P R O C E E D I N G S Whereupon, I. LEWIS LIBBY was called as a witness and, after first being duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand Jury, was examined and testified as follows: EXAMINATION BY MR. FITZGERALD: Q. Good morning, Mr. Libby. A. Good morning. Q. And we're going to go -- the first break will be at 10:45, but if you need a break sooner than that, let us know. I'd just like to briefly re-advise you of all your constitutional rights, which is that, again, you have the right to refuse to answer any question to which a truthful answer would tend to incriminate you. Do you understand that right? You just have to say yes or no. A. Oh, yes, sir. I'm sorry. Yes, sir. Q. And secondly, obviously even though you answered questions the last time, you still have the right to refuse to answer questions this time or change your mind at any time. Do you understand that? A. Yes, sir. Q. And obviously, you still have a right to counsel. And in fact, you are represented by Mr. Tate, the same attorney as last time. Correct? A. Correct, sir. Q. And you understand that you have a right to ask for a reasonable break, to step out of the room and consult with Mr. Tate if you'd like. Correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you also understand that your testimony is under oath and further that based upon your conduct, in particular contact with reporters, your conduct is the subject of investigation by this Grand Jury, as it was last time. Do you understand that? A. Yes, sir. Q. And as we confirmed prior to you appearing -- reappearing here this morning with your attorney, you remain the same status as a subject. You understand that? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And are you ready to proceed? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And is it fair to say, sir, that following your last Grand Jury appearance which I believe was March 5th of this year, just earlier this month, that you had a conversation with your attorney and relayed to your attorney that there were certain things that you wanted to correct or amend following your testimony? A. Yes, sir. I had additional recollections based on some of the questions you asked me. Q. And is it your understanding that your attorney then called me and told -- advised me, my office, that in fact you had two things you wanted to clarify, and that again this morning we met briefly and you clarified those two matters? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And now what I'd simply like to do is forget you talked to me before and just explain to the Grand Jury the two different areas you wanted to clarify. A. Yes, sir. You asked me about conversations with Undersecretary Marc Grossman, and at the time I couldn't remember any such discussion because I was trying to remember a serious discussion with him about this topic. One of your questions though had to do with whether I thought State had sent Under -- had sent Ambassador Wilson on this mission which was so far off the mark in terms of what I thought at the time that it stuck in my mind and I couldn't think about how -- I couldn't understand how that misunderstanding could come about. And then I -- in the middle of the night I remembered that I had joked with Undersecretary Grossman about this, not a serious discussion but a joke, and I can relay for you, if you wish, how that joke came about and what it was. Q. Sure. A. Ribbing is probably a better word. Q. Okay. A. In the -- I have to go back in times to -- so that you understand how it began. In, in the summer of 2002, before President Bush went to the U.N. and challenged the U.N. to respond seriously to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his unwillingness to -- at that point admit inspectors and abide by his obligation to turn over weapons of mass destruction, there was a debate within the interagency, meaning State Department, Pentagon, White House, about what, what type of resolution -- what resolution and what type of resolution we would need from the U.N. And one of the issues was if we were going to go the U.N. and ask the U.N. to get inspectors to Iraq readmitted, what sort of rights would we need? And the Vice President asked me to get the interagency together to determine, if you're going to go into Iraq and inspect for weapons, as difficult as that is, what is -- what are the rights that you would want, what are the authorities you would want the inspectors, the U.N. inspectors, to have, to have a reasonable shot at finding something given how difficult it would be since he had hidden all his weapons. This was the belief, the understanding at the time, that he had made great efforts to hide things. So I went to the interagency, to the NSC, and they went out to the interagency and said, we would like to get a study going of what are the types of rights you would need if you were a U.N. inspector. What would you most want to have if you could have the best set of rights you could possibly have? I received word back from some people on the NSC that Undersecretary Grossman had refused to participate, and he -- his view was that we couldn't get an ideal set of rights and that he told the NSC that I was asking for this solely in an attempt to get a long list that couldn't be achieved and then to leak it, give it to the press to embarrass Secretary Powell. That was not true and it was not why the Vice President had asked me to go develop this list. It was in order to get the best possible rights for the U.N. But it was bothersome that he was not only not just calling me and saying, hey, what's this about, but talking to people in the NSC and accusing us, in effect, of, of putting this request in bad faith when it was a request in good faith to find out what does the U.N. need. Eventually we went ahead with the study as best we could. The State Department participated only up to the point of what they thought the Secretary was likely to get, or something like that. That was, as I said, the fall of '02. Now, let me skip forward to spring, or whenever it was that we were -- I was in the SIT room. I recall now being in the SIT room with Undersecretary Grossman. We were waiting for a DC to begin, or we were waiting for them to change out between an old one and a new one. Q. Let me just stop you there. When you say "DC", do you mean Deputies Committee Meeting? A. I'm sorry, yes, sir. Q. Okay. A. A Deputies Committee. And we were standing there and just waiting for it to go. And I -- to fill the time, I ribbed Undersecretary Grossman by saying something like this guy who went out to Niger was one of yours. And he smiled and said, no, not one of ours, one of theirs, and pointed down the table towards where the CIA officer usually sits in the Interagency Meeting. And I said, but he was an ambassador, meaning he was, you know, formerly at least at one point a State Department person, and I was ribbing him about basically that a State Department person had been leaking something when he had been nine months before accusing us. And then, then I said something about it's a, it's a sad state of affairs when the CIA -- again, this was another ribbing again or -- it's a sad state of affairs when the CIA has to get their own ambassador to send to a country to ask questions about what our embassy could be asking about, in effect. Again, it was just a joke. And Grossman -- Undersecretary Grossman said something or other. The ambassador in Niger was a woman. I don't recall her name. But I said something else to him, like, did she know that he had been sent out there, or something like that. And that's what I recall from the, from the conversation. It was mostly, you know, filling time getting ready for another meeting, and none of it was I thinking of a serious discussion since the one thing that was clear was that the CIA had sent, had sent this ambassador out there. So that was my -- that's my recollection. Q. Do you know when this was in terms of the -- there was a Pincus article that came out on May 6th, and which referred to a former ambassador, but not by name. And then later on there was a June 12th Pincus article. Do you know where in this time frame this, this conversation would have occurred with Undersecretary Grossman? A. I don't. I think it was a Kristof article on May 6th. You may have -- Q. Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you. I meant to say Kristof. A. I don't know, I thought you said Pincus. But in any case, the May 6th article referred to an ambassador. I don't recall, I don't recall where it was. I, I remember that it was a session and standing next to him in the SIT room. Q. Would you place this conversation in May or June as opposed to July of 2003? And, and I mis-spoke. It was Kristof in May and Pincus on June 12th, and obviously you had the Wilson op-ed on July 6th. Do you know if it was before or after Wilson himself had come out by name? A. I think it was before Wilson had come out. I think it was in the first half of June I would say. Q. And was this a single conversation with Mr. Grossman about this? A. Yes, that's all I remember. Q. Do you know if you ever had a conversation about the topic of this ambassador, whether you mentioned his name as Wilson or not, where you asked him to find something out and then he got back to you? A. No. No, I don't remember anything about that. And I don't think I mentioned his name in that conversation because I don't think I knew it at that point. Q. And was there any discussion during that conversation as you recall it about whether or not this ambassador's wife had worked at the CIA? A. Not that I recall. Q. And when you had this conversation how did Mr. Grossman appear to take your comment? Seriously or lightly? A. I thought he understood it lightly. Q. And is that the only conversation you recall about the topic of the ambassador traveling to Niger with Mr. Grossman during May, June and July of 2003? A. It's the only one that I recall, yeah. Q. So we're clear, you had no conversation with Mr. Grossman ever telling you that the ambassador had a wife who worked at the CIA, at any time? A. I don't recall him ever telling me that. Q. Now, you also -- there was a second part of your testimony you wanted to clarify or amplify? A. Yes. You asked me about a lunch with Ari Fleischer on July 7, the day after Ambassador Wilson's column came out. And you also asked me about the gaggle in the morning, and I had sort of forgotten that our lunch followed the morning -- a morning gaggle where he had made points about the Vice President. And I recall that somewhere in the course of that lunch, the first portion of it, as I recall, I thanked him for having covered the points in the gaggle, so I did discuss that part of it. Q. Okay. And is it still your recollection that you also discussed his future employment at that time, on July 7th -- A. Yes, sir. Q. -- with Ari Fleischer? A. Yeah. Q. And that you discussed the Miami Dolphins with Ari Fleischer on July 7? A. Yes, sir. Q. Still no recollection at all of ever discussing the fact that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA with Mr. Fleischer? A. I don't think so, sir. I have no more -- I hade no more recollection after our discussion. The only thing that I recalled anew was the bit about the gaggle. Q. You have no recollection of ever telling Mr. Fleischer that this is either hush-hush, or q.t. or words to that effect, that Wilson's wife works out at the CIA? A. No, sir, I don't. Q. And no discussion that you recall where either one of you implied with Wilson had obtained the assignment to go to Niger as a result of perceived nepotism? A. No, sir, not that I recall. Q. And -- now, you also testified -- well, let me go back to June 6th, and we did not ask you about this last time, but your calendar reflected that you had a meeting on June 6th with Richard Armitage. And do you recall if you ever discussed the topic of Mr. Wilson's wife's employment at the CIA with Richard Armitage? A. Is this June 6th a meeting at the State Department with him? Q. I'm not sure where the meeting was. And forget the June 6th date. Did you at any time ever discuss Wilson's wife's employment with Mr. Armitage? A. Not that I recall. Q. And how close are you to Mr. Armitage? A. I mean, I see him a lot. I'm not that -- you know, we don't, we don't go out socially, but I see him in DCs, Deputies Committee meetings, once every couple weeks. For a while it was more frequent but we don't go as much as we used to. Q. And how long have you known Mr. Armitage? A. I've known him for years, 1982, 1983, 1984 I knew him. Q. Did you represent Mr. Armitage at one time? A. I did, when I was practicing law I represented him with regard to a libel matter, he was being libeled. Q. Would that be in or about 1989? Was that a dispute with Ross Perot on something? A. Yes, it was. The libel was separate from Ross Perot. Yes, there was also a dispute in that same time period with Ross Perot. Yes, sir. Q. And do you know if there ever came a time if you ever discussed with Mr. Armitage any outstanding requests for information with -- from, from Mr. Grossman when Mr. Grossman was on vacation? A. Not that I recall. Q. And do you recall in the June time frame ever receiving a document from the White House Situation Room, a fax that was to be hand-delivered to you and to John Hannah which contained a document that the CIA had prepared in earlier 2003? Does that ring a bell with you at all? A. I don't know about the Hannah being on a document. I did receive documents from the CIA, you know, that came through the SIT room, and those -- if I retained them, they would be in my documents. Q. Okay. And by the way, I think that's the first time I mentioned the name John Hannah. Can you tell us what John Hannah's role is in the Office of Vice President? A. John Hannah works in the National Security Affairs Office of the Office of the Vice President, and he's a specialist on greater Middle Eastern Affairs. Q. Okay. And in the reporting chain, who does he report to? A. He reports to my Deputy and then to me, I suppose. Q. And who -- what's the name of your Deputy that Mr. Hannah reports to? A. It varied. Prior to June of '03 it was Eric Edelman, now Ambassador, Ambassador Eric Edelman. And since about that time Toria Nuland is my new Deputy. Q. How would you spell -- A. Victoria. Q. Oh, Victoria? A. Victoria Nuland. Q. Okay. A. Nuland is N-u-l-a-n-d; Victoria is the traditional spelling. Q. Okay. And why don't I show you some documents that -- what we'll do is we won't mark them as exhibits. We'll refer to the Bates Stamp Numbers so we have it for the record, but this way we can deal with declassification issues at a later time. A. Okay. And they will be a series beginning 1456 forward, Katie, which would include page 1538, 1552. Okay, show you a document. MS. KEDIAN. 1538. BY MR. FITZGERALD: Q. Let me start with 1456. In the meantime, I'll show you 1445. Let me show you what's a document -- it's Bates Stamped 1445 and without getting into the contents it's from, from John Hannah to the Vice President and concerning a CIA paper on the Iraq/Niger/uranium deal. Do you recognize that? A. I do, sir. Q. Okay. And do you recall receiving it on or about June 9th? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall what it was that occasioned Mr. Hannah to prepare this? A. We had gotten a paper from the CIA. It was a very long paper. I think it's attached here, eight single-spaced pages with a lot of data in it, and a lot of dates and meetings and discussions, and he undertook to summarize some of the things that were in the CIA paper down to, I guess, two and a half pages. Q. Okay. And looking at page 1449, does that appear to be a cover sheet of what the CIA transmitted to Congress in April, 2003, regarding Iraq and Niger, and then the document you described as an eight-page single-spaced document followed behind it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then the document that Mr. Hannah prepared is a summary of what was contained in the transmission from CIA to Congress which included the eight page single-spaced statement? A. Yes, sir. This was a document not, not prepared for us, but one they had prepared for Congress and we were getting a copy of it. Q. Right. So in, in early 2003, and specifically on the date reflected on page 1449, April 3rd, the CIA gives something to Congress, and if you look at the fax header on 1449 and 1450 it sounds like on June 9th you get a copy sent, and the fax header seems to come from the Op Center to the Vice President's Office, and then John Hannah, on June 9th prepares this summary of the document? A. I don't see the fax cover. I don't know what -- Q. We'll, we'll produce that later, I think. But there's a June 9th fax sheet that says -- A. Okay. Q. -- please hand-deliver to yourself and Mr. Hannah. So in other words, this was not something you received, to your knowledge, in March when it was sent to Congress, this was something you received on June 9th? A. I did not -- my, my recollection is I did not receive it when it went to, to Congress. Q. Let me show you a transmittal sheet. Actually, that's a three page one -- we'll show you -- okay. If looking at page 1450 -- the handwriting on page 1456, the upper left corner. Does that read, "Did CIA have it in their document?" The handwriting? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know whose hand -- whose printing that is? A. I, I don't. It could be Hannah, but I don't know. Q. Okay. Now, once Mr. Hannah prepared the summary memo and attached the CIA memo from earlier that year, what happened with this document? Were there any meetings concerning it or discussions that you attended? A. I don't recall any meetings about -- specifically about the document. I recall reading the document and referring to it subsequently when I was, you know, talking about this issue. Q. Okay. And when you say subsequently, when would that be? A. In, in the weeks and months that followed as we were looking at the uranium issue. There was some interest -- there were some interesting in points that I didn't know. Q. Okay. And showing you what we'll mark by the Bates Stamp Numbers 1472, does that appear to be a cover sheet -- A. Yes. Q. -- for Monday, June 9th, 2003? A. Yes, sir. Q. To Jenny Mayfield. And does it say, "Please pass to Mr. Hannah and Mr. Libby ASAP?" A. Yes. Q. And does that appear to include the CIA transmittal sheet to Congress from earlier that year, and then that eight page document you referenced? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you know if you discussed this with the Vice President on or about June 9th when this was prepared? A. I did discuss points in that memorandum with the Vice President. I don't recall exactly when it was. Q. Okay. And do you know if you discussed the identity of the envoy who had gone from -- who had been sent from the United States, or the source, who had gone to Niger in 2002 to investigate the yellowcake claims with Vice President? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And do you know when you discussed that? A. At various times it was discussed. I don't know if it came up specifically with regard to this fax or not. The fax refers to the envoy having gone in a paragraph, in the course of the eight pages they talk about it, but I don't recall whether this occasioned one of the discussions about, you know, who is this envoy and how did he come to be sent and that sort of thing. Q. Okay. Let me show you a different but similar document that is Bates Stamped 1537 in the lower right corner. And do you recognize that document? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And what is this document? A. I'm not as familiar with this document as I am with this one. I studied this one more closely than this document. I think I recognize this document from having seen something like it in my files. There's a writing at the top which says, "prepared by CIA," and I haven't read it just sitting here. I don't recall when I last read it, if I ever read it fully, but I see that it looks to be sort of like the document that you showed me before where they're going through paragraph by paragraph, different chronological events seemingly in order, chronological order. Q. And on 1537 there's handwriting that says, "prepared by CIA" in the upper right corner, "received July 12th, '03," do you know whose handwriting that is? A. I don't. It looks a little bit like the Vice President's but I don't know whose handwriting it is. Q. Okay. And if you turn to the second page, page 1538, and next to paragraph number six there's a handwriting that says, "Wilson" with an underlining and a question mark. And do you know whose handwriting that is? A. I, I don't. Again, it might be the Vice President's but I'm not sure. Q. And looking at the cover sheet that had shown on June 9th that said, "please pass to Mr. Hannah and Mr. Libby ASAP," do you know if there's a particular event on June 9th which I -- which I'm referring to 1472, I've taken that away from you. Seeing that the CIA sent a document over to the office ASAP on June 9th, Mr. Hannah the same day prepared a summary, do you know what it was that occasioned this ASAP delivery of this CIA report of uranium and Niger? A. I, I do not know. It is around the time that we were doing the Pincus article, you know, preparing to talk to Pincus, so it could be in relation to that, or it could just be an inquiry, but I don't know. ASAP is not a particularly, you know, hair on fire type marking, but I don't, I don't know. Q. You understand ASAP stands for "as soon as possible"? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And whatever time it got to -- over to the -- it says it was delivered at -- it appears to be June 9, 2003. I don't know if it has a -- it doesn't appear to have a time. A. It says 9:00 p.m. -- Q. At 9:00 p.m. And then the memo from John Hannah that describes the information, CIA paper, and referring to page 1445 again, is dated June 9th, 2003. And that would be a two and a half page summary. So if in fact it got to -- over to the office at 9:00 p.m. on a Monday night in June, if Mr. Hannah dated it correctly, he created a summary sometime thereafter. So -- A. Yes, sir. Q. And that was during the time frame when you were talking with the Vice President and others about how to respond to Mr. Pincus' inquiries for an article he would eventually publish on June 12th. Correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. And at the time did you know the name of the envoy who had gone to Niger as being Mr. Wilson? A. No, sir. Not the best I recall. Q. And looking at -- if we could pull out 1552. And do you recall if you had a meeting, sat down with Vice President Cheney and with Mr. Hannah concerning this between June 9th and the time you spoke to Mr. Pincus? A. I don't recall. Q. And let me show you what's been marked as Bates Stamps 1552, 1553. And again, we'll just mark it for the record without admitting it so we can deal with classification issues later. Is that a CIA cable concerning the trip that Ambassador Wilson took to Niger -- A. Yes, sir. Q. -- in 2002? And is there handwriting on the first page? A. Yes, sir. Q. And does it say the word "Wilson"? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you know whose handwriting that is? A. Again, it looks to me like it might be the Vice President's. Q. And do you recall ever discussing this cable with the Vice President where he would have written down the name Wilson? A. I recall discussing the cable with the Vice President. I don't recall him having written the name Wilson on the cable while we talked about it, if that's what the -- if that's what your question means. I recall discussing the Wilson cable, cable about Mr. -- Ambassador Wilson with him. Q. And what were the circumstances under which you discussed the Wilson cable with the Vice President? A. It probably came up -- it came up multiple times. Part of what came up about it is in this paragraph two which is underlined by whoever wrote this where they say that Myoki, the former Nigerian Prime Minister, related that an Iraqi delegation had tried to make contact with the government of Niger to open discussions for, I think what's called "commercial relations" in here, which they understood to mean uranium. You know, they don't make C.D. players in Niger. "Commercial relations" was meant -- they understood to mean to purchase uranium. Q. And so is it fair to say when the allegations came out in the Kristof column and later in the Wilson piece, that Wilson's trip had sort of debunked the sixteen words contained in the State of the Union that one of the points the Vice President and yourself wanted to make was that you believed that Wilson's trip had sort of corroborated the sixteen words to the extent that he had reported back that there had been prior efforts to open commercial -- or establish commercial relations between Iraq and Niger? A. Yes, sir. That's what we understood the Agency took this -- the Agency took that to mean, and from this it looks that way to us too. Q. Let me show you 1588. And is that another copy of a cable containing information concerning a trip, the trip to Niger by Ambassador Wilson even if it does not name -- even though it doesn't name Mr. Wilson in the text? A. Yes, sir. I think it's the same cable, just a different format. Q. If you look at 1588, does that have some handwriting in the upper right corner? A. Yes, sir. Q. And does that say "Joe Wilson"? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know whose handwriting that is? A. It looks like it could be the Vice President's. I don't recognize the "J" but, you know, it could be the Vice President's. Q. Does the "Wilson" part look like the Vice President's? A. It looks more similar to the other writing we've seen. Yes, sir. Q. And let me show you what's been marked as 1784 Bates Stamp. And if you look at 1784, does the text -- if you're looking at the text, does that appear to mirror page two of the document we've been talking about? And I'll give you a page to compare it to. Does the text appear to match 1475 which is the page two of that eight page single-spaced document which the CIA had prepared in March of 2003, shared with Congress and then was forwarded to the Office of Vice President on June 9th? A. Yes, sir. It looks like a different version of the same thing. Q. Okay. And does page 1784 in your right hand have printing and handwriting in the left column? A. Yes, sir. Q. And does it say "Joe Wilson" in print, and then underneath "Wilson" in script? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recognize the printing? A. No, sir. Q. Do you recognize the script? A. It looks like me. Q. Okay. And do you know -- A. It looks like my writing. Q. Looks like -- okay, looks like your handwriting. And the printing, does that look like your printing? A. Does not. Q. Okay. A. It's too neat. Q. Okay. So it would look like someone else printed "Joe Wilson" and you handwrote "Wilson" underneath? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And does that look like anyone you recognize -- does the printing look like the printing of anyone you recognize or familiar with? A. No, sir -- Q. Okay. Does it look like the printing of either the Vice President or Cathie Martin, or anyone else you work closely with? A. I don't know. We -- I don't think it looks like Cathie Martin, but I'm not really that familiar -- we do have some documents that have her writing on it. It's not mine. Q. Okay. A. It's too neat. Q. So the printing on 1784 is not yours and you don't know whose it is. The handwriting on 1784, "Wilson" appears to be you? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then the other ones we've shown before say "Wilson", a number of them look similar and appear that they could be the Vice President? A. Correct, sir. Q. And seeing the various documents and various iterations with a number of references to "Wilson" or "Joe Wilson," does that refresh your recollection as to discussions you may have had in the June time frame with the Vice President about Mr. Wilson's trip to Niger? A. Not more than the others. I don't know that the writing happened -- at least my writing happened -- I don't think happened in the June time frame. Q. How often did you refer back to the June cables to refresh what was in the cables and make notes as to what it -- you know, about, for example, Wilson? A. Fairly frequently if I was about to engage about it with someone. I would have to go look at it, or I would try to go look at it to make sure that I was fresh on the document. Q. And who would you be engaging with that would cause you to go back and refresh the document? A. When I was -- if I was going to go talk to a reporter about it, or if I was getting ready to talk to a reporter about it, about the Wilson trip, or if I was going to go talk to the Vice President about it or anyone where we're talking about the substance. Q. And the last time we showed you a document that you had dated as approximately June 12th which indicated a discussion at that time with the Vice President where you noted that he had indicated to you that the ambassador's wife had worked at the functional office at the CIA, referred to as CPD, the Counterproliferation Division. Do you recall that? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you know if you had reviewed some -- any of these documents, the Wilson cable or the June 9th report, with Vice President Cheney at or about the time of the conversation where he told you that the ambassador's wife worked at the functional office in Counterproliferation? A. Did I review the CIA document that's dated June 9 and the cover memo? Q. Yes. A. I mean, the transmittal dated June 9? Yes, that would be at or about the time of that note which I was guessing was some time around June 12. Before June 12 actually. Q. And is it fair to say that before June 12 there was a fair amount of discussion of the envoy's trip to Niger and, and that discussion included the comments you recall where the Vice President told you that this envoy's wife worked at the CIA? A. I'm sorry, I missed it. I didn't get -- Q. There was conversation during the early June time frame between yourself and the Vice President where you were discussing this envoy's trip to Niger. Correct? A. Yes. Q. And during that -- those conversations you learned from the Vice President that the envoy's wife worked at the functional office concerning Counterproliferation at the CIA. Correct? A. I think I only learned that in, in one telephone conversation from -- I only had one -- that I recall, I only had one conversation about that point with the Vice President. It was not a fuller discussion of the substance like this cable. It was a very short discussion which was relaying to me something he had learned. So, so not in the course of a discussion about the cables particularly. It was a short conversation and I only recall one on that. Q. And is it fair to say that during the time frame you were having discussions with the Vice President in preparation for your speaking to Mr. Pincus who was going to write an article for the Washington Post? A. I think that was the discussion prior to my talking to Pincus. Q. Okay. And when you say that was the discussion, the discussion -- A. The one, the one where I wrote the notes that you're referring to. Q. Okay. So the conversation reflected in the notes where the Vice President advised you that the envoy's wife worked at the CIA in Counterproliferation was a discussion you had with the Vice President in preparation for your speaking to Mr. Pincus? A. Yes. There were two parts to that conversation. There was a background session and then there were the points that I was supposed to raise with Pincus. The point about the wife was in the first part, physically on the paper anyway. And the points for the -- to raise with Pincus were at the bottom of the page. Q. And do you recall if your notes distinguished between background and what to raise with Mr. Pincus when you wrote them down? A. Yes, they do to me. Q. And did you ever have a discussion with Mr. -- where the Vice President told you either that you should or should not tell Mr. Pincus about the envoy's wife's employment at the CIA? A. No. Q. Did you ask the Vice President whether it was appropriate if you could tell Mr. Pincus this fact? A. No. Q. And is it possible that you told Mr. Pincus that fact? A. No, I don't think I did. Q. You don't recall doing so? A. I don't recall doing so and I don't -- I do not recall doing so. Q. And did you understand at the time that you were legally prohibited from doing so? A. No. Q. And the last time we spoke you indicated that you had a conversation with Judith Miller on July 8th. Is that fair to say? A. Correct, sir. Q. About how long was that conversation? A. An hour perhaps, maybe, maybe a little over. Q. And you mentioned that prior to having that conversation you had a discussion with Vice President Cheney as to what you could discuss with Judith Miller? A. Correct, sir. Q. And can you tell us when you had the conversation with the Vice President and what concerns you raised, and what he told you in response? A. The Vice President and I discussed the need to get into the public domain that the CIA National Intelligence Estimate made it clear to recipients of the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq had been attempting to procure uranium. This was similar to the point that the President raised in the State of the Union in the famous sixteen words. And despite the fact that there had been a lot of talk about particular documents having been forged, the Vice President's point was that the policy makers, he, had seen and had relied upon the National Intelligence Estimate, which is sort of the gold standard of the consensus view of all the intelligence community, that Iraq was attempting to procure uranium. And he felt that that point should get out because that's what he understood at the time when the President gave his State of the Union. The National Intelligence Estimate was a classified document at that point. It's a very -- it's a long document. The portion about uranium is short and there's some key judgments at the front that were short, which are short compared to the length of the document. And the problem in letting people know what the National Intelligence Estimate said on that was that it's a classified document. So we could not talk to the press about it until it was declassified, and I discussed that with the Vice President. It was -- it's within the purview of the President, as I understand, and I was informed by the General Counsel to the Vice President's Office, that the National Intelligence Estimate, or any other document that's classified, can be declassified by the President if he wishes. And so the Vice President thought we should get some of these facts out to the press, but before it could be done, the document had to be declassified. I had had a conversation with David Addington that we talked about in our last session when he relayed that. He had mentioned to me a legal case. I had written down the name of the legal case. I'd forgotten it the first time. I came back to him, had a second conversation, wrote it down in my notes, reported to the Vice President. I reconfirmed with David Addington about this. And he then undertook to get, to get permission from the President to talk about this to a reporter. He got the permission. Told me to go off and talk to the reporter. My recollection is that I did not accomplish it right away, and he told me at one point to hold up, and then he came back and said to go ahead. And so at that point I went ahead and scheduled the meeting and had the discussion. Q. Okay. Now, can you fix the date when you first spoke to the Vice President about trying to get the facts out from the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, and then you in that conversation expressed your reservations because it was a classified document? A. No. I think there were several over a period of time, none of them being long. It was not a long debate. But there was several times it was talked about that, you know, the NIE was clear, this cable was actually not persuasive even to Director Tenet or the CIA as Director Tenet made clear in his July 11th statement. When the entire NIE was declassified, these portions of the NIE were declassified by the Agency and then provided to the press on July 18, it was clear from that text that it was all declassified. So there were discussions about that. There were discussions about getting the Agency to declassify it separately. There were discussions with the Vice President all -- for some time as I recall. But again, not, not developed discussions. It was a point that, you know, it would be good to have this out, but it would have to be declassified. And I can't give you a precise date for those. Q. Okay. Let's walk backwards. July 18th was the date that it became publicly available and declassified, is it your understanding, of the NIE? A. It became -- these sections. Not the entire NIE. Sections -- the CIA declassified sections of the NIE in advance of July 18. On July 18 it was passed out, I think. So some time before that, the CIA did. The President had already declassified some of it. Q. And, and when you say the President had already declassified it, you're referring to what you had been told by Vice President Cheney as to the fact that the President gave you permission to talk about parts of the NIE with Judith Miller? A. Yes, sir. I don't think the President knew Judith Miller, but the -- with, with the press. Yes, sir. Q. And did the Vice President know Judith Miller at the time he authorized you to discuss it? A. Yes, I think -- at one of the -- before the final -- before I actually went and talked to Judith Miller I think he knew it was Judith Miller I was going to talk to. Yes, sir. Q. Focusing on your meeting on July 8th with Judith Miller. How long before -- was that a conversation you had the day before with the Vice President where he asked you to share the -- some of the relevant materials from the NIE and then you brought to his attention the classification issue? A. There was a discussion with him the day before, roughly the day before. It was not the first time we had discussed the declassification issue, and I think by that point the declassification issue, I think, was resolved. But, but -- if, if that's complete. Q. Okay. When was it -- was Judith Miller the first reporter you, you discussed the NIE with? A. The first reporter that I discussed the text of the NIE with. Con -- National Security Advisor Rice in mid-June or so had been talking about the NIE having statements about, you know, that it was the source and it was, you know, it was clear that Iraq was seeking uranium or something like that. She had been discussing that in June to the press and it was reported in the press about the NIE. In terms of the first discussion I ever had about, you know, the language of the text, yes. Q. Okay. A. And the only, I think -- Q. Okay. A. -- prior to after the 18th. Q. Okay. And with, with -- was it your understanding that you would show the text of the relevant portions of the NIE to Judith Miller when you discussed it with the Vice President? A. Yes, sir. Q. And did you in fact show those relevant portions of the text? A. Talked it through with her and I think I gave it to her, showed it to her, an excerpt. Q. Okay. And when you showed it to her did you let her read the relevant portions of the whole document or did you have a redacted version? A. Oh, no, redacted. Q. And did she get to keep the redacted copy? A. I think I gave her a page which had bullets from it, not a xerox of it but bullets of it, I think, where it was redacted and I think, I think what I showed her had country names omitted. It was less than what I had been authorized to share with her. Q. Okay. Who created that document? A. I did. Q. Personally? A. Yes. Well, you know, I, I didn't type it I don't suppose, but I directed it to be done. Q. Okay. So do you know who would have typed it? A. Well, if I didn't type it, then I assume it would have been Jenny Mayfield, my assistant. Q. Do you type? A. I do type. Q. You're not big on e-mail I take it? A. No. Not in this job. I was in my prior job. Q. Okay. And when you type, do you type at a word processor and print it out? A. Yeah. Q. In reviewing the documents for production for discovery or compliance with the subpoenas, have you ever seen a copy of the redacted document that you shared with Ms. Miller? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. A. Well, I'm not sure exactly what I shared but I think I have. Q. And how long was the document in terms of pages? A. A third of a page. Q. And did you share that document with the Vice President prior to sharing it with Judith Miller? A. No, sir. Q. So what was your understanding? What did the Vice President tell you the limits were on what you could share with Judith Miller from what was contained in the NIE? A. I could talk to her about the uranium section of the NIE and about some of the key judgments from the NIE which made it clear that Iraq was seeking weapons of mass destruction. Q. And what was it that you understood was new in what you could share with Judith Miller that hadn't been in the public domain yet, hadn't been discussed by other government officials? A. The language of the NIE which was -- which is quoted in Director Tenet's statement on July 11th, was that Iraq had begun to vigorously pursue, something like this, very close to it. Iraq had begun to vigorously pursue the acquisition of uranium or the procurement of uranium, something like that. Q. So the phrase including, including the word "vigorously" trying to obtain or procure uranium was what the Vice President wanted you to get into the public domain through Judith Miller? A. Yes. Flat declarative statement that it was so. And that there were other instances, I guess. There were several countries mentioned. There were countries mentioned in addition to Niger. Q. And had anyone asked you, any other reporters asked you, about the NIE prior to your July 8th conversation with Judith Miller? A. I don't recall any. Q. You met with David Sanger from the New York Times on July 2nd. Correct? A. Uh-hum. Q. Do you know if you discussed the NIE with David Sanger at that time? A. I don't recall. There are notes of that conversation. I don't recall discussing it as I sit here. If I did, it was in the general sense that Dr. Rice had discussed it without reference to the particular language. Q. And do you know if you had a conversation with the Vice President before you talked to Mr. Sanger about whether or not he wanted you to share some of the contents of the NIE concerning Niger and uranium with David Sanger? A. I probably alerted the Vice President that I would be meeting with Sanger, but I don't think we discussed anything about the specific language of the NIE at that point. Q. And the fact that you're meeting with David Sanger that did not trigger a conversation with the Vice President about what your authority was to discuss classified documents. Is that fair to say? A. I don't know. We would have been discussing it in that period. I don't know that the meeting with Sanger, with David Sanger, was critical for that. Q. Was it the meeting with Judith Miller, with a reporter that would turn out to be Judith Miller, was that the event that triggered your conversation with the Vice President about sharing the content of a classified document and your conversation with David Addington, the Counsel for the Office of Vice President? A. Again, I don't think so. I think more the other way around. There, there was this controversy about the famous sixteen words and uranium, and the implication that people were drawing is that because the IAEA in March had discovered that the documents were forged, somehow the President didn't have a good faith belief that -- and the people who put the statement in the speech, which was not us, did not have a good faith belief on -- that Iraq was in fact seeking the -- to obtain uranium. And the NIE and other documents made it clear that in fact the Agency was advising the policy makers that Iraq had sought to procure uranium from Niger and so there was a general discussion which went on during that week separate and apart from the Judith Miller discussions with Director Tenet to try and get the CIA to make a statement, you know, as soon as possible that would lay out what was in the NIE and the other documents that had been put forward, some of which are detailed in this memorandum that you showed me earlier. Q. Your conversations with the Vice President about wanting to get information from the NIE out into the public domain but having concerns about the classification issue, did those take place in person with the Vice President? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And is it fair to say that the whole issue of the sixteen words took on an entirely different dimension after the July 6th op-ed piece by Mr. Wilson, the July 6th Meet the Press appearance, and then the July 7th statement that appeared to step back from the sixteen words by Ari Fleischer? A. The statement from Ari Fleischer definitely changed the atmosphere. It added to the heat. I mean, it was a lot of heat to begin with which was what led Ari Fleischer to, to make his statement. Q. The, the discussions that led to sharing information with Judith Miller, did they come as a result or did they come after the July 6th op-ed by Wilson and the July 6th appearance by Meet the Press -- on Meet the Press by Mr. Wilson? A. I think they preceded and followed the discussion, the Wilson op-ed piece. Q. And do you know when the Vice President eventually told you that he had gotten permission from the President for you to share this information with Ms. Miller? Was that after July 6th? A. I don't recall. I think it, I think it may have -- remember, I had this is recollection that there were -- a period when he said go ahead, and then a period when he said stop, and go ahead. I don't recall how compressed that was. Q. Did he give you a reason why he told you to stop after he had first told you to go ahead? A. No, I think he probably just -- his sense of when the right timing was. And then again, as I say, he then told me to proceed again. Q. Let me show you what we'll refer to in the record as a document Bates Stamped 1746, which I believe are some of your handwritten notes. Would you take a look at that page? And as you'll see, there's an entry -- I'll point to it, three-quarters of the way down the page that appears to be your symbol for the Vice President, a Y with the line over it. And can you tell us what the rest of that entry says? A. It's his instruction to me to telephone Judith Miller -- Q. Okay. A. -- is how I read it. Q. Is it the Vice President colon -- and is the next reference S.L. -- A. Yes. Q. -- meaning "Scooter" Libby? A. Yes, sir. Q. And then there's a symbol which I'll skip past in a moment, and it says "Miller"? A. Yes, sir. Q. And is the symbol a "T" with an arrow under, under it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And is that your instruction to "telephone"? A. Yes. Q. And what do you recall that means? It's dated in the upper left corner, as I understand, "July 8th, '02," but I think, it's our understanding is that the '02 might be a typo, and it's July 8th, '03. A. Yes. I don't think that's my handwriting actually. I think that may be Jenny's. Q. Okay. A. Jenny Mayfield. I'm sorry, but I lost the question when I was thinking about the handwriting. Q. Okay. And what did that reference mean? A. It was the Vice President telling me to go ahead and talk to Judith Miller. Q. Okay, and is that, is that -- as far as you understand it, is that the final instruction to speak with her? A. I don't know that from this. It looks like it based on the date at the top of the page, if the date's accurate. Q. And do you know when you arranged to have -- where does Ms. Miller work? A. She works in, I think, Washington and New York. But I'm not sure. Q. Do you know where she spends most of her time? A. I don't. I would guess New York but I'm not sure. Q. And do you know when you spoke with her if she was in town or if she made a trip down from New York to come see you? A. I think it was set up the day before and I think she was either in Washington or going to be in Washington, so I don't think it was a special trip, but I'm not sure. I mean, this is what I think she told me. Q. And so was the, the meeting being set up the day before, July 7th, and with your note being July 8th that the Vice President told you to telephone Judith Miller, is it your understanding that the initial decision to tell her would have been on July 7th and it would have been reaffirmed again on July 8th? A. That could be. Q. And do you know if you spoke to Judith Miller on July 7th in advance of this meeting yourself? A. I think I spoke to her on the phone to set up the meeting. I recall my having spoken to her not the same day, the day before, but it's possible it was the same day. Just a recollection. Q. And this meeting did not happen at the Office of the Vice President. Is that correct? A. Correct. Q. Where did you meet? A. We met at the St. Regis Hotel which is, you know -- I think it's the closest hotel to the -- in the, in the coffee shop of the hotel, or the restaurant. Q. And is there a reason you met at her hotel rather than at the -- at your office? A. I think I wanted to meet with her at lunch, over lunch, but my schedule or her schedule couldn't do the lunch so we met for coffee instead. Q. And isn't it fair to say, it's easier usually for you if the people come to your office and you sit in your office and meet and take less time out of your day than for you to go out to see a reporter outside the building? A. It's easier but I often go out. Yes, it is easier. Q. And when you meet with reporters, would you say you more often meet them inside your building versus you going to meet them at a hotel or restaurant? A. It depends on the purpose really. Many times reporters want to come to see me to get -- say they're doing a profile piece on the, on the Vice President, meaning a piece about his background or what he does every day type, you know, one of these soft news stories. Often those people, we'll have them come in, I see them in the office. When I want to discuss sort of more of how the administration is approaching an issue, some type of an off-record discussion, I often choose to do that over lunch. It's part of my job to talk to the press about different sorts of things and one of the types of things we do when we talk to them is, you know, here's how the administration generally is thinking about Iraq. We'll have a discussion like that, or about China. I'll have that usually as an off-the-record discussion over lunch just to orient them to how we think about a problem. And it was that type of atmosphere that I thought was the right atmosphere for this. Q. But you didn't have lunch. Correct? A. We couldn't. That's why we had coffee. Q. And that was 8 o'clock in the morning? A. I've forgotten the time. I thought it was a little later but it could be 8:00. Q. Okay. Was there any -- was the fact that you were meeting with her and sharing information with her exclusively one of the factors that wanted you to meet with her outside of the building? A. It could have been. It was also consistent with that. Q. And the fact that you were sharing a document with her that you were not sharing with others, did you -- did that factor into your meeting with her at the hotel and not in your building? A. I could do that in the office also, but it was also useful to do it -- it had the right atmosphere to do it at the St. Regis or someplace other than the office. So it would be a more relaxed sort of setting was the primary reason. But since I was going to be sharing this declassified document with her, it was also useful to do it outside the building, although I could have done it inside. Q. And is it your understanding the document had been declassified or is it your understanding that it was a classified document but that you were authorized to share it with Ms. Miller? A. No, declassified. Q. You understood it to be declassified because the Vice President had told you that the President had authorized you to talk about it? A. Yes, sir. Because the President -- there's no magic process that I -- according to counsel that has to be gone through. If the President says to talk about this document, it is then a declassified document. And that was the understanding that I had with the Vice President when he went to talk to the President about it. Q. And in your career had you ever been authorized before to talk about a document that you knew to be classified with the press and therefore understood that the direction to talk about the document with the press had in effect declassified it? A. I think this may be the first time I've ever talked about a classified document in this fashion, getting it declassified first. Q. And has that happened since, since your conversation with Judith Miller? A. No, sir. Q. So this would be the only time in your career that you were told that you were authorized to discuss a document that you had known to be classified but for the fact that you were told that the President authorized you to discuss it? A. Yes, sir. I think so. Q. And how clear were you when you spoke to Mr. Addington about whether this was appropriate to do? Did you tell him that you wished to discuss a classified document with a reporter but you had been authorized by the President through the Vice President to do so? A. I was very -- I didn't use those words, but I was very clear. Can the, can the Vice President -- can the President declassify a document just by telling us to talk -- and that's how he put it. If the President tells you to talk about a document, it's declassified. Q. And through your conversation with Addington you made it clear that you were going to be talking about a document with someone outside the government without a security clearance. Correct? A. It was not a -- it was not specific to a document but it was clearly asking him, could that be done? And he explained how it could be done. Yes, sir. Q. And so he understood, you made it clear to Mr. Addington, that you were going to be talking about classified material with the press or to the public, but you had been authorized to do so? A. Yes, sir. Q. And did he express any reservations, Mr. Addington, with your talking to the press or the public about a classified document? A. I may have answered the previous question a little too fast. You said, you had been authorized to do so. I don't think I said to him -- it was in the context of, if I have been authorized to do so. I don't think I said to him explicitly the President had authorized, that sort of thing. Q. But you made it clear that what you were asking him was whether or not a fact otherwise classified could be discussed with the press or the public if the President authorized you to do so? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you did not have a conversation with Mr. Addington where you asked him, could the President overrule the Director of Central Intelligence, if the Director of Central Intelligence refused to declassify a document? A. My discussion with David Addington was that -- David Addington telling me that the President had it in his authority to declassify a document. Q. And my question is, did you make it clear to him that your question wasn't whether the President had the abstract authority to declassify a document, but whether the President could in effect declassify a document by authorizing an official to discuss classified material, otherwise classified material, with the press or the public? A. Yes. Q. And did he indicate any reservations about that? A. No, sir. Q. And do you know when the Vice President talked to the President to get the permission for you to discuss this with the press and in effect in your mind declassify the document? A. No, sir. Q. And were you present for that conversation? A. No, sir. Q. What did the Vice President tell you about that conversation? A. He told me he had talked to the President and we should go ahead and, you know, talk to the press about the NIE. Q. And do you know if the Vice President told the President what the legal issue was in terms of sharing classified information? A. I don't know what happened in that conversation. But the Vice President knew that we needed to have the President's authority to talk about the document, or that section of the document. Q. And was anyone else present with you when you discussed with the Vice President the issue of whether or not you could be authorized to discuss classified material with the press or the public? A. No, sir, but I referred him to the conversation with David Addington. Q. So as far as you know, did the Vice President and David Addington discuss that issue? A. I don't know. Q. And do you know if the Vice President and the President talked about it in person or by telephone? A. I don't know. Q. And do you know how long before your July 8th meeting with Judith Miller that conversation took place? A. I don't. My sense was that it was within a few days, but I don't really know. Q. Could it have been the day before, July 7th, as far as you know? A. Could have been, or it could have been some time at the end of the previous weekend. I mean, excuse me, I mis- spoke. End of the previous week, before the weekend. It could have been any day in that period. Q. And who else in the administration was told, as far as you know, that you were authorized to discuss the relevant portions of the NIE with Judith Miller? A. Nobody as far as I know. Q. So as far you know, the only three people who knew about this would be the President, the Vice President and yourself? A. Correct, sir. Q. And going up to July 18th, is it fair to say that there were a number of different conversations within the administration about declassifying the NIE? A. Yes, sir. Q. And during those conversations did you ever tell any of the other people that in fact the President had already declassified the NIE in your mind? A. No, sir. Q. And in your presence did the Vice President ever tell these other people that you understood that the NIE had already been declassified? A. No, sir. Q. And as far as you know, was the CIA or Director Tenet ever notified that the NIE had been declassified in your mind as of July 8th with regard to those portions concerning uranium? A. No, sir. Q. And were there conversations in which Mr. Hadley discussed declassification of the NIE? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were there conversations where Dr. Rice discussed declassification of the NIE? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were there conversations in which Andrew Card, the Chief of Staff, discussed declassification of the NIE? A. Yes, sir. Q. And during all those conversations it remained unknown to them that in fact you understood that the NIE had already been declassified? A. By the President. Yes, sir. Q. And is it fair to say that on July 10th the Vice President, according to your notes, indicated that he would recommend to the President declassification of the relevant parts of the NIE? A. My recollection is that's what he was telling Steve Hadley should pass on to Director Tenet, that they wanted to get those portions declassified and then they were declassified. Q. And so in your mind, the Vice President was telling Steve Hadley to tell George Tenet that we, the Office of Vice President, would recommend declassification even though at the time, according to your account, both he and you knew that the NIE had already been declassified? A. Yes, sir. Q. And is it fair to say that in the following conversations during that week there are a number of conversations where people discussed declassification where you and the Vice President knew that in your mind the President had already authorized you to discuss this with the press? Correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was that unusual for you to have the National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence and the White House Chief of Staff, among others, in the dark as to something that you had done regarding declassification? A. It is not unusual for the Vice President to tell me something which I am not allowed to share with others. And it's so -- it doesn't happen very often -- well, it happens often that the Vice President will tell me something that I cannot share with other people and I will sit in the room with them while they talk about something. I think that many times when they know something and I know something, but neither of us know that the other person knows it or is supposed to know and we don't talk about it, that happens quite frequently actually. Q. And with regard to declassification issues, are there any other times that you're aware of that you knew that something had been declassified by the President and other members of the national security community were in the dark? A. Yes, sir. There are numbers of times when the President intends to make a statement about something, for example. He's going to announce an initiative or he's going to reveal in a speech that some -- you know, that we have intelligence on a certain point, and the fact that he is going to do so is often closely held among a certain number of people. And you can be in other people -- be in meetings with other people who don't know that you're about to give a speech on that topic or unveil that initiative who are still treating it as a classified matter and still believe it to be a classified matter. So that happens not, not infrequently. Q. Was there any other occasion where you knew the press -- a member of the press to have a document that had been given to the press by the administration where others in the administration still thought the information contained therein was, was classified? A. There are numbers of occasions where I understand, usually not with me, usually with Director -- with National Security Advisor Rice, will be assigned to go background the press about some initiative or something which the President is going to do where other people that I talk to do not know that in fact she is backgrounding people about it. There are many occasions where she has backgrounded reporters about some event and I'm in the room and I don't know that it's been done. This happens a fair amount. Q. How long have you known Judith Miller? A. Not very long. I've known of Judith Miller from her writings, and particularly from a book that she wrote, for some time. But I had actually only met her, I think, once before July 8th. Q. And what was the occasion before July 8th that you had met Ms. Miller? A. I had, I think, contacted Ms. Miller because I wanted to meet her. I under -- I believe her to be a serious reporter who cares about the substance of, of the issues. She had written a book called "Germs", if I recall, which is about biological warfare with another reporter who is a friend of mine. I think it's -- well, Steve Engleberg, I think is the co-author. And he had interviewed me for the book. I had never spoken to her in connection with the book. But the book is a serious attempt to go through at great length how the administrations, administrations, not just this one, or actually not this one, the Clinton administration, the Bush administration, others had looked at the threat of biological warfare and I considered her from this and from other things the sort of reporter who actually cares about the substance of it and wants to get it right so they're doing the best at -- the highest function of the press which is to alert the public as to, you know, a serious issue as a compliment to when the administrations talk about a serious issue. And she had obviously spent a lot of time on this issue and cared about it, so I wanted to meet her to get to know her and so I called her and she was glad to come in, and we had a -- my recollection is we had a meeting in my office some weeks before July 8th. Q. And when you met her, and when you say some weeks before, we are talking May, June, spring of 2003? A. I don't recall. It would be on my schedule. And that would be the first time I met her, as I recall. Q. Okay. And that was the first time you recall meeting her even on a social occasion? A. I don't recall ever meeting her before that. It's possible. Q. And did anyone go with you to the meeting with Judith Miller on July 8th? A. On July 8? No. No, sir. Q. Okay. And did you bring anything else besides the redacted portion of the NIE with you? A. I may have had some notes, something like that. Q. Do you know if you brought any talking points? A. I think I had talking points -- I think I had other notes that I'm not sure if I used or not, which were of the same nature. Things -- you know, statements from the NIE from the first part, from the judgments part, but I'm not -- I think I had those with me, but I don't, I don't think I -- I don't know if I used them all. Q. Did you bring the NIE itself? A. No, sir, I don't think so. Q. And did Judith Miller ever write a piece as a result of your meeting with her? A. No. Q. Why not? A. I don't know. It was a totally failed effort to get the NIE out as far as I could tell. Q. And we'll go forward -- the last time you told us about a conversation you had with Judith Miller, you believe on a Saturday where you discussed Wilson's wife working at the CIA. Do you recall that testimony? A. It was on the weekend of the aircraft carrier trip, July 12th, 13. Yes, sir. Q. And how certain are you that you had a conversation with Judith Miller about Wilson's wife working at the CIA on the weekend as opposed to being part of the July 8th meeting? A. I'm certain I talked to her about it from my home because I remember where I was. Q. And where were you? A. In my little office, cluttered. Q. Okay. And what phone did you use? A. I think either the government -- there are two phones in that office and I don't know which one I used. One is my personal home phone and the other is -- I think I used my personal home phone. Q. And you also have a government phone there? A. There's also a government phone there. Q. Do you know what the phone number is to the government phone? A. I don't. Q. Okay. Is that -- that's not the same number as your government office, I take it? A. Correct, it is not. Q. And the phone bills, I presume since it's a government phone, go to the government, not to you? A. I certainly hope so. I've never been quite clear, but I'm hoping I'm not paying for that phone. Q. Okay. So there are two phones. One is your personal phone and if you, if you think about it when you make calls, you make personal calls on your personal phone and business calls on your government phone? A. It's not quite that rigorous. I make many business calls on my personal phone. In fact, this one was a business call on my personal phone. Q. Okay. So you believe you used your personal phone? A. I think so. Q. Okay. And on your personal phone, what's your long distance service? A. AT&T, I guess. Q. Okay. Are they all -- do you get two separate bills at the end of every month, for local service and a separate one for long-distance or are they one bill? A. I, I think my wife pays the phone bills. I think there are two bills, but I'm not sure. Q. And do you use a phone card for long-distance? Is it your practice to dial one of those numbers that -- A. No, I think on this -- well, from my home I would just use my own -- I could have used the government card and probably should have, but I think I just paid for it myself. Q. Okay. And do you have a personal long-distance service that you use, a personal phone card that you employ? A. Yes -- Q. And what -- A. -- it's one -- you mean a phone card that goes to my person -- that goes to my home phone, just my home phone? Yes. Q. And what company is that with? A. It would be -- I guess it's the same. I assume it's the same. Q. Is it your practice when you make calls from your home just to dial 1, the area code and the number? A. Unfortunately sir, yes. Q. Okay, so you don't do the 10 cents a minute service? A. No, sir. And I, and I don't charge it to the government usually, although I suppose I should. Q. Okay. And your recollection is that when you spoke to Ms. Miller on that weekend you were using your personal phone at your home, but possibly your government phone at your home? A. Yes, sir. I think it was my personal phone. Q. Okay. Any chance you used your cell phone, your government cell phone? A. My recollection of the call to Judith Miller is that it, it was interrupted and I think I did all of them on my, all of them on my home desk phone. Q. Okay. And how many cell phones do you have? A. Just the one. MR. FITZGERALD. The government cell phone. Okay, why don't we break at 10:45 and come back -- GRAND JUROR. At 1100 hours, please. MR. FITZGERALD. 1100 hours, military time. That's fine. Thank you. WITNESS. Thank you. (Whereupon, the witness was excused at 10:45 a.m.) (Whereupon, the witness was recalled at 11:17 a.m.) GRAND JUROR. And we'll just remind you, you're still under oath. WITNESS. Thank you. GRAND JUROR. Thank you. BY MR. FITZGERALD: Q. And clarifying two points on the conversation with Judith Miller. Do you recall whether or not you discussed Mr. Wilson's wife at all during your conversation on July 8th with Ms. Miller? A. I don't recall. I don't recall any discussion -- Q. And do you recall if you discussed Mr. Wilson at all during your conversation with Judith Miller on July 8th? A. I don't recall any discussion of it, but it's -- in connection with the statement by the NI -- in the NIE that Iraq had vigorous -- the flat statement that Iraq had vigorously begun, that statement is six months after his report and it's possible that I said something about that. Q. And is it fair to say that the, the part of the NIE that made that statement, that talked about Iraq, quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium was the heart of what you wanted to get out to Judith Miller that day? A. Yes. Q. And that's what the Vice President wanted out in the public domain because it rebutted the claim that the efforts to get uranium had been debunked. Fair to say? A. Correct. Q. And that's -- but the fact that the "vigorously trying to get uranium" was in a classified document is what prompted the whole discussion you had with the Vice President and with Mr. Addington to make sure that it was okay for you to discuss that statement about vigorously trying to get uranium for the report. Correct? A. Yes, if I could just amend this yes and the previous one. There were other parts of the NIE. That was the section on uranium. There were other statements in the front of the NIE that were also declassified by the President and then later by Tenet which talk about more in general that they had a nuclear program and that sort of thing. They were also -- it's not just that one sentence. It was also the, the more generic statements from the key judgment section that were, that were important. But yes, the -- yes. Q. Okay. It's fair to say that if you could get Judith Miller to write one sentence about the NIE, you'd want her to quote the part that said "vigorously trying to procure uranium as a conclusion of the NIE"? A. I don't know about that. I think there's some statements up front that were even more useful, about that Iraq was pursuing chemical, biological and nuclear programs. You know, the uranium bit was just one small piece, one bit of evidence of the bigger issue which was whether they were pursuing a nuclear program. But it was certainly a useful statement. I don't mean to -- Q. And certainly after July 6th, when the efforts to try to acquire uranium were in dispute following Mr. Wilson's piece, quoting to the vigorous efforts -- quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium as a description in the NIE was, was helpful. Correct? A. I would, I would say no, sir. I would say it was important since the IAEA had in March declared the -- certain documents forgeries and that was when the controversy began about whether the President had properly said something about, about, about uranium at all. And the July 7 statement that, that, that it was a mistake to say it was really with regard to a lot of discussion prior to that by -- or prior and subsequent to that by National Security Advisor Rice which was about the fact that there were these forged documents that we had mistakenly relied upon and that was only -- but that was only part of the case about uranium. So I would say that the sentence about uranium was -- and the statements in the front about the nuclear program were important for the general broader picture of whether the President was right to say something about uranium. Q. Okay. And it's fair to say with regard to the statement that there were -- that Iraq was quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to obtain uranium, that was one of the issues that you understood to be classified that you needed the authority of the President to discuss it with the press. Correct? A. Yes, sir. It was -- yes, sir. It was also in the July 11 statement by George Tenet. Q. But prior to July 11th, prior to the July 8th meeting with Judith Miller, your concern was, I can't go to Judith Miller on July 8 and discuss with her that the NIE says that Iraq is, quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium because that's coming from a classified document, and unless I know that the President had authorized me to do that, you felt barred from discussing it? A. Exactly right. Q. Okay. And the conversation where the Vice President obtained the permission from the President for you to discuss it with the press you believe occurred before July 8th. Whether it was July 7th, or at the end of the prior week, that's when the Vice President had the authority, you understood, from the President to authorize you to discuss the reference in the NIE that Iraq was, quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium? A. Yes, sir. I don't know when that discussion occurred between the President and the Vice President. I do know that there were these, you know -- he told me to go, and then he told me to hold, and then he told me to go. And those discussions were after he had gone off to have these discussions. Q. And it was when you finally got the go-ahead, you spoke to -- on July 8th to Judith Miller and then you told her about, quote, about the efforts described in the NIE as quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium by Iraq. Is that fair to say? Let me rephrase -- A. It was a long question. Sorry. Q. After you got the final go-ahead, you then told Judith Miller that the NIE said that Iraq was, quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you also, I take it, included that reference to the NIE's language about, quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium in the redacted document you provided Judith Miller? A. Yes, sir. Q. And to your understanding is that the first time you disclosed to a member of the press that the NIE contained a reference that Iraq was, quote, vigorously, close quote, trying to procure uranium? A. Yes, sir. I think so. Q. Let me, let me show you what's been -- what we'll mark as 2881, or refer to as 2881 to 2884, for the record. And these are notes, I believe they look like Cathie Martin's handwriting. Does that look to be Cathie Martin's handwriting to you? A. Yes, sir. Q. And is that the July, the July 2nd meeting where David Sanger interview with Scooter for WMD? A. Yes, sir. Q. Does it also indicate that a Risen, R-i-s-e-n, and a Shanger were present? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were there three reporters present or is "Shanger" a mis-spelling of Sanger? A. It's weird. I don't know, sir. Q. Okay. A. No, I don't believe there were two present. Q. Okay. And does it indicate in the underlined section, "OTR but Sanger will clear background quotes"? At the top. A. Yes, sir. Yes, uh-hum. Q. Is that your understanding means off-the-record, but Sanger will clear background quotes? A. Yes, sir. Q. And does then it talk about the Powell presentation and indicate "D.S." making some statements, meaning David Sanger, and then S.L. responding, "Scooter" Libby? A. Yes, sir. Q. And does it indicate from the first page, "meant to be Chinese menu"? The first statement you made. Is that a reference to the fact that you gave some material to Secretary of State Powell that he could use in making his presentation but it was a Chinese menu from which he could draw what he wanted and ignore what he wanted? A. Yes, sir. Q. And is that a conversation you had with David Sanger that day? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you know if you ever discussed with either the Vice President or whether he discussed with anyone else whether you could share with Judith Miller the fact that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA? A. I don't recall any discussion with the Vice President about Wilson's wife working at the CIA, about sharing that with the press. Now, after July 14, after the Novak article came out, in that time frame I may have asked him, you know, "Do you want me to refer to that?" And it's possible I may have asked him that after even Russert -- although I don't know -- don't recall anything about it. Q. And what is it that makes you think you might have asked the Vice President about referring other reporters to what you had learned either in writing from the Novak column or on the telephone from Mr. Russert? A. I'm sorry -- Q. You say that it's possible that you talked to the Vice President after you spoke to Mr. Russert to ask him whether you could share with other reporters what you had learned about Wilson's wife from Russert. And do you have a recollection of, of having that conversation? A. No, sir. No recollection. Q. And you say it's possible that you may have talked to the Vice President after the Novak column appeared asking him whether it was appropriate for you to share with other reporters, call their attention to Novak's column. Do you have a recollection of that conversation happening? A. I have recollections of talking to the Vice President at times about does he want me to share some point of fact with reporters, or talk about some point of fact with reporters. About, you know, many things over three years. I don't recall specifically having a conversation with him about sharing with -- about Wilson's wife. But it's possible. I just don't recall it. Q. And is it fair to say you had, in a prior FBI interview, you indicated it was possible that you may have talked to the Vice President on Air Force Two coming back from the ceremony involving the U.S.S. Reagan about whether you should share the information with the press about Wilson's wife? A. It's possible that would have been one of the times I could have talked to him about what I had learned from Russert and what Karl Rove had told me about Novak, Mr. Novak. Q. And as you sit here today, do you recall whether you had such a conversation with the Vice President on Air Force Two on July 12th? A. No, sir. My, my best recollection of that conversation was what I had on my note card which we have produced which doesn't reflect anything about that. Q. And other than the fact -- strike that. Do you know if you spoke to the Wall Street Journal prior to July 18th about the NIE contents before the July 18th date came around and made the NIE publicly available? A. I did not. Q. Do you know who did? A. Secretary Wolfowitz did. Q. Okay. And how do you know that? A. Because I discussed with the Vice President whether we should -- the Tenet statement, which came out on July 11th -- can I start this paragraph again? Q. Sure. A. The Tenet statement came out on July 11 and referred to some of the documents but not to one of the -- some of the more important documents, including the document that came out on January -- that was sent to the White House on January 24th, 2003. And that document had the same content as the NIE word-for-word in the relevant portions. And it came very close to the State of the Union, very close to Secretary Powell's presentation, and it also said that Iraq had vigorously begun to pursue the procurement of uranium. That document had not been included in Secretary -- excuse me, Director Tenet's July 11 statement. And so during the week, you know, after July 14, in that week, the Vice President thought we should still try and get the fact of that document out. And so he asked me to talk to the Wall Street Journal. We discussed the possibility of talking to the Wall Street Journal, to get that out. I don't have as good a relationship with the Wall Street Journal as Secretary Wolfowitz did, and so we talked to Secretary Wolfowitz about -- I talked to Secretary Wolfowitz about trying to get that point across, and he undertook to do so. Q. And do you know when that week, when following July 11th that you spoke to Secretary Wolfowitz, and if you know, when Secretary Wolfowitz spoke to the Wall Street Journal? A. I don't. It was some time Monday, Tuesday, and I think it came out in the Thursday Wall Street Journal with the same language which Secretary -- Director Tenet had had in Director Tenet's July 11th statement. And so he talked to them some time before the 17th. Q. And I'll show you next 3644 to 3645. Do you know if Secretary Wolfowitz sent anything, in terms of actual written material, to the Wall Street Journal? A. I don't know. Q. Do you know if you sent anything to Secretary Wolfowitz that he could either use to talk with the Wall Street Journal or could share with them? A. I don't think so. Q. Do you know if you would have sent Secretary Wolfowitz the redacted version of the NIE that you would have shared with Judith Miller? A. I don't think so. Q. Did you ever hear if Secretary Wolfowitz sending a fax to the editor at the Wall Street Journal of talking points regarding Mr. Wilson? A. No, I didn't know -- I did not know about that. Q. And let me show you first 3644 and 3645. And that's a fax -- an e-mail from Hannah Seemers. And just for the Grand Jury's benefit, who's Hannah Seemers (ph.)? A. I believe she's someone who works for Cathie Martin in the Press Shop for the Office of Vice President. Q. Does this show, in the text of the July 17th Wall Street Journal, does it quote from different portions of the, quote, now famous NIE, close quote, in that editorial? For example, the second paragraph, does it says, the section on Iraq's hunt for uranium, for example, asserts bluntly that, quote, Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake, close quote, and that quote, "acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needed to produce nuclear weapons," close quote? A. Yes, sir. The -- it does. I mean, this is -- "vigorously trying to procure" is the same thing that's in Director Tenet's July 11th statement. Q. But it says here that "We're reliably told that the now famous NIE, which is meant to be the best summary judgment of the intelligence community, isn't nearly as full of doubt about that yellowcake story as the critics assert or as even CIA Director George Tenet has suggested." Is that correct? A. Yes, sir, it says that. Q. And so, it indicates then it quotes the NIE, so it's not quoting Director Tenet's statements, it's quoting the text of the NIE. Correct? A. Yeah. Q. And is it your -- A. Yes. Q. -- and then it goes on to say, regarding the supposedly discredited Niger story, the NIE says that, quote, and it gives you a paragraph quoted from the NIE, and continues throughout the editorial to quote sections of the NIE. Is that fair to say? A. Yes, sir. It looks like the NIE -- it quotes -- it purports to be a quote from the NIE and it looks like the NIE to me. Q. Okay. And does the article -- editorial also state that this information, by the way, does not come from the White House which, which has handled this story in a ham- handed fashion. Correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. And is it fair to say that you understand that the information did not come from the White House, it came from Secretary Wolfowitz? A. It's my understanding that Secretary Wolfowitz was going to talk to the Wall Street Journal. Q. At the direction of the White House? A. No, at -- he -- I talked to him about it and he said he was going to do it, yes, sir. Q. And so as a result of that conversation you understand that the contents of the NIE were shared with the Wall Street Journal the day before they became publicly available, on July 18th. Correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And do you know if Secretary Wolfowitz had been told that the President had, in your view, declassified the NIE prior to it being officially declassified on July 18th? A. I don't know, I may have told him, but I don't know. I don't recall. Q. Do you know if he knew that fact before you told him that he should reach out to the Wall Street Journal? A. I don't know that. Q. And do you know if you shared with him any text that you might wish to share with the Wall Street Journal? A. No, I don't think I shared text with him, but I know that it was covered in the -- well, all I know is the -- what he had available was he had the NIE and the Wall Street Journal -- I'm sorry, the July 11 piece from Tenet, talked about the sentence that as you say was the most important to us which was the vigorously trying to procure -- Q. Now, did there come a time when there was a lunch hosted by the Vice President with conservative columnists? A. Yes, sir. Q. And was that on July 17th? On July 18th? A. One of those two days. Yes, sir. Q. And was that in part an effort by the Vice President to sort of get the story out more, more fully in light of his frustration that Director Tenet's statement hadn't been as complete as he would like? A. I think it was an attempt to get the story out more fully about many issues, including the full statement on what we understood about the NIE. Q. And do you recall, did you attend the lunch that he had with those columnists? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And I'll show you 2761 and 2767. Did Cathie Martin attend that lunch? A. I think she did, sir. Q. Okay. Did anyone else from your office, besides the Vice President himself, yourself and Cathie Martin? A. I don't think so. Q. Okay. Do you know if Mary Matalin attended that lunch? A. She might have. She was not of our office at that point. You know, she had left our office, I think, at that point. Q. Do you remember her being there? A. She may have been. She's been at some of these. Yes, sir. Q. And during that luncheon with these columnists, do you recall if there was discussion about Mr. Wilson? A. I think there probably was, sir. Q. And do you recall what was said about Mr. Wilson at this luncheon? A. I don't recall in -- I don't recall. But I, I believe at this luncheon -- again, I believe at this luncheon we were able to pass out the declassified NIE, the sections of the NIE that had been declassified at this point by the Director of Central Intelligence in hard copy, and that includes the language about vigorously trying to pursue, and I think they probably talked about that at that point. Q. And what was your view of Ambassador Wilson at this point, on July 18th? A. My view was that his -- the story that he was presenting should by this point be pretty soundly refuted to anyone who was willing to pay attention to the facts. That is, it was now clear that as opposed to his sort of four part argument that the Vice President did not ask for the mission for him to go off, or anyone to go off to Niger; that report did not reach -- that the report about his trip did not reach the Vice President; that the NIE -- and the intelligence community in fact did not regard his trip as definitive and in fact regarded it as having some evidence that was supportive of the claim that Iraq tried to procure uranium and that therefore nobody was twisting intelligence when the President, you know, intended intelligence to be twisted when the President went out and made the statement. Q. Did you think that Ambassador Wilson was making an honest portrayal of the facts in his public statement? A. I thought that by that point -- in his July 6th column he had -- July 6th column, he had said that, you know, if my view of this is wrong, if somebody thought my, my presentation was not persuasive on this, then I understand, although I'd like to know why they didn't think what I found was persuasive. And I thought at this point there was enough to indicate to him that the intelligence community had not found it to be persuasive and I sort of hoped that at that point he would rescind his complaints and not be making more complaints. Q. Did you think he was qualified to have gone on the mission that he went on back in 2002? A. Yes, sir, given -- I mean, his mission as I understood, he went and he talked to a former Nigerian Prime Minister and a former Nigerian Economic Minister, maybe some others. But that's what the cable reports on. And he was -- as an ambassador he was perfectly capable to conduct those missions. Q. And did you think that -- putting aside what was characterized about the trip, that it was appropriate for him to go on that mission back in 2002? A. It's not really for me to say what's appropriate for him to -- you know, what type of mission is appropriate and who is the appropriate person to do it. That's a Central Intelligence Agency matter. I thought that he was qualified to go talk to foreign government ministers. That's something he had done as an ambassador presumably many times. Q. Hadn't your reaction been, as you told us earlier this morning with Undersecretary Grossman, even in jest that, you know, isn't it a strange world when the CIA is sending people out to do a job that the State Department could do? A. Yes, sir. That was -- back in June that was my reaction. Now it may be that -- again, that was in jest. But it may be that he knew these people personally somehow in a way that the current ambassador didn't know them. There's some suggestion to that, I think, in his column. Again, whether that's the right way to go about finding out the truth here is an issue for the, for the CIA. As the CIA itself has said, and as Director Tenet said, he went and he talked to officials there and asked them in the name of the U.S. government, saying he was going to get back to the U.S. government, did you trade -- did you do a deal with Iraq for uranium? The people who he was talking to knew that that would be against U.N. sanctions and against the interest of the United States and would be providing the makings for nuclear weapons to one of our -- an enemy that was -- a country that was a great enemy of ours. So it would be surprising if they admitted to that. But he was perfectly capable to go have those conversations in my view. Q. In your opinion did you think at that time in, in July, that he had gone as a result of nepotism? A. I didn't know why he had gone, sir. Q. But do you have an opinion one way or the other as to whether or not Ambassador Wilson had been selected because of nepotism? A. I didn't know whether he had been selected because of nepotism. Again, I, I thought he was fully qualified to do the mission that he went -- that I understood he had performed. There was a suggestion in the Novak column that his wife had been the one who suggested him to go, but I thought he was qualified to do what he went to do. Q. My only question to you is, in your state of mind were you thinking that he went on this mission because of nepotism? A. Nepotism has two meanings to me. One is of a person who is unqualified to do something but he gets the job because he's somebody's nephew. I didn't think he was unqualified to do the job that he was given. I suspected, having seen the Novak column, that if he had not been her husband they may not have picked him for this mission or they might not have done this mission, but I thought he was qualified to do the mission. Q. And next question, did you think prior to the Novak column, when you had heard that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA and, and by your own recollection you heard that from Vice President Cheney, did you think then that he might have been selected for the job because of his marital relationship? A. No, sir. That -- I don't think that is -- that was not one of the things I was thinking about at that point. Q. Did you at any time think it was abnormal for the CIA to send Former Ambassador Wilson to Niger to investigate this claim? A. Yes, I thought it was abnormal only because we have an ambassador there and he's coming in -- abnormal may be too strong a word. I didn't understand why it would be useful, given that we had an ambassador there who could go talk to people. Again, as you look at his column I think he says there were some people that he had a personal relationship with and that would make some difference, although, you know, walking in the front door and saying, "I'm from the United States government, I want to know if you traded nuclear -- the materials for nuclear weapons with our great enemy, Iraq," did not seem to me a definitive way of going about and trying to test the proposition which is in fact how -- and Director Tenet cast the same doubt upon it in his statement of July 11th. Q. Did it -- did you think it undercut the credibility of the arguments being made as a result of the Wilson column that Wilson was actually someone who wasn't on the United States' payroll? A. I didn't know whether he was on the, on the United States' payroll until his column where he says he got his expenses. And I was not familiar enough with the practices of the Agency to know whether that's a common way or not a common way of doing it. I don't, I don't think that payroll makes the difference. Q. You didn't think the issue of whether he was on or off the payroll was significant? A. I thought it was a factor in trying to figure out exactly how the Agency viewed this mission, but -- so it may have had some importance. I didn't think it was definitive of any way. Q. And why would it be important with how the Agency viewed the mission if he was on the payroll or not? A. I don't know how they normally do their -- how the Agency normally pulls people for missions like this. I would have thought in the normal course, if somebody goes on a mission like this, they might be paid for their time, but I didn't know. Q. Did you think that might be a factor in, in how people should view how much weight the Agency put on his services, whether or not he was paid? A. It's possible if they paid him it would indicate even more seriousness about it, but it didn't seem to me to -- doesn't seem to me as I sit here today definitive. Q. And do you know if Vice President Cheney in July of 2003 thought that Ambassador Wilson was qualified to do the job that he was sent to do? A. I, I don't know whether he thought he was -- I think Vice President -- I don't, I don't know the answer to your question. I think the Vice President thought he was qualified to do what was reported in the cable. If, if he was sent to somehow determine in a definitive way whether Niger had done this, I don't know that the Vice President thought he was qualified to do that. I think for what he did, I would think the Vice President thought he was qualified. Q. And did the Vice President ever indicate his belief that Ambassador Wilson was selected to go on this mission because of his marital relationship with someone who worked at the CIA? A. He -- I think he, at times, had suspicions about, you know, is that why he was selected for this mission? Q. And what makes you say that? A. You know, I think he made comments about it in connection with, well, his -- you know, his wife works there. It wasn't a full sentence, I don't think, but that's the sort of notion I took from it. Q. An implication that if his wife hadn't worked there, he wouldn't have been the one sent to do the job? A. Something like that. Yes, sir. Q. And when did the Vice President say that? A. Oh, these were in discussions, July, maybe -- late July, maybe September, things like that. Q. And what was the -- why was the Vice President discussing that in late July, early September? A. People would come through and talk about different issues and, you know, an issue might come up about the Wilson controversy which was in the news. Q. And why did the President -- Vice President not discuss this back in June, on or about June 9th, 10th, 11th, when you were preparing for the Pincus column and he noted that his wife works at the CIA? Did you take from that an observation that, oh, his wife works out there, he wouldn't have the job otherwise? A. No, sir. The only, the only time I best recall discussing it just then was that discussion. That's all I recall. Q. And when you -- A. I'm sorry, when I say that discussion, I, I, I want to be clear, the discussion that I took the note about. Q. And from July 6th, when the Novak -- July 6, when the Wilson piece appears, until July 12, when you were talking to reporters after Air Force Two, do you recall any conversation during that week where Vice President Cheney observed or had it brought to his attention that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA? A. I certainly don't recall any discussion about that prior to the Russert/Novak conversations when I learned about the wife, what I thought was the first time. And I don't recall, as I told you before, whether we discussed that on the plane that day. Q. And do you -- A. But I don't, I don't recall any such discussion. Q. -- and do you recall whether or not between July 12th and July 18th, when you had this lunch with the conservative columnists, he had any discussion with you about his -- any belief he might have that Wilson was picked because of his wife working at the CIA? A. I don't recall a discussion about that. Q. Do you recall if it came up at the lunch on July 18th with the conservative columnists present? A. I don't recall if it came up at that lunch. Q. Do you recall if the Vice President had questions about the credibility of Wilson in light of the fact that he was not on the payroll of the U.S. government when he took the trip? A. It's possible. You know, we should have notes from that lunch, but I don't recall it sitting here about that lunch. Q. And do you recall if he ever expressed to you at any time an opinion that Wilson's credibility is less because he was not a person on the government payroll at the time of the trip? A. He might have said that. I, I don't recall it specifically, but it's consistent with the general sense -- an uneasy -- had a general uneasy head about it. Q. And did the Vice President at any time express to you that he thought this trip was handled in an unusual or other than normal fashion by the CIA? A. Yes. Q. When did he express that? A. Back in -- I think there were times when he was asking -- I think back in June when he was asking about how did we end up -- how did this trip come about, this trip being in the May Kristof column an ambassador was sent, he went on this mission, and then he was talking about this mission which we had only in a classified cable. He was sort of, you know, asking about, oh, how did this mission come about that this fellow went out and talked about it? And so there was some unease at that point. And then I, as I say, I think I recall after the, after the Wilson column came out he may have also wondered about it. Q. In what time frame? How, how long after the Wilson column came out? A. I don't recall, sir. I mean, I think -- it was not just one discussion, there was some other discussions and I just don't recall specifically on the point of irregularity of CIA hiring practices, if you will, what -- when that came up. Q. And why don't I show you the copy of the July 6th column with some handwriting on it. If we could lay our hands on that. And I believe we showed this document to you the last time, or at least discussed it, and you indicated that you had not seen this copy of the article with the handwriting until the FBI showed it to you? A. That's my recollection, sir. Q. And showing you what has been already marked as Grand Jury Exhibit 8, is that the copy of the Wilson column with the handwriting that you recall first being shown by the FBI? A. Yes, it is. Q. Okay. And have you ever seen the Vice President with a paper copy of the Wilson column? And by paper copy I mean one not printed off the internet, not printed off a computer, but the actual physical newspaper column? A. I don't recall. Q. Did you often see him with the actual newspaper column -- actual physical columns from newspapers? A. Yes, he often will cut out from a newspaper an article using a little pen knife that he has and put it on the edge of his desk or put it in his desk and then pull it out and look at it, think about it. That will often happen. Q. Okay. And do you recall if he did that on this occasion on July 6th? A. Evidently he did, but I don't recall. Q. Okay. And fair to say -- A. Once again, this, this column came out, I believe he got this column when he was in Wyoming, not in Washington, over the July 4 recess. And so it's -- I don't think it would have been there the day I walked in the office, for example. Q. Okay. How long does the Vice President keep the columns that he cuts out with a pen knife and puts on the corner of his desk? A. Sometimes a long time. Q. And if you walked in the Vice President's office, would you see a stack of old newspaper articles on the corner of his desk? A. He doesn't necessarily always keep it on the corner of his desk. He keeps it in, in -- underneath papers or in a briefcase or something. I've seen him produce them from different places. And since the FBI showed me this, I have on occasion, noticed him still -- you know, having a document on his desk which is a cut out newspaper article. Q. Just to paint the picture for people who haven't been to the office of the Vice President, if any of us would walk into his office would we, would we see a stack of newspaper clippings or are we talking about one or two columns that might be on the desk if someone were to look? A. Oh, one or two. I mean, you'd see stacks of paper and you wouldn't know what was in the stack of paper. I -- I'd never seen bunches of them, but I have seen two or three. Q. And the handwriting at the top, is it fair to say that that appears to be the Vice President's handwriting? A. Yes, sir. As I told you last time -- Q. Right. A. -- I think that's right. Q. And does one of the questions indicate at the top here say, "Have they done this sort of thing before?" A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall the Vice President ever asking you whether or not the CIA had ever done this sort of thing before? A. I think he did at one point. Q. And do you know when that would have been? A. No, sir. Q. And it says here, underneath that, says, "send an ambassador to answer a question"? Did, did he ever express to you his disbelief that they would send an ambassador to answer a question? A. I don't recall him asking that specific question. Q. Knowing the Vice President the way you do with daily contact, would the question, "send an ambassador to answer a question," indicate some sort of belief on his part that this seems sort of silly to send an ambassador overseas to answer a question? A. It certainly seems like he thought it was an issue, yes. Q. And the next question written is, "do we ordinarily send people out pro bono to work for us?" Do you recall the Vice President asking you a question to the effect of, do we, the United States government, send people unpaid to go work for us? A. Yes, sir. I think he asked something like that. Q. And do you recall when he asked about that? A. I, I don't. Q. And lastly, it says, "or did his wife send him on a junket?" Do you recall the Vice President indicating or asking you or anyone in your presence whether or not Ambassador Wilson's wife had arranged to have him sent on a junket? A. I think I recall him -- I don't recall him asking me that particular question, but I think I recall him musing about that. Q. Okay. And do you recall when it was that he mused about that? A. I, I think, I think it was after the Wilson column. Q. Okay, and obviously -- A. I'm sorry, I don't mean the Wilson column, I'm sorry, I mis-spoke. I think, I think it was after the Novak column. Q. Okay. And you mentioned last time that you thought that the questions written, handwritten here, may have been discussed at a later date, like August or September by the Vice President? A. Yes, sir. Q. And -- A. I don't know, later. I don't know when, but yes. Q. Okay. And can you tell us why it would be that the Vice President read the Novak column and had questions some of which apparently seem to be answered by the Novak column, he would go back and pull out an original July 6th op-ed piece and write on that? A. I -- I'm not sure I -- Q. Well, the Novak column -- A. -- followed your -- he, he often kept these columns for awhile and keeps columns and will think on them. And I think what may have happened here is he may have -- I don't know when he wrote, he wrote the points down. But he might have pulled out the column to think about the problem and written on it, but I don't, I don't know. You'll have to ask him. Q. All right. As you sit here today are you telling us that his concerns about Ambassador Wilson, his concerns that he's working pro bono, his concerns that he's an ambassador being sent to answer a single question, his concerns that his wife may have sent him on a junket, would not have occurred between July 6th and July 12th when you were focusing on responding to the Wilson column but instead would have occurred much later? A. Only the part about the wife, sir, I think might not have occurred in that week. The rest of it, I think, could have occurred in that week because, you know, it's all there. You say it's all in the column. The part about the wife I don't recall discussing with him. It might have occurred to him but I don't recall discussing it with him prior to learning, again, about the wife. Q. And when you say learning again, you mean your conversation with Mr. Russert -- A. Yes. Q. -- where he told you about the wife? And your recollection is that you did not remember you knew about the wife, even though your notes show that you discussed that with Vice President Cheney in June? A. Yes, sir, that's right. I had forgotten it by the time -- my recollection is that I had forgotten it by the time I heard it again from Tim Russert. Q. Now, you mentioned last time that when you had called Tim Russert one of the things you had called him about was to complain about Andrea Mitchell, but then you explained that that really wasn't the reason you had called, you called to complain about Chris Matthews. Correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was your complaint about Andrea Mitchell when you spoke to him? A. She had said something earlier in the week. My recollection is there had been twice in recent times prior to that she had said something in her reports which I thought was inaccurate or unfair. I -- and I think this one -- one of them had to do with Andrea Mitchell had said that the White House was angry at the CIA because the CIA did not include in the NIE Ambassador Wilson's concerns. And that actually was, was quite backwards. It wasn't, it wasn't true. And so I was concerned about that. But it wasn't the purpose of my phone call to Tim Russert that day. My purpose was to discuss the Chris Matthews issue. Q. Let me show you the documents marked 1528 and looking ahead, the next document will be 1801. And my first question is, do you recognize that document? A. It's a document I've seen before. Q. Do you know who prepared it? A. I'm not sure who did the main work. It looks like the type of document, the style of documents, that, that we do and that I might have worked on, but I don't recall whether -- who did the first -- you know, the basic drafting of it. Q. Okay. And do you recall when you saw this document? A. I, I don't. There is a note at the bottom about when the staff secretary received it, but I don't know when I saw it. Q. Okay. And that note indicates in handwriting, July 18th, '03, beneath the stamp, "OVP staff secretary received"? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is it your system that as things go through your offices they get routed to the staff secretary to file so that if it says July 18th, '03 is when the staff secretary received it that it's in circulation or the people working on this document are discussing it July 18th or before? A. Yes, sir. Q. So it could