141.

Sample Jury Instruction

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CRIMINAL NO. PJM-95-0148 BRANDON SHELDON, Defendant _________________________ GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS The United States of America, by its attorneys, Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, and Douglas B. Farquhar, Assistant United States Attorney for said District, requests this Honorable Court to instruct the jury in the above-captioned case in accordance with the proposed instructions attached hereto, in addition to, but not in limitation of, its usual instructions in a criminal case. The government further requests this honorable Court, in accordance with Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to inform counsel of its proposed actions upon the requested instructions prior to counsels' argument to the jury. Respectfully Submitted, Lynne A. Battaglia Deval L. Patrick United States Attorney Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division ________________________________ ___________________________ Douglas B. Farquhar Gerard V. Hogan Assistant United States Attorney Mary E. Healy United States Courthouse Attorneys, Criminal Section Suite 400 Civil Rights Division 6500 Cherrywood Lane U.S. Department of Justice Greenbelt, Maryland 20770 Washington, D.C. 20530 (301) 344-4034 (202) 616-3941 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CRIMINAL NO. PJM-95-0148 BRANDON SHELDON, Defendant GOVERNMENT REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1-12 The government requests the following standard instructions from Sand, Siffert, Laughlin & Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions (hereinafter referred to as "Sand"): No. 1. 2-12 (Sympathy) No. 2. 3-1 (Indictment is not evidence) No. 3. 3A-1 (Knowingly) No. 4. 3A-3 (Willfully) No. 5. 4-1 (Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof) No. 6. 5-2 (Direct and Circumstantial Evidence) No. 7. 5-4 (Testimony, Exhibits, etc.) No. 8. 2-18 (Jury to Consider Only This Defendant) No. 9. 6-1 (Inference Defined) No. 10. 6-16 (Consciousness of Guilt from Intimidation of Witness) No. 11. 7-1 (Witness Credibility) No. 12. 7-4 (Defendant's Interest if Defendant Testifies) UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.___13_____ Count One of the Indictment reads as follows: [Read Count One of Indictment] The defendant is charged in Count One of the Indictment with having violated Section 241 of Title 18, United States Code. The words of this statute that are pertinent to Count One read as follows: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any State of the United States in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same...they shall [be guilty of a crime against the United States]. ____________________________ Authority: 18 U.S.C. § 241. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____14____ Section 241 as charged by this Indictment has four elements to be considered: First: That a conspiracy, agreement, or understanding existed; Second: That the defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the conspiracy, agreement, or understanding. Third: That the purpose of the conspiracy, agreement, or understanding was willfully to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate Douglas Monahan, Joan Bennett, or her sons in the free exercise or enjoyment of the right to hold and to occupy their dwelling without injury, intimidation, or interference because of race, or in the free exercise or enjoyment of their right to associate in that dwelling with persons of another race; Fourth: That one of the intended victims of the conspiracy was an inhabitant of one of the states of the United States; If you find from the evidence that these four elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to a defendant, then proof of the offense is complete. I will now explain further each of these four elements. _________________________ Authorities: United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____15____ First, I will explain the term "conspiracy." A conspiracy is an agreement understanding, or combination of two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose. Thus, a conspiracy is, in a very true sense, a partnership in crime in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. The essence of the offense is the agreement to violate or disregard the law. What the evidence must show to establish that a conspiracy existed is that the members in some way or manner, outwardly or silently, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that they took some step or steps toward accomplishing its objectives. However, the evidence need not show that the members of an alleged conspiracy entered into any express or formal agreement, or that they directly, by words spoken or in writing, stated between themselves what their object or purpose was to be, or the details thereof, or the means by which the object or purpose was to be achieved. Ordinarily only the results of a conspiracy, rather than the agreement, are observable. To prove that a conspiracy existed, moreover, the government is not required to show that all of the members of the alleged conspiracy were named or charged. Proof of a conspiracy may be by direct evidence or by inference. Direct evidence of the agreement and purpose may come from such evidence, for example, as conversations between the conspirators themselves. When proven by inference or circumstantial evidence, the conspiracy may be deduced from acts that are done in pursuit of an apparent criminal purpose. The evidence need not establish that all the means or methods set forth in the Indictment were agreed upon by all members; nor that those means or methods which were agreed upon were actually used or put into operation; nor that all of the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such. What the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt is that the alleged conspiracy was knowingly formed in an effort to accomplish some plan or purpose of the conspiracy, as charged in the Indictment; that two or more persons, including the accused, were knowingly members of the conspiracy, as charged in the Indictment; and that the defendant knowingly contributed in some way to the accomplishment of the plan or purpose of the conspiracy. ___________________________ Authorities: Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954). Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 714 (1943). United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940).United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1981). United States v. Askew, 958 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1992). Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (4th ed., 1990), § 28.04. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____16____ For the United States to have proved the crime charged against the defendant in Count One you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally became a member of the conspiracy. A person may become a member of a conspiracy without full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy. Before the jury may find that the defendant, or any other person, became a member of a conspiracy, the evidence must show that the conspiracy was formed, and that the defendant, or other person who is claimed to have been a member, knowingly and intentionally participated in the unlawful plan with the intent to advance or further some object or purpose of the conspiracy. To participate knowingly and intentionally means to participate voluntarily and intentionally. So if the defendant, or any other person, with understanding of the unlawful character of a plan, intentionally encourages, advises or assists, for the purpose of furthering the undertaking or scheme, then he thereby becomes a knowing and intentional participant and a co-conspirator. Once you have decided that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy, the defendant is responsible for what other conspirators said or did to carry out the goals of the conspiracy, whether or not the defendant knew what they said or did. The extent of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy is not determinative of his guilt or innocence. A defendant may be convicted as a conspirator even though he may have played a minor part in the conspiracy. When proof of a conspiracy is shown, only slight additional evidence is necessary to connect a particular defendant with it. Furthermore, the United States is not required to prove that the parties to, or members of the agreement or conspiracy charged in Count One were successful in achieving any or all of the objects or goals of the agreement or conspiracy. __________________________ Authorities: Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947). United States v. Monteiro, 871 F.2d 204, 208 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 833 (1989). Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 104 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____17____ In this case, the United States has alleged that the unlawful plan of the conspiracy was "willfully to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate" the named victims in their "free exercise and enjoyment of the right to hold and to occupy their dwelling without injury, intimidation, or interference because of their race," or "the right to associate in that dwelling with persons of another race." In other words, in determining whether the second element of the crime charged in Count One has been proved, you must consider the purpose of the conspiracy and the issue of the defendant's intent in joining or forming the conspiracy. For the United States to have proved this element of the crime charged in Count One, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted "willfully" to deprive one or more of the persons named in the Indictment of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. I instruct you that an act is done "willfully" if it is done voluntarily and with the intent to do something that the law forbids, in this case, with the intent to deprive someone of a right secured by the Constitution or other laws of the United States. Intent is a state of mind and can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Indeed, it can rarely be established by any other means. In determining whether this element of intent was present you may consider all the attendant circumstances of this case. You may infer that a person ordinarily intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act knowingly done. In other words, you may infer and find that a defendant intended all the consequences that a person, standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge, should have expected to result from his act or acts knowingly done. There has been evidence presented that the Defendant took flight from the scene and attempted to conceal his role in the activities that night. If this evidence is credited by you, in light of all the instructions I am giving you, you may infer from this conduct that the Defendant's intent in burning the cross was not advocating an idea, but rather was designed to threaten and intimidate the residents of 6201 Armstrong Lane. It does not matter that the defendant may have been acting out of anger, frustration or some other emotion, provided the intent which I have described to you is also present. It is not necessary, however, for you to find that the alleged conspirators were thinking in legal terms in order to find that they acted willfully, or with the intent to interfere with a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is not necessary that the alleged conspirators knew that the right they intended to interfere with was a federally protected right, for a reckless disregard for a person's rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights. Nor does the United States have to prove that the sole purpose of the conspiracy was to interfere with that right. The United States must prove that the alleged conspirators intended to do an act which in fact would have interfered with a right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. You may find that the defendant acted with the requisite intent, that is, that the defendant acted willfully, even if you find that he had no real familiarity with the right involved, provided that you find that the defendant intended to do an act which would have the effect of depriving the victims of their federally protected right. ______________________________ Authorities: Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). United States v. Anderson, 417 U.S. 211, 223-26 (1974). United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966). United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 (1945). United States v. Dean, 722 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1983) (concerning "willfulness" in the context of § 245). United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979)(specific intent to violate constitutional right need not be predominate purpose of conspiracy but one means toward achieving common end). United States v. Price, 464 F.2d 1217, 1218 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972)(person ordinarily intends natural consequences of acts). United States v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971)(intent in the context of § 242). United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1303 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1550 (1994) (flight and concealment may be grounds for inference that Defendant was not advocating idea, but rather was designed to threaten and intimidate) UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___18___ The words "injure," "oppress," "threaten" or "intimidate" are not used in any technical sense. They are to be understood in their ordinary meaning to cover a variety of conduct intended to harm or frighten other persons or to prevent or punish the free actions of other persons. In this case, the United States has alleged that the plan and purpose of the defendant's conspiracy was to burn a cross near 9201 Armstrong Lane. If you find that the there was a conspiracy whose plan was to burn a cross, you may find that the conspiracy was one "willfully to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate" within the meaning of the law provided that you find that the conspirators intended the cross-burning to be a threat of force or intended to cause the victims to reasonably fear the imminent use of force or violence. In determining whether the cross-burning was intended as a threat of force or was intended to cause the victims to reasonably fear the imminent use of force, you may consider all the evidence in this case and the entire context in which the cross was burned. You may also consider the reaction of victims in determining whether the United States has proved this second element of the crime charged in Count One. Authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 241. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). United States v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1994). United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 825-27 (8th Cir. 1994). United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987). United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983). United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404, 408-09 (8th Cir. 1994) United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1304 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1550 (1994) United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1252 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1369 (1994) UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ____19____ Finally, with regard to the second element of Count One, the United States has alleged that the "protected right" at which the conspiracy was aimed was the right to hold and to occupy property without injury, intimidation, or interference because of race and to associate with persons of another race in their dwelling. The laws of the United States, including Section 1982 and the "Fair Housing Act" provisions of Title 42, United States Code, guarantee to all citizens the right to hold and to occupy their dwellings without injury, intimidation, or interference because of their race, and to associate with persons of another race within their dwelling. Intent to interfere with either of these rights is sufficient—the government does not need to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the goal of the conspiracy was to interfere with both of these rights. _______________________________ 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966)(statute precludes interference with all rights protected by Constitution or federal statutes). United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994). United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ___20___ The third element of the offense is present if an individual against whom the conspiracy was directed was an inhabitant of the United States. The term "inhabitant" includes any individual who was a resident of any state of the United States at the time of the acts committed as described in the Indictment. The statute and the indictment do not mean, however, that the defendants must have had in mind a particular named individual whom they knew to be an inhabitant. It is sufficient if the conspiracy charged in Count One was aimed at the identified class of victims and the class included at least one inhabitant of any state of the United States. _________________________ Authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 241. United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1960 (1992). United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987). Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552, 561 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 964 (1967). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.____21____ Although the Indictment alleges that the statutes in question were violated by various acts which are in the Indictment joined by the conjunctive "and," it is sufficient for guilt if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the violation of the statute by any one of the acts charged. For example, Count One of the Indictment alleges that the defendant conspired to "injure, intimidate, oppress, and threaten" Joan Bennett, her sons, and Douglas Monahan." The proof need only establish that the defendant conspired to injure, intimidate, oppress, or threaten Joan Bennett, or one of her sons, or Douglas Monahan. Similarly, the right "to hold and to occupy" a dwelling is the right either to hold or to occupy a dwelling. ______________________ Authorities: Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970). United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 298 (1st Cir. 1979). United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979). United States v. Anderson, 527 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1976). United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.___22___ You will notice that the Indictment sets forth a number of "overt acts" for Count One. An "overt act" is any transaction or event, even one which may be entirely innocent when considered alone, but which is knowingly committed by a conspirator in an effort to accomplish some object of the conspiracy. The United States is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants committed any overt act set forth in the Indictment, but you may consider any overt act which you believe occurred to help determine whether the conspiracy was formed and who joined it. _______________________ Authorities: United States v. Shabani, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 382 (1994)(proof of overt act not required in 21 U.S.C. § 846 where statute is silent, like § 241, about such requirement). United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct 353 (1991). United States v. Umentum, 547 F.2d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977)(citing § 241 as an example of a statute which, like 21 U.S.C. § 846, has no "overt act" requirement). United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___23____ You may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, toward the United States or toward the defendant on trial, from the fact that certain persons were not named as defendants in the same Indictment. This must play no part in your deliberations. Whether a person can or should be indicted as a defendant, and whether a person can or should be included in the same Indictment as another defendant are matters within the sole discretion of the United States Attorney or the Assistant Attorney General and the grand jury after a consideration of the available evidence and the applicable laws. Therefore, you must not consider it in any way in reaching your verdict as to the defendant on trial for the offenses in the Indictment. _________________________ Authority: 1 Sand, Siffert, Loughlin and Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions (1991), § 3.01, Instruction No. 3-4 at 3-7 (modified). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.___24____ Count Two of the Indictment of the Indictment reads as follows: [Read Count Two of Indictment] UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___25___ Section 3631 of Title 42, United States Code provides in pertinent part: Whoever... by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates, or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with -- (b) any person because he is or has been, or in order to initmidate such person or any other person...from... participating, without discrimination on account of race... in...[occupying any dwelling without regard to his or her race] shall be [guilty of an offense against the United States] _________________________ Authorities: 42 U.S.C. § 3631. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___26__ The violation of Section 3631 charged in Count Two has four elements to be considered: First: The defendant used force or threat of force; Second: The defendant intimidated or interfered with, or attempted to intimidate or interfere with, the victims' right to hold and to occupy a dwelling; Third: The defendant engaged in the conduct described because of the victims' race or color and because of their occupancy of a dwelling and their association therein; Fourth: The defendant acted willfully. I will now explain each of these four elements in more detail. ______________________ Authorities: 42 U.S.C. § 3631. US v. McDermott 29 F3d 404, 409 (8th Cir. 1994). United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. l983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984). United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1252 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1369 (1994) UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___27____ The first element of the Section 3631 offense charged in Count Three requires the use, or attempted use, of force or threat of force by the defendant. The term "force" includes the exercise and application of physical power. In common usage force means power, violence, compulsion, or restraint exerted upon or against a person or thing. The term "threat of force" means precisely what the term implies - namely a threat, either by words or gestures, to inflict some harm. While "force" itself requires some physical manifestation of violence, "threat of force" falls short of actual violence and ordinarily signifies the expression of one person's intention to act against another or to do some harm. As I instructed you earlier with regard to Count One, burning a cross may be a use or attempted use of force or a threat of force provided that you find that the defendant intended by the cross-burning to make a threat or attempted threat of force, or intended to cause the victims to reasonably fear the imminent use of force or violence. In determining whether the cross-burning was intended as a threat of force or to cause the victims to reasonably fear the imminent use of force, you may consider all the evidence in this case, including the reaction of the victims. Authorities: United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710 (1st Cir.),cert. denied, 424 U.S. 945 (1975). United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 1994). United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1987). United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___28___ For the second element of the Section 3631 offense charged in Count Two, the words "intimidate" and "interfere with" have no technical meaning; they are to be understood in their ordinary meaning, and cover conduct intended to harm or frighten other persons. It is not necessary that actual intimidation or interference be proved; an attempt to intimidate or to interfere with is sufficient. For proof of this element to be complete, the United States must prove only that the defendant's conduct was intended to intimidate or interfere with the protected right. Intimidation or interference may be inferred from violent acts or threats of force. _______________________ Authorities: 42 U.S.C. § 3631. United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 945 (1975). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___29____ The third and fourth elements of the crime charged in Count Two concerns the defendant's intent. Regarding the third element to be proved for the Section 3631 offense charged in Count Two, if you find that the Defendant engaged in the conduct alleged because of the victims' race or color and because they occupied their dwelling and associated therein with persons of another race, then proof of this element of the offense is complete. It does not matter if you find that the defendant was also acting out of anger, frustration, or some other emotion, provided the intent I have just described to you is also present. ______________________ Authorities: United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 30 The fourth element to be proved for the offense charged in Count Two is that the defendant acted "willfully." An act is done "willfully" if is done knowingly, deliberately, "on purpose," as contrasted with accidentally, carelessly, or unintentionally. If the evidence convinces you that the defendant willfully engaged in the conduct described because of the victims' race or color and because the victims' occupied their home or associated therein with persons of another race, then you may find that the third and fourth elements are proved even if he had other reasons for doing what he did. ______________________________ Authorities: Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (4th ed., 1992), § 17.04. United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___31___ Intent and motive are different concepts and should never be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted. Personal advancement and financial gain, for example, are two well-recognized motives for much of human conduct. These praiseworthy motives, however, may prompt one person to voluntary acts of good while prompting another person to voluntary acts of crime. Good motive alone is never a defense where the act done or omitted is a crime. The motive of the defendant is, therefore, immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in the determination of state of mind or the intent of the defendant. _____________________ Authority: Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (4th ed., 1992), § 17.06. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ___32_____ The defendant is also charged in Count Two with having violated § 2 of Title 18, United States Code. Title 18, Section 2 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part: Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission in punishable as a principal. A person may violate the law even though he or she does not personally do each and every act constituting the offense if that person "aided and abetted" the commission of the offense. Before a defendant may be held responsible for aiding and abetting others in the commission of a crime, it is necessary that the United States prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and deliberately associated himself in some way with the crime charged and participated in it with the intent to commit the crime. In order to be found guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of the crimes charged in Count Two of the Indictment, the United States must prove the following: First: That the crime (in Count Two) was committed; Second: That the defendant knew the crime charged was to be committed or was being committed; Third: That the defendant knowingly did some act for the purpose of helping, aiding, or encouraging the commission of that crime; and Fourth: That the defendant acted with the intention of causing the crime charged to be committed. Proof that the defendant may have known about the crime, even if he was there when it was committed, is not enough for you to find him guilty. What the United States must prove is that the defendant did something to help or to encourage the crime with the intent that the crime be committed. _______________________ Authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 2. Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (4th ed., 1992), § 18.01 (modified). Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-620 (1949). CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this ___ day of January, 1996, I caused a copy of the foregoing proposed Jury Instructions to be sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the attorney for the Defendant, Richard Bittner, 5 Light Street, Suite 510, Baltimore, Maryland 21202. ______________________________ Douglas B. Farquhar Richard C. Bittner, Esq. 5 Light Street, Suite 510 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 [cited in Civil Rights Resource Manual 60]