In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings
which
occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the
statute.
See alsoUnited States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir.
1977),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United
States,
349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire
used
after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf.United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze
has
no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that
use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of
executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court
in
United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen
fraudulently
obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed
acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the
services
would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails
was
for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. Thus, post-purchase
mailings
or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false
sense of
security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less
suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).