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(2)	Dean Schmalensee’s conclusion that quality increases explain Internet Explorer’s rise and Netscape’s decline is inaccurate and ignores the impact of Microsoft’s predatory campaign	712
(3)	Dean Schmalensee’s criticisms of the Adknowledge data, and of the inferences plaintiffs’ economists drew from that data, are misplaced	717

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