals discussing biology, chemistry, explosives and poisons.
- Pesticides, large delivery vehicles, vans, cargo containers, trailers or related equipment.

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NOTABLE INCIDENTS

(U//FOUO//LES) UNITED STATES: Suspicious Individuals Traveling Under Cover of Familial Responsibilities. The CBP Office of Intelligence Trends Analysis team has noted that over the past month, an increasing number of known or suspected terrorists, extremists, or associates thereof, have traveled in the company of their immediate family. In each case, when interviewed by CBP inspectors, individuals indicated they were traveling for family reasons: an illness in the family, a family vacation, a visit to a cousin's home, a family wedding, or a visit to a childhood friend. It remains unclear if this is a potential diversionary tactic to minimize suspicions or simply a coincidence. (2 Sep 04 HSOC 3177-04)

(U) CONNECTICUT: Possible Middle Eastern Male Inquiring on How to Purchase Ambulances. According to the Connecticut Division of Homeland Security, on 29 June, an investigation was initiated based on Bridgeport Police Department information regarding a suspicious inquiry regarding the purchase of an ambulance. Reportedly, a dark-skinned male approached two ambulance attendants and inquired how he might purchase an ambulance. A trace of his Connecticut license tags led to an individual residing in Bridgeport. ICE records reflect the individual is a permanent resident alien who originated from India. The investigation is on-going. (S&L Desk, 30 Aug 04; HSOC 3085-04)

(U) INDIANA: Incident at VA Medical Center. Subject: On August 27, 2004 at 3:26 PM, two men described as approximately 25 years old, dark skin, shaved heads appearing of Middle Eastern descent entered the VA Medical Center at 1481 West 10th Street in Indianapolis. The men went to the Customer Service area on the 2nd floor and spoke with a representative of the VA. The Customer Service Representative stated they both had very deep accents and were barely understandable. The two men asked about the patient population, if we had military patients, and what types of patients we had. They seemed to press the questions about serving a military population. When the Customer Service Representative asked their nationality, they replied "French". The Customer Service Representative gave them directions to Wishard Hospital. After they left, the Customer Service Representative notified VA Police Officers who were unable to locate the subjects inside the facility. This information has been forwarded to the FBI JTTF in Indianapolis. For more information contact Captain Robert Gard, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Police at (317) 554-0063. To: lesc@leo.gov; HSCenter, SDO)

(U//FOUO//LES) CALIFORNIA / NORTH DAKOTA: Possible Surveillance of U.S. Military Recruiting Stations. According to recent military reporting, at two military recruiting stations, at least two separate incidents of possible surveillance have been reported. On 25 August, at a recruiting station in Victorville, California, a female in the backseat of a passing car was observed taking pictures of the recruiting office. Two other females, described as dark-skinned, possibly Hispanic, African American, or Middle Eastern, were in the car. On 26 August, at a USAF recruiter's office in Bismarck, North Dakota, a U.S. military service member reported suspicious behavior by a Middle Eastern-looking individual. The individual entered the recruiting station and inquired about officer training; however, he appeared to be focusing more attention on the layout of the recruiting office. After speaking with the recruiter for several minutes, he departed. (AFOSI Talon, 26 & 27 Aug 04; HSOC 3096-04)

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NOTABLE INCIDENTS

(U//FOUO//LES) LOUISIANA: Suspicious Activity at the Rhodia Chemical Plant. On 30 August, in Baton Rouge, at RHODIA Inc, a night shift worker noticed occupants of a car located in the front parking lot the plant taking pictures of the railroad track that runs above the surface of the ground leading over the Mississippi River. The worker contacted the guard service on site; in turn, patrol officers were immediately sent to the area. The officers approached the car and noticed a white male, a white female, and a small child inside. While the officers were getting the license plate number and a description of the car, it pulled off. (Richard Kane Director, Environment & Security, RHODIA Inc; 31 Aug 04; HSOC 3107-04)



RECENT EVENTS IN REGION 4 (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN)

(U//FOUO) FLORIDA / ALABAMA: Bomb Threat to Hospitals, Schools, Offices, and Interstates. According to Florida Department of Law Enforcement reporting, on 30 August, a letter was found at the Helping Hands Mission in Pensacola demanding money and threatening to detonate four powerful explosives at hospitals, schools, offices and on interstates between Pensacola, Florida and Mobile, Alabama. The letter demanded scheduled payments of \$250,000, \$500,000, \$1,000,000 and \$2,000,000 over the next four days. Directions regarding the selection of currency and placement of payments were also given. Death and destruction were threatened if the payments were delayed or not made. The letter characterized its demands as revenge for devastation to the writer's homeland and its citizens. An investigation is on-going. (FDLE Daily Brief, 31 Aug 04; HSOC 3120-04)



(U//FOUO//LES) GEORGIA: Security Alert issued for Ahmed Albeti Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) recently received information about a possible planned bombing of the Richard Russell Federal Building located in Atlanta. The source of the information indicated that Ahmed Albeti allegedly stated in a letter that he was planning on blowing up the Richard Russell Building on September 11, 2004, because he had been unjustly accused of child molestation and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Albeti is originally from Saudi Arabia, and there is an active warrant for Probation Violation on file with the Gwinnett County Sheriff's Office. BICE (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement) advised that Albeti was deported not long after his release from prison and should not be residing in the United States. GISAC is currently investigating this case to determine the source's validity and the credibility of this information. If you have any contact with Albeti, please hold for the Gwinnett County Sheriff's Office, and notify GISAC at 404-486-6420, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force at 404-679-9000. Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity for Storage Facilities (GISAC September 2004)

(U//FOUO//LES) GEORGIA: Between 20 and 22 Aug 04, a dry cleaner's delivery van, Georgia license 425-ALE, was stolen in the Atlanta area. The missing vehicle is a white box van, 16 feet long, formerly owned by the Salvation Army with faint Salvation Army markings still visible on its sides. At the time of the theft the van contained numerous US Air Force uniforms from nearby Robbins Air Force Base (23 Aug 04, AFOSI Talon 325G-23-08-04-2032).

(U//FOUO//LES) FLORIDA: Bomb Threat Against Ship Terminal. According to USCG reporting, on 22 August, in Mayport, an unidentified individual called in a bomb threat against the Port Canaveral Ship Terminal. At the time, the only vessel in the port terminal was the casino boat STERLING AMBASSADOR which was embarking passengers. Local police along with other law enforcement agencies and a canine team inspected the STERLING AMBASSADOR and the ship terminal with nothing suspicious found. The STERLING AMBASSADOR was cleared and the terminal was reopened.(24 Aug 04; HSOC 2920-04)

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R4 (KY/TN/NC/SC/MS/AL/GA/FL)

8/24/04 3:39 PM

Stolen Alabama EMS Trailer and Equipment

ABI Robert Clark

Stolen EMS Trailer and Equipment

The trailer is 7 X 16, Gold (Champagne) Color. VIN# 5D4EB16211G003279; Tag #38UTF820
2002 Legacy, Completely enclosed with a side door. Back door lets down from top to form ramp.

Purchased from Trailer World in Ozark. It had some training equipment inside to include a big tent for decontamination that would take four large men to move. The decontamination tent is 11.5 X 18 feet and the Serial Number is 425. Some very expensive EMS training equipment was also inside. We are working on an inventory of equipment to see what is missing.

Registered EMPACT Southeast Alabama. (Southeast Alabama EMS) Stolen over the weekend of 08/16/2004 from 2323 West Main parking lot behind the Recruiting Offices. Was here Friday at 5:00 p.m., not here yesterday according to other tenants.

AL003CI08

MKE/STOLEN TRAILER - TYP/H STA/S

AIN/21561660 LIC/38UTF820 LIS/AL LIY/05 LIT/TL VIN/5D4EB16211G003279

VYR/01 VMA/TRLR VMO/TL VST/UT VCO/GLD STD/08162004 OCA/04007572

NIC/V846516907 MIS/LEGACY 7X16 DUAL AXLE ENCLOSED TRL

ORI/AL0380100 - DOTHAN POLICE DEPT

TEL/334 793-0215 SEQ # 0007 MRI # 113309

If spotted or recovered report to the Dothan Police Department (334-793-0215) or the Cottonwood Police Department (334)677-4808 (VRC, 25 Aug 04)



ATAC Members:

The Alabama Department of Homeland Security, the Birmingham FBI and the United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of Alabama suggest in consideration of the recent incident involving school children overseas in Russia that the issue of school security plans and emergency procedures be reviewed. Although we have no reported intelligence indicating a threat to US schools, this would be a timely and proactive measure for local law enforcement to take with the start of the new school year.

It is recommended that school districts order the "Bomb Threat Response Planning Tool", a joint project of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools. For more information on this tool please visit the project's web site at www.threatplan.org.

Tammy R. Ellis
Intelligence Research Specialist
United States Attorney
Northern District of Alabama

(205) 244-2188 (Office)
(205) 244-2182 (Fax)
(256) 390-4136 (Mobile)