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                            SOUTHERN DIVISION
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      SA CR 09-00077-JVS
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                                      GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO
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                   Plaintiff,
                                      DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
                                      DISCOVERY; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
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                                      AND AUTHORITIES
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   STUART CARSON et al.,
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                   Defendants.
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         Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its
   attorneys of record, the United States Department of Justice,
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   Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and the United States Attorney
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   for the Central District of California (collectively, "the
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government"), hereby files its Opposition to Defendants' Motion 1 to Compel Discovery. The government's Opposition is based upon 2 the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the files and 3 records in this matter, as well as any evidence or argument 4 5 presented at any hearing on this matter. 6 DATED: October 21, 2009 Respectfully submitted, 7 GEORGE S. CARDONA Acting United States Attorney 8 ROBB C. ADKINS 9 Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Office 10 DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK Assistant United States Attorney 11 Deputy Chief, Santa Ana Office 12 MARK F. MENDELSOHN, Acting Chief 13 HANK BOND WALTHER, Assistant Chief ANDREW GENTIN, Trial Attorney 14 Fraud Section, Criminal Division United States Department of Justice 15 /s/ 16 DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK 17 Assistant United States Attorney 18 19 20 21 22 23 2.4 25 26 27

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

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INTRODUCTION

In a motion sweeping in its requests, defendants seek to obtain from the government approximately 5.6 million documents, including a significant number of privileged documents, that are not in the government's possession, custody or control. The government has turned over to the defense all non-privileged documents in its possession -- a total of approximately 39,000 pages which, in effect, comprises its entire case file. But the defendants, proposing a broad "constructive possession" theory that directly contradicts binding Ninth Circuit case law, now seek to obtain from the government approximately 75 million pages of documents in the possession of CCI, which amounts to over 1,900 times the number of pages which the government obtained from CCI in connection with its investigation.

The government has already instructed CCI to produce all documents related to corrupt payments, and the government is satisfied that CCI has fully complied with the government's requests. By turning over all non-privileged documents obtained from CCI, the government has gone beyond the requirements of Brady, Giglio, and Rule 16 to ensure that the defendants have all

¹ In their Motion to Compel, the individual defendants seek Control Component Inc.'s ("CCI") entire electronic database. At the time they filed their motion, the defendants, relying on the inaccurate page-count presented in CCI's corporate sentencing memorandum, indicated that the database contained 5.5 million In its Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Intervene, CCI states that the database actually contains 5.6 million documents, consisting of approximately 75 million pages. The defendants have not indicated to the government that they have altered their request for the entire database in any way so the government is proceeding based on the assumption that the defendants are seeking all 75 million pages.

documents remotely related to the matters under investigation.

Defendants' current request is the very definition of a fishing expedition and is a barely concealed attempt to clog up the case. To the extent defendants can identify specific, relevant, and admissible documents in the possession of CCI, the correct, well-established mechanism to obtain such documents is through a subpoena served on CCI pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendants should not be permitted to circumvent Rule 17 to obtain documents that are not in the government's possession, custody or control.

II.

FACTS

A. The Indictment

A federal grand jury returned a sixteen-count indictment on April 9, 2009 ("the Indictment"), charging defendants Stuart Carson ("S. Carson"), Hong "Rose" Carson ("R. Carson"), Paul Cosgrove, David Edmonds, Flavio Ricotti, and Han Yong Kim (collectively, "the defendants") with conspiring to pay bribes to officials of foreign state-owned companies and officers and employees of foreign and domestic private companies for the purpose of assisting their employer, CCI, to obtain and retain business.

Count One of the Indictment charges the defendants with conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2, and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, from 1998 through 2007. Counts Two through Ten of the Indictment allege substantive FCPA violations involving corrupt payments to foreign officials in Korea, China, United Arab Emirates, and

Malaysia. Counts Eleven through Fifteen allege substantive violations of the Travel Act involving corrupt payments to officers and employees of private companies. The final count of the indictment alleges that defendant R. Carson obstructed an investigation within the jurisdiction of a federal agency when she destroyed documents relevant to CCI's internal investigation of the corrupt payments by flushing them down the toilet of CCI's ladies' restroom.

B. CCI's Guilty Plea

On July 31, 2009, CCI pleaded guilty before this Court to a three-count Information. Count One of the Information charged CCI with conspiring to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act; Counts Two and Three charged CCI with substantive FCPA counts. The Information and Statement of Facts filed with the Court largely track the allegations in the Indictment in this case. This Court imposed the sentence set forth in the corporate Plea Agreement, which included an \$18.2 million criminal fine, three years of organizational probation including the appointment of an independent corporate monitor, and the creation and implementation of a rigorous Compliance Code.

The Plea Agreement also requires CCI to continue to provide full, complete, and truthful cooperation to the Justice

Department. Specifically, paragraph 6 of the Plea Agreement states, in relevant part:

CCI shall truthfully disclose to the Department all non-privileged information with respect to the activities of CCI and its affiliates, its present and former directors, officers, employees, agents, consultants, contractors and subcontractors, concerning all matters relating to corrupt payments to foreign public officials or to employees of private customers

in connection with their operations about which CCI has any knowledge and about which the Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or, at the request of the Department, any foreign law enforcement authorities and agencies, shall inquire. This obligation of truthful disclosure includes the obligation of CCI to provide to the Department, upon request, any non-privileged document, record, or other tangible evidence relating to such corrupt payments to foreign public officials or to employees of private customers about which the aforementioned authorities and agencies shall inquire of CCI, subject to the direction of the Department.

(Emphases added).

C. Discovery Provided

The government's investigation into the bribery charges related to CCI and its employees arose from a voluntary disclosure to the government made by IMI, CCI's parent company, on August 15, 2007. IMI/CCI retained the law firm Steptoe & Johnson ("Steptoe") to undertake an internal investigation with regard to potential violations of the FCPA and other laws. Steptoe retained forensic accountants at Ernst & Young to assist with document collection and analysis. According to Steptoe, Ernst & Young secured approximately 75 million pages of documents and electronic records at the outset of the investigation, including entire email servers and forensic images of over 200 hard drives of company employees.

On October 18, 2007, IMI/CCI and the government entered into a Confidentiality and Non-Waiver Agreement, which provided that IMI/CCI intended to cooperate in the government's investigation by producing document compilations, oral summaries of witness interviews, and other investigative findings (the "Confidential Information"), some of which were protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine. The

government agreed to maintain the confidentiality of the Confidential Information and not disclose it to any third party, except to the extent that disclosure was required by law.

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Pursuant to the Confidentiality and Non-Waiver Agreement, CCI, through Steptoe, produced approximately 37,000 pages of documents to the government. Steptoe indicated that the production consisted of the relevant, non-privileged documents reflecting potentially improper payments to employees of stateowned and private CCI customers. Steptoe also produced (1) a chart of the 236 improper payments identified during its investigation, and (2) a chart summarizing the gifts, travel, and entertainment expenses provided to customers, and certain improper training trips provided by CCI to employees of stateowned enterprises. Steptoe assured the government throughout the production process, and still maintains, that it searched the documents previously secured by Ernst & Young for documents relevant to corrupt payments made by CCI to state-owned or private companies, and then turned over such documents to the government.

Except for the handful of privileged documents created by Steptoe and provided to the government (the government has provided the individual defendants with Steptoe's privilege log summarizing these documents), the government has produced to the individual defendants every single page of every document provided to the government by Steptoe.² The government has also

 $^{^2}$ In their motion, defendants state that they are missing about 5,000 pages of discovery material which CCI produced to the government. See Defendants' Motion to Compel at 22-23. As CCI can confirm, $\overline{\text{CCI}}$ erroneously stated in its Sentencing Memorandum

turned over the following categories of documents to the defendants: (1) written summaries of the statements made to Steptoe by the individual defendants during the course of Steptoe's internal investigation, which were communicated orally by Steptoe to the government; (2) written summaries of those portions of statements made by witnesses to Steptoe during the course of its internal investigation that are favorable to the defendants, which were communicated orally by Steptoe to the government; (3) all documents subpoenaed by the government or obtained via Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request during the course of the government's investigation; (4) all documents provided to the government by individual witnesses; (5) all documents produced to the government by KPMG, the external auditors for IMI and CCI; (6) all written agreements between the government and individual witnesses; (7) all FBI 302 reports except those relating to four witnesses, which the government plans to provide sixty days before trial; and (8) any Brady/Giglio material to the extent such material is not covered by the above listed categories.

In accordance with the Court's May 18, 2009, Order, the

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³ As they have in the past, the defendants boldly assert that the government "essentially outsourced its investigation to

Steptoe . . . " See Defendants' Motion to Compel at 4. This claim is patently false. While the government need not detail

the investigative steps it took in this case, the government notes that it conducted over fifty witness interviews prior to

indictment.

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that it had produced approximately 42,000 pages of documents to the government. In fact, CCI produced approximately 37,000 pages of documents to the government. The government has also produced to the defendants approximately 2,000 pages of additional materials that the government obtained from non-CCI sources.

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government also produced to the defendants a Bill of Particulars in the form of a chart summarizing each of the 236 improper payments alleged in the indictment. See Exhibit 1 (attached). The defendants now assert that the chart is deficient with regard to several of the payments. See Defendants' Motion to Compel at 43-44.

In fact, the chart contains even more information than is required by the Court's Order. It not only contains the "on or about date" and approximate amount of each of the 236 alleged improper payments, but provides the names of both the intermediaries and ultimate recipients, where known, together with their respective business affiliations. The government also provided the defendants with explanatory endnotes, which supply further information, especially with respect to the substantive counts payments. The chart and endnotes, together with the government's identification of the Bates range at which the supporting documents for each of the 236 payments are sequentially organized, provide a straightforward framework which allows the defendants to easily "mesh the discovery with the Indictment." See Court's May 18, 2009, Order at 2.

D. Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery

In their Motion to Compel Discovery, the defendants, positing a broad "constructive possession" theory that reaches private parties, seek a wide range of documents, none of which are in the actual possession, custody or control of the government except for the eight documents listed on the CCI privilege log and a small number of correspondence documents and drafts of CCI's Plea Agreement. The defendants seek, inter alia:

(1) all 5.6 million documents in the electronic database that

Ernst & Young created to permit Steptoe to search for relevant

documents; (2) the documents identified on CCI's privilege log;

(3) all documents relating to Steptoe's internal investigation,

including interview memoranda; (4) documents reflecting

communications between IMI and/or CCI and the government; and (5)

several other broad categories of documents.

While the government is committed to fulfilling all aspects of its discovery obligations, it strongly opposes this effort to further delay this case because: (1) the defendants' broad "constructive possession" theory has no merit and, in any event, does not apply to the many documents requested that are outside the scope of CCI's cooperation agreement because they are not related to corrupt payments; (2) it seeks documents protected by CCI's attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine; and (3) to the extent defendants can identify specific, relevant, and admissible documents that the government has not produced, defendants can obtain such materials via the proper, and more direct, means -- a Rule 17(c) subpoena served upon CCI.

III.

ARGUMENT

Under general principles of contract law, the defendants, who are not a party to the Plea Agreement, cannot seek to enforce one of its provisions. Furthermore, pursuant to Ninth Circuit Authority, the documents sought by the defendants are not within the government's possession, custody or control for purposes of Rule 16. To the extent CCI possesses additional documents that the defense believes are material to their case, which the

government has no reason to believe actually exist, the defendants should seek to obtain such documents via the more direct, well-established mechanism of a Rule 17(c) subpoena served on CCI.

A. Defendants Have No Authority to Compel the Government to Request Documents from CCI Pursuant to a Plea Agreement to which they were not a Party

To the extent that CCI possesses any documents that the defendants now seek and that have not already been produced, the individual defendants cannot compel the government to seek additional documents from CCI as a result of cooperation language in a plea agreement entered into between the government and CCI. As a third party, the individual defendants cannot seek to enforce a plea agreement between two other parties, especially where they are not third party beneficiaries. See United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that court is unaware of legal authority to allow enforcement of plea agreement by a third party).

Federal courts can look to general principles of contract law to interpret a plea agreement. <u>United States v. Given</u>, 164 F.3d 389, 395-96 (7th Cir. 1999). "Individuals who are not parties to a contract may enforce its terms only when the original parties intended the contract to directly benefit them as third parties." <u>United States v. Andreas</u>, 216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry "centers on the intention of the parties, which is to be gleaned from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of its execution." <u>Id.</u> (citation omitted).

To the extent contract principles allow a third-party

beneficiary to enforce a contract, the contract must reflect an express or implied intention to benefit the third party. <u>United States v. El-Sadiq</u>, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608 (N.D. Ohio 2001). "If the promisee has no intent to benefit a third party, then any third-party beneficiary to the contract is merely an 'incidental beneficiary,' who has no enforceable rights under the contract." <u>Norfolk & Western Co. v. United States</u>, 641 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir. 1980).

In this case, neither the government nor CCI intended to benefit the individual defendants by entering into the Plea Agreement. The individual defendants cannot be viewed, under any reasonable interpretation, as third party beneficiaries of the Plea Agreement. As a result, under general principles of contract law, they have no right to attempt to enforce one of the provisions of a contract between the government and CCI. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("the surrounding circumstances clarify that neither [of the defendants] were intended beneficiaries of the plea agreement" and thus had no right to enforce the agreement); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d at 663 (upholding lower court ruling and stating "the circumstances conclusively establish that neither the promisee [] nor the promisor (the government) intended to give [the defendants] any benefit of the promise since both knew [the defendants] specifically would be excluded from the plea deal"); cf. United States v. El-Sadiq, 133 F. Supp. at 608-09 (defendant permitted to enforce non-prosecution agreement because he was a third party beneficiary).

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B. <u>Rule 16 Requires Actual Possession, Custody or Control and a Showing of Materiality</u>

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) describes certain information that the government must disclose to defendants during discovery:

Upon a defendant's request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, building or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government's possession, custody, or control and:

(i) the item is material to preparing the defense;

(ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or

(iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.

As discussed further below, "the triggering requirement under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) is that the papers, documents, and tangible objects be in the *actual* possession, custody or control of the government." <u>United States v. Fort</u>, 472 F.3d 1106, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting <u>United States v. Gatto</u>, 763 F.2d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 1985)) (emphasis added).

Additionally, before a court may order disclosure of any such materials, a defendant must make a prima facie showing of materiality. "Neither a general description of the information sought nor conclusory allegations of materiality suffice; a defendant must present facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of information helpful to the defense." United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir.

- 1990). Evidence is material if it will "play an important role

in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding in witness preparation,

Corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal."

<u>United States v. Liquid Sugars</u>, 158 F.R.D. 466, 474 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (emphasis in original).

2.4

Rule 16(a)(2) provides certain exceptions to the discovery requirements of Rule 16(a)(1)(E):

Except as Rule 16(a)(1) provides otherwise, this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case. Nor does this rule authorize the discovery or inspection of statement made by prospective government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.

In <u>United States v. Armstrong</u>, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the Supreme Court considered the parameters of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) [now Rule 16(a)(1)(E)] and ruled that defendants are entitled to the discovery of only those materials that are material to the defendant's response to the government's case in chief:

While it might be argued that as a general matter, the concept of a 'defense' includes any claim that is a 'sword,' challenging the prosecution's conduct of the case, the term may encompass only the narrower class of 'shield' claims, which refute the Government's arguments that the defendant committed the crime charged. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) tends to support the 'shield-only' reading. If 'defense' means an argument in response to the prosecution's case in chief, there is a perceptible symmetry between documents 'material to the preparation of the defendant's defense,' and, in the very next phrase, documents 'intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial.'

<u>Id.</u> at 462; <u>see also United States v. Chon</u>, 210 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting <u>Armstrong</u>).

Courts have consistently recognized that criminal pretrial discovery is much narrower than discovery in civil cases. "In contrast to the wide-ranging discovery permitted in civil cases, Rule 16 . . . delineates the categories of information to which

defendants are entitled in pretrial discovery in criminal cases, with some additional material being discoverable in accordance with statutory pronouncements and the due process clause of the Constitution." <u>United States v. Ramos</u>, 27 F.3d 65, 68 (3rd Cir. 1994).

Despite defendants' apparent belief to the contrary, Rule 16 is not the equivalent of a "request for production" in a civil suit, in that the defendants are not entitled to all documents that might lead the defendants to relevant evidence. See Chon, 210 F.3d at 995 (defendants only entitled to materials relevant to the specific charges); Ramos, 27 F.3d at 67 (criminal and civil discovery "vastly different"); United States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1287 (5th Cir. 1971) (criminal discovery "narrower" than civil discovery). Were it to be adopted, the defendants' view of Rule 16 would lead to an unprecedented expansion of the scope of criminal discovery.

C. <u>The Documents Sought by the Defendants Are Not Within the</u> Government's Possession, Custody or Control for Purposes of Rule 16

Ignoring all Ninth Circuit case law on the issue of the definition of "possession, custody or control" in the context of Rule 16, defendants rely on a single, distinguishable, out-of-circuit decision, <u>United States v. Stein</u>, 488 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), to concoct a theory of broad "constructive possession" in an attempt to trigger Rule 16 and avoid having to comply with the stricter standards of Rule 17. No other court has adopted the defendants' position that documents in the actual possession of a cooperating, private, third party are within the government's constructive possession for purposes of Rule 16 and

thus must be produced to individual defendants. This Court should not rely on this single, outlying decision, where the government was not even invited to submit a written brief regarding the court's novel "constructive possession" theory.4

In this Circuit, the case law is clear; the application of the constructive possession concept in the Rule 16 context is limited to documents possessed by certain **federal agencies** other than the prosecution. <u>See United States v. Santiago</u>, 46 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1995); <u>United States v. Bryan</u>, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor has constructive possession of "anything in the possession, custody or control of any federal agency participating in the same investigation of the defendant").

Thus, the Ninth Circuit's limited acceptance of constructive possession in the context of Rule 16 only applies to other federal agencies that participated in the same investigation. It does not even extend to documents possessed by state or local agencies, much less a private third party with no ties to the

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 $^{^4}$ The defendants in <u>Stein</u> did not initially attempt to obtain the documents at issue via Rule 16; instead, pursuant to well-established practice, they applied for a subpoena pursuant to Rule 17(c) requiring KPMG to produce certain documents. court, in addressing KPMG's motion to quash the subpoena, on its own volition invited the parties at oral argument to address the question of whether the documents were within the government's possession, custody or control. Following oral argument, the Court directed KPMG to submit evidence and argument "on the issue whether the documents described by the subpoena are within the government's control and whether KPMG is obliged to produce them to the government, either voluntarily or upon request." Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 356. Significantly, the government was not invited to submit a brief on the issue and did not do so. On May 11, 2007, following the court's ruling, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York wrote a letter to Judge Kaplan noting its disagreement with the Opinion and seeking the opportunity to fully brief the issue, which was not granted.

government. In ruling that documents found and held by a state agency were not discoverable in a federal criminal case, the court stated that Rule 16 "triggers the government's disclosure obligation only with respect to documents within the **federal government's** actual possession, custody or control." <u>United</u> States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 474 (E.D. Cal. 1994); <u>United States v. Robertson</u>, 634 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (E.D. Cal. 1986).

Gatto's holding was recently reaffirmed in <u>United States v.</u>

Fort, 472 F.3d 1106, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007), where the court held with respect to state-gathered evidence that, in the absence of federal agency involvement, "physical possession [is] the dispositive factor" and that "Gatto's emphasis on possession as the triggering requirement for Rule 16 accords with decisions by this and other circuits." <u>Id.</u>; <u>see</u>, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>United States v.</u>

Adkins, 741 F.2d 744, 747 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rule 16(a)(1)(E)

"require[s] the government only to turn over those records actually in its possession"). Evidence gathered by state authorities only "becomes subject to the disclosure obligation established by Rule 16(a)(1)(E) when it passes into federal possession." Fort, 472 F.3d at 1118.

In her concurrence in the denial of an *en banc* rehearing,

Judge Graber summed up the holding in Fort as follows:

For the purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(E), this court has held, '[t]he prosecutor will be deemed to have knowledge of and access to anything in the possession, custody or control of any **federal agency** participating in the same investigation of the defendant.' <u>United States v. Bryan</u>, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). The majority opinion does not deem

the prosecution to have knowledge of or access to anything generated by a state or local actor that is not ${\it actually}$ known by and in the possession of the prosecutor.

<u>United States v. Fort</u>, 478 F.3d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (Graber, J. concurring in the denial of rehearing *en banc*) (emphases in original).

Thus, the very basis of the <u>Stein</u> opinion and of defendants' argument - that "actual possession" by the government is not "necessary if the [government] has control of the items" (<u>see</u> Defendant's Motion to Compel at 6) - is directly contradicted by the Ninth Circuit's controlling case law. <u>Gatto</u> and <u>Fort</u> unequivocally hold that, absent federal agency involvement, actual physical possession by the prosecuting agency is the dispositive factor in determining whether materials are discoverable under Rule 16. Here, there is no dispute that the government does not have actual physical possession of the 5.6 million documents in the Ernst & Young database.

⁵ Under the defendants' reasoning, the government would seemingly also be required to subpoena any document from a third party at a defendant's request, and then turn over the results to the defendant pursuant to Rule 16, since the government could obtain such documents through the grand jury process. Of course, no court has held the government would be required to take such action.

⁶ There would also be significant public policy implications if criminal defendants were permitted to gain access to any materials in the possession of an independent, third-party, including corporate entities that disclose criminal wrongdoing to the Department of Justice. Because corporations are understandably reluctant to share internal corporate documents with outsiders, especially where such documents might contain privileged or proprietary material, far fewer companies would be willing to cooperate with the government or self-disclose violations to the government. Of course, this would also result in a reduction of the concomitant prosecutions of individuals.

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The federal government's relationship with state investigative authorities is much closer than any relationship the federal government may have with a private party, even where the private party is cooperating with the government. If the "constructive possession" doctrine does not apply in the Rule 16 context to documents in the possession of state and local law enforcement authorities, it has even less application to documents in the possession of private entities such as CCI. See United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980) (although Rule 16(a)(1)(E) "provides for the inspection and photographing of buildings or places which are within the possession, custody or control of the Government, there are no comparable provisions allowing inspection of the property of third parties."); United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 154 (1st Cir. 2000) ("While prosecutors may be held accountable for information known to police investigators, . . . we are loath to extend the analogy from police investigators to cooperating private parties who have their own set of interests. private interests, as in this case, are far from identical to -or even congruent with -- the government's interests.").7

The relationship between the government and a cooperating third party can, in many respects, be analogized to that between a U.S. prosecutor and a foreign government where the foreign authority is in possession of relevant evidence. In <u>United</u>

<u>States v. Mejia</u>, 448 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the court

 $^{^{7}}$ <u>See also United States v. Fred</u>, 2006 WL 4061156 (D. N.M. 2006) ("objects in the possession of state authorities, foreign governments, or private parties are not discoverable under Rule 16").

addressed the issue of whether a U.S. prosecutor should be required to produce to criminal defendants evidence that is abroad but can be obtained by the U.S. prosecutor pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request. Like the cooperation language in CCI's Plea Agreement, the applicable treaty required Costa Rica to produce certain material at the U.S. government's request. Compare CCI Plea Agreement, Paragraph 6 ("CCI shall truthfully disclose to the Department all non-privileged information . . . concerning all matters relating to corrupt payments . . .") with Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Article 12 (1988) ("A request [for evidence] shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested Party") (emphases added).

The defendants in <u>Mejia</u> argued that the prosecution had the power to secure the evidence from the Costa Rican government as a result of the contractual requirements of the treaty, and thus had the obligation to do so and then produce the evidence to the defendants under Rule 16. The court, however, rejected the defendants' argument, ruling that the U.S. government's obligations under Rule 16 did not require it to seek the evidence from Costa Rica despite the fact that it had the authority to do so. "The government's obligation was to comply with Rule 16, and there is no dispute that it did so." <u>Id.</u> at 444; <u>see also United States v. Hughes</u>, 211 F.3d 676, 688 (1st Cir. 2000) (U.S. prosecutor not required to obtain via informal means materials held by Mexican authorities); <u>United States v. Friedman</u>, 593 F.2d 109, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1979) (U.S. prosecutor not required to obtain via informal means materials held by Chilean authorities).

In finding that CCI has standing to litigate the scope of the government's contractual right to custody and control of some sphere of CCI's documents, this Court stated that "[u]nlike the typical situation, where the pre-existing relationship between the United States Attorney and another governmental agency defines the scope, here any such argument depends on the Plea Agreement, a contract between the Government and [CCI]." See Court's Order Regarding CCI's Motion to Intervene at 3.

While the government maintains that the Court's decision should be guided by the Ninth Circuit's "actual possession" case law, Mejia affirms that the same result would be obtained if the Court were to focus on the contractual relationship between the government and CCI in the Rule 16 context. Given the similarities between the language in CCI's plea agreement and the relevant treaty in Mejia (i.e., both require one party to produce certain documents at the request of the other party), this Court should follow Mejia in ruling that, to the extent it finds that the government has constructive possession over any of the documents in CCI's possession, the government's obligations under Rule 16 do not require it to seek the evidence from CCI. As described further below, if such documents exist, the proper means by which defendants can obtain them is by a Rule 17(c) subpoena.

D. The Plea Agreement Only Gives the Government the Ability to Request from CCI Non-Privileged Documents Relating to Corrupt Payments

Even if the Court were to determine that the applicable Rule 16 standard is "constructive possession" rather than actual possession and that the government does have constructive

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possession over documents in CCI's possession, which the government strongly disputes, the government's ability to obtain additional documents from CCI would be severely circumscribed because the Plea Agreement does not give the government the ability to obtain all documents in CCI's possession. The Plea Agreement only gives the government the ability to request non-privileged documents relating to "corrupt payments to foreign public officials or to employees of private customers." See Plea Agreement, Paragraph 6. Steptoe maintains that it has produced such documents to the government, and the government has no specific knowledge of the existence of additional documents in CCI's possession that relate to corrupt payments.

In order to make it appear that the government can request any document from CCI, defendants erroneously assert that "CCI's Plea Agreement reflects that the government has the legal right to demand production by CCI of any of its non-privileged documents in connection with the government's case." See Defendants' Motion to Compel at 8; see also Defendants' Motion to Compel at 6 ("CCI's Plea Agreement gives the government the unqualified right to demand from CCI the production of any non-privileged documents within CCI's control."). This is simply not the case; the Plea Agreement is crystal clear in only requiring CCI to disclose information relating to corrupt payments.

Aside from the fatal weaknesses associated with <u>Stein's</u> "constructive possession" theory, defendants' reliance on <u>Stein</u> is further weakened by the clear differences between the broad cooperation language in KPMG's Deferred Prosecution Agreement and the narrow language in CCI's Plea Agreement. The cooperation

language in KPMG's Deferred Prosecution Agreement required KPMG to produce "all documents, records, information, and other evidence in KPMG's possession, custody, or control as may be requested by the [U.S. Attorney's] Office or the IRS." <u>United</u> States v. Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (emphasis added).

The Deferred Prosecution Agreement also required KPMG to "[c]ompletely and truthfully disclos[e] all information in its possession to the [U.S. Attorney's] Office and the IRS about which the [U.S. Attorney's] Office and the IRS may inquire, including but not limited to all information about activities of KPMG, present and former partners, employees, and agents of KPMG." Id. (emphases added). On the other hand, CCI's Plea Agreement only requires it to produce evidence relating to corrupt payments.8

Despite the broad cooperation language in the KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, the individual defendants in that case did not seek all documents in KPMG's possession but, rather, only requested a narrow set of documents. Within this narrow set, the court granted some requests and denied others on the grounds that certain requests had not met the requisite materiality standard.

Befendants' reliance on <u>United States v. Kilroy</u>, 523 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wis. 1981) is similarly misplaced. In <u>Kilroy</u>, the cooperating third party, Standard Oil, made available to the government "any records which Standard Oil has and which the Government wants." <u>Id.</u> at 215 (emphasis added). Thus, like the language in the KPMG cooperation agreement in <u>Stein</u>, there were no qualifiers as to the types of documents the government could request. Further, there was no requirement that Standard Oil make the documents available; Standard Oil's decision as to whether to produce the documents was entirely voluntary. <u>Id.</u> Last, the court's decision in <u>Kilroy</u> was based on the belief that such documents could only be obtained via subpoena after the trial had started, and the court was reluctant to disrupt the trial in any manner. Id.

Thus, even in the broad "constructive possession" <u>Stein</u> context, the <u>Stein</u> court did not grant the type of wide-ranging request for documents in the possession of a cooperating third party that the CCI individual defendants are requesting in this case.

CCI maintains that it has produced to the government the relevant, non-privileged documents reflecting potentially improper payments to employees of state-owned and privately-owned CCI customers. See CCI's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 6. The government has, in turn, produced all of these documents to the defendants.

A ruling by the Court ordering the government to instruct CCI to produce all documents related to corrupt payments would be fraught with practical, definitional, and other difficulties. The government and Steptoe worked together to come up with a common understanding of the term "corrupt payment" to ensure that Steptoe produced all documents related to corrupt payments within the statute of limitations. Based on Steptoe's representations, the government is satisfied that CCI fully complied with the government's requests for the production of documents related to "corrupt payments" as defined by the parties.

Were the Court to order the government to instruct CCI to produce all documents related to "corrupt payments" based on a more expansive interpretation of that phrase, the Court would be placed in the position of having to create another definition of the phrase "corrupt payment," which would be different from the understanding of the term that was used by the government and Steptoe. The Court may also be placed in the position of having either to approve or create search terms that could be run on the

Ernst & Young database, and deciding what time period any such searches should cover. To the extent the Court orders the government to instruct CCI to produce all documents related to corrupt payments, the government has already done so and CCI has already complied.

As further described below, if the defendants can identify specific additional material evidence they need from CCI, they should obtain such evidence by a Rule 17(c) subpoena. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 634 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (in denying discovery because the materials requested were not within the government's custody, possession or control, court stated that its decision "does not foreclose defendant from obtaining the requested material, but only denies him the ability to discover it under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) [now Rule 16(a)(1)(E)]. If defendant wants these items, he can subpoena the IRS or any other agency which he believes possesses them.").

E. <u>CCI's Intervention on Defendants' Motion Will Permit It to Litigate Its Claims of Privilege</u>

_____The Court has permitted CCI's intervention for the purpose of addressing its attorney-client and attorney work-product privilege claims over certain documents in the government's possession (as identified in the privilege log produced to defendants). To the extent that the Court finds that some or all of the documents identified in the privilege log are not privileged or that any such privilege has been waived, the government is prepared to produce those documents.

F. The Proper Means By Which Defendants Should Seek the Requested Documents is Through a Rule 17(c) Subpoena

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Should this Court conclude that the documents sought by defendants are not in the constructive possession or control of the government by means of its plea agreement with CCI, defendants are not without a remedy. Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides defendants with an avenue to obtain the documents they seek, and to do so by means of a procedure which allows CCI to present its claims of privilege.

Rule 17(c) provides for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to "order the witness to produce any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates." The Supreme Court issued guidelines for the issuance and enforcement of Rule 17(c) subpoenas in <u>United States v. Nixon</u>, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), which established that the burden for showing good cause for production prior to trial is on the party seeking production. This burden may be met by showing the following:

(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."

Id. at 699-700 (footnote omitted).

The <u>Nixon</u> Court further provided that "against this background, [the party seeking production], in order to carry his

⁹ Rule 17(c)'s "chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the inspection of subpoenaed materials." <u>Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States</u>, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951).

burden, must clear three hurdles: (1) relevance; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity." <u>Id.</u> at 700. To the extent defendants can meet this standard with respect to some or all of the categories of documents outside of the government's possession or control, they can utilize Rule 17(c) subpoenas to compel their production from CCI or other third parties.¹⁰

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In addition to the 75 million page database, the defendants seek certain documents over which CCI claims either attorneyclient or attorney work-product privilege. The proper mechanism for adjudicating CCI's claim of privilege over these documents, the vast majority of which were never produced to the government in connection with CCI's cooperation, is through litigation under Rule 17 and its case law. Aside from Stein, the pursuit of such documents via Rule 17(c) has been the well-established avenue through which these claims of privilege have been adjudicated. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (addressing defendant's efforts to obtain via Rule 17(c) subpoena from two law firms production of documents related to internal investigation of stock options backdating, including "interview summaries," "reports," and "memoranda" related to the interviews of company witnesses); United States v. Ferguson, 2007 WL 2815068 (D. Conn. 2007) (addressing defendant's efforts to obtain via Rule 17(c) subpoena documents from government

¹⁰ One district court in this Circuit has held that "[t]he notion that because Rule 16 provides for discovery, Rule 17(c) has no role in the discovery of documents can, of course, only apply to documents in the government's hands; accordingly, Rule 17(c) may well be a proper device for discovering documents in the hands of third parties." <u>United States v. Tomison</u>, 969 F. Supp. 587, 593, n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1997)

cooperators and company in a securities fraud prosecution).

As the government is not in actual possession, custody or control of the 75 million page database, and has never even seen the materials contained in the database (with the exception of those that CCI produced), it cannot make determinations about whether documents contained within that database are material. If defendants are compelled to specify which categories of documents within that database they seek, as they presumably would be under Rule 17(c), the court could then determine, after hearing from CCI and perhaps conducting an *in camera* review of certain documents, whether the documents sought were relevant.

See, e.g., Reyes, 239 F.R.D. at 601 (compelling the production of materials requested by subpoena to the court for *in camera* review).

G. <u>Defendants Are Not Entitled to Obtain Additional</u> Communications Between the Government and CCI

Aside from the categories of documents sought by defendants that are not in the possession or custody of the government, defendants seek an order compelling the government to produce at least two categories of documents that are in the government's actual possession:

• "[C]orrespondence and drafts of CCI's Plea Agreement

¹¹ Aside from the documents that CCI has produced to the government, the government has no specific knowledge as to what is contained in the 75 million pages in the electronic database. Given Steptoe's representations, however, that the database was compiled from entire CCI email servers and hundreds of employee hard drives, including that of the IMI general counsel, the defendants' claim that "each of the more than 5.5 [now 75] million pages is material to the defense as they relate directly to each of the 236 payments" (see Defendants' Motion to Compel at 15) strains credulity.

and the statement of facts contained therein"; and

• "any submissions made by IMI/CCI to the government."

<u>See</u> Defendants Motion at 29. 12 Defendants are entitled to neither.

Relying entirely on <u>Stein</u>, defendants assert that these documents are subject to disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(E). The government agrees in part: such documents are subject to disclosure to the extent that they contain exculpatory information under <u>Brady</u> and/or <u>Giglio</u>. The government remains mindful of its ongoing obligation to produce exculpatory and impeachment material. Within these categories, however, the government represents that it is not aware of any documents not otherwise disclosed that are subject to disclosure as <u>Brady</u> or <u>Giglio</u> material.

To the extent the district court in <u>Stein</u> concluded that all communications between the government and a cooperating defendant were subject to disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(E), its analysis is flawed, especially given the case law in this Circuit. As noted above, conclusory allegations of materiality do not suffice. <u>Mandel</u>, 914 F.2d at 1219; <u>United States v. Cadet</u>, 727

Defendants are in possession of several items identified on page 29 of their Motion to Compel, including: (1) the non-waiver agreement dated October 18, 2007 (see Declaration of Brian M. Heberlig in support of Motion to Intervene by IMI plc and Control Components, Inc. [Heberlig Decl.], Exh. A); and (2) the letter reflecting the government's agreement not to prosecute IMI (see Heberlig Decl. Exh. B).

¹³ One could imagine, for example, that CCI corrected an early draft of the statement of facts appended to its plea agreement in such a way that tended to exculpate one of the defendants. As noted in the text, the government is not aware of any communication that meets this description.

F.2d 1453, 1466 (9th Cir. 1984). In <u>United States v. Santiago</u>,
46 F.3d 885, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a defendant had not made the threshold showing of
materiality where he had offered nothing more than "assertions.
. without ground in fact." "These assertions, although not
implausible, do not satisfy the requirement of specific facts,
beyond allegations, relating to materiality." Id.

Here, likewise, defendants have offered nothing more than conclusory allegations and assertions that these documents will aid them to "uncover[] . . . evidence," "aid[] witness preparation," "corroborat[e] testimony," or "assist[] impeachment or rebuttal." These assertions - although copied verbatim from the standard employed by Stein - fall woefully short of the Ninth Circuit's requirement of "specific facts." See Santiago, 46 F.3d at 894-95.14

This is especially true where, as here, defendants seek such things as draft plea agreements and statements of fact. As at least one district court has noted in a different context, "[d]rafts, by their very nature, rarely satisfy the test of relevance." Grossman v. Schwarz, 125 F.R.D. 376, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Another district court has relied on that conclusion to determine that "absent evidence showing the relevance of a

^{14 &}lt;u>Stein</u> adopted a different test of materiality from that established in the Ninth Circuit, importing a test from the D.C. Circuit: "The 'materiality standard [of Rule 16] is not a heavy burden; rather, evidence is material so long as there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in uncovering

admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal." Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 356-57 (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

particular draft, production of draft documents is likely to produce a wasteful fishing expedition." <u>United States v.</u>

<u>Shanahan</u>, 252 F.R.D. 536, 542 (E.D. Mo. 2008). Defendants have offered no facts to support any inference that any **non- exculpatory** changes in the plea agreement or the statement of facts have any relevance to their defense.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Defendants have no legal authority to enforce the provisions of a plea agreement between the government and CCI. Furthermore, defendants' broad "constructive possession" theory directly contradicts binding Ninth Circuit case law. To the extent CCI does have any documents in its possession that are material to the defense, the proper, well-established mechanism to obtain such documents is to seek them directly from the source via a Rule 17(c) subpoena. Accordingly, defendants' motion should be denied.

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Document 89-2

Filed 06/09/2009

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McCormick, Doug (USACAC)

From:

Gentin, Andrew (CRM)

Sent: To:

Monday, June 08, 2009 3:07 PM

Cc:

Hanna, Nicola T.; Dunne, Kimberly A.; tbienert@bmwklaw.com; dwiechert@aol.com Walther, Hank (CRM); McCormick, Doug (USACAC); Smith, Courtney (CRM)

Subject:

Payments Chart

Attachments:

Payments Chart.pdf

Nick, Kim, Tom, and Dave:

In accordance with Judge Selna's May 18 ruling regarding your Joint Motion for a Bill of Particulars, attached is a payments chart which provides further details concerning the 236 payments.

Andrew Gentin Trial Attorney Fraud Section, Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice 202-353-3551 (telephone) 202-514-0152 (fax) andrew.gentin@usdoj.gov

	On or About	Approximate	
Payment	Date	Amount	Recipient and/or Beneficiary
1	2005	\$6,530	Mr. Khiter (Asmidal Fertilizer)
2	2004	\$1,890	Mr. Nasri (Sonatrach)
3	5/12/2005	\$14,162	Dhafir Engineering, Giuseppe Giardina (Technip)
			Kyung Maek Co., Mr. Choi (Hyundai Heavy Industries ("HHI")), Mr. Cho
4	3/30/2004	\$5,231	(HHI)
5	1/26/2004	\$13,200	HHI Friend(s)-in-Camp ("FIC(s)")
6	2/16/2005	\$9,686	CV Control S.A., Total Austral FIC(s)
7	11/30/2005	\$5,652	Solve Computers, Alstom FIC(s)
8	2006	\$5,542	A.K. Al-Moayed, Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company ("GPIC") FIC(s)
	2005	\$38,048	Sun Xing Di, Shanghai Electric Corporation ("SEC") FIC(s), Power Design Institute ("PDI") FIC(s)
9	2003	\$705	VDM Control, Neale Chelin (Botswana Ash)
11	2004	\$9,481	Neale Chelin (Botswana Ash)
12	2006	\$7,080	Valtork, Marco Pfeiffer (P&S Eng Associados), Petrobras FIC(s)
13	9/16/2005	\$1,662	Valtork, Rafael Maccariello (Sulzer), Claudio Machado (Sulzer)
14	8/30/2005	\$9,992	Valtork, Sulzer FIC(s)
15	5/31/2007	\$6,234	Valtork, Petrobras FIC(s)
16	6/2/2005	\$1,644	Valtork, Sulzer FIC(s)
17	5/31/2007	\$2,436	Valtork, Petrobras FIC(s)
	9/25/2006, 10/2/2006,	02,700	valion, reassed i 10(3)
18	11/6/2006	\$8,793	Valtork, Marco Pfeiffer (P&S Eng Associados), Petrobras FiC(s)
19	12/20/2005	\$6,345	Valtork, Eletrobras Termonuclear SA FIC(s)
20	2006	\$3,560	Valtork, Petrobras FIC(s)
21	2005	\$13,200	Bontcho Bonev (TEZ Maritza Iztak)
22	2005	\$10,544	Dimitar Yordanov (Bobov)
22 23	2003	\$2,725	Maritza Iztok FIC(s)
24	2006-2007	\$1,760	Ever Exquisite, Beilun Power FIC(s)
25	3/9/2004	\$10,000	Fujian Pacific FIC(s) (Count Eleven)
26	4/18/2004	\$13,000	Fujian Pacific FIC(s)
27	2004	\$10,000	Fujian Pacific FiC(s)
28	4/25/2005	\$5,000	Fujian Pacific FIC(s) (Count Twelve)
29	10/21/2003	\$36,146	Qin Rui (son of Qing Ding Guo and Sha Li (Guo Hua Electric Power)) (Count Nine)

			. China Warenhandelsgesellschaft, Zhang Minyou (Shenhua International),
		1	Li Daolin (Shenhua International / Taishan Electric), Zhan Weihua
	1/20/2003,		(Shenhua International / Taishan Electric), Yang Xiaohua (Guangdong
30	2/18/2003	\$30,923	PDI)
31	2004	\$41,373	Qin Rui (son of Qing Dingguo and Sha Li (Guo Hua Electric Power))
	1/20/2004,		·
	4/2004,		
	10/15/2004,		Lu Yan (Jia Long Mechanical), Mr. Li (Kela-2), Zhao Qun (Jia Long
	1/14/2005,		Mechanical), China Petroleum Materials & Equipment Corp. ("CPMEC")
32	3/1/2005	\$226,712	FIC(s) (Count Five)
	1/14/2005,		
33	3/1/2005	\$85,920	Zhao Qun (Jia Long Mechanical), CPMEC FIC(s)
			Dabn Qiang (Guang Xi PDI); Sun Mingli (Datang Gui Guan Heshan
34	1/23/2004	_\$42,596	Power Generating Corp. Ltd.)
35	2003	\$7,500	Meson Technology Hong Kong Ltd., Sichuan Chemical Works FIC(s)
36	2003	\$2,500	PetroChina FIC(s)
37	1/18/2005	\$16,000	Luo Anping (Chengdu Xin Pu Technology), PetroChina FIC(s)
			Luo Anping (Chengdu Xin Pu Technology), PetroChina FIC(s) (Count
38	4/13/2004	\$15,000	Four)
İ			Golden Fidelity Ltd., Zhang Pei, Liu Peixian (CPMEC), Cheng Shuang
39	2003	\$143,019	(Lang Fang PDI), GC&C Inc.
			Liu Hui (Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company), Chengdu Aircraft FIC(s),
40	4/2/2004	\$5,000	PetroChina FIC(s)
	. '		Hui Xie Hong Kong Ltd., Yu Jinghai (China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp.
41	7/7/2004	\$15,000	("CNEIC"))
			Li Ping (Suzhou Engineering), Wu Tao (Central Southern China Electric
42	1/19/2004	\$3,850	Power Design Institute ("CSEPDI")), Wu Qiong (CSEPDI)
			Pu Xinmao (Daqianjun Power), RenQun (Chengdu Chenhua), China
43	2004, 2006	\$78,000	Electric Power Technology FIC(s), Mr. Shengke (PDI)
44	3/3/2004	\$3,333	Huang Haipin (Ao Xiang Engineering), PDI FIC(s)
45	2/19/2004	\$11,236	Peng Tao (PDI), Xuzhou China Resources Electric Power FIC(s)
46	1/23/2004	\$3,516	Ju Yongtao (PDI)
47	1/20/2004	\$7,612	Fu Xiangwei (Northeast Design Institute)
			Kang Jian (Zhong Neng Long Intl. Corp. Ltd.), Zhejiang Natural Gas
48	1/15/2004	\$18,000	FIC(s)
			Kang Jian (Zhong Neng Long Intl. Corp. Ltd.), Zhejiang Natural Gas
49	1/5/2004	\$55,598	FIC(s)

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			Lu Yan (Jia Long Machinery Ltd.), China National Offshore Oil Co.
50	12/5/2003	\$3,920	("CNOOC") FIC(s)
			Lilian Cai, Wang Mei, Guo Yuchao (China Huaneng Electrical Power), Li
	-		Huasheng (China Huaneng Electrical Power), Zheng Jianlong (China
51	2004	\$40,437	Huaneng Electrical Power)
52	5/13/2004	\$16,000	Wang Congrong, Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corp. ("JNPC") FIC(s)
53	1/31/2005	\$31,500	Sheng Jier, Datang Power FICs
54	9/26/2005	\$47,196	Sheng Jier, Gong Rong (China Electric / Datang Power)
55	2005	\$64,400	Skoda Power FIC(s), Datang Power FIC(s)
56	8/1/2003	\$7,500	Kang Hui (Xin Pu), CNOOC FIC(s)
	3/16/2004,		Bao Yuanzhu (Dingzhou Power), Li Guizhen (Dingzhou Power), Long
57	4/20/2004	\$29,400	Haiyun (Dingzhou Power), Jiang Congjin (Dingzhou Power)
58	7/31/2003	\$1,500	Li Zhenxin (Henan Huamei Power Equipment)
59	3/15/2004	\$8,180	Long Yuan Company, PDI FIC(s)
·	5/10/2007,		Mr. Xiao, Sang Linhuai (Huainin Lairui Power High Tech Dev. Co.),
60	7/3/2007	\$33,525	Spring Energy Technologies, Datang Power FIC(s)
61	2003	\$23,264	Bohai Offshore Oil Co. / CNOOC FIC(s)
62	2003	\$5,000	CNOOC FIC(s)
······································			Liu Hui (Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company), SDIC Huajing Power /
63	8/1/2003	\$1,000	Meiya Power FIC(s)
64	2005	\$3,900	Liu Hui (Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company), China Guodian FIC(s)
165	2005	\$3,654	Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, China Guodian FlC(s)
66 66	2006	\$1,134	Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, China Guodian FIC(s) Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, China Guodian FIC(s)
67	2006	\$4,860	Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, China Guodian FIC(s)
68	2006	\$2,430	Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, Ningxia Power FIC(s)
69	2006	\$2,430	Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, Ningxia Power Fic(s) Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company, Huaneng Group Fic(s)
0.5	2000	φ <u>2,151</u>	Meson Technologies, China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering ("CPPE")
70	9/30/2004	\$45,307	FIC(s)
71	11/2/2003	\$1,000	Tang Ligun (Fujian Pacific)
72	2004		China Guodian FIC(s)
73	2004	\$8,000	Sichuan Chemical Works FIC(s)
74		\$66,000	
14	6/1/2004	\$7,000	Zhen Yongzhong (Shenzhen Mawan Power)
75	1/8/2004	\$2,016	Liu Hui (Chengdu Chuanliao Trading Company), Huaneng Power FIC(s)
76	2/3/2005	\$105,000	Zhao Qun (Jia Long Mechanical), Erdos Electric Power FIC(s)

			Wang Dawei (Guorun Electric), Yan Lin (Shanghai Nibo Auto Control
7	2006	\$15,623	Equipment)
8	1/14/2004	\$634	Li Zhengxing (Qujing Power Generation)
	2/2/2005, 200	05-	
79	2007	\$316,000	Digiton Technology, Shineast Int'l Ltd., Dongfang FIC(s) (Count Eight)
30	2005-2007	\$348,000	Digiton Technology, Shineast Int'l Ltd., Dongfang FIC(s) (Count Eight)
1	8/3/2006	\$7,500	Shanghai Juhon Consulting Co., Ltd., Genting Power FIC(s)
		<u> </u>	Hu Yan Liang (Hunan HCC Super Information System), China Resources
32	4/18/2007	\$58,800	Power FIC(s)
			General Technology, PDI FIC(s), Kentex, Suntech, China Huaneng
33	2004	\$82,866	FIC(s)
			Yan Lin (Shanghai Nibo), PDI FIC(s), GuoDa FIC / Zhangjiang Power
34	7/5/2006	\$17,662	FIC(s)
	9/15/2005.		
35	10/7/2005	\$24,967	Digitone Technology Ltd., Mr. Xue (PDI), Mr. Shi (PDI)
36	2006	\$27,860	Champ Win International, Profit Net Technology, Huizhou Power FIC(s)
			Zhang Qiang (Shanxi Fulite), Xie Pingzhou (Shanxi Bai Hui), Ningxia
37	2006	\$44,043	Power FiC(s)
38	2004	\$2,480	Digitone, Zhejiang Electric Power FIC(s)
39	2004	\$24,870	CNOOC FIC(s)
90	2003	\$14,425	China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation ("CCECC") FIC(s)
91	2003-2004	\$23,700	Nara Systems, Daelim Industrial FIC(s)
			Mature Yield Ltd., PDI FIC(s), China National Water / China Datang
92	3/21/2006	\$20,260	FIC(s)
93	2005	\$27,442	Meson, Spring Energy, Shenhua / Guo Hua Electric Power FIC(s)
			Kang Jian (CNOOC / Sky Team Trading), CNOOC FIC(s), PDI FIC(s)
94	1/14/2005	\$58,500	(Count Six)
	4/11/2003,		
95	9/18/2003	\$15,300	Chen Yena, Lu Tianyin (Harbin Power)
96	2004	\$8,000	Sultec, TE Plomin FIC(s)
			BTG Sovensko, Skoda Power FIC(s), Stanko Peric, Ante Despot
97	2007	\$11,024	(Hrvatska Elecktroprivreda)
98	2004	\$6,286	Jun Vladimir (Sokolovska)
99	2004	\$5,416	Teplarna Otrokovice FIC(s)
100	2005	\$4,830	BTG Slovensko, Frantschach Energo FIC(s)

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101	2003	\$47,738	Dominion Marketing, M.W. Kellogg FIC(s)
	9/22/2006,		
102	1/30/2007	\$27,089	Dominion Marketing, JP Kenny FIC(s)
			Broward, Engineering for the Petroleum and Process Industries ("ENPPI")
103	12/23/2005	\$10,956	FIC(s) / Petrobel FIC(s)
104	9/29/2003	\$45,671	Broward, AGIP FIC(s)
105	12/23/2005	\$7,455	Broward, ENPPI / Petrobel FIC(s)
106	5/28/2003	\$15,243	Panagiotis Varsakis (Transteco Hellas), Public Power FIC(s)
107	2003	\$44,543	Transteco Hellas Ltd., Public Power FIC(s)
108	2003-2004	\$29,643	Transteco Hellas Ltd., Public Power FIC(s)
109	2007	\$3,000	Toyo Engineering FIC(s)
	11/6/2006,		Industrial Trading, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited ("BHEL") FIC(s),
110	1/9/2007	\$69,012	Maharashtra State Electricity Board ("MSEB") FIC(s)
			International Materials and Components Corp. ("IMCC"), BHEL FIC(s),
111	10/16/2006	\$11,732	MSEB FIC(s)
112	3/12/2004	\$15,000	Spin Industries, J. Mehta & Co., MSEB FIC(s)
113	7/20/2007	\$15,802	Industrial Trading, Haryana State Electricity Board ("HSEB") FIC(s)
			Consolidated Suppliers, Michel Latouf (National Petroleum Construction
114	2007	\$31,029	Company ("NPCC"))
115	2005, 2007	\$27,700	Doosan Heavy Industries FIC(s)
	11/29/2005,		
116	10/24/2006	\$163,449	Vladimir Batenko (Power Machines) (Count Fourteen)
			Valves.com, TopBottom Impex, National Thermal Power Corp. ("NTPC")
117	2003	\$1,230	FIC(s)
118	2006	\$1,725	IMCC, BHEL FIC(s)
119	2005	\$5,025	IMCC, BHEL FIC(s)
120	2007	\$8,600	Industrial Trading, Bhilai Electric FIC(s)
			Woo Yang Industry Ltd., Doosan Heavy Industries FIC(s) / Torrent Power
121	3/19/2007	\$14,175	FIC(s)
122	7/20/2006	\$22,280	Regent Overseas Global, West Bengal Power FIC(s)
123	2005	\$1,400	TCE Consulting, Jindal Power FIC(s)
124	2004	\$306	Jindal Power FIC(s)
125	2005	\$2,971	PT Kota Minyak, Indah Kiat FIC(s)
126	2004	\$1,750	PT Kota Minyak, Tijwi Kimia FIC(s)
127	2004	\$26,000	PT Kacida, Valves.com, Ray Anderson (Conoco)
128	2005	\$11,000	PT Kacida, Conoco FIC(s)
129	2004	(\$10,000	PT Kota Minyak, Indah Kiat FIC(s)

130	2004	\$3,000	PT Kota Minyak, Indah Kiat FIC(s)
131	2004	\$1,500	PT Kota Minyak, Indah Kiat FIC(s)
132	2/17/2004	\$19,920	PT Kacida; Paiton FIC(s)
133	2/2/2005	\$13,500	PT Kacida, Paiton FIC(s)
134	3/4/2004	\$3,000	PT Technindo, Riau Prima Energi FIC(s)
	9/18/2006,		
135	3/27/2007	\$8,703	PT Kacida, Ray Anderson (Conoco)
136	12/29/2006	\$2,525	PT Kacida, Paiton FIC(s)
			Pyunsung System Engineering, AGIP FIC(s), D.J. Han (Hyundai), K.C.
			Lim (Hyundai), S.S. Lee (Hyundai), C.S. Kim (Hyundai), M.H. Jun
137	2004	\$311,000	(Hyundai)
138	2003	\$126,590	Pars Terminal, Mr. Shirazi (National Iranian Gas Company ("NIGC"))
·····	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Pars Terminal, NIGC FIC(s), Industrial Projects Management of Iran
139	2006	\$25,986	("IPMI") FIC(s)
			Pars Terminal, J.S. Kim (LG), National Iranian Oil Company ("NIOC")
140	2006	\$135,000	FIC(s)
141	2004	\$135,464	Pars Terminal, Iran Marine Industries ("SADRA") FIC(s)
142	2005	\$31,699	Pars Terminal, SADRA FIC(s)
143	12/21/2006	\$69,420	Broward & Co., Giovanni Toscani (AGIP) (Count Thirteen)
144	6/9/2005	\$8,619	Nara Systems, Daelim Industrial FIC(s)
145	12/4/2003	\$8,185	Kwang-Woo Lee (Korea Electric Power Co. ("KEPCO"))
146	12/4/2003	\$13,987	Kwang-Woo Lee (KEPCO)
147	4/21/2004	\$29,426	Namaina Han (Karan Huden and Alvalous Davine (*KHAID**) (Court There)
148	4/21/2004		Namsing Heo (Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power ("KHNP")) (Count Three)
140	3/25/2003,	\$27,747	Namsing Heo (KHNP) (Count Three)
149	4/7/2003	647.704	Se-Jeong (Scott) Oh (MnO Korea), Korea National Oil Corporation
149	1/15/2004.	\$17,761	("KNOC") FIC(s), Hyundai Heavy Industries FIC(s)
150	1/15/2004,	007.004	Institute Technology I forested Dec III. Dec For to dectablished
151		\$27,294	Jangwon Technology, Hicopyland, Dae Hwa, Daelim Industrial FiC(s)
	9/21/2004	\$145,950	Koseal, Mr. Kwan (KHNP), KHNP FIC(s) (Count Two)
152	9/18/2006	\$2,363	Kian C&T Co., KHNP FIC(s)
153	2004	\$12,192	PETCO, Ministry of Electricity and Water ("MEW") FIC(s)
154	6/12/2007	\$8,177	PETCO, MEW FIC(s)
155	3/19/2007	\$15,013	Won-Woo Lee (Hyundai Engineering and Construction ("HDEC")
156	10/18/2006	\$12,110	Panaron, Tanjung Bin Power Plant FIC(s)
157	7/1/2003	\$100,000	S.K. Wong, Petronas FIC(s)
158	10/4/2004	\$4,347	Tan Kean Soon (Inovatif), Petronas FiC(s)

159	2006	\$47,000	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
160	1/6/2004	\$98,000	Crystal Progress (parent of Inovatif), Petronas FIC(s) (Count Ten)
61	2007	\$7,580	Panaron, Tenaga Nasional Berhad FIC(s)
162	2/13/2004	\$6,197	Tan Kean Soon, Petronas FIC(s)
163	2/3/2005	\$18,225	Tan Kean Soon, Exxon FIC(s)
164	2004	\$105,000	Inovatif, Sime Sembcorp Engineering FIC(s)
165	8/16/2004	\$925	Inovatif, BASF Petronas FIC(s)
166	2005	\$29,185	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
167	2004	\$3,020	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
168	2004	\$679	Inovatif, Exxon FIC(s)
169	2004	\$3,395	Inovatif, Exxon FIC(s)
170	2004	\$3,402	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
171	2004	\$11,722	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
172	2004	\$2,652	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
173	2004	\$1,407	Inovatif, Exxon FIC(s)
174	2004	\$3,017	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
175	2004	\$2,704	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
176	2007	\$14,100	Inovatif, Exxon FIC(s)
177	2006	\$20,682	Inovatif, Petronas FIC(s)
178	1/14/2005	\$4,170	ControlPro, Cerrey FIC(s)
179	2005	\$14,502	ControlPro, Comisión Federal de la Electricidad de Mexico FIC(s)
180	2005	\$15,058	ControlPro, Petroleos Mexicanos ("Pemex") FIC(s)
181	8/1/2003	\$4,424	Thomas Logan (Rotatech), J.R. Kim (Daewoo), Shell FIC(s)
182	2005-2007	\$31,710	MAQ International, AES Corporation FIC(s)
183	5/1/2003	\$52,751	Venugopal Ambadi (Qatargas)
			Munther Helwani (Consolidated Suppliers), National Petroleum
			Construction Company ("NPCC") FIC(s), Sam Mebarek (Dhafir
184	2006	\$251,000	Engineering), Technip FIC(s)
185	2007	\$40,000	Specialized Oil Services ("SOS"), Shell Qatar FIC(s)
	5/19/2006,		
186	4/20/2006	\$13,605	SOS, Priyalal Liyanage (McDermott)
	2/28/2005,		
187	2003-2005	\$20,045	SOS, Priyalal Liyanage (McDermott) (Count Fifteen)
	3/28/2006,		Trust Technical Services, IBA Ltd., Ibrahim Lari (Dolphin Energy), Sandi
188	5/9/2006	\$70,437	Chopola (Dolphin Energy)
	4/20/2006,		SOS, Sudarsanam Krishnaiyer (McDermott), Techma, Ziad Ben Achour
189	2/8/2007	\$100,978	(Total)

190	2005	\$134,769	BTG Tecno Engineering, Rovinari FIC(s)
191	1/26/2004	\$43,645	AA Turki, Saudi Aramco FIC(s)
			Baqthiaruddin Nooruddin Ahmed (Rayes Consultant), Syed Sadathulla
192	4/29/2005	\$144,324	(Safco)
			Baqthiaruddin Nooruddin Ahmed (Rayes Consultant), Syed Sadathulla
193	5/4/2006	\$79,245	(Safco)
			Djordje Radojevich (RMS), Electric Power Industry of Serbia ("EPS")
194	2005-2006	\$38,712	FIC(s)
195	2003-2004	\$9,723	Djordje Radojevich (RMS), Novi Sad and Panonske Elektrane FIC(s)
196	2003	\$2,374	BTG Slovensko, Neusiedler FIC(s)
197	2007	\$9,840	BTG Slovensko, Skoda Power FIC(s) / Zorlu Energy FIC(s)
198	2002-2003	\$133,242	Sultech International, Kovintrade, Termoelektrama Śoštanj FIC(s)
199	2004	\$48,704	Sultech International, Kovintrade, Termoelektrama Sostanj FIC(s)
200	2/10/2006	\$9,798	Malakaibo Trading, Danie Smith (SASOL)
201	7/18/2003	\$5,201	Asiam, Chiahui Power FIC(s)
202	7/18/2003	\$13,929	Asiam, Mr. Hoo (Chiahui), Teh-Jen Chen (wife of Mr. Hoo)
203	7/18/2003	\$6,964	Asiam, Mr. Hoo (Chiahui), Teh-Jen Chen (wife of Mr. Hoo)
204	2003	\$68,410	Asiam, Taiwan Power Co. ("TPC") FIC(s)
205	2003	\$40,000	Asiam, TPC FIC(s)
206	2003	\$12,270	Asiam, TPC FIC(s)
207	4/7/2003	\$6,919	Asiam, TPC FIC(s)
208	2/4/2005	\$16,700	Lin Wen-Hsiu (Ho-Ping Power)
209	2005	\$8,848	Asiam, Ho-Ping Power FIC(s)
210	2004	\$9,910	Asiam, Sun Ba Power FIC(s)
211	2/4/2005	\$16,350	Asiam, Huon-Chong (Taiwan Power)
1			Asiam, Vincent Engineering, T.R. Ho (Taiwan Power), Taiwan Power
212	2006	\$66,000	FlC(s)
213	2/4/2005	\$5,800	Asiam, Fang Ching-Long (Taiwan Power)
214	2003	\$3,113	Asiam, Alstom FIC(s)
215	2003	\$1,120	Asiam, Ever Power IPP Co. ("EPIC") FIC(s)
216	2003	\$21,051	IMI Industries, Viktor Machek, Alstom FIC(s), TLP Cogen FIC(s)
217	3/4/2005	\$4,387	iMI Industries, S.W. Hur (Samsung)
218	2005	\$25,000	Atikol, Cayirhan Thermal Power Plant FIC(s)
	3/25/2002,		Atikol, Turkey Electricity Generation and Transmission Corporation
219	4/7/2003	\$22,193	("TEAS") FIC(s)
220	2007	\$3,499	BTG Slovensko, Dominik Adam (SES)

	4/2/2007,		Consolidated Suppliers, Michel Latouf (National Petroleum Construction
221	4/13/2007	\$67,791	Company ("NPCC")), NPCC FIC(s) (Count Seven)
	1/9/2007,		
222	4/11/2007	\$18,841	Trust Technical Services, Ibrahim Lari (Dolphin Energy)
	8/29/2005,		Consolidated Suppliers, NPCC FIC(s), Abu Dhabi Company for Oil
223	1/6/2006	\$33,070	Operations ("ADCO") FIC(s)
224	10/16/2006	\$27,224	Consolidated Suppliers, Nama Development, ADCO FIC(s)
225	2007	\$71,250	Trust Technical Services, GASCO FIC(s)
226	6/16/2003	\$6,095	Kumwoo Limited, Jae Seop Jeong (Doosan)
227	6/26/2005	\$15,811	Deco Energy, Power Machines FIC(s)
228	4/18/2006	\$87,650	Vladimir Batenko (Power Machines)
229			Not included in 236 payments
230	1/5/2004	\$13,000	Lu Yan (Winfo), CNOOC FIC(s)
231	1/5/2004	\$9,000	Kang Jian (Digitone), CNOOC FIC(s)
232	1/5/2004	\$3,000	Lu Yan (Winfo), CNOOC FIC(s)
233	1/5/2004	\$300	Lu Yan (Winfo), Sichuan Meifeng Chemical Co. FIC(s)
234	2004	\$4,641	IMCC, Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation FIC(s)
235	2003	\$4,000	Jang Dong-II (Daesan)
236	2003-2004	\$6,410	Zhang Jiabo (China National Machinery and Equipment Corp.)
			VDM Control Solutions, Danie Smith (SASOL Synfuels), Tom van
237	8/12/2003	\$2,000	Schalkwyk (SASOL Synfuels)

Payments Chart Endnotes

The charged payments are listed in italics on the payments chart. The corresponding count in the Indictment for each of these charged payments is noted on the chart. The chart contains 237 entries; payment number 229 is not included in the 236 payments mentioned in the Indictment,

Payment 29 - CCI made two separate payments totaling approximately \$36,146 on or about October 21, 2003, for the benefit of Qin Rui. The payment of approximately \$24,500 is charged as a substantive count.

Payment 32 - The payment of approximately \$33,706 on or about March 1, 2005, is charged as a substantive count.

Payments 79 & 80 - Payment 79 concerns the commission related to the Dongfang factory sales order; Payment 80 concerns the commission related to the Dongfang aftermarket sales order. The payments were made in connection with a promise to pay an 11% commission. The payment of approximately \$125,447 on or about February 2, 2005, is charged as a substantive count.

Payment 116 - CCI made two separate payments totaling approximately \$163,449 for the benefit of Vladimir Batenko. The payment of approximately \$136,584 on or about October 24, 2006, is charged as a substantive count.

Payments 147 & 148 - Payment 147 concerns the commission related to the Wolsong project; Payment 148 concerns the commission related to the YGN project. CCI paid the commissions related to both the Wolsong and YGN projects in one wire transfer of approximately \$57,658 on or about April 21, 2004.

Payment 151 - CCI made a payment to Koseal, CCI's representative, on or about September 21, 2004, in the amount of approximately \$250,200. CCI requested that Koseal pay approximately \$145,950 (7% of the sales order) of this amount to the KHNP FICs.

Payment 187 - The total commissions promised for this sales order totaled approximately \$20,045. The payment of approximately \$11,800 on or about February 28, 2005, is charged as a substantive count.

Payment 221 - CCI made two payments to Consolidated Suppliers, CCI's representative, related to this NPCC project. On or about April 2, 2007, CCI made a payment in the amount of approximately \$161,413; on or about April 13, 2007, CCI made a payment in the amount of approximately \$100,000. CCI requested that Consolidated Suppliers pay approximately \$67,791 (1.5% of the sales order) of this amount to the NPCC officials. The payment of approximately \$161,413 on or about April 2, 2007, is charged as a substantive count.