Several courts have held that the unit of prosecution in a §
924(c)
case is the use of the firearm, rather than the underlying narcotics offense
or
crime of violence. Consequently, these cases hold that a single predicate
offense, such as conspiracy to distribute narcotics, can support multiple
§
924(c) counts. SeeUnited States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102,
106-09
(4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995); United
States
v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417, 423-24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct.
701 (1993). Other courts have held that the predicate offense, and not the
firearm, is the unit of prosecution for a § 924(c) violation.
SeeUnited States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 993 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1401 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied,
114 S. Ct. 1575 (1994). Under this analysis, each § 924(c) count must
be
based on a different predicate offense. Therefore, a single continuing
conspiracy -- even one that embraces multiple discrete firearms transactions
--
is insufficient to support multiple § 924(c) counts. SeeUnited
States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
To avoid exacerbating the conflict in the circuits on this issue,
the
Criminal Division urges prosecutors to base each § 924(c) count on a
separate, distinct predicate narcotics offense or Federal crime of violence.