The government must prove that the defendant had the specific
intent
to defraud. SeeUnited States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997
(D.C.
Cir. 1979) ("Because only 'a scheme to defraud' and not actual fraud is
required,
proof of fraudulent intent is critical."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982
(1980); see alsoUnited States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 664
(8th
Cir. 1993) (intent is an essential element, inquiry is whether defendants
intended to defraud); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1358
(2d
Cir.) (specific intent requires intent to defraud, not intent to violate the
statute), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989); cf.United
States
v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Proof that someone
was
actually defrauded is unnecessary simply because the critical element in a
'scheme to defraud' is 'fraudulent intent,' Durland v. United States,
161
U.S. 306 . . . (1896), and therefore the accused need not have succeeded in
his
scheme to be guilty of the crime."); United States v. Bailey, 859
F.2d
1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1988) (court held that there must be sufficient
evidence
that the defendant acted with intent to defraud, that is, "willful
participation
in [the] scheme with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with intent that
these illicit objectives be achieved." (quoting United States v.
Price,
623 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016
(1980),
overruled on other grounds by, United States v. DeBright, 730
F.2d
1255 (9th Cir. 1984)), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989).