912
Falsity
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Section 1001 of Title 18, United States Code, requires that the
statement or representation actually be false, and the government has the
burden
of establishing the alleged falsity of the statement. Webster's 3d
International Dictionary defines the adjective "false" as "not
corresponding
to truth or reality." Although a statement may be misleading, unauthorized,
or
even fraudulent, a conviction under this section generally cannot be
sustained
unless the statement also is false. See United States v.
Diogo,
320 F.2d 898, 905-09 (2d Cir. 1963)(literally true that defendant married).
The
statute also covers half-truths where there is a duty to speak the truth--as
in
a sworn deposition before an agency. See generally United States
v.
Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 344 U.S. 604 (1953);
United States v. DeRosa, 783 F.2d 1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986).
The question whether a literally true statement can also be a false
representation is an open one. While the Diogo court held that a
literally true statement cannot be said to be a false representation, a
contrary
holding was reached in United States v. Rodgers, 624 F.2d 1303,
1310-11
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). This problem
often
can be avoided by casting the indictment in terms of a "concealment of a
material
fact" rather than the making of a false statement or representation.
Diogo, 320 F.2d 902.
A false or fictitious statement or representation is an assertion
that
is untrue when made or when used, and that is known by the person making it
to
be untrue. United States v. Worthington, 822 F.2d 315, 319 (2d
Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987). A fraudulent statement or
representation is an assertion that is known to be untrue and that is made
or
used with the intent to deceive. Id.; 2 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar & K.
O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 37.08
(1990).
The
government need prove only that the statements were false "under a
reasonable
interpretation." United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th
Cir.
1980).
But if a defendant's statement (or the government's question or
form
requiring an answer) is ambiguous, it is incumbent upon the government to
negate
any reasonable interpretation that could make the defendant's statement
factually
correct. See United States v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455 (8th
Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978); United States v. Race, 632
F.2d
1114 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517 (10th
Cir.
1994)(involving § 1341). Thus, the defendant may wish to offer
evidence,
including expert testimony, that a government form or document was vague and
ambiguous. United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 432-33 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); United States v.
Hauck, 980 F.2d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 1992). In United States v.
Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991), the court found the airman's
medical
certificate (which included two of 23 questions about "convictions" on a
form
regarding medical history) was fundamentally vague. Finally, even if a
question
is arguably ambiguous, "the defendant's understanding of the question is a
matter
for the jury to decide." United States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1136
(5th
Cir. 1980).
[cited in USAM 9-42.001] | |