|
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CRIMINAL NO. PJM-95-0148
BRANDON SHELDON,
Defendant
_________________________
JOINT PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The United States of America, by its attorneys, Lynne A. Battaglia,
United
States Attorney for the District of Maryland, and Douglas B. Farquhar,
Assistant
United States Attorney for said District, and the Defendant, Brandon
Sheldon, by
and through his attorney, Richard Bittner, jointly request this Honorable
Court
to instruct the jury in the above-captioned case in accordance with the
proposed
instructions attached hereto, in addition to, but not in limitation of, its
usual
instructions in a criminal case. The government further requests this
honorable
Court, in accordance with Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to
inform counsel of its proposed actions upon the requested instructions prior
to
counsels' argument to the jury.
Respectfully Submitted,
Lynne A. Battaglia Deval L. Patrick
United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
________________________________ ___________________________
Douglas B. Farquhar Gerard V. Hogan
Assistant United States Attorney Mary E. Healy
United States Courthouse Attorneys, Criminal Section
Suite 400 Civil Rights Division
6500 Cherrywood Lane U.S. Department of Justice
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770 Washington, D.C. 20530
(301) 344-4034 (202) 616-3941
____________________________
Richard C. Bittner
Bittner and Demyan
7485 Baltimore-Annapolis Blvd.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21061
(410) 787-8700
Dated: June 5, 1997
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CRIMINAL NO. PJM-95-0148
BRANDON SHELDON,
Defendant
_________________________
JOINT REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1-14
The government and the Defendant request the following standard
instructions from Sand, Siffert, Laughlin & Reiss, Modern Federal Jury
Instructions (hereinafter referred to as "Sand"):
No. 1. 2-12 (Sympathy)
No. 2. 3-1 (Indictment is not evidence)
No. 3. 3A-1 (Knowingly)
No. 4. 3A-3 (Willfully)
No. 5. 4-1 (Presumption of Innocence and Burden of
Proof)
No. 6. 4-3 (Number of Witnesses and Uncontradcited
Testimony)
No. 7. 5-2 (Direct and Circumstantial Evidence)
No. 8. 5-4 (Testimony, Exhibits, etc.)
No. 9. 2-18 (Jury to Consider Only This Defendant)
No. 10. 6-1 (Inference Defined)
No. 11. 6-16 (Consciousness of Guilt from Intimidation of
Witness)
No. 12. 7-1 (Witness Credibility)
No. 13. 7-5 (Accomplices Called by Government)
No. 14. 7-11 (Codefendant's Plea Agreement)
No. 15. 8-3 (Voluntary Intoxication)
No. 16. 5-21 (Defendant's Right Not To Testify)
No. 17. 5-22 (Defendant's Silence as Admission)
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____18_____
Count One of the Indictment reads as follows:
[Read Count One of Indictment][INDENT]
The defendant is charged in Count One of the Indictment with having
violated Section 241 of Title 18, United States Code. The words of this
statute
that are pertinent to Count One read as follows:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
or
intimidate any inhabitant of any State of the United States in the free
exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws
of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same...they
shall
[be guilty of a crime against the United States].
____________________________
Authority:
18 U.S.C. § 241.
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____19____
[The parties are unable to agree on this Instruction, and will submit
separate proposed instructions.]
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____20____
First, I will explain the term "conspiracy."
A conspiracy is an agreement understanding, or combination of two or
more
persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose. Thus, a conspiracy is, in a
very
true sense, a partnership in crime in which each member becomes the agent
of
every other member. The essence of the offense is the agreement to violate
or
disregard the law.
What the evidence must show to establish that a conspiracy existed is
that
the members in some way or manner, outwardly or silently, came to a mutual
understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that they
took
some step or steps toward accomplishing its objectives.
However, the evidence need not show that the members of an alleged
conspiracy entered into any express or formal agreement, or that they
directly,
by words spoken or in writing, stated between themselves what their object
or
purpose was to be, or the details thereof, or the means by which the object
or
purpose was to be achieved. Ordinarily only the results of a conspiracy,
rather
than the agreement, are observable. To prove that a conspiracy existed,
moreover, the government is not required to show that all of the members of
the
alleged conspiracy were named or charged.
Proof of a conspiracy may be by direct evidence or by inference.
Direct
evidence of the agreement and purpose may come from such evidence, for
example,
as conversations between the conspirators themselves. When proven by
inference
or circumstantial evidence, the conspiracy may be deduced from acts that are
done
in pursuit of an apparent criminal purpose.
The evidence need not establish that all the means or methods set forth
in
the Indictment were agreed upon by all members; nor that those means or
methods
which were agreed upon were actually used or put into operation; nor that
all of
the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such. What
the
evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that the alleged
conspiracy
was knowingly formed in an effort to accomplish some plan or purpose of the
conspiracy, as charged in the Indictment; that two or more persons,
including the
accused, were knowingly members of the conspiracy, as charged in the
Indictment;
and that the defendant knowingly contributed in some way to the
accomplishment
of the plan or purpose of the conspiracy.
___________________________
Authorities:
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 714 (1943).
United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940).United States v.
Flaherty, 668
F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1981).
United States v. Askew, 958 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1992).
Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
(4th ed., 1990), § 28.04.
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____21____
For the United States to have proved the crime charged against the
defendant in Count One you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the
defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the conspiracy.
A person may become a member of a conspiracy without full knowledge of
all
the details of the conspiracy.
Before the jury may find that the defendant, or any other person,
became
a member of a conspiracy, the evidence must show that the conspiracy was
formed,
and that the defendant, or other person who is claimed to have been a
member,
knowingly and intentionally participated in the unlawful plan with the
intent to
advance or further some object or purpose of the conspiracy.
To participate knowingly and intentionally means to participate
voluntarily
and intentionally. So if the defendant, or any other person, with
understanding
of the unlawful character of a plan, intentionally encourages, advises or
assists, for the purpose of furthering the undertaking or scheme, then he
thereby
becomes a knowing and intentional participant and a co-conspirator.
Once you have decided that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy,
the
defendant is responsible for what other conspirators said or did to carry
out the
goals of the conspiracy, whether or not the defendant knew what they said or
did.
The extent of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy is not
determinative of his guilt or innocence. A defendant may be convicted as a
conspirator even though he may have played a minor part in the conspiracy.
When
proof of a conspiracy is shown, only slight additional evidence is necessary
to
connect a particular defendant with it.
Furthermore, the United States is not required to prove that the
parties
to, or members of the agreement or conspiracy charged in Count One were
successful in achieving any or all of the objects or goals of the agreement
or
conspiracy.
__________________________
Authorities:
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
United States v. Monteiro, 871 F.2d 204, 208 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 833 (1989).
Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 104 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352
U.S. 1025 (1957).
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____22____
[The parties are unable to agree on this Instruction, and will submit
separate proposed instructions.]
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___23___
[The parties are unable to agree on this Instruction, and will submit
separate proposed instructions.]
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ____24____
Finally, with regard to the second element of Count One, the United
States
has alleged that the "protected right" at which the conspiracy was aimed was
the
right to hold and to occupy property without injury, intimidation, or
interference because of race or to associate with persons of another race
in
their dwelling.
The laws of the United States, including Section 1982 and the "Fair
Housing
Act" provisions of Title 42, United States Code, guarantee to all citizens
the
right to hold and to occupy their dwellings without injury, intimidation,
or
interference because of their race, and to associate with persons of another
race
within their dwelling.
Intent to interfere with either of these rights is sufficientthe
government does not need to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
goal of
the conspiracy was to interfere with both of these rights.
_______________________________
42 U.S.C. § 1982.
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966)(statute precludes
interference
with all rights protected by Constitution or federal statutes).
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1184
(1986).
JOINT PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ___25___
The third element of the offense is present if an individual against
whom
the conspiracy was directed was an inhabitant of the United States. The
term
"inhabitant" includes any individual who was a resident of any state of the
United States at the time of the acts committed as described in the
Indictment.
The statute and the indictment do not mean, however, that the
defendants
must have had in mind a particular named individual whom they knew to be an
inhabitant. It is sufficient if the conspiracy charged in Count One was
aimed
at the identified class of victims and the class included at least one
inhabitant
of any state of the United States.
_________________________
Authorities:
18 U.S.C. § 241.
United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1960 (1992).
United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987).
Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552, 561 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 964 (1967).
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____26____
Although the Indictment alleges that the statutes in question were
violated
by various acts which are in the Indictment joined by the conjunctive "and,"
it
is sufficient for guilt if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt the
violation of the statute by any one of the acts charged. For example, Count
One
of the Indictment alleges that the defendant conspired to "injure,
intimidate,
oppress, and threaten Joan Bennett, her sons, and Douglas Monahan." The
proof
need only establish that the defendant conspired to injure, intimidate,
oppress,
or threaten Joan Bennett, or one of her sons, or Douglas Monahan.
Similarly, the
right "to hold and to occupy" a dwelling is the right either to hold or to
occupy
a dwelling.
______________________
Authorities:
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970).
United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 298 (1st Cir. 1979).
United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S.
1076 (1979).
United States v. Anderson, 527 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1976).
United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
828
(1973).
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.___27___
You will notice that the Indictment sets forth a number of "overt acts"
for
Count One. An "overt act" is any transaction or event, even one which may
be
entirely innocent when considered alone, but which is knowingly committed
by a
conspirator in an effort to accomplish some object of the conspiracy. The
United
States is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants
committed any overt act set forth in the Indictment, but you may consider
any
overt act which you believe occurred to help determine whether the
conspiracy was
formed and who joined it.
_______________________
Authorities:
United States v. Shabani, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 382 (1994)(proof
of
overt act not required in 21 U.S.C. § 846 where statute is silent, like
§
241, about such requirement).
United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied,
____ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct 353 (1991).
United States v. Umentum, 547 F.2d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430
U.S. 983 (1977)(citing § 241 as an example of a statute which, like 21
U.S.C.
§ 846, has no "overt act" requirement).
United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 917
(1972).
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___28____
You may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, toward the
United
States or toward the defendant on trial, from the fact that certain persons
were
not named as defendants in the same Indictment. This must play no part in
your
deliberations.
Whether a person can or should be indicted as a defendant, and whether
a
person can or should be included in the same Indictment as another defendant
are
matters within the sole discretion of the United States Attorney or the
Assistant
Attorney General and the grand jury after a consideration of the available
evidence and the applicable laws. Therefore, you must not consider it in
any way
in reaching your verdict as to the defendant on trial for the offenses in
the
Indictment.
_________________________
Authority:
1 Sand, Siffert, Loughlin and Reiss, Modern Federal Jury
Instructions (1991), § 3.01, Instruction No. 3-4 at 3-7 (modified).
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.___29____
Count Two of the Indictment of the Indictment reads as follows:
[Read Count Two of Indictment]
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___30___
Section 3631 of Title 42, United States Code provides in pertinent
part:
Whoever... by force or threat of force willfully injures,
intimidates, or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate, or
interfere
with --(b) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate
such
person or any other person . . . from . . . participating, without
discrimination
on account of race . . . in . . . [occupying any dwelling without regard to
his
or her race] shall be [guilty of an offense against the United
States]
_________________________
Authorities:
42 U.S.C. § 3631.
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___31__
The violation of Section 3631 charged in Count Two has four elements to
be
considered:
First: The defendant used force or threat of force;
Second: The defendant intimidated or interfered with, or attempted to
intimidate
or interfere with, the victims' right to hold and to occupy a dwelling;
Third: The defendant engaged in the conduct described because of the
victims'
race or color and because of their occupancy of a dwelling and their
association
therein;
Fourth: The defendant acted willfully.
I will now explain each of these four elements in more detail.
______________________
Authorities:
42 U.S.C. § 3631.
US v. McDermott 29 F3d 404, 409 (8th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1184
(1986).
United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. l983), cert. denied, 467
U.S.
1216 (1984).
United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1252 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114
S.Ct. 1369 (1994)
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___32____
[The parties are unable to agree on this Instruction, and will submit
separate proposed instructions.]
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___33___
[The parties are unable to agree on this Instruction, and will submit
separate proposed instructions.]
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___34____
[The parties are unable to agree on this Instruction, and will submit
separate proposed instructions.]
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 35
The fourth element to be proved for the offense charged in Count Two
is
that the defendant acted "willfully."
An act is done "willfully" if is done knowingly, deliberately, "on
purpose," as contrasted with accidentally, carelessly, or unintentionally.
If the evidence convinces you that the defendant willfully engaged in
the
conduct described because of the victims' race or color and because the
victims'
occupied their home or associated therein with persons of another race, then
you
may find that the third and fourth elements are proved even if he had other
reasons for doing what he did.
______________________________
Authorities:
Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
(4th ed., 1992), § 17.04.
United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
469
U.S. 838 (1984).
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___36___
Intent and motive are different concepts and should never be confused.
Motive is what prompts a person to act or fail to act. Intent refers
only
to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted.
Personal advancement and financial gain, for example, are two
well-recognized motives for much of human conduct. These praiseworthy
motives,
however, may prompt one person to voluntary acts of good while prompting
another
person to voluntary acts of crime.
Good motive alone is never a defense where the act done or omitted is
a
crime. The motive of the defendant is, therefore, immaterial except insofar
as
evidence of motive may aid in the determination of state of mind or the
intent
of the defendant.
_____________________
Authority:
Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
(4th ed., 1992), § 17.06.
JOINT PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___37_____
The defendant is also charged in Count Two with having violated § 2
of
Title 18, United States Code. Title 18, Section 2 of the United States
Code
provides in pertinent part:
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission in punishable as a
principal.
A person may violate the law even though he or she does not personally
do
each and every act constituting the offense if that person "aided and
abetted"
the commission of the offense.
Before a defendant may be held responsible for aiding and abetting
others
in the commission of a crime, it is necessary that the United States prove
beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and deliberately associated
himself in some way with the crime charged and participated in it with the
intent
to commit the crime.
In order to be found guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of
the
crimes charged in Count Two of the Indictment, the United States must prove
the
following:
First: That the crime (in Count Two) was committed;
Second: That the defendant knew the crime charged was to be committed or
was
being committed;
Third: That the defendant knowingly did some act for the
purpose of helping, aiding, or encouraging the commission of that crime;
and
Fourth: That the defendant acted with the intention of
causing the crime charged to be committed.
Proof that the defendant may have known about the crime, even if he was
there
when it was committed, is not enough for you to find him guilty. What the
United
States must prove is that the defendant did something to help or to
encourage the
crime with the intent that the crime be committed.
_______________________
Authorities:
18 U.S.C. § 2.
Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
(4th ed., 1992), § 18.01 (modified).
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-620 (1949).
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ___ day of January, 1996, I caused a copy
of
the foregoing proposed Jury Instructions to be sent by first-class mail,
postage
prepaid, to the attorney for the Defendant, Richard Bittner, 5 Light
Street,
Suite 510, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
______________________________
Douglas B. Farquhar
Richard C. Bittner, Esq.
5 Light Street, Suite 510
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
[cited in
Civil Rights Resource Manual 60]
|