

SEALED

Office of the United States Attorney District of Nevada 501 Las Vegas Boulevard South, Suite 1100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-6336

		FILED.	
	NICHOLAGA EDITEANICH	DATED: 5:29 pm, August 10, 2020	
1	NICHOLAS A. TRUTANICH United States Attorney	U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
2	Nevada Bar Number 13644 JAMIE MICKELSON		
3	Assistant United States Attorney 501 Las Vegas Boulevard South, Suite 1100		
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 388-6281		
5	Email: jamie.mickelson@usdoj.gov		
6	ROBERT A. ZINK Chief, Fraud Section		
7	Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice WILLIAM E. JOHNSTON		
8	Assistant Chief 1400 New York Ave NW		
9	Washington, D.C. 20530 Telephone: (202) 514-0687		
10	Email: william.johnston4@usdoj.gov		
11	Attorneys for the United States		
12			
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
14	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	Case No. 2:20-mj-666-BNW	
15	Plaintiff,		
1,		SEALED COMPLAINT for violations of: Title 18 United States Code Section 1014	
16	v.	SEALED COMPLAINT for violations of: Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution;	
17	v. BRANDON CASUTT,	Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343	
		Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 – Wire Fraud;	
17	BRANDON CASUTT,	Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343	
17 18	BRANDON CASUTT,	Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 – Wire Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(2) – Bank Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section	
17 18 19	BRANDON CASUTT,	Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 – Wire Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(2) – Bank Fraud;	
17 18 19 20	BRANDON CASUTT,	Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 – Wire Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(2) – Bank Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) – Concealment Money Laundering; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957	
17 18 19 20 21	BRANDON CASUTT,	Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 – False Statement to a Financial Institution; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 – Wire Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(2) – Bank Fraud; Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) – Concealment Money Laundering;	

1 Before the Honorable Brenda Weksler, United States Magistrate Judge, Las Vegas, 2 Nevada, the undersigned being first duly sworn states: 3 Count One 4 (False Statement to a Financial Institution) 5 On or about May 13, 2020, in the State and Federal District of Nevada, 6 **BRANDON CASUTT,** 7 defendant herein, knowingly made a false statement and report for the purposes of 8 influencing the action of a financial institution, whose accounts were insured by the Federal 9 Deposit Insurance Corporation, upon an application, agreement, and loan, to wit: false 10 statements on a Borrower Application Form for a \$349,775 loan under the Paycheck 11 Protection Program from Financial Institution A about the number of employees and the 12 amount of monthly payroll for CASUTT's business Sky DeSign, in violation of Title 18, 13 United States Code, Section 1014. 14 Count Two 15 (Wire Fraud) 16 On or about June 4, 2020, in the State and Federal District of Nevada, 17 **BRANDON CASUTT,** 18 defendant herein, having devised a scheme and artifice to defraud the Small Business 19 Administration of Economic Injury Disaster loan funds, and to obtain money and property 20 by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, did, for the 21 purpose of executing the scheme and artifice, transmit and cause to be transmitted by means 22 of wire, radio, and television communication in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, 23 signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, to wit: an interstate wire transfer in the amount of

\$149,990 from the Small Business Administration in Colorado to a bank account at Wells

1 Fargo held in the name of Skyler's C.F. Foundation in Nevada, in violation of Title 18, 2 United States Code, Section 1343. 3 Count Three (Bank Fraud) 4 5 On or about May 15, 2020, in the State and Federal District of Nevada, 6 **BRANDON CASUTT,** 7 defendant herein, knowingly executed a scheme and artifice to obtain the moneys, funds, 8 credits, assets, securities, and property owned by and under the custody and control of 9 Financial Institution A, to wit: CASUTT caused the disbursement of a \$349,775 Paycheck 10 Protection Program loan from Financial Institution A to a Wells Fargo bank account 11 ending in 4506 held in CASUTT's name, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 12 Section 1344(2). 13 Count Four 14 (Concealment Money Laundering) 15 On or about June 5, 2020, in the State and Federal District of Nevada, 16 **BRANDON CASUTT,** 17 defendant herein, conducted a financial transaction involving the proceeds of specified 18 unlawful activity, that is, bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 19 1344, as alleged in Count Three, knowing that the property involved represented the 20 proceeds of unlawful activity and knowing that the transaction was designed in whole and 21 in part to conceal and disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, and the 22 control of the unlawful proceeds, to wit: CASUTT caused the deposit of two checks made

23

24

pay" and "back pay," drawn on Wells Fargo bank account ending in 4506 into Wells Fargo

out to Family Member B in the amounts of \$8,330 each, with the memo lines "pandemic

bank account ending in 2821, held by Family Member B, who was not in fact an employee of CASUTT's business Sky DeSign, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2.

Count Five

(Engaging in Transactions in Unlawful Proceeds)

On or about June 23, 2020, in the State and Federal District of Nevada,

BRANDON CASUTT,

defendant herein, knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than \$10,000 that was in fact derived from specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, as alleged in Count Two, and bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344, as alleged in Count Three, to wit: CASUTT initiated a wire transfer in the amount of \$388,859.03 from Wells Fargo bank account ending in 1455, held in the name of Skyler's C.F. Foundation, to an account at U.S. Bank held in the name of Title Company A for the purchase of Residence A in Henderson, Nevada, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957.

PROBABLE CAUSE

Complainant, Kirk Miller, states the following as and for probable cause.

INTRODUCTION

1. I make this statement in support of a criminal complaint charging
BRANDON CASUTT with violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 (False
Statements to a Financial Institution); Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire
Fraud); Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344 (Bank Fraud); Title 18, United States

- 2. I have been a Special Agent with the United States Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (hereinafter, "IRS-CI"), since October 2001. During my eighteen years as a Special Agent with IRS-CI, I have received extensive training and have conducted several investigations with respect to tax crimes, financial crimes, money laundering and other criminal violations. I have participated in approximately six months of training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, which included evaluating probable cause, executing search warrants, and examining the personal and business records of individuals and corporations for federal criminal tax violations. In addition, I have participated in the execution of federal search warrants for evidence of financial, tax, and other crimes. I have studied and received training on a variety of law enforcement and criminal investigator methods, Bank Secrecy Act violations, tax crime issues, asset forfeiture and money laundering related crimes, including search and seizure methods, violations of the Internal Revenue Laws, and Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") procedures and policies in criminal investigations. I am currently assigned to the Financial Crimes Taskforce operated by IRS-CI. As part of my assignment with the FCTF, I investigate possible money laundering, structuring, and Bank Secrecy act violations.
- 3. The statements contained in this Criminal Complaint are based on my training, experience and background as a Special Agent, my personal knowledge of the ongoing investigation, as well as information provided to me by other law enforcement agents and individuals with knowledge of this matter. This statement is intended to show

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the charges in the Criminal Complaint and does not set forth all my knowledge about this matter.

Payroll Protection Program

- 4. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ("CARES") Act is a federal law enacted in or around March 2020 and designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans who are suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of up to \$349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses, through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP"). In or around April 2020, Congress authorized over \$300 billion in additional PPP funding.
- 5. In order to obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business must submit a PPP loan application, which is signed by an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan application requires the business (through its authorized representative) to acknowledge the program rules and make certain affirmative certifications in order to be eligible to obtain the PPP loan. In the PPP loan application, the small business (through its authorized representative) must state, among other things, its: (a) average monthly payroll expenses; and (b) number of employees. These figures are used to calculate the amount of money the small business is eligible to receive under the PPP. In addition, businesses applying for a PPP loan must provide documentation showing their payroll expenses.
- 6. A PPP loan application must be processed by a participating lender, such as a financial institution. If a PPP loan application is approved, the participating lender funds the PPP loan using its own monies, which are 100% guaranteed by the Small Business Administration ("SBA"). Data from the application, including information about the

borrower, the total amount of the loan, and the listed number of employees, is transmitted by the lender to the SBA in the course of processing the loan.

7. PPP loan proceeds must be used by the business on certain permissible expenses—payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent, and utilities. The PPP allows the interest and principal on the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven if the business spends the loan proceeds on these expense items within a designated period of time and uses a certain percentage of the PPP loan proceeds on payroll expenses.

The Economic Injury Disaster Relief Program

- 8. The Economic Injury Disaster Loan ("EIDL") program is a SBA program that provides low-interest financing to small businesses, renters, and homeowners in regions affected by declared disasters.
- 9. Another source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization for the U.S. Small Business Administration SBA to provide EIDLs of up to \$2 million to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the CARES Act authorized the SBA to issue advances of up to \$10,000 to small businesses within three days of applying for an EIDL. The amount of the advance is determined by the number of employees the applicant certifies having. The advances do not have to be repaid.
- 10. In order to obtain an EIDL and advance, a qualifying business must submit an application to the SBA and provide information about its operations, such as the number of employees, gross revenues for the 12-month period preceding the disaster, and cost of goods sold in the 12-month period preceding the disaster. In the case of EIDLs for COVID-19 relief, the 12-month period was that preceding January 31, 2020. The applicant must

agency with support from a government contractor, Rapid Finance. The amount of the loan, if the application is approved, is determined based, in part, on the information provided by the application about employment, revenue, and cost of goods, as described above. Any funds issued under an EIDL or advance are issued directly by the SBA. EIDL funds can be used for payroll expenses, sick leave, production costs, and business obligations, such as debts, rent, and mortgage payments. If the applicant also obtains a loan under the PPP, the EIDL funds cannot be used for the same purpose as the PPP funds.

Overview of Fraudulent Scheme

12. As detailed below, from approximately April 2020 until the present,
CASUTT has perpetrated a scheme to defraud the SBA and Financial Institution A, a bank
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with headquarters in Fort Lee, New
Jersey, by obtaining monies through submitting false applications for EID and PPP loans, in
which he misrepresented the number of employees and the amount of revenue and payroll
his companies had while diverting the loan proceeds to, among other things, purchase a
home.

The Fraudulent Scheme

Misrepresentations on EIDL Application

13. On or about April 2, 2020, CASUTT submitted an electronic EIDL application to the SBA in the name of Skyler's C.F. Foundation. CASUTT listed himself as the CEO of the organization and his wife, Family Member A, as the accountant of the organization and a co-guarantor for the loan. Records from Financial Institution A show

- 14. On the application, CASUTT made the following misrepresentations:
- a. CASUTT falsely listed \$600,000 as the amount of revenue that the Foundation had for the 12 months preceding January 31, 2020. Other records indicate that statement is false. For example, I have reviewed the bank account records for an account ending in 1455 at Wells Fargo (hereinafter "the x1455 Account"), which is the account CASUTT designated on the EIDL application to receive loan proceeds. Records show CASSUTT is the only signatory for the x1455 Account, which was opened in the name of Skyler's C.F. Foundation. In the year preceding January 31, 2020, Skyler's C.F. Foundation had approximately \$15,000 in deposits into its bank account, which is inconsistent with revenue of \$600,000. I have not identified another bank account for Skyler's C.F. Foundation that was open during 2019.
- b. CASUTT falsely stated Skyler's C.F. Foundation employed 32 people. There is reason to believe the statement was false for at least three reasons: First, a query to the Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation showed that they had no records of any payments for unemployment insurance by Skyler's C.F. Foundation. Employers who pay more than \$225 of payroll in any quarter for employees in Nevada are required by Nevada law to pay for unemployment insurance with the State. Second, IRS records showed that Skyler's C.F. Foundation never filed IRS Form 941s in 2019, which are

¹ Wells Fargo closed the x1455 account at the end of June 2020. Afterwards, CASUTT opened a new bank account for Skyler's C.F. Foundation at U.S. Bank.

quarterly payroll reports that employers must file with the IRS. Third, a review of the x1455 Account did not show any payroll payments in 2019.

- 15. On or about April 27, 2020, the x1455 Account received a \$10,000 deposit from the SBA, which represented an advance on the EIDL loan.
- 16. On or about May 30, 2020, CASUTT signed the note and loan authorization documents for the EIDL loan. In the loan authorization and agreement, CASUTT made the following misrepresentations:
- a. CASUTT certified that the loan proceeds would only be used for "working capital" (that is, rent, utilities, wages, etc.), when, in fact, as detailed below, he intended to use the proceeds to purchase a house for himself and his family.
- b. CASUTT certified that the representations in the loan application were true and correct, when, in fact, as detailed above, he knew the loan application misstated the number of the Foundation's employees and its revenue.
- 17. On or about June 4, 2020, the proceeds from the EIDL loan were disbursed via wire transfer from the SBA into the x1455 Account in the amount of approximately \$149,900.

Misrepresentations on PPP Loan Application

18. On or about April 11, 2020, CASUTT submitted an electronic loan application to Financial Institution A. CASUTT listed the DBA for his business as Sky DeSign. CASUTT classified his business as an independent contractor in the commercial screen-printing business with 17 employees. The application stated Sky DeSign began in February 2019. The address listed for Sky DeSign was a residential address on East Lake Mead Boulevard in Las Vegas, Nevada. Records from Financial Institution A show that the

- 19. On or about May 13, 2020, CASUTT signed the PPP Borrower Application Form (SBA Form 2483) with Financial Institution A. Sky DeSign requested a \$349,775 loan to be used for Payroll, Lease/Mortgage Interest, Utilities, and Other: back owed payroll. On the Borrower Application Form (SBA Form 2483), CASUTT made the following misrepresentations:
- a. CASUTT falsely represented that Sky DeSign's average monthly payroll was \$139,910, when in fact Sky DeSign had no employees nor paid salaries. There is reason to believe CASUTT's statement was false for three reasons. First, the IRS Form 941 for Q1 2020 that CASUTT submitted as part of his loan application to support the payroll figure appears to be fraudulent. For example, the form lists CASUTT's social security number (SSN) as the Employer Identification Number (EIN), but the IRS does not permit employers to use their SSN as an EIN when filing Form 941s. Second, the bank statements CASUTT submitted as part of his loan application—a Wells Fargo account ending in 4506 ("the x4506 Account")—do not support the payroll he claimed to have paid. Bank records for the x4506 Account show deposits and withdrawals during the first quarter of 2020 amounted to approximately \$7000 and \$4000, respectively, which is far below the amount of activity commensurate with an average monthly payroll of \$139,910. Third, as further detailed below, CASUTT had friends and family pose as employees of Sky DeSign to launder the loan proceeds so he could use them for unauthorized purposes.
- b. CASUTT falsely certified that his business was in operation on
 February 15, 2020 and had employees for whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes or paid

independent contractors, when in fact Sky DeSign was not in operation nor had employees or paid salaries, as mentioned above.

c. CASUTT falsely certified that the loan funds would be used to retain workers and maintain payroll or make mortgage interest payments, lease payments, and utility payments, as specified under the PPP Rule, when, in fact, CASUTT intended to divert the proceeds for unauthorized purposes, as further detailed below.

Laundering of PPP Loan Proceeds

20. On or about May 15, 2020, the proceeds of the fraudulently obtained PPP loan, \$349,775.00, were transferred by Financial Institution A into the x4506 Account, held in the name of CASUTT and Family Member A, CASUTT's wife. From there, records show CASSUTT implemented a scheme to launder the funds by disguising withdrawals as "back pay" or "pandemic pay" for friends and family members who were posing as CASUTT's employees. Records show that between in or around May 18, 2020 and June 18, 2020, CASSUTT issued approximately 38 checks to himself, family members, and individuals believed to be associates. The total amount of the checks was approximately \$359,900, the source of which was PPP loan proceeds.² On some of the checks, CASSUTT wrote the memo "pandemic pay" or "back pay." The following chart summarizes the transfers out of the x4506 Account:

Check #	Memo	Date Processed	Amount	Payee
645105755	None	5/18/20	\$8,330	Family Member A
0001	None	5/19/20	\$8,330	Family Member A

² The total outgoing flow of loan proceeds from the x4506 Accounts exceeds the incoming deposit because CASUTT redeposited \$30,000 of cashier's checks drawn on the x4506 Account back into the x4506 Account.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Check #	Memo	Date	Amount	Payee
2222	7.7	Processed	40.220	D 1
0002	None	5/19/20	\$8,330	Brandon
0002	3.7	5 (10 (00	#0.220	CASUTT
0003	None	5/19/20	\$8,330	Brandon
100	D 1	((00 (00	#0.220	CASUTT
102	Back pay	6/02/20	\$8,330	Family
102	D 1	((00 (00	#0.220	Member C
103	Back pay	6/02/20	\$8,330	Family
105	D 1 '	((00 (00	#0.220	Member C
105	Pandemic	6/02/20	\$8,330	Family
106	pay	((02 (20	¢0.220	Member C
106	Pandemic	6/02/20	\$8,330	Family Member A
107	pay Pandemic	6/02/20	\$8,330	Brandon
107		6/02/20	\$6,550	Casutt
101	Pay Back pay	6/05/20	\$8,330	Family
101	раск рау	0703720	\$6,550	Member B
104	Pandemic	6/05/20	\$8,330	Family
104	pay	0703720	\$6,550	Member B
109	Pandemic	6/05/20	\$8,330	B.A.
107	pay	07 037 20	\$0,550	D.T.
108	Pandemic	6/08/20	\$8,330	J.M.
100	pay	0, 00, 20	ψο,εεο	5.171.
110	Pandemic	6/08/20	\$8,330	K.S.
	pay		40,000	
645102733	none	6/10/20	\$60,000	CASUTT
			,	
645105827	none	6/10/20	\$10,000	CASUTT
645105828	none	6/10/20	\$10,000	CASUTT
645105829	none	6/10/20	\$10,000	CASUTT
645105830	none	6/10/20	\$10,000	CASUTT
			***	0.1.07.7777
645105831	none	6/10/20	\$10,000	CASUTT
100	D 1 '	C (11 (00	#0.220	TO TO
120	Pandemic	6/11/20	\$8,330	T.T.
110	pay	(/15/00	¢0.220	E-mil
112	Pandemic	6/15/20	\$8,330	Family Member D
112	pay Pandomia	6/15/20	¢0 220	
113	Pandemic	6/15/20	\$8,330	Family Member E
01	pay	6/16/20	\$8,330	H.D.H.
02	none	6/16/20		Sit.H.
UZ	none	0/10/20	\$8,330	ы.п.

Check #	Memo	Date	Amount	Payee
		Processed		
03	none	6/16/20	\$8,330	Y.D.H.
04	none	6/16/20	\$8,330	Sis.H.
05	none	6/16/20	\$8,330	H.G.H.
06	none	6/16/20	\$8,330	T.H.
111	Pandemic	6/16/20	\$8,330	M.B.
	pay			
121	Pandemic	6/16/20	\$8,330	T.L.
	pay			
122	Pandemic	6/16/20	\$8,330	J.K.
	pay			
114	Pandemic	6/18/20	\$8,330	S.S.
	pay			
115	Pandemic	6/18/20	\$8,330	G.S.
	pay			
116	Pandemic	6/18/20	\$8,330	T.S.
	pay			
119	Pandemic	6/18/20	\$8,330	A.S.
	pay			

21. The above-listed transactions are suspicious for a few reasons. First, the amount on each check, \$8,330, is the maximum monthly payroll payment to an employee allowed under PPP rules. That is, the maximum annual salary for an individual that can be covered by PPP loan proceeds is \$100,000 per year, or \$8,330 per month. The fact that every single supposed employee of Sky DeSign—a supposed print screening company in Las Vegas—has an annual salary of at least \$100,000, as evidenced by the \$8,330 checks, is simply not believable. Second, payments are being made to many members of several different families: Family H's, Family S's, and the Casutts. Third, as further detailed below, most of the proceeds were ultimately diverted back to the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation bank account, under CASUTT's control.

Laundering Transactions with Family Member B

22. Family Member B is CASUTT's son. Based on recurring deposits into his bank account, Family Member B appears to be an employee of Starbucks, not an employee

of Sky DeSign. The checks made out to Family Member B, with "pandemic pay" and "back pay" in memo lines, were deposited into a Wells Fargo account ending in x2821 (the "x2821 Account") in his name on or about June 5, 2020, totaling \$16,660. Additional cash deposits were made into the x2821 Account in the approximate amounts of \$8080 and \$8,330 on or about June 8, 2020. These last two deposits, in turn, correspond to checks (#109 and #110) that had been made out to B.A. and K.S., but were ultimately endorsed to Family Member B. Following these deposits, on June 8, 2020, Family Member B electronically transferred \$29,820 from the x2821 Account back to a personal bank account controlled by CASUTT and his wife. On or about the same day, CASUTT electronically transferred \$29,820 from that personal account to the x1455 Account (the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation account controlled by CASUTT).

Laundering Transactions with Family Member A

23. Family Member A is CASUTT's wife. Based on recurring deposits into her bank account, she appears to be an employee of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS), not an employee of Sky DeSign. Between in or around May 18, 2020 and June 2, 2020, six checks drawn on the x4506 Account, totaling \$49,980, were deposited into a bank account in the name of Family Member A. On or about June 2, 2020, CASUTT was added as a signatory to Family Member A's account. On or about June 8, 2020, approximately \$46,600 was transferred by check from Family Member A's account to the x1455 Account (the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation account controlled by CASUTT).

Laundering Transactions with Family Member C

24. Family Member C is the daughter of CASUTT and Family Member A. She is approximately 16 years old. On or about June 2, 2020, three checks drawn on the x4506 Account, totaling \$24,990, were deposited into an account in her name at Wells Fargo (with

"pandemic pay" and "back pay" in the memo lines). On or about June 3, 2020,

approximately \$24,890 was electronically transferred from that account to a personal bank

account in the name of CASUTT and Family Member A. On or about June 4, 2020,

approximately \$24,890 was electronically transferred from CASUTT's personal account to

the x1455 Account (the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation account controlled by CASUTT).

Laundering Transaction with J.M.

25. As described above, one \$8,330 check drawn on the x4506 Account was made out to J.M. On or about June 8, 2020, that check was deposited into a personal bank account in J.M.'s name. On or about June 10, 2020, a cashier's check in the amount of \$6330 remitted by J.M. was deposited into the x1455 Account (the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation account controlled by CASUTT).

Laundering Transaction with Family Member D and Family Member E

26. Family Member D and Family Member E are CASUTT's parents. They are 72 and 74 years old and live in Imperial, Missouri. On or about June 15, 2020, two checks drawn on the x4506 Account and totaling \$16,660 were deposited into accounts controlled by Family Member D and Family Member E. On or about, June 27, 2020, a check from Family Member D in the approximate amount of \$14,410 was deposited into an account controlled by CASUTT and Family Member A. Those funds have remained there over the last month and have been used on personal expenses, such as groceries, gas, and dining.

Laundering \$110,000 in Cashier's Checks

27. On or about June 10, 2020, CASUTT withdrew six cashier's checks made out to himself totaling \$110,000 from the x4506 Account. On or about June 17, 2020, CASUTT deposited three of those checks, totaling \$80,000, into the x1455 Account and deposited the three remaining checks back into the x4506 Account.

Additional Laundering Transactions

28. Nine checks drawn on the x4506 Account (each in the amount of \$8,330) were cashed on or about June 16, 2020. On or about the same day, nine deposits of cash—each ranging from \$8030 to \$8230—were made into the x1455 Account (the deposits were ultimately processed on June 17, 2020).

Misuse of EID and PPP Loan Funds

- 29. Prior to receiving any PPP loan proceeds via the transactions described above, the balance on the x1455 Account (the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation account controlled by CASUTT) was approximately \$14,152.20 (\$10,000 of which was an advance on the fraudulently obtained SBA EID loan, mentioned in paragraph 15). As a result of the transactions described above and receiving the proceeds of the EID loan, by June 17, 2020, the balance of the x1455 Account was approximately \$430,943.
- 30. On or about May 31, 2020, Skyler's C.F. Foundation, acting through CASUTT, submitted a Residential Purchase Agreement to purchase a residential property (hereinafter, "Residence A") in Henderson, Nevada for the purchase price of \$399,000.
- 31. On or about June 2, 2020, Title Company A received a check, signed by CASUTT, in the amount of \$10,000 for the purpose of "earnest money for new house." The check was drawn on the x1455 Account (the Skyler's C.F. Foundation account controlled by CASUTT). The funds were for the purchase of Residence A.
- 32. On or about June 23, 2020, Title Company A received a wire in the amount of \$388,859.03 from the x1455 Account (the Skyler C.F.'s Foundation account controlled by CASUTT). The funds were for the purchase of Residence A. As outlined above, the source of these funds were the proceeds of the fraudulent PPP and EID loans.

- 33. On or about June 25, 2020, CASUTT and Family Member A switched the service address for their Cox broadband Internet account to the address for Residence A.

 Additional Fraudulent Loan Applications
- 34. During the course of the fraudulent scheme, CASUTT submitted additional PPP loan applications to Financial Institution A.
- application to Financial Institution A in the name of Skyler's C.F. Foundation, requesting a \$1,992,000 loan. Records from Financial Institution A show that the application was submitted from IP address 24.253.75.61, the same one from which CASUTT submitted his EIDL application and the PPP application in the name of Sky DeSign. In the application, CASUTT claimed that Skyler's C.F. Foundation had monthly payroll of \$796,800, and 96 employees, as opposed to the 32 employees CASUTT claimed the Foundation had on the EIDL application, submitted just 7 days earlier. Financial Institution A never approved the loan.
- 36. On or about June 18, 2020, CASUTT electronically submitted a third PPP loan application to Financial Institution A in the name of Skyler's C.F. Foundation, requesting a loan in the amount of \$349,965. Records from Financial Institution A show that the application was submitted from IP address 68.96.182.77, which Cox had assigned to the same broadband Internet account registered in the name of Family Member A. In the application, CASUTT claimed that Skyler's C.F. Foundation now had monthly payroll of \$139,986 and 18 employees. CASUTT also submitted an IRS Form 941 claiming that the Foundation had paid \$279,972 in wages in the first quarter of 2020. Aside from directly contradicting what CASUTT had stated in his April 9 loan application, this form is false